Jonathan Hunt, a postdoctoral MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC, writes in this commentary in The National Interest that the secret history of Cold War détente offers a case study in how back-channel discussions at multilateral talks might help the United States and Iran resolve their differences.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and foreign ministers from the six-nation group negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran will resume talks in Vienna this weekend. The foreign ministers are trying to forge a a comprehensive nuclear deal by a July 20 deadline.

“The annals of nuclear diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union might afford a useful case study from which American and Iranian leaders could learn,” writes Hunt, who has a Ph.D. in History and wrote his dissertation on nuclear internationalism during the Cold War.

“In contrast to the conventional wisdom that Nixon and Kissinger masterminded Soviet-American détente, those who brokered the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) during the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson in fact laid the groundwork for superpower cooperation,” he writes. 

Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at CISAC and FSI and one of Stanford's leading experts on terrorism, says the terrorist group known as ISIS poses a danger to the United States if it grows more powerful. But that organization, she adds, may be overreaching in its ruthlessness and religious zealotry. Crenshaw answers questions in this Stanford Report interview with the Stanford News Service.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government has not found a way to deal with the larger Iraq conflict that now involves ISIS, says Crenshaw, who founded and runs the Mapping Militant Organizations project. 

According to a new study co-authored by Stanford professor David Lobell, the chance of a worldwide slowdown in agricultural yield growth in the next two decades is significantly higher due to global warming.

Lobell and co-author Claudia Tebaldi, a senior researcher at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, set out to estimate the odds of a steep drop in global wheat and corn yield progress under several climate scenarios. The study, “Getting caught with our plants down: the risks of a global crop yield slowdown from climate trends in the next two decades” appeared in Environmental Research Letters.

Lobell said he was motivated to pursue the study based on questions posed by stakeholders and decision makers in governments and the private sector.

“I’m often asked whether climate change will threaten food supply, as if it’s a simple yes or no answer,” Lobell said. “The truth is that over a 10 or 20 year period, it depends largely on how fast the Earth warms, and we can’t predict that very precisely. So the best we can do is try to determine the odds.”

Lobell and Tebaldi calculated the chance of a 10 percent global yield loss from climate change over the next 20 years, which would represent a severe impact on food supply, enough to roughly halve the rate of yield growth.

The short time frame of the study was deliberate, Lobell said. “Many studies have looked at climate and agriculture trends over the coming 50 or 100 years. But the next two decades are when most of the global population growth, and dietary shifts driven by a growing middle class, will occur. The growth rate of food demand will be higher during this time than at any other time in the next century.”

Without human-induced global warming – in other words, in a world with only natural climate variability – the likelihood of a yield drop that large is only 1 in 200. But when the team accounted for global warming, they saw the odds jump to 1 in 10 for corn and 1 in 20 for wheat. “In this study, we did not try to estimate the most likely impacts of climate change on crops,” Lobell said. “Rather, we estimated the likelihood of a really major impact, not because we want to scare people, but because there are many people who want to be prepared for all contingencies.”

“The point of the paper is to move from hand-waving about scenarios of what could go wrong, to specific and transparent estimates of the actual odds,” Lobell said. “The odds are not very high, but they are significant and a lot bigger than they used to be. The people asking these questions are accustomed to planning for scenarios with much less than a 10 percent chance of happening, so it will be interesting to see whether this study has any effect on how they operate.”

Lobell adds that organizations working toward global food security, and related issues such as conflict prevention, are most interested in the next 20 years because their decisions rarely consider the more distant future.  “As scientists, we might prefer to work on time scales in which the answers are clearer, but we also want to be responsive to the actual concerns and questions that decision makers have.”

Lobell is associate professor of Environmental Earth System Science at Stanford and associate director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment. He is also a senior fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Contact:

David Lobell: dlobell@stanford.edu

Laura Seaman, Communications and External Relations Manager, Center on Food Security and the Environment: lseaman@stanford.edu

Research by CISAC's Joseph Felter shows that insurgents try to derail government-delivered aid programs in poor areas because they fear successful programs will boost the government's credibility. Preventive measures include providing greater security around aid projects and limiting advance knowledge about them.

A research paper, published in the American Economic Review, involved an analysis of a large community-driven development program in the Philippines. In 2012, the World Bank supported more than 400 of these projects in 94 countries with about $30 billion in aid.

Conventional wisdom assumes that development aid is a tool to help reduce civil conflict. But some aid projects may actually exacerbate the violence, the research showed.

In an interview, Joseph Felter, a senior research scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said, "A 'winning hearts-and-minds' strategy for disbursing development aid may lead to an increase in insurgent attacks in the world's poorest areas. The study's takeaway is not to stop aid delivery, but to appreciate and plan for the possibility of unintended consequences."

Felter co-wrote the article, "Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict," along with Benjamin Crost of the University of Colorado-Denver and Patrick Johnston of the RAND Corporation. Their research relied on conflict data from the Philippines military from between 2002 and 2006 that allowed them to precisely estimate how the implementation of aid affected violence levels in ongoing insurgencies against the government.

Spotlight on the Philippines

These issues are particularly important in poor and conflict-ridden countries like the Philippines, Felter said. The Philippines is home to some of the most protracted insurgencies in the world. Islamic separatist groups struggle for an independent Muslim state; a communist group continues to wage a classic Maoist revolutionary war; and the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group conducts kidnappings and terrorist attacks.

The aid program Felter and his colleagues studied was the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Service – or KALAHI-CIDSS – the largest of its kind in the Philippines. Through it, poor communities receive projects to address their most pressing needs. According to Felter, this typically involved funding for projects like roads, schools, health clinics and other infrastructure.

"This is government funding for projects that citizens in these areas have expressly asked for," Felter said.

The researchers noted that community-driven development projects, also known as "CDD" projects, are popular because evidence suggests they enhance social cohesion among citizens. But sometimes they draw the wrong kind of attention from anti-government groups, as the research illustrated.

Felter and his colleagues found an increase of 110-185 percent in insurgent attacks in communities where aid projects commenced, the authors wrote. If this effect is extrapolated across all of the Philippines' municipalities, the authors estimate that the program resulted in between 550 and 930 additional casualties during three years.

"Taken together, this detailed evidence sheds new light on the mechanisms that link aid and conflict, which may eventually help design more effective aid interventions that alleviate poverty without exacerbating conflict," they wrote.

When the insurgent groups destroy such a project, it has the effect of weakening the perception that the government can actually deliver on community projects, the scholars wrote. For example, the communist rebels in the Philippines have issued public statements denouncing the KALAHI-CIDSS program as "counterrevolutionary and anti-development." If a successful aid program shifts the balance of power in favor of the government, it reduces insurgents' bargaining power and their political leverage.

As a result, insurgents tended to engage in conflict in the earlier stages of a project in order to keep it from succeeding, according to the research. In fact, conflict increased when municipalities were in the early or "social preparation" stages of publicizing an aid program, Felter and his colleagues wrote.

Sometimes rebel groups divert aid to fund their own operations – aid shipments are often stolen or "taxed" by these groups, according to the paper.

The Next Step

What can be done to prevent attacks?

"Greater security around the aid projects and limiting advance knowledge of the particular projects are good measures to start with," Felter said.

He noted that governments and aid organizations need to be discreet in how they identify aid projects and their locations, and how they disburse the aid itself. More research on this issue needs to be done, Felter said.

"One lesson is not to give insurgents too long a lead time to plan attacks," he said.

Unfortunately, as the researchers noted, poverty and violence are often linked: "The estimated one-and-a-half billion people living in conflict-affected countries are substantially more likely to be undernourished, less likely to have access to clean water and education, and face higher rates of childhood mortality."

Continued progress – in the form of international aid – is urged toward eradicating poverty. "To help achieve this, governments and multilateral donor organizations are increasingly directing development aid to conflict-affected countries worldwide," Felter and his co-authors pointed out.

Felter, also a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, retired from the U.S. Army as a colonel in 2012 following a career as a Special Forces and foreign area officer. He has conducted foreign internal defense and security assistance missions across East and Southeast Asia and has participated in combat deployments to Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010-11, he commanded the International Security and Assistance Force Counter Insurgency Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan.

"I saw this dynamic (insurgent attacks on aid projects) firsthand in Afghanistan and Iraq. This research paper confirms it," Felter said.

He devoted much of his Stanford doctoral dissertation and his work at CISAC and Hoover to build what he hopes will be the largest and most detailed micro-conflict database – the Empirical Studies of Conflict – ever assembled.

Felter said there is only so much that the military can do to win over people in areas ravaged by war and conflict.

"The military can 'lease' hearts and minds by creating a safe environment for aid projects," he said, "but ultimately it's up to the government to win them over."

Update: A full report summarizing the discussion of the 12th Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum is available below.

Northeast Asia has been rife with animosity over the past year. Among the outstanding concerns are China’s naval movements in the South China Sea and the threat of a fourth nuclear missile test by North Korea. While no major incidents have occurred in recent months, the uncertainty weighs heavily on policymakers and observers. What if an accidental clash happens in the sea or air?

Senior security scholars and practitioners from South Korea and the United States recently gathered for the Korea–U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, a Track II workshop to exchange views on these major issues impacting the Northeast Asia region.

The Strategic Forum, established in 2006, is held semiannually and alternates between Seoul and Stanford, hosted by the Korean Studies Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Korean counterpart organization is the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the foreign ministry’s think tank within the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

Twenty-four participants gathered on June 20 at the Bechtel Conference Center, and offered a diversity of opinions on Korean peninsula issues and the potential impact they could have on the countries’ allies. The participants collectively expressed a desire for regional stability, increased dialogue, and commitment to maintaining the U.S.–ROK alliance and cooperation on other trust-building activities.

The conference operates under the Chatham House Rule of individual confidentiality to allow for candid conversation. A few main points from the sessions are disclosed below:

Session I: Northeast Asia Regional Dynamics

Many participants shared the concern that trilateral relations between China–South Korea–Japan are at one of the worst points in recent history.

China’s current attitude toward its neighbors and the United States was discussed at length. Many participants discussed the strategic trajectory of China and how the country’s domestic situation may challenge its ability to effectively move forward, contrary to popular perceptions that simply straight-line its current growth rate into the indefinite future. 

Korean participants expressed concern toward Japan’s position, particularly following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the stance he has taken on other wartime issues like “comfort women.” They said they hoped the United States would do more to help Korea–Japan relations, as participants recognized the desirability of increased trilateral U.S.–Japan–Korea security and diplomatic cooperation.

Session II: U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)

Participants shared the view that the U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is serving to broaden and deepen the U.S.­–ROK relationship.

The KORUS FTA is only in its second year of implementation, so additional time is needed to make a comprehensive evaluation, but it appears that it will significantly increase bilateral trade as time passes.

Session III: U.S.–ROK Alliance

The U.S.­–ROK relationship, on the whole, is in very good shape. South Korea and the United States have similar policies in most strategic areas.

The two countries cooperate on many diplomatic and security initiatives, such as the U.S. 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea and many United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. 

Session IV: North Korea

Participants agreed that North Korea continues to engage in provocative behavior. This remains the chief concern of the U.S.–ROK alliance, as well a priority of the international community in total.

The policies of the United States and South Korea toward North Korea are well-coordinated and principled, but a number of Korean and American participants expressed concern that more creative thinking was needed, as the challenges North Korea poses are increasing. 

Reports from past forums are available on the Shorenstein APARC website.

Phillip Lipscy, the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at FSI and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, talks about his time at Stanford as a student and teacher. In conversation with Shorenstein APARC, Lipscy highlights current projects and motivations to research in the fields of East Asian political economy and international relations.

You studied at Stanford as a student and returned as an assistant professor and center fellow. What led you back to campus? What has changed, remained the same?

Stanford is an incredible place to pursue the kind of research I am interested in, which focuses on international relations and the political economy of East Asia. Stanford’s political science department is among the top in the world, and Shorenstein APARC is among the most highly regarded research centers focusing on the Asia-Pacific region. All of these things have remained the same since I was a student. Probably the biggest change since I was an undergraduate is the broadening and deepening of expertise at Shorenstein APARC, particularly in the areas of Korean studies and health policy. 

What motivated you to pursue research on East Asia?

When I was an undergraduate at Stanford, Professor Daniel Okimoto was a great mentor and inspiration (he was the co-founder of Shorenstein APARC and now Professor Emeritus of Political Science). I think his influence was the most important factor. I was also born to a multicultural family and spent about equal parts of my childhood in Japan and the United States, so I have always been interested in the differences among societies and how they interact. 

One focus of your research areas is on energy policy in Japan and other countries. What lessons can you draw from your research for policymakers?

I show in my recent piece in the Annual Review of Political Science that political scientists largely neglected energy issues after the oil shocks of the 1970s. There needs to be more research on the politics of energy. One of the findings of my recent work is that countries generally do better in achieving energy efficiency improvements in political systems where consumers have less influence: the governments of these countries can get away with imposing higher prices on energy consumption, which leads to conservation and efficiency. One illustration is Japan, which achieved very high levels of energy efficiency after the oil shocks, but which has struggled in recent years as bureaucratic scandals and electoral reform have tilted the scales in favor of consumer interests. There is an obvious tradeoff though, because political insulation also means less accountability. A good illustration of the downside of insulation is the collusion between policymakers and utility companies in Japan, which was made painfully obvious after the Fukushima disaster. Our study of nuclear power plants shows that large, influential utilities in Japan, which tend to be politically powerful, were also the least prepared against a potential tsunami.

Another of your research streams is on international organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Do you see East Asia’s role expanding in these organizations over time?

I am working on a book that examines how international organizations respond to shifts in international power, such as the one we are observing today with the rise of Asia. In a forthcoming article in the American Journal of Political Science, I show that there are important differences in how institutions adapt to these sorts of global changes, and I offer an explanation for how these differences arise. My research shows that East Asia is consistently underrepresented in many of the major international organizations that have become central to the functioning of the international system since the end of World War II. The world is changing rapidly, but the international architecture is struggling to keep up. East Asia’s position in these institutions will surely grow over time, but there is also the danger that dissatisfied countries will disengage and seek alternatives, fracturing the postwar order developed by the United States. This is one of the topics I explore in my forthcoming book.

Can you tell us about your involvement in the upcoming Summer Juku on Japanese Political Economy?

I am co-organizing the Summer Juku along with Takeo Hoshi and Kenji Kushida. The Juku was Takeo’s idea. We hope to develop it into the premier venue for exciting new research on Japanese political economy. Judging from the quality of papers submitted for the first two meetings, we are well on our way. Along with a new discussion platform we are planning, which focuses on Japanese political economy, and the Japan lunch series, which just completed its second year, the Juku really showcases the breadth and depth of Shorenstein APARC’s engagement with the study of contemporary Japan. 

Tell us something we don’t know about you.

I once learned Kyogen, traditional Japanese comic theater, from a living national treasure.

The Faculty Spotlight Q&A series highlights a different faculty member at Shorenstein APARC each month giving a personal look at his or her scholarly approaches and outlook on related topics and upcoming activities.

Oh Yeon-Cheon, the president of Seoul National University (SNU), has been named the 2014–15 Koret Fellow. He will join the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center this fall after completing his four-year term as SNU’s president. 

Oh Yeon-Cheon

“Yeon-Cheon has demonstrated forward-thinking, innovative leadership as SNU’s president. We’re delighted to welcome him back to Shorenstein APARC and look forward to collaborative dialogue on national values and the increasingly important role that educators play in their adoption by young people,” says Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC.

The Koret Fellowship brings leading professionals from Asia and the United States to Stanford University to study U.S.–Korea relations with the broad aim of fostering greater understanding and closer ties between the two countries.

Oh will analyze the significant change in the history of East Asia since the late 19th century, and in the process, identify forces endemic to East Asian politics, economy and culture as well as their limitations, thereby attempting to create a model for “Asian Values.”

He aims to create a new paradigm for higher education that will actively foster leaders who can contribute to the peace and prosperity of humanity, and also propose new alternative policies. Oh gave a lecture on this topic at Shorenstein APARC earlier this year. 

Oh has an extensive career as a university administrator, professor and in leadership positions in South Korea’s civil service. He is the 25th president of SNU (2010­–2014) and chairman of the Board of Trustees. Before then, he taught at SNU’s Graduate School of Public Administration from 1983 to 2010, and also served as the dean of that school from 2000 to 2004. His main areas of research include applied public economy and financial management.

Outside academia, Oh served as the chairman of the Committee of Industry Development Deliberation, Ministry of Knowledge Economics, from 2007 to 2009; board member of ITEP, Ministry of Commerce, from 2005 to 2009; and chief of ICT, Policy Review Committee, Ministry of Information and Communication, from 2003 to 2007.

He received his bachelor’s degree in political science from SNU, and his master’s degree and doctorate in public administration from New York University. 

The Koret Fellowship, established in 2008, is made possible through generous support from the Koret Foundation.

Research associate Kenji E. Kushida argues that Japan's top political leadership during the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis actually handled the situation more effectively than originally thought. Otherwise, the incident could have been much worse due to Japan's long-existing lack of emergency preparation.

Faced with an unprecedented disaster in postwar Japan, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his Democratic Party of Japan government handled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster better than originally perceived, according to new Stanford research.

It could have been far worse.

That's the conclusion of research associate Kenji Kushida of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He wrote in the journal Japanese Political Economy that Kan's party had to overcome bureaucratic problems and a lack of emergency planning, both of which they inherited after winning a landslide victory in 2009. The Fukushima nuclear crisis in March 2011 occurred when the plant was hit by a tsunami that resulted from a 9.0 earthquake off the coast of Tohoku, Japan, which claimed more than 15,000 lives.

Three of the plant's six nuclear reactors melted down and more than 300,000 people were evacuated. At the time, the Democratic Party of Japan and TEPCO, the private company that operated the power plant, were criticized for their responses.

"Japan's political leadership, and particularly Prime Minister Kan, has been blamed widely for worsening the crisis as the nuclear disaster unfolded," Kushida said. "However, an objective analysis of events as they transpired suggests that the political leadership, newly in power after over 50 years of virtually uninterrupted rule by its opposition, had inherited a very difficult situation, with vested interests, lack of emergency planning and insufficient bureaucratic capacity."

Kushida examined reports by Japanese government commissions, independent committees, a private investigation, TEPCO, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, among others. He also conducted interviews with key observers.

'Saved Japan'

Based on his research, Kushida said he believes that Japan's political leadership reined in a disaster that could have spiraled out of control on a far larger scale.

"Rather, Prime Minister Kan, often accused of excessive micro-management and a  counterproductive management style, was actually responsible for a government stance and concrete actions that, in some sense, saved Japan from a far worse disaster," he said.

In the article, Kushida said it was difficult for the general public, inside and outside Japan, to gauge how Japan's government was responding. "In the media confusion surrounding the nuclear accident, and subsequent politicized debates over the Tohoku disaster, the (Japanese) general public was left largely confused," he wrote.

Critiques focused on delays in declaring the emergency and evacuations, chaotic press conferences, micro-management and a slow response to hydrogen explosions at the plant.

But Kan, Kushida wrote, understood the broad risk to Japan if the Fukushima crisis got even worse. So he wrested control of the situation from TEPCO and the bureaucracy. Japan does not have martial law.

"Kan played a critical role in shifting the government's nuclear response into emergency mode," which allowed, for example, sustained water-cooling of the hot reactors, according to Kushida.

Kushida noted that the Democratic Party of Japan ran its 2009 election campaign on "seizing power from the bureaucracies" – giving rise to the criticism during the Fukushima event that it lacked the ability to coordinate such expertise in emergency situations.

"The DPJ's inexperience governing the country was clearly manifested in policy paralysis during its early days in power, suggesting that the party might not have the capacity to deal with Japan's largest postwar natural disaster and nuclear accident," Kushida wrote.

On the other hand, he added, the DPJ inherited a government and nuclear industry structure from the Liberal Democratic Party, which had enjoyed virtually uninterrupted power in Japan from 1955 until 2009. It was the LDP, not the DPJ, that had created the policies, units and procedures that were called upon in the Fukushima disaster.

Kushida found that Japan's existing government structures were not up to the challenge of dealing with Fukushima – no matter which political party was in power.

"Existing procedures and organizations were drastically inadequate for planning and executing an evacuation, and the government suffered shortcomings in information gathering, expertise, and on-the-ground response during the crisis," he wrote.

Kushida said that Kan's leadership was "beneficial in that he took control of a situation in which the locus of responsibility became ambiguous during the crisis and he solved several serious information and coordination problems."

As for blaming Kan's style, Kushida said that strong leadership was precisely what Japan needed at the time: "He did not measurably worsen the crisis, although his relatively abrasive leadership style (for Japanese norms or expectations, at least) alienated many with whom he worked."

Kushida said that much of the "blame-game" after the crisis was a result of the Liberal Democratic Party using Fukushima against the Democratic Party of Japan for electoral gain. In 2012, the LDP regained power based on this strategy.

American perspective

The lessons of Fukushima apply to America's nuclear industry and political leadership as well, Kushida said.

"The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is more independent from industry than Japan's regulators at the time, but the American political leadership needs to continue applying sustained pressure and attention to ensure that it remains as neutral and objective as possible," he said in an interview.

Kushida suggested that America's political leadership should diligently examine the repeated extensions of the maximum lifespan of nuclear power plants, the increased risk of nuclear power plant inundation due to climate change, and the need for contingency plans when cascading events overwhelm nuclear plant operators. 

He also pointed to the importance of input from outside the established nuclear engineering community on key issues.

Kushida, who grew up in Tokyo, describes himself as "very deeply attached to Japan." When the 2011 disaster hit, he was in the United States attending graduate school – and felt helpless.

"I desperately wanted to do something to help, and over time it became clear that my potential contribution with the greatest impact would be an objective analysis," he said.

Kushida's initial research grew out of a conference report that he wrote for Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin.

Today, Japan's 48 nuclear reactors all remain offline for safety checks. Now in power, the Liberal Democratic Party plans to have them reactivated once the Nuclear Regulation Agency confirms their compliance with the new safety standards introduced after the Fukushima nuclear crisis. Prior to the earthquake and tsunami of 2011, Japan had generated 30 percent of its electrical power from nuclear reactors.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Petra Moser, Assistant Professor of Economics and Europe Center faculty affiliate, and co-authors Alessandra Voena and Fabian Waldinger's forthcoming article in the American Economic Review analyzes how Jewish émigrés from Nazi Germany influenced chemical innovation in the U.S. 

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