Democratic institutions worldwide have reached a unique and precarious turning point, said Larry Diamond on a recent episode of the World Class podcast by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

After the Cold War, the world became dominated by liberal values and a prevailing consensus for freedom, democracy and human rights, Diamond told World Class host and FSI Director Michael McFaul. During this time, the percentage of democratic states rose from making up about a quarter to more than half of all of the independent states in the world — which had never happened before in history. However, explained Diamond, who is senior fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, this trend may come to an end soon.

“It’s under severe challenge from Russia, China, Iran and from many other countries that were until recently democracies or are in danger of no longer being democracies soon,” Diamond said. “We are in a new and urgent situation.”

In 2018, Freedom House — a non-governmental organization that conducts research on democracy and political freedom — reported a decline in global freedom for the 13th consecutive year, reversing the post-Cold War trend between 1991 and 2006.
        
“We could be on the cusp of a democratic depression,” said Diamond. In his view, here are the four main causes of this worldwide shift. 

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Incremental Authoritarianism
The first cause, according to Diamond, is what he calls “incremental authoritarianism,” which usually occurs when elected populist rulers — such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin or Turkey’s Tayyip Erdoğan, for example — begin to spread conservative, anti-immigrant or anti-pluralist values in an attempt to “save” the nation from corruption or threatening international illiberal values.

“Of course, the corrupting influences are human rights, accountability, pluralism, the rule of law and anything that would constrain their power and eliminate all potential rivals,” Diamond explained.

Russian Rage
The second cause has to do with Russia’s status as what Diamond describes as a “fallen superpower.”. Russia has begun to intervene in the politics of European democracies, meddle with the politics of the U.S. electoral democracy, spread confusion and promote division — all actions that stem from “Russian rage.”

“I think Putin has become unleashed,” he said. “He’s much more aggressive and ambitious now that he has found a cost-effective way of inflicting damage on democracy through disinformation and the penetration of the electoral space of democracies that we thought was sacred and secure.”

Chinese Ambition
Since coming to power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has tried to cultivate ties with “sympathetic actors” abroad — whether it be by sending Chinese citizens to U.S. graduate programs or to think tanks — but this effort has been ramped up and extended under Xi Jinping to a degree that hasn’t been seen before, according to Diamond.

“Chinese influence is extending into universities, corporations, Chinese-language media overseas, and certainly into aggressive — and I’d say illegal — technology practices that are boldly trying to create a new world of Chinese influence and even domination by the People’s Republic of China,” he explained.

American Complacency
Finally, Americans have become complacent about the security of their democracy, and many think that it doesn’t require their attention or participation in order to be upheld, said Diamond. In addition, some Americans have also become comfortable about the slow deterioration of their democracy through the polarization of U.S. politics. 

“People are becoming so intense in their feelings about parties and politicians that they won’t even talk to people from the other side at the Thanksgiving dinner table,” Diamond said. “Some of the statements of our own president are not consistent with democratic values…in which everyone is recognized as having the right to speak and in which violence can never be encouraged.”

Read more about Diamond’s thoughts on the state of global democracy in his new book, “Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency.”

In the past six weeks, I have been in mainland China, Hong Kong (three times), and Washington. From these trips and recent developments, I have concluded that Hong Kong is a huge tragedy in the making. Proactive and positive moves by all parties to this rapidly deteriorating situation are required.

Though Washington is not a principal party in these developments, it should be a constructive force rather than irrelevant or counterproductive...

The elements of the current crisis are many. In Hong Kong, there is a leaderless movement on the ground. There are rising levels of political and socio-economic frustration among many Hong Kong citizens stemming from mobility and economic considerations, as well as perceptions of political retrogression in the special administrative region.

There is a tone-deaf, neutered local leadership that is prideful and unwilling to admit that it made a huge strategic misstep pushing forward with an ill-conceived extradition bill. And there are local tycoons who curry favour with Beijing rather than protecting the rule of law that is in their own long-term interests...

Read the full article on South China Morning Post.

For more by Okseberg-Rohlen Fellow David M. Lampton, read our recently posted Q&A in which he analyzes the escalating U.S.-China conflict.

As a former business executive with IBM and a veteran policymaker, Bonnie Glick is well-equipped to bridge the Silicon Valley — Washington, DC divide.

It was a sunny day in mid-July when Glick, the deputy administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and her team touched down in the Bay Area. The group’s goal was to engage Silicon Valley leaders in USAID’s work, including a discussion with scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) about threats to democracy from two key sources: authoritarian regimes and the abuse of social media.

I participated in a round table discussion at @Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in #California. We discussed how @USAID builds messaging, strategic programming, & donor partnerships to address global challenges posed by China’s authoritarian approach. pic.twitter.com/IJDNRn4Jyd

— Bonnie Glick (@USAIDBGlick) July 25, 2019

In back-to-back roundtable meetings, FSI scholars drew from their research and expertise to discuss with Glick about how USAID could combat these thorny challenges. The scholars also had the opportunity to learn more about USAID’s priorities and programs. Below are highlights from their discussion.

The Authoritarian Threat
Vulnerable democracies are facing increasingly political and economic interference from authoritarian regimes, particularly China and Russia. The One Belt, One Road Initiative — China’s global development strategy comprising infrastructure projects and investments in 152 countries — can lead to excessive debt and undermine sovereignty in borrower countries, for example. Meanwhile, countries like Ukraine struggle with election meddling and information manipulation at the hands of the Kremlin.

Implications of Social Media Abuse
The misuse of social media also poses a threat to democracies. While Russian efforts to spread disinformation and discord in the months leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election may be the best known example, social media abuse is now a global problem propagated both by foreign adversaries and domestic foes. The case of social media fanning the flames of violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar is a prime example of domestically driven social media abuse.

Glick and the USAID team appreciated hearing the perspectives of the FSI scholars. “One of the things that’s resonating so clearly is that the Washington, DC beltway bubble is a powerful force of nature,” Glick said following the roundtables. “For us, to get outside of that bubble and to be challenged in our ideas is extremely valuable.”

This summer I was very fortunate to be able to spend three weeks at the Stanford Center at Peking University (Běidà) for a short course on rheology. It was a really special opportunity for me to experience student life at my dad’s alma mater and get to know friends from Stanford, Peking, Tsinghua and Beihang University.

As we went out for meals, however, I quickly discovered that I was one of the only people on the trip who can’t handle spicy food! But don’t worry, if you’re like me, there are still plenty of delicious and affordable options to try in Beijing.

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SCPKU Rheology Class of 2019! A big thank you to Prof. Gerry Fuller, our TA Vinny, the SCPKU team, and everyone in the class for a wonderful three weeks in Beijing!

First of all, if you travel there during the summer months, it will be very, very hot. The best way to beat the heat is to eat lots of fruit, mung bean (has cooling properties), and ice cream! The cafeterias at Beida had fresh cut fruit, and we all fell in love with the (~1 USD) red dragonfruit (hóng huǒ lóng guǒ) there. There are also lots of ice cream flavors that are hard to find in the US, like red bean, white peach, durian, taro, honeydew, grape, etc.

Next, Beijing/northern China is known for a lot of flour-based dishes, so be sure to try the dumplings (shuǐ jiǎo), steamed buns (bāo zi), fried dough (yóu tiáo), pancakes (bǐng) and noodles of all sorts (miàn tiáo). Also, if you go to a restaurant specializing in Beijing food, a lot of things on the menu will not be spicy, like Peking Duck (běi jīng kǎo yā) and Zhajiang Noodles (zhá jiàng miàn). A fun place on Beida campus to get a Beijing street food is the jian bing Jiānbing shop, which is essentially a savory crepe with egg, sauce, a crispy interior, plus whatever add-ons you want. (Caution: the sauce is a little bit spicy…)

Beijing also has lots of cuisines from other parts of China, so make sure to try dishes like Shanghai style soup dumplings, Yunnan pineapple rice, and Taiwanese pork rice!

There are also lots of foods that you can pretty easily enjoy the non-spicy version of. Either you (or your friendly hosts!) can ask the waiter/waitress for no spice (“miǎn là” or “bù yào là”):

Shredded chicken cold noodle (jī sī liáng miàn) and bean curd noodle with veggies and sauce (liángpí) -- still tasty without the chili oil!

Hotpot (huǒ guō) and Grilled fish (kǎo yú) -- the spice is just in the broth, and there are many to choose from

And finally, of course, desserts are not spicy! Shaved ice (bào bīng), sago (xī mǐ lù), bubble tea, fluffy pancakes, mooncakes and old Beijing desserts (lǘ dǎgǔn and wāndòu huáng) are some favorites of mine. A newly popular boba place called HeyTea (xǐ chá) also has fully customizable drinks in case it’s too late for caffeine.

Overall, even if I couldn’t try all of the spicy foods, sharing meals was a great way to get to know everyone, and we all can’t wait to see our friends again. Who knows, maybe my spice tolerance will have gone up by then...

If America frames its response to Russia and China as one of “civilizational struggle,” Diamond says, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will only get stronger. Listen and read here. 

Every summer, the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program brings together international leaders who are pioneering new approaches to advance social and political change in some of the most challenging global contexts. The fellows spend three weeks living and taking classes on the Stanford campus, visiting Silicon Valley tech companies and building a network.

Representing business, government and the nonprofit sector, fellows are working on the frontlines of democratic change to combat the global rise of authoritarianism and populism. The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies spoke to five of the fellows about the impact of the Draper Hills program on their work and activism. These are their stories.

Shaili Chopra, India

Shaili Chopra, founder of SheThePeopleTv. Photo: Alice Wenner

Wiem Zarrouk, Tunisia

Wiem Zarrouk, senior advisor to the Minister of Development, Investment and International Cooperation in Tunisia. Photo: Alice Wenner

“I’ve been working for the Tunisian government for three years as an advisor to the Minister of Development, Investment and International Cooperation. I am leading the government reforms to improve Tunisia's ranking in the World Bank Competitiveness Report - Doing Business.

“In Tunisia, we’ve set up most of our democratic institutions, and now we want to improve the business environment to attract more investment in local businesses. Eight years ago, the people went into the streets demanding more jobs. The challenge in Tunisia right now is economic, that’s why economic reforms are important to our government.

“I think the impact of the Draper Hills program will be immediate. I’ve learned a lot here about the link between development and democracies, so it really covers the scope of my work. And it's been great to learn about the theoretical side — the professors are really speaking about things that impact our daily work.” 

Ujwal Thapa, Nepal

Ujwal Thapa, president of the BibekSheel Nepali youth movement. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Bibeksheel Nepali is basically a political startup. It’s a youth-led movement, and we’re focused on changing the norms and mindsets of the culture in Nepal. We work a lot with citizens to instill the values of transparency, empathy and humility because we think democracy needs to be more emotional instead of just logical. I think liberal democracy needs to be understood more in the context of humanity. So it’s an experiment that we're doing in Nepal.

“When we started with the experiment, we decided not to focus only on the state, but thought about a few more components: one is our citizens, another is the society and the third is the government. Nepal recently came out of a violent civil war, and we just built a new constitution that is much more tolerant. Transparency is another value that we want to instill, because of the long isolationist and autocratic dictatorship that has existed in the past.

“Draper Hills is bringing all of these practitioners together who are experimental and innovative. And the world needs better collaboration from people who really believe in the ideals of the 21st century, which are liberal, democratic and more humanistic. That’s one of the strongest aspects of the Draper Hills program.”

N.S. Nappinai, India

N.S. Nappinai, senior practitioner in the Supreme Court of India and Bombay High Court. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Some of the social media platforms had very good reporting mechanisms, whereas it was more hidden on other platforms. So we ensured that this issue was brought to the forefront so that people know that these are things that can be reported and some action can be taken. The whole idea was that as long as you identify such content at the earliest possible time, then you help the victim that much more.

“For me, balancing victims' rights with free speech is very important. This was a big dilemma that I faced, in terms of ‘How much of what I am doing is likely to stifle free speech?’ A lot of discussions at Draper Hills have helped formulate and structure my thoughts, and it's very nice to get the perspective from people from 26 other countries.”

Hinda Bouddane, Morocco

Hinda Bouddane, the first vice president of the elected provincial council of the city of Fez. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Education for girls is really important in fighting discrimination against women. Education empowers women to become financially independent, say no to violence, and to get engaged in the public sphere. Through that, women can be a part of the democratic process not only by voting, but also by taking part from within and running for office.

At Draper Hills, we're deepening our knowledge about topics like the rule of law, democracy and human rights, and hearing many different perspectives. And importantly, we are building a great network to connect many intelligent people from around the world, and we will work together to foster democratic values.”

“Win support from the people,” Yuhua Wang, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, repeated the words from one of Xi Jinping’s speeches that was given to justify China’s massive anti-corruption campaign. The exact scope and motivations for President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is, as yet, unknowable, Wang stated; but clearly, a major public aim of CCP Chairman Xi Jinping was to build regime support by cracking down on bad actors in the government.

Prof. Yuhua Wang gave a talk titled “Why Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign has Undermined Chinese Citizens’ Regime Support?” at the Stanford China Program on November 12^th, 2018, based on a national-level survey analysis that he had conducted with his co-author, Prof. Bruce Dickson at George Washington University. Rather than focusing on Xi’s motivations for undertaking his crackdown, however, Wang and Dickson tried to measure the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on public perception of the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Did the campaign, in other words, shore up public support for China’s central government and Party, as Xi hoped it would – or did it, in fact, undermine regime support?

Professor Wang first offered some background on how this anti-corruption campaign got started around 2012-2013, shortly after Xi Jinping became Chairman of the CCP. A staggering 261 vice-ministerial officials and 350,000 officials had been investigated to date; and, even those at the highest levels of China’s leadership – former Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members, for instance –were not immune from scrutiny. And, equally unprecedented, media coverage of these corruption cases – from Bo Xilai to Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou – were extensive, exposing their lavish lifestyles and illicit dalliances on social and traditional media. Wang speculated that such lurid publicity most likely shocked the public, potentially turning citizens against even the central government, which consistently enjoys significantly higher levels of public trust than local governments in China. He decided, therefore, to explore with his co-author what the effects of such exposés might be on public perception of the central regime.

Replicating the same questionnaire and sampling design, Wang and his co-author took a national random sample in two waves – one before the anti-corruption campaign in 2010 and a second one during the campaign in 2014. They interviewed approximately 4,000 people across 25 provinces in China in order to measure potential shifts in people’s attitudes towards the regime over those four years. The findings were, indeed, illuminating:

First, Wang stated, increasing frequency of corruption investigations in a locality was correlated with a greater drop in popular regime support (defined as trust in central government or support for the CCP) in that locality. Higher volume of corruption investigations in a locality was also negatively correlated with people’s perception that government officials were generally honest and clean. The corrosive effects of the campaign, furthermore, proved strongest on those who had initially believed in the integrity of government officials; but for those who were already cynical about official corruption, the campaign had a smaller effect. Lastly, higher the survey respondent’s use of social media like WeChat, stronger the negative effects on his/her support for the regime. The authors also took into account how the chilling effects of the campaign may be negatively impacting local economies and how that slowing economy may actually be the primary cause behind decreasing public regime support. To account for this potentially confounding effect, Wang looked for evidence as to whether the campaign had contributed to a slowdown in China’s economy by 2014. Perhaps because 2014 was still early on in the campaign, he stated that they found no evidence of slower GDP growth rate, growth rate per capita GDP, etc., in the regions where they had undertaken their surveys.

Overall, Wang’s research calls into question whether Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is, in fact, advancing one of his main goals– i.e., to increase people’s faith in the central regime – or whether it is actually proving counterproductive to his aim. In fact, Wang’s research seems to indicate that the more Chinese citizens are exposed to evidence of government corruption, the more the central regime appears to suffer a loss in credibility. Wang was careful to point out, however, that they were barred, due to political sensitivity, from asking any questions regarding respondents’ attitudes towards Xi Jinping himself. Thus, it is still an open question whether popular support for Xi Jinping himself is increasing even though public trust in the regime might be decreasing.

The recording and transcript are available below.