On April 21, Henry S. Rowen offered testimony - based on SPRIE's work in China - to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Created in 2000, the twelve-member Commission is charged to monitor, investigate, and submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and China, including recommendations for legislative action.

The agenda and written testimony from the two-day hearing took place at Stanford's Hoover Institution.

As part of a new initiative on Greater China, SPRIE has selected two outstanding young scholars as the inaugural SPRIE Fellows at Stanford for research and writing on Greater China and its role in the global knowledge economy. Xiaohong (Iris) Quan and Doug Fuller, from the University of California, Berkeley and MIT, respectively, will join the SPRIE research team for the 2005-2006 academic year.

The primary focus of the program is the intersection of innovation and entrepreneurship and underlying contemporary political, economic, technological, and/or business factors in Greater China (including Taiwan, Mainland China, Singapore). Topics of particular interest include, but are not limited to, university-industry linkages, globalization of R&D, venture capital industry development, networks and flows of managerial and technical leaders, and leading high technology clusters in Greater China. Industries of ongoing research at SPRIE include semiconductors, wireless, and software.

SPRIE Fellows at Stanford will be in residence for at least three academic quarters, beginning in fall 2005. Fellows take part in Center activities, including research forums, seminars, and workshops throughout the academic year, and will present their research findings in SPRIE seminars. They will also participate as members of SPRIE's team in its public and invitation-only seminars and workshops with academic, business, and government leaders. Fellows will also participate in the publication programs of SPRIE and APARC.

Former National Security Advisor addresses the future of Asia, and explains why, by 2020, the world's five most important countries are likely to be, in this order, the United States, the European Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, and India.

The Oksenberg Lecture, given in 2005 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, honors the legacy of Professor Michel Oksenberg (1938-2001) longtime member of APARC, senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for International Studies, and an authority on China. Professor Oksenberg was consistently outspoken about the need for the United States to engage with Asia in a more considered manner. In tribute, the Oksenberg Conference/Lecture recognizes distinguished individuals who have helped to advance understanding between the United States and the nations of the Asia-Pacific.

It is with great pleasure that I announce that Professor Gi-Wook Shin will assume the directorship of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center commencing September 1, 2005. Gi-Wook is well qualified to assume this role and to provide APARC with the same kind of leadership he has brought to the Korean Studies Program.

When Professor Shin left UCLA four years ago to come to Stanford, he left the largest Korean studies program in the nation. It must have been quite a gamble for him to come here since there was little by way of Korean studies at Stanford. With true entrepreneurial spirit, Professor Shin has built an impressive and dynamic Korean studies program at SIIS. It hosts luncheon seminars, workshops, and conferences, and has sponsored many Korean scholars, government officials, and business leaders who spend time at Stanford as visiting scholars. It also supports an active research program spearheaded by two postdoctoral research fellows and two Pantech professional fellows. Stanford is steadily becoming a world-class center for contemporary Korean studies.

I have great confidence that Gi-Wook will continue his outstanding work in his new role as the director of Shorenstein APARC. Gi-Wook's strong leadership will prove invaluable in the years to come as the Institute grows and as the International Initiative unfolds. Please join me in congratulating and supporting Gi-Wook in his new role.

Best regards,

Coit. D. Blacker, Director, Stanford Institute for International Studies

We hardly needed the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam War's end to remind us of that war. Iraq provides daily reminders, prompting frequent comparisons to Vietnam. While many of the analogies are misplaced, looking back at America's intervention in Vietnam can be valuable.

The major challenge now facing the United States in Iraq is to establish a stable and powerful indigenous military to provide a secure environment for nation-building.

The U.S. Army's initial unwillingness to integrate South Vietnamese soldiers into its military plans--and its later inability to motivate the indigenous troops to take over the fighting--tells us what to avoid in Iraq.

The old Iraqi army fell apart in April 2003 as American soldiers marched on Baghdad. As the insurgency grew and American casualties mounted, the coalition forces started putting Iraq's army together again. Many of the same soldiers came back to sign up--it was only at the higher levels that Baathist officers were purged. Both Iraq and the United States have an interest in strengthening a purely Iraqi force.

Still some lessons

President Bush calls the comparison of Iraq with Vietnam a "false analogy" and accuses those who use it of sending the wrong message to the enemy and to the troops. Likewise, Rep. Richard Baker, R-La., calls the analogy "wrong, disturbing and dangerous."

In fact, Vietnam does not make for a good comparison with Iraq--but the differences are informative. The most striking difference between the two situations is in the sequence of war and nation-building. In Vietnam, the United States attempted nation-building under South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's administration for nearly a decade before intervening directly with ground troops; in Iraq, a short and overwhelming display of force preceded nation-building. Moreover, the Americans were facing a much stronger adversary--including an organized army--in Vietnam.

Beginning in 1969, the Nixon administration implemented its policy of "Vietnamization," withdrawing U.S. troops while simultaneously turning over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the fighting and the pacification efforts. By 1973, the South Vietnamese army was the strongest in Southeast Asia, boasting more than 1 million soldiers and toting the most advanced weaponry, thanks to U.S. Army programs such as Enhance and Enhance Plus. However, unimpressive performances during a joint incursion into Cambodia and the 1972 spring offensive testified otherwise. Finally, on April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to the communists. Where did Vietnamization go wrong?

From the entry of American ground forces in 1965, South Vietnamese forces were made to feel marginalized in defending South Vietnam. This was mainly due to the U.S. Army's belief in 1965-69 that the South Vietnamese troops were essentially irrelevant to victory or defeat. Not only were the soldiers equipped with inferior weapons, underpaid and given poor housing compared to their American counterparts, but they also were relegated to so-called pacification missions.

U.S. soldiers had more respect for their enemies from the North than for their allies in the South. Training and communication were beset with linguistic, social and cultural barriers. By the time South Vietnamese soldiers started replacing U.S. soldiers in 1969, it was too late to induce them to adopt what had come to be regarded as U.S. strategic goals, rather than South Vietnamese ones.

It's not too late

Now, in Iraq, a window of opportunity is still open for Americans. According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States wasted the whole first year after the invasion in halfhearted attempts to create effective Iraqi military and police forces. The bulk of the army is made up of soldiers who were fighting Americans a few months ago. Ethnic and religious divisions among the men, and their legacy of service under an autocrat, make it difficult for them to attain modern professional military standards. However, the Iraqi people are much less distrustful of the Iraqi army than they are of occupying U.S. forces.

The Multinational Security Transition Command, set up late last year, must focus on the Iraqi army's esprit de corps. It is not too late to incorporate and integrate Iraqi forces in strategic planning and operations so that they have a stake in securing a stable Iraq. Otherwise, the Iraqi army will soon be overwhelmed by the size and hostility of a growing insurgency.

The Vietnam analogy has too often been deployed in times of political conflict in the United States. But the comparison can be useful. If we learn the right lessons from the mistakes in Vietnam, we need not be condemned to repeat them in Iraq.

We are pleased to announce that five prominent scholars have been selected to join the Korean Studies Summer Workshop from June 27 to July 1, 2005 at Stanford University. Financial support for this program has been provided by Pantech Group and Korea Research Foundation (KRF).

The 2005 Summer Workshop Fellows are:

Yoon S. Choi, University of California, Irvine

Rachael Joo, Stanford University

Jong-young Kim, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Ki-young Shin, University of Washington

Kyoim Yun, Indiana University