This week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.

The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest--more than 90 percent--land here without any perusal.

We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies--a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.

Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.

So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.

Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans--perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent--to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.

If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box--an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.

Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.

Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.

Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.

Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.

In the old popular song about the rout by Americans at New Orleans during the War of 1812, the British "ran so fast the hounds couldn't catch 'em." Even allowing for patriotic hyperbole, it can hardly be argued that the British extricated themselves with a great deal of dignity, particularly given that another battle in the same war inspired the American national anthem.

The impact of that defeat on the British national psyche is now obscure, but nearly two centuries later, as the Americans and their British allies seek to extricate themselves from Iraq, the story of how a superpower looks for a dignified way out of a messy and often unpopular foreign conflict has become a historical genre of sorts. As the pressure to leave Iraq increases, that genre is receiving new and urgent attention.

And in the shadow of the bleak and often horrific news emerging from Iraq nearly every day, historians and political experts are finding at least a wan hope in those imperfect historical analogies. Even in the absence of a sudden and dramatic shift on the battlefield toward a definitive victory, there may still be a slight opening, as narrow as the eye of a needle, for the United States to slip through and leave Iraq in the near future in a way that will not be remembered as a national embarrassment.

Most of the recent parallels do not seem to offer much encouragement for a confounded superpower that wants to save face as it cuts its losses and returns home. Among them are the wrenching French pullout from Algeria, the ill-fated French and American adventures in Vietnam, the Soviet humiliation in Afghanistan and the disastrous American interventions in Beirut and Somalia.

Still, there are a few stories of inconclusive wars that left the United States in a more dignified position, including the continuing American presence in South Korea and the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. But even those stand in stark contrast to the happier legacy of total victory during World War II.

The highly qualified optimism of these experts about what may still happen in Iraq - let's call it something just this side of hopelessness - has been born of many factors, including greatly reduced expectations of what might constitute not-defeat there. The United States already appears willing to settle - as if it were in a relationship that had gone sour but cannot quite be resolved by a walk out the door, punctuated with a satisfying slam.

Alongside the dampening of hopes, there has also been a fair amount of historical revisionism regarding the darker tales of conflicts past: a considered sense that if the superpowers had made different decisions, things could have turned out more palatably, and that they still might in Iraq.

Maybe not surprisingly, Vietnam is the focus of some of the most interesting revisionism, including some of it immediately relevant to Iraq, where the intensive effort to train Iraqi security forces to defend their own country closely mirrors the "Vietnamization" program in South Vietnam. If Congress had not voted to kill the financing for South Vietnam and its armed forces in 1975, argues Melvin R. Laird in a heavily read article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Saigon might never have fallen.

"Congress snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by cutting off funding for our ally in 1975," wrote Mr. Laird, who was President Nixon's defense secretary from 1969 to 1973, when the United States pulled its hundreds of thousands of troops out of Vietnam.

In an interview, Mr. Laird conceded that the American departure from Vietnam was not a pretty sight. "Hell, the pictures of them getting in those helicopters were not good pictures," he said, referring to the chaotic evacuation of the American embassy two years after Vietnamization was complete, and a year after Nixon resigned. But on the basis of his what-if about Vietnam, Mr. Laird does not believe that all is lost in Iraq.

"There is a dignified way out, and I think that's the Iraqization of the forces over there," Mr. Laird said, "and I think we're on the right track on that."

Many analysts have disputed the core of that contention, saying that large swaths of the Iraqi security forces are so inept they may never be capable of defending their country against the insurgents without the American military backing them up. But Mr. Laird is not alone in his revisionist take and its potential application to Iraq.

William Stueck, a history professor at the University of Georgia who has written several books on Korea, calls himself a liberal but says he buys Mr. Laird's basic analysis of what went wrong with Vietnamization.

Korea reveals how easy it is to dismiss the effectiveness of local security forces prematurely, Mr. Stueck said. In 1951, Gen. Matthew Ridgeway felt deep frustration when Chinese offensives broke through parts of the line defended by poorly led South Korean troops.

But by the summer of 1952, with intensive training, the South Koreans were fighting more effectively, Mr. Stueck said. "Now, they needed backup" by Americans, he said. By 1972, he said, South Korean troops were responsible for 70 percent of the front line.

Of course, there are enormous differences between Iraq and Korea. Korean society was not riven by troublesome factions, as Iraq's is, and the United States was defending an existing government rather than trying to create one from scratch.

Another intriguing if imperfect lesson can be found in Algeria, said Matthew Connelly, a Columbia University historian. There, by March 1962, the French had pulled out after 130 years of occupation.

That long colonial occupation, and the million European settlers who lived there before the bloody exodus, are major differences with Iraq, Mr. Connelly noted. But there were also striking parallels: the insurgency, which styled its cause as an international jihad, broke down in civil war once the French pulled out; the French, for their part, said theirs was a fight to protect Western civilization against radical Islam.

Like President Bush in Iraq, President Charles de Gaulle probably thought he could settle Algeria in his favor by military means, Dr. Connelly said. In the short run, that turned out to be a grave miscalculation, as the occupation crumbled under the insurgency's viciousness.

Over the long run, though, history treated de Gaulle kindly for reversing course and agreeing to withdraw, Mr. Connelly said. "De Gaulle loses the war but he wins in the realm of history: he gave Algeria its independence," he said. "How you frame defeat, that can sometimes give you a victory."

The Americans in Beirut and the Soviets in Afghanistan are seen, even in the long view, as cases of superpowers paying the price of blundering into a political and social morass they did not understand.

For the Soviets, that mistake was compounded when America outfitted Afghan rebels with Stinger missiles capable of taking down helicopters, nullifying a key Soviet military superiority. "I don't think they had a fig leaf of any kind," said Henry Rowen, a fellow at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford who was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1989 to 1991. "They just left."

In Beirut, the Americans entered to protect what they considered a legitimate Christian-led government and ended up, much as in Iraq, in the middle of a multipronged civil conflict. In October 1983, a suicide attack killed 241 American servicemen at a Marines barracks, and four months after that, with Muslim militias advancing, President Ronald Reagan ordered the remaining marines withdrawn to ships off the coast, simply saying their mission had changed. The episode has been cited by Vice President Dick Cheney as an example of a withdrawal that encouraged Arab militants to think the United States is weak.

Today, even as expectations for Iraq keep slipping, some measure of victory can still be declared even in a less-than-perfect outcome, said Richard Betts, director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia. For example, he said, an Iraqi government that is authoritarian but not totalitarian might have to do.

The key point, he said, is that under those circumstances, the outcome "doesn't look like a disaster even if it doesn't look good."

One of the less publicized but perhaps most important matters before President Bush on his recent trip to South Korea for the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit was that of relations between the United States and the host country. Although South Korea has long been a close ally of the United States, relations between the two have cooled in recent years, and the alliance has come under great strain. Bush's trip did not set a new direction for the alliance, which has been drifting for the past few years.

There is a way to reverse this cooling in relations, I believe -- to promote U.S. strategic interests in the region, including denuclearization of North Korea; to retain U.S. influence there; and to strengthen a long-standing alliance. What is needed is an effort to widen the "North Korea problem" from one of nuclear weapons to one of unification.

Controversy over the fraying U.S.-South Korea alliance focuses almost exclusively on cultural or emotional issues. In the United States there are some who feel that South Koreans are insufficiently grateful for the steadfast U.S. support to South Korea, particularly for the American lives lost in defense of the South during the Korean War of 1950-53 and for the extensive economic and military aid since. Others feel that rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea reveals the naivete of a younger generation of Koreans who are insufficiently worried about the North Korean threat.

But the problems in the alliance are not a result of emotion, naivete or ingratitude. Indeed, even if none of those emotional and cultural issues existed, the alliance would still be in dire need of revision. To find the best path forward for both the United States and South Korea, we need to focus on the real issues.

The main factor straining the alliance is the unresolved Korean War and the continued division of the peninsula. This has created differing long-term strategic concerns for the United States and South Korea.

For South Korea, the key issue is not North Korean nuclear weapons -- it never was. South Korea's overriding concern is how to resolve the issue of national unification and integrate North Korea back into the world's most dynamic region, whether or not there are nuclear weapons. All other South Korean foreign policy issues take second place.

In contrast to Korea's regional issues, U.S. concerns are global and military. For at least the next several years, the United States will be mainly concerned with countering potential terrorist threats. Distracted by the overwhelming focus on anti-terrorism, homeland security and other issues, the United States has viewed its Korea policy as a narrow extension of its anti-terrorism policy, focusing almost exclusively on denuclearizing the North. These different strategic priorities have led to severe strains between the two allies, despite the desire of both to maintain a close relationship.

The United States can improve its position in East Asia, as well as solidify its alliance with South Korea, by widening its focus beyond North Korean denuclearization and coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification. Although the United States rhetorically supports unification, it has been noticeably passive in pursuing policy to that end.

Such a policy shift would achieve many U.S. goals and would strengthen our alliance with South Korea in the process.

First and foremost, denuclearization is far more likely to occur with a change in North Korea's regime and a resolution to the Korean War than it is without resolving that larger issue. Until now the United States has put denuclearization first, without making much progress. Folding the nuclear issue into the larger issue would provide far more leverage on both questions and potentially create new or broader areas for progress.

Second, such a policy would provide grounds for agreement between U.S. and South Korean policymakers from which they could cooperate and work together, rather than against each other. Exploring the best path toward unification will require both economic and military changes in the North -- changes that will provide the United States with more flexibility to rebalance its own forces in the region.

Finally, it would put the United States in a solid position to retain goodwill and influence in Korea after unification -- something that is far from ensured today, when many South Koreans are skeptical about U.S. attitudes and policies toward the region. If the United States is seen as a major source of help for unification, it is far more likely that the post-unification orientation of Korea will be favorable to Washington.

This would be a major policy change for the United States, but given the importance of the region and of the Korean Peninsula, it is the best path to follow.

What is the state of China-Taiwan relations?

President George Bush fanned the flames of the longstanding conflict between China and Taiwan during his November 16 speech in Kyoto, at the start of a week-long state visit to Asia. In urging China to expand openness and allow its people more freedoms, the president used Taiwan as a model, saying Taiwan had brought prosperity to its people by embracing freedom and creating a democratic Chinese society. China rejected Bush's comments. "Taiwan is an inseparable part ofChina, and China does not brook any interference in its internal affairs," Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told reporters at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in South Korea. Bush meets Chinese President Hu Jintao and other Asian leaders at the summit November 19.

What is the history of the conflict?

Taiwan, an island of 23 million off China's southern coast, was occupied by Japan for fifty years, from 1895 to 1945. In 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party lost its power struggle with the Communist Party in China, Chiang and his followers fled to Taiwan. Their Kuomintang (KMT) government-in-exile in Taipei defined itself as the alternative to Communist rule and hoped one day to return to power in Beijing. The KMT governed Taiwan from 1949 to 2000; its often harsh rule included discriminatory laws against ethnic Taiwanese and nearly forty years of martial law, which was finally lifted in 1987. The KMT has historically seen Taiwan as a part of "one China" that would eventually be reunited under Nationalist rule.

Taiwan's current ruling party, the predominantly ethnic Taiwanese Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded in 1986 to counter the KMT, and only became legal in 1989 after a longtime ban on opposition parties was dropped. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian is a member of the DPP, which envisions Taiwan as an independent nation, separate from China. In 2000, Chen was the first DPP candidate to be elected president. Taiwanese sovereignty is the first and most prominent issue on the party's platform. This position has put the DPP severely at odds with China's leadership, which views Taiwan as a renegade province that will one day be reunited with Communist China--by force, if necessary.

What is the U.S. position?

The United States officially recognizes only one China -- including Taiwan -- and urges a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. However, Washington is also bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to aid in Taiwan 's defense, including selling the island the weapons it needs to defend itself against China. Experts say the United States is walking a fine line between China 's growing influence and the historical U.S. relationship with Taiwan. "Bush had to stand up for freedom and democracy and all the other values he constantly talks about, without picking a fight with China that nobody really wants," says David Kang, an Asia expert and visiting professor at Stanford University's Shorenstein APARC. Bush stressed in his speech that "there should be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo by either side."

What is the impetus behind independence for Taiwan?

After the long KMT reign, many Taiwanese are now pushing for self-determination. Independence advocates say Taiwan is a free and democratic nation with multiparty elections and a very successful economy, with a gross national product (GNP) of $328 billion in 2004, of which $174 billion was due to exports including electronics, computer parts, textiles, metals, plastic, and rubber. They say the Taiwan people should have the right to decide for themselves if they want to join China or become an independent nation. Since Chen was elected to his first term in 2000, he has steadily pushed the idea of Taiwanese independence. He provoked Beijing August 3 by supporting the idea of a referendum to ask Taiwanese citizens if the island should declare formal independence from China. China is very hostile to such talk: On August 7, the official China Daily newspaper quoted a Chinese military official saying, "Taiwan choosing independence is tantamount to choosing war."

What has China been doing?

Making both incendiary statements and conciliatory moves. In July, General Zhu Chenghu, the dean of China's National Defense University, warned that China would attack the United States with nuclear weapons if it intervened in a military dispute over Taiwan. Although he later claimed the comments were his own and did not reflect the views of the state, Zhu's words generated international concern. However, China's actions toward some Taiwanese officials have been friendlier. James Soong, head of the Taiwanese opposition party People First, has visited China several times in the last year at the invitation of Beijing. Experts say Beijing is reaching out to opposition leaders in Taiwan in an attempt to sidestep the DPP and build new bases of support on the island. Soong is taking advantage of the opening to play for domestic political support and attempt to show up the DPP, they say. His actions infuriate the ruling party in Taiwan because, despite his unofficial status, Soong is building friendly relations with China in direct contrast to DPP policy.

What are the next steps?

Bush alluded to peace talks in his November 16 speech, but experts say such talks between China and Taiwan are unlikely in the near future. "There are elements moving towards peace talks, and other elements, especially in Taiwan, that are pushing toward independence and want to stick China in the eye," David Kang says. But "it's hard to say what Taiwan wants," he adds, noting the Taiwan electorate is almost evenly split between those who favor independence and those who want to improve relations with Beijing for historical, cultural, and especially economic reasons. David Kang says that, in the last several years, as many as one million Taiwanese have moved to China to do business.

What are Taiwan's security concerns?

China, located just 100 miles away across the Taiwan Strait, has hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and is targeting much of its recent militarization campaign specifically at the island, including building amphibious tanks that can be used to storm Taiwan's shores. China's military buildup has put Taiwan at a strategic disadvantage: Taiwan's military spending has dropped 25 percent over the last five years, to only 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The United States has been pressuring the island to buy a specially designed $18 billion package of U.S. arms to improve its military capabilities. But some Taiwanese politicians are reluctant to devote resources to military buildup given the presumed U.S. protection, and opposition leaders have blocked the sale over what experts call domestic political squabbling. But, David Kang points out, a military invasion of Taiwan by China is highly improbable. "That's the least likely scenario," he says. "You can have a military dispute that's far short of all-out war."

On the surface, President Bush's week-long swing through Northeast Asia has been a strong contrast with his recent stormy (and, some say, stumbling) excursion into Latin America.

There was little sign of overt anti-Americanism. And no Asian leader will openly oppose American leadership in the flamboyant manner of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Even prickly China swallowed President Bush's barbs about lack of democratic freedom in China, quietly acknowledging the two powers' differences. In contrast to the meeting of leaders from the Americas, the annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Korea will embrace the principles of free trade.

Beneath the polite appearance, however, there is no less a challenge to American leadership in Asia. While Washington fiddled, a powerful momentum has been building up in Asia toward the formation of an East Asian Free Trade Area or, more ambitiously, an East Asian Community, modeled on the European community. Led by China, the East Asian grouping pointedly excludes the United States.

The APEC agenda focuses on an initiative to counter the spread of avian flu and to offer a common push at the WTO meeting in Hong Kong next month to revive the Doha Round of global trade talks. The Bush administration has its own agenda for the APEC meeting: to reposition itself as a leader of economic growth and integration in the region. For this, APEC has the virtue of being a more open organization than those behind the disappointment at the American summit. Its 21 members span the Pacific Rim, bringing together nations from Chile and Mexico to Russia, China and Southeast Asia. But this attention to APEC may be a case of too little, too late. The momentum to give the amorphous APEC an ongoing institutional role, beyond its annual summit meetings, has slowed in recent years. Its pledges for mutual tariff reduction exist almost entirely on paper.

Until this year, the Bush administration barely addressed regional economic issues at APEC. It preferred to use the meetings to promote a post-9/11 security agenda of anti-terrorism. U.S. trade policy has focused more on reaching free trade agreements with a few selected "friends" in that war, such as Singapore and Australia.

Meanwhile a Chinese-sponsored move to hold an East Asian summit offers the most visible expression of a trend of declining American influence in Asia. That meeting will take place in Malaysia in mid-December. The gathering groups the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Pointedly not invited is the United States.

This meeting is an outgrowth of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process - an annual dialogue of ASEAN with China, South Korea and Japan that began in December 1997 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. The APT has grown into an elaborate mechanism for cooperation in a range of areas from finance and agriculture to information technology. This reflects an underlying economic reality - the growth of regional and bilateral trade agreements and the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade.

Until fairly recently, foreign trade in East Asia was dominated by trans-Pacific trade with the United States. But the share of Asian exports headed to the U.S. has dropped dramatically, while those destined for other Asian nations has risen. In the two decades from 1981 to 2001, according to economist Edward Lincoln, the share of intra-regional exports has risen from 32 percent to 40 percent, and intra-regional imports from 32 percent to 50 percent.

Much of the growth of regional integration is being driven by China, which is generating enormous demand for imports of raw materials as well as for semi-finished goods that are assembled for export. China has not been hesitant to use this role to expand its influence in the region. It has embraced the APT as a road towards creation of an East Asian community. At the ASEAN summit last year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared that such a community was a "long-term strategic choice in the interests of China's development." China has also outmatched the U.S. in negotiating free trade agreements, both bilateral and regional. The most impressive is an FTA deal between China and ASEAN set to take effect in 2010. Beijing even dreams of an Asian currency, based on the Chinese yuan, to rival the dollar and the euro.

China is not the first nation to try for such East Asian economic unity. Back in the days when Japan was riding high as an economic superpower, it too talked of leading an East Asian bloc, based on a yen currency zone. As late as 1997, in response to the Asian financial crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, a kind of alternate regional financial system. More recently, both South Korea and Japan offered their own visions of an East Asian community in 2001. And both countries tried to match China in the APT by offering to form free trade agreements with ASEAN.

Japan, however, was never as successful as China is likely to be. "It would seem that Japan is a natural counterweight to China, but Tokyo is generally perceived as reactive and incapable of outflanking Beijing," Brad Glosserman, director of research at the Pacific Forum of CSIS, wrote recently. "Its economic dynamism is no match for that of China."

The United States has never been friendly toward efforts to create an East Asian economic bloc, viewing them as chipping away at the global trading system and rivaling American leadership. But Asia is arguably only following in American footsteps -- witness the NAFTA deal with Canada and Mexico and the more recent trade pact with Central America.

Many American policymakers believe these developments are partly a product of the failure of the Bush administration to articulate - much less pursue - a strategy to engage East Asia.

"The United States has greater strategic interests in Asia now than it did in Europe before World War I or World War II,'' argued a recent report of the Grand Strategic Choices Working Group, co-chaired by John Hopkin's University's Francis Fukuyama and Princeton's G. John Ikenberry. "Thus," the report continued, "it is unfortunate that part of the problem, in East Asia in particular, is that America's relative lack of interest in tending to the region has caused some allies of the U.S. to doubt our resolve and question the value of resisting unfavorable developments alone."

The report echoes other policymakers in suggesting the U.S. form its own East Asian economic zone with Japan, South Korea and Australia."That's a non-starter,'' says Professor Vinod Aggarwal, director of Berkeley's APEC study center. "Nobody wants to be cut out of the China market."

Privately, Bush administration officials downplay the importance of the East Asian summit in December, pointing to the lack of any concrete agenda. The addition of India, Australia and New Zealand to the invitation list, along with Japan, should effectively counter any Chinese initiative, they believe.

But those countries also fear being left out of whatever may emerge from this process. They cannot afford to be left on the outside, looking in.

Ultimately, neither can the United States. The President's trip is a belated recognition of that fact. But to be more than a momentary gesture, the United States must give East Asia the consistent attention it deserves.