Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formed a panel to rewrite national textbooks that reference the country's wartime past. Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, says those actions are a “backdoor way of limiting references to Japanese aggression” in an Economist article analyzing the history debates.

Research by CISAC's Joseph Felter shows that insurgents try to derail government-delivered aid programs in poor areas because they fear successful programs will boost the government's credibility. Preventive measures include providing greater security around aid projects and limiting advance knowledge about them.

A research paper, published in the American Economic Review, involved an analysis of a large community-driven development program in the Philippines. In 2012, the World Bank supported more than 400 of these projects in 94 countries with about $30 billion in aid.

Conventional wisdom assumes that development aid is a tool to help reduce civil conflict. But some aid projects may actually exacerbate the violence, the research showed.

In an interview, Joseph Felter, a senior research scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said, "A 'winning hearts-and-minds' strategy for disbursing development aid may lead to an increase in insurgent attacks in the world's poorest areas. The study's takeaway is not to stop aid delivery, but to appreciate and plan for the possibility of unintended consequences."

Felter co-wrote the article, "Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict," along with Benjamin Crost of the University of Colorado-Denver and Patrick Johnston of the RAND Corporation. Their research relied on conflict data from the Philippines military from between 2002 and 2006 that allowed them to precisely estimate how the implementation of aid affected violence levels in ongoing insurgencies against the government.

Spotlight on the Philippines

These issues are particularly important in poor and conflict-ridden countries like the Philippines, Felter said. The Philippines is home to some of the most protracted insurgencies in the world. Islamic separatist groups struggle for an independent Muslim state; a communist group continues to wage a classic Maoist revolutionary war; and the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group conducts kidnappings and terrorist attacks.

The aid program Felter and his colleagues studied was the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Service – or KALAHI-CIDSS – the largest of its kind in the Philippines. Through it, poor communities receive projects to address their most pressing needs. According to Felter, this typically involved funding for projects like roads, schools, health clinics and other infrastructure.

"This is government funding for projects that citizens in these areas have expressly asked for," Felter said.

The researchers noted that community-driven development projects, also known as "CDD" projects, are popular because evidence suggests they enhance social cohesion among citizens. But sometimes they draw the wrong kind of attention from anti-government groups, as the research illustrated.

Felter and his colleagues found an increase of 110-185 percent in insurgent attacks in communities where aid projects commenced, the authors wrote. If this effect is extrapolated across all of the Philippines' municipalities, the authors estimate that the program resulted in between 550 and 930 additional casualties during three years.

"Taken together, this detailed evidence sheds new light on the mechanisms that link aid and conflict, which may eventually help design more effective aid interventions that alleviate poverty without exacerbating conflict," they wrote.

When the insurgent groups destroy such a project, it has the effect of weakening the perception that the government can actually deliver on community projects, the scholars wrote. For example, the communist rebels in the Philippines have issued public statements denouncing the KALAHI-CIDSS program as "counterrevolutionary and anti-development." If a successful aid program shifts the balance of power in favor of the government, it reduces insurgents' bargaining power and their political leverage.

As a result, insurgents tended to engage in conflict in the earlier stages of a project in order to keep it from succeeding, according to the research. In fact, conflict increased when municipalities were in the early or "social preparation" stages of publicizing an aid program, Felter and his colleagues wrote.

Sometimes rebel groups divert aid to fund their own operations – aid shipments are often stolen or "taxed" by these groups, according to the paper.

The Next Step

What can be done to prevent attacks?

"Greater security around the aid projects and limiting advance knowledge of the particular projects are good measures to start with," Felter said.

He noted that governments and aid organizations need to be discreet in how they identify aid projects and their locations, and how they disburse the aid itself. More research on this issue needs to be done, Felter said.

"One lesson is not to give insurgents too long a lead time to plan attacks," he said.

Unfortunately, as the researchers noted, poverty and violence are often linked: "The estimated one-and-a-half billion people living in conflict-affected countries are substantially more likely to be undernourished, less likely to have access to clean water and education, and face higher rates of childhood mortality."

Continued progress – in the form of international aid – is urged toward eradicating poverty. "To help achieve this, governments and multilateral donor organizations are increasingly directing development aid to conflict-affected countries worldwide," Felter and his co-authors pointed out.

Felter, also a research fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, retired from the U.S. Army as a colonel in 2012 following a career as a Special Forces and foreign area officer. He has conducted foreign internal defense and security assistance missions across East and Southeast Asia and has participated in combat deployments to Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010-11, he commanded the International Security and Assistance Force Counter Insurgency Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan.

"I saw this dynamic (insurgent attacks on aid projects) firsthand in Afghanistan and Iraq. This research paper confirms it," Felter said.

He devoted much of his Stanford doctoral dissertation and his work at CISAC and Hoover to build what he hopes will be the largest and most detailed micro-conflict database – the Empirical Studies of Conflict – ever assembled.

Felter said there is only so much that the military can do to win over people in areas ravaged by war and conflict.

"The military can 'lease' hearts and minds by creating a safe environment for aid projects," he said, "but ultimately it's up to the government to win them over."

In a piece for The Irrawaddy, Draper Hills Summer Fellow Zin Mar Aung ('13), a Burmese human rights activist, writes on recent attempts by nationalist monks in Burma to lobby for a new law, which would restrict interfaith marriages and interrupt individual freedoms. Aung critiques the so-called reformist government, calling all people of Burma, no matter gender, ethnicity or faith, to unite during Burma's democratic reform process.

Update: A full report summarizing the discussion of the 12th Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum is available below.

Northeast Asia has been rife with animosity over the past year. Among the outstanding concerns are China’s naval movements in the South China Sea and the threat of a fourth nuclear missile test by North Korea. While no major incidents have occurred in recent months, the uncertainty weighs heavily on policymakers and observers. What if an accidental clash happens in the sea or air?

Senior security scholars and practitioners from South Korea and the United States recently gathered for the Korea–U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, a Track II workshop to exchange views on these major issues impacting the Northeast Asia region.

The Strategic Forum, established in 2006, is held semiannually and alternates between Seoul and Stanford, hosted by the Korean Studies Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Korean counterpart organization is the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the foreign ministry’s think tank within the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

Twenty-four participants gathered on June 20 at the Bechtel Conference Center, and offered a diversity of opinions on Korean peninsula issues and the potential impact they could have on the countries’ allies. The participants collectively expressed a desire for regional stability, increased dialogue, and commitment to maintaining the U.S.–ROK alliance and cooperation on other trust-building activities.

The conference operates under the Chatham House Rule of individual confidentiality to allow for candid conversation. A few main points from the sessions are disclosed below:

Session I: Northeast Asia Regional Dynamics

Many participants shared the concern that trilateral relations between China–South Korea–Japan are at one of the worst points in recent history.

China’s current attitude toward its neighbors and the United States was discussed at length. Many participants discussed the strategic trajectory of China and how the country’s domestic situation may challenge its ability to effectively move forward, contrary to popular perceptions that simply straight-line its current growth rate into the indefinite future. 

Korean participants expressed concern toward Japan’s position, particularly following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the stance he has taken on other wartime issues like “comfort women.” They said they hoped the United States would do more to help Korea–Japan relations, as participants recognized the desirability of increased trilateral U.S.–Japan–Korea security and diplomatic cooperation.

Session II: U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)

Participants shared the view that the U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is serving to broaden and deepen the U.S.­–ROK relationship.

The KORUS FTA is only in its second year of implementation, so additional time is needed to make a comprehensive evaluation, but it appears that it will significantly increase bilateral trade as time passes.

Session III: U.S.–ROK Alliance

The U.S.­–ROK relationship, on the whole, is in very good shape. South Korea and the United States have similar policies in most strategic areas.

The two countries cooperate on many diplomatic and security initiatives, such as the U.S. 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea and many United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. 

Session IV: North Korea

Participants agreed that North Korea continues to engage in provocative behavior. This remains the chief concern of the U.S.–ROK alliance, as well a priority of the international community in total.

The policies of the United States and South Korea toward North Korea are well-coordinated and principled, but a number of Korean and American participants expressed concern that more creative thinking was needed, as the challenges North Korea poses are increasing. 

Reports from past forums are available on the Shorenstein APARC website.