The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future are pleased to announce the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue (TPSD) in Seoul, Republic of Korea, set to take place on September 12-14, 2023. This convening, designed to accelerate progress on achieving the United Nations-adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, will focus on energy security, the seventh of the Agenda’s underlying 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

APARC and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation launched the dialogue initiative to spur new research and policy collaborations between experts from the United States and Asia to expedite the implementation of the SDGs by governments and non-state actors. This year’s event builds upon the success of the inaugural Tran-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue, held in Seoul in October 2022, and the continued momentum generated through its resultant regional convening, the Trans-Altai Sustainability Dialogue, which took place earlier this summer in Mongolia.  

The Korea Environment Institute, Korea Energy Economics Institute, Korea Environmental Industry & Technology Institute, K-water, and Ewha Womans University will co-host the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue. The event’s supporters include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, and the Asian Development Bank. Award-winning Korean actor and director Cha In-pyo has been named honorary ambassador of the TPSD. Mr. Cha will deliver remarks at the opening session of the dialogue. 

At the core of the 2023 TPSD is the pivotal theme of energy security, SDG7, which proposes to ensure access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy for all. The challenge of energy production, transportation, and security poses a critical barrier to a shared sustainable future. Despite ongoing progress toward sustainable energy targets on a global scale, recent data indicates that the pace of advancements is insufficient to meet the SDG7 targets by 2030 and varies significantly across different regions. The latest report from the SDG7 Indicator Custodian Agencies also finds that the policy measures required to tackle the global energy crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, continue to lag and that international public financial support for clean energy in low and middle-income countries has been declining since before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Energy security is pivotal to the SDGs. Without securing clean energy, the climate crisis remains insurmountable. However, the clean energy future is under serious threat from the war in Ukraine sparked by Russia,” says Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations. “In this regard, I expect the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue to play an important role in convening world-renowned researchers, policymakers, and students to address energy security and advance clean energy technologies,” he adds.

In pursuit of genuine progress, the second annual TPSD will convene esteemed academics, government officials, industry experts, and leading professionals from Stanford University and across Asia. Together, they will interact in dynamic discussions that bridge multiple disciplines and climate science, exploring technological and policy solutions to expedite the transition toward a future free from fossil fuels and other unsustainable energy practices.

“As we approach the 2023 TPSD, we find ourselves at a crucial juncture, crossing the mid-point of the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with mixed results,” notes Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea at Stanford and director of APARC. “By extending a platform for leading experts to combine rigorous scientific research, policy analysis, and industry insights, I am confident in our ability to advance tangible solutions and real-world action to propel us forward in pursuit of a decarbonized world.”

The first day of the dialogue, co-hosted by the Korea Environment Institute and the Korea Energy and Economics Institute, will convene at The Plaza Seoul. A World Leaders Session will kick off the event, headlined by Mr. Ban Ki-moon; Chairman of the State Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia Zandanshatar Gombojav; former U.S. Secretary of Energy and Nobel Prize Laureate in Physics, Stanford Professor Steven Chu; and Managing Director General of the Asian Development Bank Woochong Um. The following plenary sessions will examine the intersections of energy security, sustainability, and issues such as geopolitics, green technologies, and clean energy co-benefits.

The second day will be held at Ewha Womans University and hosted by Ewha’s Center for Climate/Environmental Change Prediction Research. The day’s discussion topics will include, among others, energy-efficient technologies and principles for energy security education. With the mission of empowering young leaders to drive the climate change and sustainable development agenda, the second day will offer opportunities for emerging scholars and young professionals to present their research and applied work in championing progress toward energy security.

The 2023 TPSD underscores APARC’s and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation's shared commitment to fostering ambitious action toward delivering the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals. APARC and our partners, co-hosts, and supporters warmly invite scholars, students, policy experts, and professionals to join us at the TPSD and get involved with our efforts to shape a sustainable and resilient future for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Visit the 2023 TPSD page to register to attend the event in person and access the complete program agenda and list of speakers.

About the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) is Stanford University's esteemed institute dedicated to addressing critical issues impacting Asia and its relations with the United States. Through interdisciplinary research, education, and dialogue, APARC seeks to shape innovative policy solutions and enhance collaboration among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For more information, visit aparc.stanford.edu.

About the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future
The Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future upholds the legacy and vision of Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations. Guided by the principles of unification, communication, co-existence, and dedication, the Foundation works tirelessly towards achieving peace, security, development, and human rights. Collaborating with international organizations and stakeholders, the Foundation actively supports the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and the 2050 carbon net-zero target set by the Paris Climate Accord. For more information, visit eng.bf4bf.or.kr.

Contact

For further information on the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue, contact Cheryll Alipio, Shorenstein APARC’s Associate Director for Program and Policy at calipio@stanford.edu.

This announcement was updated on October 6, 2023, to reflect the addition of two new fellowship offerings focused on contemporary Taiwan.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2024.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy; contemporary Japan; contemporary Asia broadly defined; postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the new Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab; and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded annually to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

This commentary originally appeared in Shukan Toyokeizai.

Military tensions between China and Taiwan rise, and the U.S. government informs the Japanese government that it wants to deploy U.S. forces in Japan to defend Taiwan. At the same time, China sends a message through various channels that it will not touch Japan at all if it does not cooperate with the U.S. military and remains neutral.

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, It is highly likely that military conflict between China and Taiwan will lead to a decision by the U.S. military to intervene, followed by the deployment of fighter jets and naval vessels from U.S. military bases in Japan. In the process, Japan will be forced to make a major choice. 

If U.S. forces are deployed to the area around Taiwan, U.S. bases located in Japan, including Okinawa, will serve as bases. Under the so-called “Far East Clause” of Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. forces can use Japanese facilities and areas “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, the deployment of U.S. forces under the Far East Clause requires prior consultation with the Japanese side. Nevertheless, there is little chance that the Japanese government will turn the US down for fear of a confrontation with China. If Japan were to refuse at the last minute, the trust between Japan and the U.S. would be damaged, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty regime would effectively collapse. As a result, Japan would have no choice but to confront China alone. This would be a bad move that would only be a temporary fix. 

However, some officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are concerned about how the public would react. From China's point of view, this is a point to take advantage of, and by communicating that "Japan will be safe if it declares its neutrality," it may be able to divide Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan. 

The phrase "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" was introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a symposium sponsored by a Taiwanese think tank in 2006. This comment was followed by the statement, "It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance." How will Japanese public opinion react to the "ultimate choice" in the face of a Taiwan contingency? 

An interesting study, part of the Stanford Japan Barometer, conducted by Stanford University sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui and his colleagues examined this issue using a method called conjoint experiments. 

The subjects were presented with two scenarios: "In the event of an emergency in Taiwan, under what circumstances would you be more likely to support military involvement by the Self-Defense Forces?" The subjects were presented with two scenarios and asked to choose the one in which they would be more likely to support Japan's military involvement. 

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the researchers presented three options in each of five categories: "Chinese actions," "U.S. actions," "Chinese actions toward Japan," "U.S. actions toward Japan," and "international community reaction. In an experiment in which each of more than 7,000 subjects was asked to answer which of two scenarios in which they were randomly combined would support Japan's military involvement in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. The series of scenarios reflect the opinions of security experts who participated in simulations of a Taiwan contingency conducted by various agencies in the United States. The results show whether support for Japan's military involvement strengthened or weakened when each scenario was presented.

One of these scenarios is precisely related to the aforementioned issue. When China promised Japan that it would not touch Japanese territory, including the Senkaku Islands, support for Japan's military involvement weakened. On the other hand, if China landed on and occupied the Senkaku Islands at the same time as its invasion of Taiwan, support for Japan's military involvement increased. The result is clear: "Japanese people place the highest priority on the impact on Japanese territory," said Professor Tsutsui. 

The survey results indicate that Japan is hesitant to fight China but would respond to a request from the U.S. military for logistical support. How will Japan be involved in a Taiwan contingency? Public opinion is not yet settled. 

In reality, many experts believe that if U.S. forces deployed from bases in Japan clash with Chinese forces, the next request will be for cover by the Self-Defense Forces. It is quite a narrow pass to say that they will not participate in combat and only provide logistical support. 

As for why Japan should get involved in a Taiwan contingency, the debate tends to settle on supply chain issues, particularly in the area of semiconductors, or geopolitical importance. Many Japanese, however, may feel that such reasons alone are not sufficient to make a decision to put the lives of Self-Defense Force personnel on the line and the residents of the Nansei Islands at risk. 
The supply chains that Japanese firms have built in East Asia, including China, would also be severely damaged. In addition, Chinese nationalism would flare up violently if it were to fight Japan again. The cost of fighting China as a neighbor is extremely high for Japan. 

Where Did You Get the Money To Pay for the Succession?
 

The issue of money is also unavoidable. In order to prepare for contingencies, we must also consider financing the cost of war. 

If the armed conflict with China is prolonged, huge fiscal outlays will be required not only for the continuation of the war but also for the repair of domestic infrastructure. In addition to supplementary budgets, it will be necessary to issue government bonds. 

However, Japanese financial institutions alone may not be able to digest the Japanese Government Bonds. For this reason, a simulation by the Japan Strategy Research Forum this year called for the direct underwriting of Japanese Government Bonds by the Bank of Japan. 

Junichi Kanda, a Bank of Japan alumnus in the House of Representatives who served as finance minister, opposed this proposal, saying, "It would cause a sudden loss of confidence in Japan's finances and the yen, leading to a significant depreciation of the yen to over 300 yen to the dollar and an increase in interest rates to over 10%. Such an extreme depreciation of the yen would also hinder the purchase of equipment and materials in foreign currency. 

Instead, Kanda suggested issuing foreign currency-denominated government bonds for foreigners. However, since there has been no such issuance since 1988, it is necessary to gradually issue these bonds from normal times to develop investors, he said. 

The prerequisite is that confidence in Japan's finances is secured. Japan needs to maintain fiscal discipline on a regular basis in case of emergency," said Kanda. Even in peacetime, there is a strong argument in Japan for using government bonds as a source of funds for increased defense spending. If the government cannot even raise taxes, China will question its seriousness. More open and substantive discussions are needed if the Japanese people are to be convinced to accept the costs of a Taiwan contingency.

Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to unveil the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), an interdisciplinary initiative committed to producing evidence-based, actionable policy research to facilitate structural reform and propel Asia toward a future defined by growth, maturity, and innovation. Based at APARC and led by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, SNAPL seeks to tackle pressing social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asian countries, including aging populations, escalating inequality, brain drain, environmental threats, and institutional deficiencies in areas like the rule of law and cultural intolerance.

"SNAPL represents a significant milestone in our commitment to building research networks that engage academics, policymakers, business leaders, and civil society organizations interested in regional and global perspectives on contemporary Asia," said Shin, who is also the director of APARC and the Korea Program within APARC. “Through an interdisciplinary, solution-oriented, and comparative lens, we aim to set a research and policy agenda to help Asian nations create their unique roadmaps to becoming and remaining innovation-driven economics at the center of 21st-century dynamism and growth. At the same time, we believe that research on Asia could uncover important implications and lessons for the United States and European countries as they grapple with their own social, cultural, economic, and political challenges.”

Combining theoretical and field studies, SNAPL researchers will initially examine issues such as the prospects for reform of educational institutions, immigration policy, and cultural attitudes in Asia; paths to combating recent democratic declines; and U.S.-Asia relations. In addition to Shin, the lab director and principal investigator, the SNAPL inaugural research team includes Research Scholar Xinru Ma, Postdoctoral Fellows Gidong Kim and Junki Nakahara, Research Associates Haley Gordon and Irene Kyoung, and a cohort of Stanford undergraduate and graduate students serving as research assistants. The lab plans to continue offering fellowship and training opportunities to scholars and students.

“SNAPL’s education mission is to nurture the next generation of researchers, including students and visiting scholars, and we firmly believe that the laboratory model, proven successful in the sciences — with its mentorship and hands-on engagement — holds immense potential for nurturing talent in the social sciences,” notes Shin. “I look forward to our team’s contributions to U.S.-Asia dialogue and Asia’s security and prosperity, and I am grateful to our supporters for providing foundational funding for the lab.”

On August 29-30, 2023, SNAPL will co-host its inaugural event, the Sustainable Democracy Roundtable, jointly with the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies and APARC's Korea Program. The two-day event will convene scholars and students from the United States and South Korea to present solutions that address global democratic backsliding, promote social progress, and advance long-term development.

For more information about SNAPL, visit the lab’s website at aparc.stanford.edu/snapl.