This two-fold paper discusses 15 years of privatization of Italian cultural and architectural heritage between 1996 and 2010. The paper is composed by I) an introductory talk between Salvatore Settis und Roland Benedikter, and II) an essay by Roland Benedikter. It builds upon a 2004 publication by Roland Benedikter in the International Journal of Heritage Studies (IJHS), London. The present paper is one of the first attempts to get an overall view of the privatization process of Italian cultural and architectural heritage of the past 15 years. Part I is an easy to read introduction into the outstandingly complex topic. Part II is an in-depth elaboration that builds upon a review of the history of Italian heritage conservation, including the laws of the “Berlusconi culture” since the second half of the 1990s. It discusses some case studies and assesses the perspectives of the process at its 15-year-anniversary. The importance of the issue derives from the fact that the privatization process of Italian cultural heritage, numerically speaking the most important in Europe and one of the most important in the world, can be seen as to some extent exemplary for the development of the sector in Europe, including both its ambivalences and chances.
From 2007 to 2010, a financial and economic crisis gripped the United States, Europe and the world. 7 million Americans and 2 million Europeans lost their jobs, and 10 million were pushed below the poverty line. Thousands of families lost their homes, and many lost their savings. A global recovery from the effects of the crisis will take years.
As a result of the crisis, social banking and social finance have become important trends among bank customers in Europe. In fact, European social banks are the big winners of the crisis, growing by more than 20% per year and doubling their assets between 2007 and 2010. The crisis transformed social banks from niche institutions to large, publicly visible players. This success is due to the conviction of a growing number of bank customers in Europe that social banking is a less speculative and more responsible, ethical, and community-oriented way to deal with money than traditional banking. In the aftermath of the crisis, many see social banking as less egoistic and more caring for the overall progress of society than mainstream banking. Thus, social banking may provide important lessons for the banking and finance sector as a whole, in order to avoid further crises in the future.
In order to see what can be learned from social banking, let us first take a look at what social banking is; second, review the most important social banks today; and third, examine lessons from the success of social banks.
Michael A. McFaul, a Stanford political science professor and senior fellow at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, was confirmed by the Senate to be the next ambassador to Russia.
McFaul, President Barack Obama’s top advisor on Russia and a Bing Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, will succeed John Beyrle.
"Mike will bring to his new posting in Moscow the same intensity, clarity of vision and imagination that he demonstrated as President Obama's point person on Russia at the White House," said Coit D. Blacker, FSI’s director and the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies.
The Dec. 17 voice vote confirming McFaul came on the last day the Senate was in session before its winter break. Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., had held up McFaul's approval over issues with U.S. policies toward Russia.
During confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, McFaul discussed the overall status of U.S.-Russian relations, missile defense, arms reduction agreements and trade relations.
Since the beginning of the Obama administration, McFaul has been the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Security Council.
He served as senior adviser on Russia and Eurasia to Obama during the presidential campaign and continued to advise on foreign policy issues during the transition.
The Obama administration has achieved new momentum in relations with Russia with McFaul's involvement.
The two countries have signed the New Start arms control treaty, which calls for significant cuts in nuclear arsenals; finalized a civilian nuclear cooperation pact; forged agreement on tougher sanctions on Iran; and expanded the supply route to Afghanistan through the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The two powers now turn to the efforts to forge cooperation on missile defense in Europe and to gain Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization, as well as the challenges posed by Iran and Libya.
"This is a complex and sensitive time in the ever-evolving relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation," Blacker said. "Having an ambassador in place who gets the relationship has never been more important. For this reason above all others, Mike is the perfect choice. We are all deeply proud of Mike and all that he has accomplished."
McFaul, who has served as FSI’s deputy director and director of the institute’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, received a bachelor’s degree in international relations and Slavic languages and an master’s in Slavic and East European studies from Stanford in 1986. He was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, where he completed his PhD in international relations in 1991.
The past year unfolded with Japan’s unprecedented triple disaster and closed with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s historic trip to Myanmar. Moving into 2012, Europe’s economy creaks along uncertainly and China gears up for a major leadership change. In an interview with the Ukranian magazine Glavred, political science professor Phillip Lipscy discusses landmark Asian economic and political events of 2011, and what they could mean in the coming year.
What was the most significant event in terms of Asia’s economy in 2011?
The March 11 Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami: Besides the tragic loss of life and property, the disaster disrupted global supply chains and plunged the Japanese economy into a recession. The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima also led many countries to question the future of nuclear energy—this will have long-lasting consequences for global energy markets and efforts to deal with climate change.
What was the most significant political event?
Signs of political opening in Burma/Myanmar could have profound consequences not only for that country but for the rest of Asia as well. Hillary Clinton became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit the country in 50 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from detention and the National League for Democracy has re-registered as a political party. If this leads to democratization, it will be remembered as an important turning point.
What new policy and economic trends appeared in 2011? Which of them will continue into the coming year?
There seems to be a subtle shift in views towards China's economy. Chinese government officials are deeply concerned about the "middle income trap." China has reached a level of development where many countries saw their economic growth slow down sharply. Rising incomes are eroding China's advantage in low-cost manufacturing. There is much talk of multinational companies relocating their operations to even cheaper countries, such as Vietnam. This is an important transition for China, and it will remain an important issue in coming years.
In terms of people, who do you feel was the most notable, and who was the most disappointing this past year?
The people of Japan, who responded with remarkable perseverance, order, and discipline to such a tragic natural disaster.
The most disappointing were the political leaders of Japan, who could not set aside their differences and come together for the sake of their country.
Will China continue to spread its influence in 2012, and might any countries oppose this process?
China is now the second largest economy in the world and an important military power. It is inevitable that China will rise in international stature and influence. However, Chinese leaders also face some important challenges—rising inequality, an overheated housing market, and bad loans in its financial system. The focus of international attention should be on integrating China into the world order as a peaceful, responsible stakeholder—not on confrontation.
What impact could the economic crisis in Europe have on the economics and international policy of the Asia-Pacific region?
If the financial crisis in Europe is mismanaged, nobody will escape the consequences. Europe is a crucial export market for Asian countries, and European financial institutions are major lenders to emerging economies in the region. Equally as important, repeated financial crises and political mismanagement in the United States, Japan, and Europe could begin to undermine perceptions of democratic government and capitalism.
What will be most important event in Asia next year?
China's leadership transition, particularly given the many immediate challenges the country faces.
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U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Aung San Suu Kyi at her house in Rangoon, Myanmar, Dec. 2011.
On December 6, the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the Safadi Foundation USA inaugurated the Safadi-Stanford Initiative for Policy Innovation (SSIPI) at a conference hosted by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC and supported by the Center for International Private Enterprise. This gathering convened an upwards of 100 guests to explore the conference's theme of economic reform and development in the Arab world.
The keynote addresses were delivered by IMF Head Christine Lagarde who commented on the economic landscape in the region and suggested methods to stimulate growth for emerging Arab economics, and Lebanese Finance Minister Mohammad Safadi who stressed the importance of institution building and transparent accountable governance practices for development in the region, particularly in relation to how Arab governments handle international aid.
Safadi Scholar of the Year Katarina Uherova Hasbani presented the findings of a research study she authored on electricity sector reform in Lebanon while in residence at CDDRL this fall. The SSIPI research partnership was initiated to promote policy-relevant research on Lebanon and supported Hasbani's visiting fellowship at Stanford. Hasbani, an energy policy expert, presented her findings to the policy- making community, arguing that reliable and stable electricity supplies are a pre-condition for economic development. Hasbani cautioned that the failing electricity sector in Lebanon threatens the country's progress diverting resources from social development and education.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Tamara Wittes and Mara Rudman, Assistant Administrator for the bureau for Middle East at USAID, both commented on the development challenges and opportunities that lie in the wake of the Arab Spring. "What is happening in the region is about the people writing their own story," said Wittes. "The United States has to approach this with a sense of humility but we have a role to play because we are a major presence in the region." Rudman added that USAID is reaching out to new audience and partners in Egypt, many of whom are outside Cairo, to engage new actors after the January 25 revolution.
Miriam Allam, an economist with the OECD and Safadi Scholar first runner-up stressed the importance of public consultation and good regulation as best practices for cultivating active and democratic citizenship. Undersecretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs Robert D. Hormats, underscored the fact that economic reform must match social and political change in the region to create diverse economies that support growth, investment, and trade.
Inger Anderson, Vice-President for MENA at the World Bank, commented on the funding shortages from European countries that are resulting in decreased investment in the Arab world, when they need it the most. Both Anderson and Lagarde advocated for the reform of government subsidies, according to Lagarde, "governments need sustainable fiscal policies, including better targeted subsidies to help low-income groups."
Lagarde added that a key way forward is encouraging private sector investment to spur job creation but stressed that this requires predictability, a stable legal and tax environment, absence of corruption, and the elimination of regulatory loopholes.
Through this conference and ongoing research, the Safadi-Stanford Initiative for Policy Innovation seeks to offer new approaches and recommendations to advance development and governance practices in the region.
The supercommittee's failure to reach an agreement on debt reduction will probably result in unexpected reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That possibility concerns the defense establishment, but it also presents an opportunity: It might finally be possible to have an honest debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and the prospect for further arms reductions.
Before moving ahead with this conversation, though, it is critical to review and debunk three misguided ideas about nuclear weapons.
The first is that our nuclear world is safe and stable and that all we need to do now is prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. Though it is undoubtedly true that the U.S. stockpile is safer than ever, the dangers are far from over. Nuclear terrorism remains a threat. Mistakes are possible, too. In just one example, in August 2007, six nuclear warheads disappeared for two days between North Dakota's Minot and Louisiana's Barksdale Air Force bases.
What's more, unsafe nuclear weapons elsewhere remain a major threat. Tensions between nuclear India and Pakistan, the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and the future of the North Korean nuclear weapons program all suggest that the commitment to making U.S. weapons more reliable and secure will not solve the problem.
The second piece of nuclear mythology is that nuclear disarmament has never taken place and never will. Put slightly differently, it is the idea that nuclear history is proliferation history. But nuclear disarmament is far from unprecedented. South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan all disarmed. Many nuclear-capable states chose to pursue security without nuclear weapons because policymakers recognized these weapons would endanger rather than protect them. Sweden went down the nuclear path and then decided against it in the late 1960s.
Germany had a nuclear weapons program during World War II but became a law-abiding, non-nuclear member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Japan had two nuclear weapons programs during the war and accumulated a significant quantity of plutonium; since then, its authorities thought about restarting a weapons program four times but decided against it.
In each of those cases, most analysts did not believe that giving up nuclear weapons ambitions was possible. They were wrong, and today we all are glad these countries chose the path they did.
The third misguided concept is that reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will lead to proliferation. Those who believe this think that countries that no longer feel protected by U.S. nuclear weapons will start building their own to protect themselves. Although this might have some validity, it should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Historically, many of the states that have disarmed or given up their nuclear-weapon ambitions - including every non-nuclear nation outside of NATO - have done so despite the absence of a nuclear-security guarantee.
On the other hand, states determined to get the bomb, such as the United Kingdom and France, have done so despite security guarantees. Finally, this argument assumes that the role of nuclear weapons in future alliances and geopolitical relationships will be as important as it was in the past. This might be true, but it cannot be considered a fact. It is just a bet on the future and a set of policy priorities.
In 2007, "the four horsemen" - Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz - wrote a highly influential opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that relying on nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence has become "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective." Coming from former Cold Warriors from both sides of the political aisle, it legitimized the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and challenged the conventional wisdom.
Now policymakers in Washington and candidates on the electoral trail should embrace the issue, and begin a real conversation with the electorate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy rather than allowing that policy to be driven by inertia or budget cuts.
This roundtable engages the causes, courses and consequences of the policy of mass population exchanges that have shaped the political and ethnographic boundaries of modern Eurasia.
Co-sponsored by the Department of History, Mediterranean Studies Forum, Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies, and the Stanford Humanities Center.
Levinthal Hall
Matthew Frank
Lecturer in International History
Speaker
University of Leeds, UK
Catherine Gousseff
Researcher at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and FSI-Humanities Center international visitor for February 2012
Speaker
European leaders converged in Brussels to figure a way out of a worsening debt crisis and agreed to greater financial oversight and centralization. England refuses to go along with the plan, and Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama says he expects some countries will start bailing out of the eurozone.
Fukuyama talks about the summit, the euro’s chances of survival and what’s at stake for America if the currency collapses.
What does the Brussels agreement mean for Europe’s debt crisis?
We will have to see how much of a binding constraint this agreement actually is. It’s just an informal agreement at this point. Political leaders can promise anything at this kind of summit and fail to deliver.
I think the most interesting thing going on is the eurozone – the 17 countries that participate in the euro – is actually splitting off from the greater EU. The reason that’s happening is that in order to save the eurozone, they need to make certain decisions on this type of deepening control. And countries like Britain will never go along with this. The 17 countries have to create their own unit that can make decisions at the expense of the larger EU.
Explain Britain’s refusal to have its budget reviewed by the European Commission
The UK is like the United States – they’ve always been jealous of their sovereignty. If you go to England and talk about crossing the Channel, they’ll say, “Oh, so you’re going to go to Europe.” While an American would say “England is a part of Europe.”
There’s a strong strain – especially within the conservative party – that really does not want to give up authority to what they regard as a bunch of French socialists in Brussels. That’s their vision of what the EU really represents. So they’re resistant about being dragged into any German scheme to deepen the powers in Brussels to include control over national budgets because that is a core element of sovereignty. The majority of people in Britain will say that will happen over their dead bodies.
What is the likelihood that countries will begin exiting the eurozone?
I don’t think it makes sense for a country like Greece to stay in the eurozone. It’s a matter of national pride that they don’t want to be the first country out, but it’s very hard to see how they actually return to growth under a system that links them to Germany in terms of the price of their currency. Long before there’s any kind of centralized fiscal reform that’s imposed on Greece, Portugal and these other peripheral countries, I think it’s more likely that they’ll exit. The euro will probably remain, but it will be at the core of the more stable countries.
What mechanism is there for countries to exit the eurozone?
There is no mechanism. Not only is there no legal way of exiting, there’s no disciplining mechanism. You have a stability pact where countries agreed they wouldn’t run a budget deficit greater than 3 percent, and Germany was really one of the first counties to violate that. But there were no sanctions. That’s the problem right now – there’s neither discipline nor an exit mechanism. That’s why everyone is fearing a disorderly, messy breakup of the EU, which would be extremely damaging.
President Obama has said the U.S. “stands ready to do our part" to help Europe resolve its crisis. What can America really do?
It’s an indication of how far we’ve fallen, but there’s really nothing concretely we can do apart from possibly increasing our International Monetary Fund share. But the IMF doesn’t have the ammunition to really help at all in this particular crisis. So all we can do is sit on the sidelines and try to get the Europeans to take our advice, which a lot of them are not inclined to do given the mess that happened on Wall Street three years ago. It’s a mark of the diminishment of overall American influence that we’re simply relegated to the sidelines of this crisis.
What’s at stake for America in the wake of a total European financial meltdown?
There’s a lot at stake. We are slowly crawling out of the biggest recession since the Great Depression. The one thing that could really send us back into a second leg of a recession is collapse of the European financial system and panic in Europe. If Europe doesn’t do well, the United States isn’t going to do well.
