In the eyes of many observers of globalization today, its origins are recent and Western. In fact, Indians, Chinese, and Southeast Asians pioneered globalization long before the colonial era. In the 1st century CE, discovery of the monsoon wind brought increasing number of Indian, Roman, and Arab traders to Southeast Asia in search of spices and precious metals. In the 16th century, the port of Malacca emerged as a crucial nexus - the vital transshipment point of commerce between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The discovery of the New World and the ensuing boom in silver bound Southeast Asia even more tightly with India and Europe in triangular trade. Malacca's early importance as an entrepot is akin to the role that Memphis, Tennessee, plays today as the global air-cargo hub for Federal Express. Against this rich background, Nayan Chanda will contend that "calls to shut down globalization are pointless, because nobody is in charge," while at the same suggesting ways in which "we can attempt to nudge our rapidly integrating world toward a more harmonious course."

Nayan Chanda is director of publications at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and editor of YaleGlobal Online. In April 2007 Yale University Press will publish his new book on globalization, Bound Together. In 2005 Stanford and Harvard Universities awarded him their joint Shorenstein Prize for Excellence in Journalism on Asia. In 1990-92 he edited the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly. His many writings include a widely admired book on Indochina, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (1986). Earlier in his career he worked for the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review as its reporter, diplomatic correspondent, and editor.

Co-sponsored with the Global Management Program at Stanford's Graduate School of Business.

This is the Southeast Asia Forum's ninth seminar of the 2006-2007 academic year.

U.S.-European relations hit a dramatic and highly visible low point in the weeks leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. With the exception of the British government, which was, of course, supportive of the enterprise, many long-time U.S. allies – including, most prominently, France and Germany – were openly hostile to the American action. Relations have recovered, to a degree at least on an official level, but disagreements persist and resentments fester on both sides of the Atlantic four years after the onset of the war.

Is the damage that has been inflicted on the relationship irreparable in some sense? Or, as on so many other occasions since the establishment of the trans-Atlantic partnership at the mid-point of the last century, is the current unpleasantness likely to prove transitory? While the arrows point in both directions, the evidence continues to mount that the tensions so much in evidence between the two sides over the course of the last half-decade or so transcend disputes over particular issues. If this is true – which I believe it is – then our differences over Iraq are a reflection of something much deeper that is underway within the relationship, and not, in and of themselves, the cause – or even a cause – of the problem.

The real issue, it seems to me, is not whether relations between the United States and Europe can be repaired. Within limits, they can and will be. The more interesting – and important – question is whether the very nature of the relationship has changed (and is continuing to change) and if so, how, why, and with what implications for the future?