-

Building 460, Room 429

James Ferguson Speaker
Robert Harrison Speaker
Bogumil Koss Jewsiewicki Speaker
Francoise Lionnet Speaker
Andrea Lunsford Speaker
Paula Moya Speaker
Istvan Rev Speaker
Hayden White Speaker
Symposiums
-

The change of Russian foreign policy under President Putin, the war in Georgia, and the recent disputes over Russian gas exports cannot but affect Moscow's relations with the European Union. Looking back at the history of these relations in the 1960s and 1970s will provide the analyst with valuable insights and with recommendations for future European policy.

Dr. Mueller focuses not only on Russia's current relations with the EU but also the historical buildup to the current state of play. He examines the most recent issues straining the EU-Russia relationship and the dependence of the two powers on each other. Dr. Mueller also leads the audience from World War II to the USSR's eventual recognition of the EEC in 1988. 

Synopsis

Dr. Mueller begins by introducing the current status of both the EU and Russia. As it stands, Russia’s population of 142m people is outweighed significantly by the EU’s 500m. In addition, Dr. Mueller reminds the audience that the EU’s economy is 10 times the size of Russia’s. However, the two are important trade partners. To Russia, the EU represents more than 50% of its trade. To the EU, Russia represents its 3rd largest trading partner. However, the EU’s dependence on Russia for energy is crucial. Dr. Mueller explains how various integration efforts have come to very little. The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has not been renewed, and the four common spaces approach the EU took to Russia has borne little fruit. Dr. Mueller reveals how relations are further strained by a variety of current issues such as debates over disarmament, democracy in Russia, and Kosovo.

In order to properly understand this, Dr. Mueller returns to the post-World War II period and the formation of the EEC in 1957. While Western European countries saw the EEC as an opportunity to unite and help each other in economic recovery after the war, the USSR perceived it as an economic base for NATO and an organization standing in the way of the USSR becoming Europe’s supreme power. Dr. Mueller describes how the Soviet Union was forced to change such an attitude because of the success of the EEC in raising wages in member states as well as Eastern European countries’ increasing dependence on it as an export partner. In 1962, Khrushchev took a new approach to all-European integration but his offer of formal relations fell through when de Gaulle vetoed the UK’s membership application into the EEC. Such efforts on the part of the USSR fell through once again in 1972 when the EEC was not interested in dealing with Comecon. Under Gorbachev, the USSR finally recognized the EEC in 1988. Dr. Mueller concludes by saying that while it was obvious that USSR did not really endorse Western European integration, it is surprising that the USSR did not see it as an opportunity to counter U.S. influence during the Cold War.

About the Speaker

Dr Wolfgang Mueller is a research fellow at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and a lecturer in Russian history and politics at the University of Vienna. His book on Soviet policy in Austria, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1955 (Böhlau 2005), was awarded the R.G. Plaschka Prize. Dr Mueller was a visiting scholar at the Freeman Spogli Institute's Forum on Contemporary Europe during the 2008-2009 academic year.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

616 Serra Street
Encina Hall E103
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 724-8020 (650) 725-2592
0
Research Scholar, Austrian Academy of Sciences
Visiting Scholar, Forum on Contemporary Europe
PhD

Dr Wolfgang Mueller, PhD in contemporary history and Russian studies (University of Vienna), is a research associate at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Former professional affiliations include the Montreal Holocaust Memorial Centre, Canada, and the Institute of East European History, University of Vienna. Wolfgang Mueller was a visiting fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of OSCE missions to the CIS area. He teaches Russian history and politics at the University of Vienna.

Research interests: Russian and Soviet foreign policy, international relations, the Cold War, European integration. Current research projects: continuities in Russian foreign policy behavior, the USSR/Russia and European integration; the revolutions of 1989.

Wolfgang Mueller’s book on postwar Soviet policy in Austria Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945-1955 (2005) was awarded the Richard G. Plaschka Prize. Further publications include Sovetskaia politika v Avstrii: Dokumenty iz Rossiiskikh arkhivov (with N. Naimark, A. Suppan, G. Bordiugov eds. 2005); The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (with G. Stourzh, A. Suppan eds. 2005); “Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War,” Cold War History 6 (2006) 1; Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (with M. Portmann eds. 2007); “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” in From the Common Market to European Union Building (M. Gehler ed. 2009); Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe 1955-1989 (Forthcoming).

Dr. Mueller was a visiting scholar with the Forum on Contemporary Europe from October 2008 through March 2009.

Wolfgang Mueller Research Scholar, Austrian Academy of Sciences; Visiting Scholar, Forum on Contemporary Europe Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Daishiro Nomiya
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

In activist communities worldwide, globalization has had an enormous impact, both in the composition of activist groups and the content of their messages. At the same time, regional concerns are playing a significant role in the ways protests are organized, managed, and deployed.

Regardless of their location or their target, it is clear that protest campaigns have, on the one hand, become increasingly globalized. The protests that took place during the July 2008 G8 Toyako Summit in Japan offer a case in point. Approximately one hundred transnational activists flew into Sapporo, a city located near the summit site, and joined various civil and protest activities. Over a loudspeaker, they broadcast statements denouncing the summit meeting as “antidemocratic” and “discriminatory against the poor.” These activists were drawn from East, Southeast, and Central Asia, as well as Europe and North America, and they voiced correspondingly global concerns—for human rights, global peace, and democracy, and against inequality and poverty. These themes echoed those of other major global protests, including demonstrations that took place against the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, the latter most notably in 1999 in Seattle. Indeed, protests of this kind represent what might be called an antiglobalization movement

On the other hand, global movements of this kind also appear to be organized on an increasingly regional basis. Though the activists who protested the Toyako Summit came from all over the world, and addressed topics of global importance, most of the participants came mainly from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Given this apparent dichotomy, the question arises: Will global social movements become regional?

One could argue that global social movements are and will remain regional, at least for the time being, for two practical reasons. First, the costs associated with flight to activist hubs near protest sites can be expensive. Second, the amount of time spent in transition to the protest site becomes a burden. The time doubles when taking into consideration the time spent to return to the originating country. These factors can be prohibitive especially to those based far away, but are less burdensome to regional activists, thus making it easier for nearby protesters to participate.

While time and cost are no doubt a concern, they may not be as important when compared with the other factors. Language is among these factors. Cooperative activities beyond the national borders are on the rise, yet many foreign activists do not speak the languages spoken in the countries where they protest. They invariably rely on English, widely accepted as the “global” language. Yet the levels of English fluency differ among participating activists, and this is a key factor. With their English ability, activists from Europe and North America tend to communicate with others on an individual basis, while those from nearby countries often rely on interpreters, especially when discussions delve into the details of the planned activity and necessary arrangements associated with it. Typically, interpreters are group leaders, well educated and knowledgeable about regional and global issues—and these individuals facilitate most intergroup communication.

Preestablished ties and preexisting communication can influence negotiation and cooperation processes among activists. Global social movements tend to enhance crossnational cooperation among participating activists—that is, activists who come together from different countries often regroup elsewhere, building on their previous cooperative activities. In the case of the 2008 G8 summit protests, regionalization was very much at work. Several months prior to the summit, Japanese media activists planned a temporary umbrella organization called the G8 Media Network, which helped to accommodate incoming foreign media activists and arranged international cooperative activities during the summit. As it happened, the foreign activists and groups that interacted with the G8 Media Network were actually regional, originating mainly from South Korea and Hong Kong. Under the auspices of the G8 Media Network, these groups of activists arrived prior to the summit and stayed until it concluded. Afterward, the same media groups discussed the continuation of crossnational cooperation. Though technically foreign, the dominant actors and groups who sought to continue cooperative activities were, in fact, only from neighboring countries.

Looking more closely at participants in the global protest activities provides further insight into contemporary global protest movements. At the 2008 G8 Summit protests, two different types of foreign participants were on display—those who had prior ties to host activist groups in Japan, and those who did not. The former group could be described as professional activists, whose preestablished ties ensure that they have good knowledge of a given protest’s scheduled activities. The professional group also organizes its own plans of action, precoordinated with domestic groups. The latter group tends to be traveling activists, a more or less independent and unorganized collection of individuals who enjoy traveling the globe and joining the activities offered at protest sites worldwide. The professional activist group is often drawn largely from neighboring countries in the region.

Most global social movements feature participants from around the world. At the same time, signs of regionalization also exist, making most protests both global and regional in nature. One could claim that the future of global social movements is regional. But whether global or regional, it is vital that we continue to study the composition of global protest movements and their abiding impact on civil society.

Hero Image
g8summit flickr miki yoshihito Flickr/MIKI Yoshihito
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
This new series builds on the success of last year's History, Memory, and Politics in Francophone Africa. In 2008-09 the Forum on Contemporary Europe and Division of Literatures, Cultures and Languages expand the subject by bringing together different disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, as well as different geographical areas, societies, and communities in which dealing with the past represents an important national and scholarly concern.
All News button
1
-

Workshop - 10:00 AM
Contact Cosana Eram for RSVP and pre-circulated paper: cosana@stanford.edu

Lecture - 4:00 PM
No RSVP required

Professor Lionnet discusses the various issues surrounding French literary identity. She examines the increasing award-winning French literature coming from writers outside of France and current issues of the term 'Francophone.' Moreover, Prof. Lionnet analyzes that attempts to create the notion of a world literature in French.

Synopsis

Prof. Lionnet begins by revealing that French literature is no longer conventionally French. Prof. Lionnet explains that there are many ‘canonical figures’ who are Francophone but do not have lineage in France. She cites the key poetic movements of the 18th century that opened the way for romanticism and poeticism in prose of three Creole poets notably including the poet Parny. In France, he was seen as Creole. In Russia, where he spent some time during his travels, Parny was seen as French. Prof. Lionnet moves on to discuss the role of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) which seeks to promote the French language and oppose the universality of English. Prof. Lionnet also focuses on the tension between the writers’ identity being defined by the language they write in or by their political, social, and ethnic situation. This debate extends into the wider problem of the hierarchy caused by the Francophone system because it arguably impedes French-speaking writers’ access to the same literary glory as native French writers, not in line with the ideals of the French republic. Prof. Lionnet then begs the question of how are we to name this new global literature and how are to deal with this universalism. Prof. Lionnet concludes the first part of her talk by proposing that universalism is the core of the issue. The question lies in how far we are ready to accept differences in the approach to French literature.

Prof. Lionnet begins the second part of her talk by explaining that questions of belonging are still crucial in contemporary debates of identity, especially in literature. Therefore, to Prof. Lionnet, geographically neutral methods of literary criticism fall short. Prof. Lionnet also discusses the 2007 manifesto, published in the newspaper Le Monde, for a world literature in French which crystallizes the cultural, ideological, and political issues relating to identity and language and tries to end the notion of Francophone as unemployable in French literary culture. Prof. Lionnet criticizes the manifesto in a variety of ways. First, she explains that the manifesto naively tries to decouple language and power. She also questions the ability of the French language to work as a world language in all walks of life and highlights the importance of French as a language that adapts and is influenced to wherever region it is used. In arguing against the manifesto, Prof. Lionnet finishes by saying that what is missing from the concept of a world literature in French is respect for the multiplicity of all the languages of the world.

Prof. Lionnet also kindly takes the time to answer many questions in the audience touching on multiple issues. She debates the suitability of the suffix ‘-phone’ in Francophone and analyzes tentative parallels between the situation of today and the 19th century use of ‘lower class’ language in the literature by writers such as Victor Hugo. Prof. Lionnet touches on the role of the Academie Francaise and the long time universality of France which is currently coming into question as the population itself has to deal with identity issues as its ethnic makeup continually evolves. 

About the Speaker

Françoise Lionnet is Professor of French and Francophone Studies at UCLA. Author of Autobiographical Voices: Race, Gender, Self-Portraiture (Cornell, 1989), and Postcolonial Representations: Women, Literature, Identity (Cornell, 1995);co-editor of a special double issue of Yale French Studies entitled "Post/Colonial Conditions: Exiles, Migrations, Nomadisms", and a special issue of Signs on "Postcolonial, Indigenous, and Emergent Feminisms."

Currently she is working on a book entitled Dissonant Echoes: Seduction and Disavowal in Postcolonial Novels, which is a study of Francophone Caribbean and Indian Ocean writers' re-appropriation of 19th- and 20th-century British and American classics.

Building 460, Room 429

Françoise Lionnet Professor of French and Francophone Studies Speaker UCLA
Seminars
-

The subject of the lecture is the emergence of memory-life. I consider the early 1980s to effectively bring the twentieth century to a close. In this time of the collapse of Communism it became obvious that the Utopian experiments, based on continuous, deep state intervention on the macro-sphere, could no longer be sustained. Memory as a discursive frame became available and readily usable for anybody, for millions of people, who lost their future because they lost their past, both in the East and West, and especially in East and Central Europe. By making use of the readily available Memory frame, they managed to find a past under a new description. Memory has emerged as a tool with which to reimagine and represent both individual and collective identity. Instead of analyzing notions of individual or collective memory, I will focus my talk on the emergence of Memory as a discursive and existential frame. I will closely examine the emergence of a specific interactive type, The Survivor, The Living Memorial, who considers it as his or her obligation to bear witness to his or her refashioned, newly found past.

Synopsis

Professor Rev begins by explaining that the 20th century had led to the emergence of the science of memory. Prof. Rev shows how there is an unfortunate and unnecessary line between history and memory when in fact they should complement each other. Aiming to survey the public discourse from the mid-1980s , Prof. Rev begins his story at a time where the after effect of the Vietnam War was deeply pitted in the American psyche, there was serious alarm at the high incidents of child abuse, and fundamental critiques were being made of the typical bourgeois family. He discusses the crucial notion of trauma through the example of the work of Catherine MacKinnon in trying to associate mass rape during the Balkans conflict of the 1990s as genocide due to its attacks on sex and ethnicity. Prof. Rev also explains the intense discussions of the trauma in the section on mass rape of the U.N. archives on humanitarian violence in former Yugoslavia. To Prof. Rev, this along with other historical factors, such as the outbreak of hysteria in France in the 1970s, led to a new kind of memory born from the previously unrecognizable state called trauma and the previously unknown kind of forgetting called repression.

Prof. Rev explores how memories of atrocities are closely connected with traumatic silence, as well as the theory of how trauma can be passed onto others by listening, making trauma an intergenerational experience. The significance of such transmission has led to a belief that the history of events such as the Holocaust is better experienced than understood. Prof. Rev also examines how such historical events really came to light once communism had fallen, and there was a ready made discursive frame for the past to be made sense of. The significance of memory, in particular in Eastern Europe, was that memory was a tool of unmediated access to the past or a source of authenticity after decades of censored, centrally written history. Consequently, issues such as the Holocaust departed from being shameful taboos to a respected identity for the Jewish people. Prof. Rev explains how through memory such an identity could really be formed.

Prof. Rev also analyzes how the fall of the Soviet Union led the liberation of memories through key works such as Alice Miller’s ‘Breaking Down the Wall of Silence.’ Miller links difficult childhoods to the acts of great tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin. Prof. Rev reveals how a tough childhood stunts the growth disabling one reach the full human capacity of being able to feel inclinations such as compassion. He links this with the work of Jeffrey Mason, archivist for Freud’s archives, who emphasized that sexual, physical, and emotional violence is a tragic part of the lives of many children. Mason’s book played a serious role in the recovered memory movement. Prof. Rev brings this all together by expressing that, to him, the Holocaust is a symptom as well as a cause of repressed memories of child abuse.

In a lengthy question-and-answer session, Prof. Rev and the audience raise of a number of points. For example, Prof. Rev further explores the concept of inherited or transgenerational memory. In addition, he reiterates his concern about the clash between historians and memory scientists. Another notable point Prof. Rev addressed among a variety of others was the history of the status accorded to victims and the fraudulent behavior that may be caused by this phenomenon.

About the speaker

Istvan Rev is Professor of History and Political Science at the Central European University, Budapest, where he is also the Academic Director of the Open Society Archive. He has been a visiting faculty member at the University of California, Berkeley on several occasions. Since the early 1980s, Rev has published widely on the political cultural, and architectural history of Hungary and other Eastern bloc countries. He is the author of "Retroactive Justice" (Stanford University Press, 2005). He edited the special issue of Representations on "Monumental Histories"(1991).

Sponsored by Contemporary History and the Future of Memory, a project of the DLCL Research Unit co-sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe.

Building 460, Room 429

Istvan Rev Professor of History and Political Science Speaker Central European University
Seminars
-

North Korea has often been considered an aberration in the post-Cold War international system, a relic of a Stalinist past. In fact, a close examination of North Korean foreign relations during the Cold War period reveals that Pyongyang's behavior never fit neatly into the paradigm of a bipolar international order, and that the Cold War itself had a distinctive dynamic in the Korean context. This dynamic helps to explain the continued existence of a divided Korea to this day, long after the bipolar international system has ended. Based largely on formerly secret materials from North Korea's Cold War allies in Eastern Europe, this paper suggests that Pyongyang's "aberrent" behavior long pre-dates the 1990s. It argues that North Korea has exhibited more continuity than change in the way it has dealt with the outside world over the last several decades, focusing on three areas of foreign policy: economic extraction, political non-alignment, and the development of an independent nuclear weapons capability.

Charles K. Armstrong is The Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Korean Studies in the Social Sciences in the Department of History and the Director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University. In the fall semester of 2008 he was a Visiting Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University.

A specialist in the modern history of Korea and East Asia, Professor Armstrong is the author or editor of several books, including The Koreas (Routledge, 2007), The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Cornell, 2003), Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (M.E. Sharpe, 2006), and Korean Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (Routledge, second edition 2006), as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters.  His current book projects include a study of North Korean foreign relations in the Cold War era and a history of modern East Asia.

Professor Armstrong holds a B.A. in Chinese Studies from Yale University, an M.A. in International Relations from the London School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago. He has been a member of the Columbia faculty since 1996.

Philippines Conference Room

Charles K. Armstrong Associate Professor, Director of the Center for Korean Research Speaker Columbia University
Seminars
Authors
Larry Diamond
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Bush gave democracy promotion a bad name, Larry Diamond writes in Newsweek. The new administration needs to get it right.

The new U.S. President will face more than one kind of global recession. In addition to the economic downturn, the world is suffering a democratic contraction. In Russia, awash with oil money, Vladimir Putin and his KGB cronies have sharply restricted freedom. In Latin America, authoritarian (and anti-American) populism is on the rise. In Nigeria, the Philippines and once again in Pakistan, democracy is foundering amid massive corruption, weak government and a loss of public faith. In Thailand, the government is paralyzed by mass protests. In Africa, more than a dozen fragile democracies must face the economic storm unprepared. And in the Middle East—the Bush administration's great democratic showcase—the push for freedom lies in ruins.

In the past decade, the breathtaking democratic wave that swept the world during the final quarter of the 20th century reversed course. Making democracy work proved harder than bringing down authoritarian rule. And receptive peoples everywhere were alienated by the arrogance and unilateralism of President George W. Bush's approach, which associated "democracy promotion" with the use of force and squandered America's soft power. Advancing democracy abroad remains vital to the U.S. national interest. But the next president will have to craft a more modest, realistic and sustainable strategy.

It's easy today to forget how far freedom has advanced in the past 30 years. When the wave of liberation began in 1974 in Portugal, barely a quarter of the world's states met the minimal test of democracy: a place where the people are able, through universal suffrage, to choose and replace their leaders in regular, free and fair elections. Over the course of the next two decades, dictatorships gave way to freely elected governments first in Southern Europe, then in Latin America, then in East Asia. Finally, an explosion of freedom in the early '90s liberated Eastern Europe and spread democracy from Moscow to Pretoria. Old assumptions—that democracy required Western values, high levels of education and a large middle class—crumbled. Half of sub-Saharan Africa's 48 states became democracies, and of the world's poorest countries, about two in every five are democracies today.

This great shift coincided with an unprecedented moment of U.S. military, economic and cultural dominance. Not only was America the world's last remaining superpower, but U.S. values—individual freedom, popular sovereignty, limited government and the rule of law—were embraced by progressive leaders around the world. Opinion surveys showed democracy to be the ideal of most people as well.

In recent years, however, this mighty tide has receded. This democratic recession has coincided with Bush's presidency, and can be traced in no small measure to his administration's imperial overreach. But it actually started in 1999, with the military coup in Pakistan, an upheaval welcomed by a public weary of endemic corruption, economic mismanagement and ethnic and political violence. Pakistan's woes exposed more than the growing frailty of a nuclear-weapon state. They were also the harbinger of a more widespread malaise. Many emerging democracies were experiencing similar crises. In Latin America and the post-communist world, and in parts of Asia and Africa, trust in political parties and parliaments was sinking dramatically, as scandals mounted and elected governments defaulted on their vows to control corruption and improve the welfare of ordinary people.

Thanks to bad governance and popular disaffection, democracy has lost ground. Since the start of the democratic wave, 24 states have reverted to authoritarian rule. Two thirds of these reversals have occurred in the past nine years—and included some big and important states such as Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Thailand and (if one takes seriously the definition of democracy) Nigeria and the Philippines as well. Pakistan and Thailand have recently returned to rule by elected civilians, and Bangladesh is about to do so, but ongoing crises keep public confidence low. Democracy is also threatened in Bolivia and Ecuador, which confront rising levels of political polarization. And other strategically important democracies once thought to be doing well—Turkey, South Africa and Ukraine—face serious strains.

This isn't to say there haven't been a few heartening successes in recent years. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has become a robust democracy nearly a decade after its turbulent transition from authoritarian rule. Brazil, under the left-leaning Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has also strengthened its democratic institutions while maintaining fiscal discipline and a market orientation and reducing poverty. In Africa, Ghana has maintained a quite liberal democracy while generating significant economic growth, and several smaller African countries have moved in this direction.

But the combination of tough economic times, diminished U.S. power and the renewed energy of major authoritarian states will pose a stiff challenge to some 60 insecure democracies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. If they don't strengthen their political institutions, reduce corruption and figure out how to govern more effectively, many of these democracies could fail in the coming years.

Part of the tragedy is that Washington has made things worse, not better. The Bush administration was right that spreading democracy would advance the U.S. national interest—that truly democratic states would be more responsible, peaceful and law-abiding and so become better contributors to international security. But the administration's unilateral and self-righteous approach led it to overestimate U.S. power and rush the dynamics of change, while exposing itself to charges of hypocrisy with its use of torture and the abuse of due process in the war on terror. Instead of advancing freedom and democracy in the Middle East, 2005 and 2006 witnessed a series of embarrassing shocks: Hamas winning in the Palestinian territories and Islamist parties winning in Iraq; Hizbullah surging in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood surging in Egypt. After a brief moment of optimism, the United States backed away and Middle Eastern democrats grew embittered.

The new American administration will have to fashion a fresh approach—and fast. That will mean setting clear priorities and bringing objectives into alignment with means. The United States does not have the power, resources or moral standing to quickly transform the world's entrenched dictatorships. Besides, isolating and confronting them never seems to work: in Cuba, for example, this policy has been a total failure. This does not mean that the United States should not support democratic change in places like Cuba, Burma, Iran and Syria. But it needs a more subtle and sophisticated approach.

The best strategy would be to open up such places to the freer flow of people, goods, ideas and information. The next administration should therefore start by immediately lifting the self-defeating embargo on Cuba. It should offer to establish full diplomatic ties with Havana and free flows of trade and investment in exchange for a Cuban commitment to improve human rights. Washington should also work with Tehran to hammer out a comprehensive deal that would lift economic sanctions, renounce the use of force to effect regime change and incorporate Iran into the WTO, in exchange for a verifiable halt to nuclear-weapons development, more responsible behavior on Iraq and terrorism, and improved human-rights protection and monitoring. Critics will charge that talking to such odious governments only legitimizes them. In fact, engaging closed societies is the best way to foster democratic change.

At the same time, the United States should continue to support diaspora groups that seek peaceful democratic change back home, and should expand international radio broadcasting, through the Voice of America and more specialized efforts, that transmits independent news and information as well as democratic values and ideas.

In the near term, however, Washington must focus on shoring up existing democracies. Fragile states need assistance to help them adjust to the shocks of the current economic crisis. But they also need deep reforms to strengthen their democratic institutions and improve governance. This will require coordinated help from America and its Western allies to do three things.

First, they must ramp up technical assistance and training programs to help the machinery of government—parliaments, local authorities, courts, executive agencies and regulatory institutions—work more transparently and deliver what people want: the rule of law, less corruption, fair elections and a government that responds to their economic and social needs. This also means strengthening democratic oversight.

Second, we know from experience that these kinds of assistance don't work unless the political leaders on the receiving end are willing to let them. So we need to generate strong incentives for rulers to opt for a different logic of governance, one that defines success as delivering development and reducing poverty rather than skimming public resources and buying support or rigging elections. This will mean setting clear conditions that will have to be met before economic and political aid is doled out to governments.

The third priority is to expand assistance to independent organizations, mass media and think tanks in these fragile states that will increase public demand for better governance and monitor what governments do. This means aiding democratic professional associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, student groups and organizations devoted to human rights, women's rights, transparency, civic education, election monitoring and countless other democratic activities. Ordinary people must be educated to know their rights and responsibilities as citizens—and be ready to defend them.

While Western countries have provided this kind of aid for more than two decades, economic assistance handed out at the same time has often undermined democracy efforts by subsidizing corrupt, abusive governments. Aid donors should thus strike a new bargain with recipients, telling them: if you get serious about containing corruption, building a rule of law and improving people's lives, we will get serious about helping you. Those that show a real commitment should get significant new rewards of aid and freer trade. Those unwilling to reform should get little, though the West should continue to fight disease and directly help people in dire need wherever they are.

Finally, the new president should keep in mind the power of example. Washington can't promote democracy abroad if it erodes it at home. The contradictions between the rhetoric of Bush's "freedom agenda" and the realities of Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, torture, warrantless surveillance and boundless executive privilege have led even many of the United States' natural allies to dismiss U.S. efforts as hypocritical. Thus the new president must immediately shut down Guantánamo and unequivocally renounce the use of torture; few gestures would restore American credibility more quickly. The United States should also reduce the power of lobbyists, enhance executive and legislative transparency and reform campaign-finance rules—both for its own good and for the message it would send.

Make no mistake: thanks to the global economic crisis and antidemocratic trends, things may get worse before they get better. But supporting democracy abroad advances U.S. national interests and engages universal human aspirations. A more consistent, realistic and multilateral approach will help to secure at-risk democracies and plant the seeds of freedom in oppressed countries. Patience, persistence and savvy diplomacy will serve the next president far better than moralistic rhetoric that divides the world into good and evil. We've seen where that got us.

All News button
1
-

This seminar proposes readings of texts by migrants to and from Galicia as a means of mapping the cultural consequences, in Galicia, of the shifting relations between territory and citizenship, language and identity that have resulted from the massive population movements of the last century. While an important body of work already exists on migration between Galicia and the Americas, I argue here that the full implications of questions of migration and diaspora in Galicia can only be uncovered by relocating our discussion of diaspora and migration outside the colonial framework and the inevitably tangled linguistic, racial, cultural and historical ties within which Galician migration to Latin America has taken place. To this end, the paper focuses on writers connected with the Anglophone and Germanic diasporas for whom Galician is or has been a creative language.

Synopsis

Prof. Hooper begins by aiming to address the question of how to understand Galicia in a contemporary world where literature goes beyond state boundaries. She explains of Galicia’s complicated relationship with the world; while seen as a major literary force, it is still part of Spain and often disputes its nationhood. Prof. Hooper reveals, however, that Galicia’s self-image and image in the rest of the world has long been shaped by emigration. However, to Prof. Hooper, the traditional narrative of Galicia is no longer adequate. The overwhelming focus of this narrative on Galicia’s relationship with Spain and Latin America further perpetuates the notions of colonialism and Galicia as a minority. On the other hand, Prof. Hooper explains how decolonization and globalization have made artists and writers changed their approach to representing Galicia. Emigration is crucial to this reimagining because it is such a central part of Galician identity.

The 2005 Galician elections, decided by voters abroad, raised key questions about voting rights and Galician identity, according to Prof. Hooper. She discusses how conservatives and nationalists alike have promoted artificially stabling coordinates of identity in the region. Prof. Hooper illustrates such uncertainty about identity in Galicia through the example of the literary community. Those who are fervent supports of Galicia but write in Spanish are excluded, while foreigners writing in Galician are welcomed.

Another key aspect which Prof. Hooper raises is the emphasis on 'process over essences' in moving Galicia’s identity past state boundaries. However, Prof. Hooper reveals how this emigrant identity is characterized by various tensions. The intergenerational clash between what may be seen as the romantic notion of exile and economically driven emigration figures prominently in literature. Another significant tension is between nationalism and displacement, according to Prof. Hooper. She also argues that romanticizing emigration could lead dangerously to reinforcing conservative models. Finally, Prof. Hooper makes the point that immigration back into Galicia is changing identity in ways that the region does not yet know how to cope with.

Prof. Hooper finishes by taking questions on a range of topics from linguistic standardization to Galician literary work in Latin America. One of the issues particularly explored is the role of Galician electorate abroad, both in terms of voters and candidates. In addition, Prof. Hooper explores of notion of Galician identity abroad as a brand.

About the speaker

Kirsty Hooper teaches Spanish and Galician at the University of Liverpool, UK, where she is a founding editor of the journal Migrations & Identities and an assistant editor of the Bulletin of Hispanic Studies. She has published widely on modern and contemporary Spanish and Galician culture and literature, and is an active translator of Galician, Polish and Spanish literature.

This event is jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at Stanford University.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Kirsty Hooper Lecturer in Spanish and Galician Speaker University of Liverpool
Seminars
-

Over the past century, national elites have used proprietary narratives to justify the breakup of multiethnic societies and legitimize the nation-states that replaced them. Can scholars now redeploy history as a vehicle for promoting mutual recognition and reconciliation? Over the past decade a consortium of historians and social scientists has endeavored to do just that across the newly erected political and cultural frontiers of the former Yugoslavia.

Professor Charles Ingrao discusses the efforts of his organization, the Scholars' Initiative, in trying to provide a common platform for the media and politicians to move forward in dealing with the Yugoslav controversies. Prof. Ingrao emphasizes the need for a long term approach that employs irreproachable scholarly methodology and moves past the 'myths' created with the narratives of newly created nations. He also examines the problems that arise when trying the put together such an inclusive and multinational endeavor.

Synopsis

Professor Ingrao explains that there are several central issues that arise when multi-ethnic nation states are created. He discusses this particularly in reference to the Yugoslavian crisis of the 1990s, the main area of focus for his organization, the Scholars' Initiative. Prof. Ingrao argues that when creating new multi-ethnic nation states in the areas of the former Ottoman and Habsburg empires new narratives are created for the countries. Along with these narratives, certain myths are created that become engrained in the national psyche. The combination of these both, to Prof. Ingrao, tends to cleave these societies and create mutual incompatibility between them. In addition, democratization raises the problem that politicians are compelled, in order to receive voter support, in their respective countries to appeal to national emotions by leaning on such myths which further pits societies against each other. It also creates the sense that one ethnic majority is establishing its superiority of over ethnicities in the region.

How does one solve this? Prof. Ingrao reveals that politicians cannot be relied upon because they are ‘slaves to the ballot box.’ He also indicated that because of the two to three year cycles that U.S. State Department officials operate, they cannot be relied upon to provide long term solutions either. However, to Prof. Ingrao, scholars are supposed to see the ‘bigger picture’ and be able to analyze the causative roots as well as look to the future. Prof. Ingrao discusses how the Scholars’ Initiative brings together scholars from 28 different countries together to form a single, unified narrative of what happened that both exposes the myths and injects what Prof. Ingrao calls inconvenient facts. Prof. Ingrao explains that the revolutionary second aspect is public outreach. Such a narrative can be employed by the media, as well as political leaders who can use this narrative as a common platform to advance in dealing with these issues. Prof. Ingrao highlighted the need for such a report to be transparent, accessible, and inclusive of all scholars who could bring something to the table to satisfy both the scholarly methodology and public demand for the truth. As Prof Ingrao declared, “If we all can fess up...maybe we can start building bridges.”

About the speaker

Charles Ingrao is Professor of History at Purdue University. He has published extensively on early modern and contemporary central European history, and was formerly editor of The Austrian History Yearbook (1997-2006). Since 1995 his work has focused on the destruction of multiethnic central Europe, particularly in the former Yugoslavia. He has been a regular commentator for news media in Europe and North America, including The News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Over the past decade he has directed the Scholars’ Initiative, an international consortium of scholars that has just published Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, a common narrative of the wars of the 1990s that will serve as the basis for his talk.

Jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Charles Ingrao Professor of History Speaker Purdue University
Seminars
Subscribe to Western Europe