-

*Open only to Stanford students.* 

Speaker Bio: 

Zahera Harb is one of the six 2013-2014 FSI-Humanities Center International Visitors and will be in residence at Stanford in May 2014. She is Senior Lecturer in International Journalism at City University London. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in journalism studies from Cardiff University (United Kingdom). As an expert on Arab media, she has published widely on journalism ethics, conflict and war reporting, political communication and representation of Muslims and Islam in western media. Her recent publications include Narrating Conflict in the Middle East: Discourse, Image and Communications Practices in Lebanon and Palestine (2013) and Channels of Resistance: Liberation Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media (2011). Dr. Harb also has 11 years of experience as a journalist in Lebanon working for Lebanese and international media organizations.

 

This event is co-sponsored by the Sohaib and Sara Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, CDDRL Program on Arab Reform and Democracy, the Mediterranean Studies Forum, Stanford Humanities Center, Arab Studies Table, Stanford Language Center. 

Building 30, Room 102

Zahera Harb Senior Lecturer in International Journalism Speaker City University London
Seminars
Date
Paragraphs
CDDRL Director Larry Diamond addresses concerns of an intensifying democratic recession in a piece in The Atlantic. Despite recent turmoil in Ukraine and democratic breakdowns in Thailand and Turkey, among others, Diamond emphasizes the critical role economic development, globalization and the growth of civil society will play in the long-run inducement of democratic change worldwide.
Hero Image
democracy Logo
Protesters carry a large banner reading: ''Democracy'' as they participate in an anti-government protests organized by Bahrain's leading opposition Al Wefaq. Sept. 14, 2012.
Hamad I Mohammed / Reuters
All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

President Barack Obama’s trip to four Asian nations – Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines – set out to address an ambitious agenda, including trade negotiations, territorial disputes, and the threat of North Korea. Scholars at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute provided commentary to local and international media about the state tour.

Ambassador Michael Armacost, a distinguished fellow at Shorenstein APARC, evaluated the goals of the trip, saying it aimed to deliver a message of reassurance to East Asia that the U.S. rebalance is intact. Armacost highlighted the efforts to negotiate a 12-nation trade pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the centerpiece of the Obama trip to Asia. He was interviewed by Weekly Toyo Keizi, a Japanese political economy magazine. An English version of the Q&A is available on Dispatch Japan.

Many foreign policy issues shadowed the outset of President Obama’s Asia trip, the crisis in Ukraine and Syria, among others. Daniel Sneider, associate director of research at Shorenstein APARC, said in Slate that Asian nations notice where the United States focuses its time. Obama’s commitment to the region may have come across as distracted given the breadth of his current foreign policy agenda.

Sneider also spoke with LinkAsia on Obama’s stop in Tokyo. President Obama met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe; the two leaders addressed issues surrounding territorial disputes and attempted to reach an agreement on outside market access issues in the TPP negotiations.

Donald Emmerson, director of Shorenstein APARC’s Southeast Asia Forum, offered an assessment of America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ and on the significance of the Malaysia and Philippines visits. He said the trip most notably reinforced America’s efforts to upgrade security commitments and promote freer trade negotiation in that region. The Q&A was carried by the Stanford News Service.

Emmerson spoke with McClatchyDC on two occasions about the Philippines leg of the tour. He commented on Obama’s statement reaffirming the United States’ security commitment to Japan, which recognized Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku Islands. Emmerson suggested the greater context of claims in the South China Sea must be considered, including Manila’s. He also said maintenance of the security alliance is a positive step, but trade is a an essential part of the the pivot's sustainablility.

Hero Image
Obama Asia Trip Japan Logo
All News button
1
-

Abstract:

Moulay Hicham’s newly published memoir, Journal d’un prince banni, retells his personal life within the context of devastating political critique against the Moroccan political system, its authoritarian monarchy, and the “deep state” within that resists democratic change, the Makhzen.  Written during Moulay Hicham's time as a fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford University, the volume is neither a settlement of accounts nor a gossipy narrative of frivolous stories.  It instead uniquely ensconces vivid personal recollections within the context of authoritarian politics.  The prince witnessed the rise of the system under King Hassan II, the long-lasting ruler who eliminated all opposition, centralized power, and linked a loyal community of courtiers, elites, and cronies to his will—the Makhzen.  The memoir reveals how Moulay Hicham’s aspirations towards autonomy and independence were constantly blocked by this system, often by either the King himself or his coercive apparatus, comprising the intelligence services and military.  At the same time, the nearly half-century reign of King Hassan exposes critical insight into the development of Moroccan politics and identity, from his acumen regarding the Western Sahara problem to his ability to make the kingdom a focal point of Arab politics after the demise of Nasserism. 

Those personal observations on governance continue with the royal ascent of Hassan’s son, Mohamed VI, who assumed the throne in 1999 and is Moulay Hicham’s cousin.  Replacing Hassan’s powerfully intent personality was this more humane yet political disengaged new king.  His inability to curb the Makhzen and enact meaningful democratic reforms shows the system’s very success.  Whereas the pressures of conforming to the system crushed many of those personalities who grew up in the court, Moulay Hicham managed to elude this destructive side through his self-imposed exile to the United States and his intellectual decision to criticize an authoritarian machine to which he was meant to belong.  As the memoir concludes, such resistance to change implicates the monarchy’s future.  Decades of political exclusion, false promises, and rising inequality have alienated much of the Moroccan public.  As the Arab Spring showed, such discontentment portends to future social and political conflict that could well discredit the monarchy, resulting in its overthrow after 350 years of continuous reign.

Journal d’un prince banni has become a literary and political phenomenon in Morocco and the Moroccan diaspora worldwide.  Its release ignited tumultuous debates within the press, social media, and civil society.  Dubbed an “exceptional document” by Le Nouvel Observateur, the memoir has become one of the best-selling non-fiction works in France.  Though print versions are currently unavailable in Morocco, electronic versions have been downloaded and disseminated on an exponential scale.  Arabic, English, and other language-editions are scheduled for release in the near future.

 

Speaker Bio:

Hicham Ben Abdallah received his B.A. in Politics in 1985 from Princeton University, and his M.A. in Political Science from Stanford in 1997. His interest is in the politics of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

He has lectured in numerous universities and think tanks in North America and Europe. His work for the advancement of peace and conflict resolution has brought him to Kosovo as a special Assistant to Bernard Kouchner, and to Nigeria and Palestine as an election observer with the Carter Center. He has published in journals such Le Monde,  Le Monde Diplomatique,Pouvoirs, Le Debat, The Journal of Democracy, The New York Times, El Pais, and El Quds.

In 2010 he has founded the Moulay Hicham Foundation which conducts social science research on the MENA region. He is also an entrepreneur with interests in agriculture, real estate, and renewable energies. His company, Al Tayyar Energy, has a number of clean energy projects in Asia and Europe. 

 

Oksenberg Conference Room

CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

0
Consulting Professor
Ben_Abdallah.jpg MA

Hicham Ben Abdallah received his B.A. in Politics in 1985 from Princeton University, and his M.A. in Political Science from Stanford in 1997. His interest is in the politics of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

He has lectured in numerous universities and think tanks in North America and Europe. His work for the advancement of peace and conflict resolution has brought him to Kosovo as a special Assistant to Bernard Kouchner, and to Nigeria and Palestine as an election observer with the Carter Center. He has published in journals such Le Monde,  Le Monde Diplomatique,Pouvoirs, Le Debat, The Journal of Democracy, The New York Times, El Pais, and El Quds.

In 2010 he has founded the Moulay Hicham Foundation which conducts social science research on the MENA region. He is also an entrepreneur with interests in agriculture, real estate, and renewable energies. His company, Al Tayyar Energy, has a number of clean energy projects in Asia and Europe. 

Hicham Ben Abdallah Consulting Professor Speaker Stanford University
Conferences
Paragraphs

Abstract:

This article aims to explain the 2011 Tunisian transition by offering a historical institutional and a game-theoretic analysis of how the army played a crucial role in the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. What is the rationality behind the military’s decision to refuse Ben Ali’s order to open fire on the demonstrators? Why did the Tunisian army repressed protesters in the revolt of the Gafsa Mining Basin in 2008, and refused to do so in the decisive uprising of 2011? How to explain the speed at which the Tunisian regime fell? It is argued that the balance of power on the field was such that the army was better-off to back the population and used a strategic entry point to bring a decisive “coup” to the regime. The high degree of institutionalization of the Tunisian army is seen as a precondition to make such an independent decision. The army’s commitment to back the population constituted a strong signal to the protesters as well as to foreign allies, causing a rapid fall of the Tunisian dictatorship. This paper offers the first analysis applying game theory to explain the 2011 Tunisian transition and, more precisely, the interactions between Ben Ali’s regime and the army. While several analyses focus on the unprecedented popular mobilization to explain Ben Ali’s fall, only a few authors attempted to explain the role of the militaries. However, while they emphasize on the “disdain” of the army towards the regime, we, instead, claim that the rationality of one of the most professional army of the region to understand how and why the militaries refused to repress demonstrators in the 2011 national protests. 

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Journal Publisher
CDDRL Working Papers
Authors
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
Donald K. Emmerson, director of Shorenstein APARC's Southeast Asia Program and FSI senior fellow emeritus, offers insight on U.S. President Barack Obama's Asian tour. He says the trip most notably reinforces America's 'rebalance' efforts to upgrade security commitments and promote freer trade negotiation in that region.

When President Barack Obama this week began a high-profile visit to Asia, it called into question how effective the "Asian pivot" in America's foreign policy has been. A few years ago, Obama announced that a rebalancing of U.S. interests toward Asia would be a central tenet of his legacy. Now he is visiting Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines to reassert the message that America is truly focused on Asia – despite finding itself repeatedly pulled away by crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, and political battles in Washington, D.C.

Stanford political scientist Donald K. Emmerson, an expert on Asia, China-Southeast Asia relations, sovereignty disputes and the American "rebalance" toward Asia, sat down with the Stanford News Service to discuss Obama's trip. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

President Obama started his Asian pivot a few years ago. Have problems in Ukraine, Syria, Iran and at home detracted from this new approach?

The pivot as practiced continues unabated. The pivot as perceived has suffered from its displacement on various attention spans by superseding events and concerns, both foreign and domestic. President Obama's current trip to Asia is itself a reflection of these distractions. Originally planned for October, it was postponed by extreme political discord in Washington. But the chief elements of the pivot remain in place and in progress. They are most notably the upgrading of American security commitments and the effort to negotiate freer trade.

Why does this rebalancing in U.S. foreign policy make sense – or not?

The pivot certainly serves U.S. interests. Americans cannot afford to deny themselves, or be denied by others, the opportunities for trade and investment that Asia's most dynamic economies will continue to generate. The U.S. also needs to work with China and its neighbors to help ensure that China's rise serves the wider security interests of Americans, Chinese, Asians and the world, however dissonant the day-to-day advocacy of those interests may be. Ironically, by obliterating Obama's proposed reset of U.S.-Russia relations, Vladimir Putin has become an unintentional friend of the rebalance toward Asia. His aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has made all the more urgent the need for Washington to pursue mutually beneficial relations with Beijing and the rest of Asia that could moderate China's willingness and ability to force its ownfaits accomplis in the East and South China Seas.

Do Chinese leaders view Obama's Asian pivot as a de facto containment approach to a rising China?

China's leaders do question U.S. intentions. But one ought not ignore the dozens and dozens of venues and ways in which the two countries' governments continue to cooperate on multiple fronts. In domestic terms it is politically convenient for Chinese hardliners to disparage American motives. As with the pivot itself, however, perception and practice are not the same thing.

Are Asian countries more rattled than ever by China's behavior in places like the South and East China Seas?

Concerned, yes; rattled, no. There are six or seven different claimants to contested land features and/or sea space in the South China Sea, not to mention the territorial tensions that also bedevil interstate relations in Northeast Asia. East Asian leaders are not lined up in a united front against Beijing. They are themselves divided. The more assertive China becomes, the more pushback it can expect. But most of the states in Southeast Asia do not want to ally with the U.S. against China, or with China against the U.S.

The U.S. and the Philippines are poised to sign a treaty that will expand America's military presence in the island country. What's the significance of the treaty?

Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty commit Washington and Manila to "act to meet the common dangers" implied by "an armed attack in the Pacific Area" on the "metropolitan territory" of either party, or on the "island territories under its jurisdiction," or on "its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific," and to do so "in accordance with its constitutional processes." But these provisions are hardly self-implementing; they require interpretation. Even if China were to forcibly evict the Philippine marines who now occupy Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, the treaty would not automatically trigger an American military response. Applied to that scenario, the treaty would not instantly entrap the U.S. in a war with China. But the treaty would require some action or statement on the part of Washington. In Manila, Obama will try to reassure his Philippine host in this regard without enraging its Chinese neighbor.

Obama will be the first U.S. president in five decades to visit Malaysia. What does that visit mean for that country?

Of the four countries that Obama is visiting, it is in Malaysia that the pivot's third face after security and economy – namely democracy – will be most visible. Obama will be careful not to appear to enter into the domestic political turbulence Malaysia is experiencing, but his visits with civil society actors and university students in Kuala Lumpur will send the nonpartisan message that America remains committed to democratic values for itself and for Asians as well.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Hero Image
Obama Asia April2013 Japan logo
All News button
1
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
In a recent report, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Amr Adly, with the support of the Center for International Private Enterprise, provides insight on post-revolution entrepreneurship in Egypt and Tunisia. He suggests that in order to advance their economies, governments must carry out comprehensive reforms that provide greater accessibility to formal institutional structures for the broadest base of private sector enterprises, namely, small business owners, rural enterprises, and female entrepreneurs.
Hero Image
Amr Pic 1
Cairo Nile city towers from Al Zamalek area just a few minutes after sunset.
Flickr/Marwa Morgan
All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Foreign aid for health care is directly linked to an increase in life expectancy and a decrease in child mortality in developing countries, according to a new study by Stanford researchers.

The researchers examined both public and private health-aid programs between 1974 and 2010 in 140 countries and found that, contrary to common perceptions about the waste and ineffectiveness of aid, these health-aid grants led to significant health improvements with lasting effects over time.

Countries receiving more health aid witnessed a more rapid rise in life expectancy and saw measurably larger declines in mortality among children under the age of 5 than countries that received less health aid, said Eran Bendavid, MD, an assistant professor in Stanford Medical School's Division of General Medical Disciplines and lead author of the study. If these trends continue, he said, an increase in health aid of just 4 percent, or $1 billion, could have major implications for child mortality.

“If health aid continues to be as effective as it has been, we estimate there will be 364,800 fewer deaths in children under 5,” he said. “We are talking about $1 billion, which is a relatively small commitment for developed countries.”

The study was published online April 21 in JAMA Internal Medicine. The study’s co-author, Jay Bhattacharya, MD, PhD, is an associate professor of medicine.

 

Bendavid and Bhattacharya are core faculty members at Stanford’s Center for Health Policy and Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research at the university's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Does it work?

Bendavid noted that there is much debate around foreign aid. Critics question whether it’s used effectively and reaches its intended recipients. They often argue that it discourages local development and displaces domestic resources that might otherwise be devoted to health. So the researchers devised a statistical tool to address the basic unanswered question: Do investments in health really lead to health improvements?

Bendavid said there are many reasons to suspect the answer would be no, though the findings proved just the contrary, with health-related aid leading to direct, beneficial outcomes.

“I think for many people, that will be surprising,” he said. “But for me, it fits with other evidence of the incredible success of public health promotion in developing countries.” In a previous study, for instance, he found that hundreds of thousands of lives were saved through the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, in which the U.S. government invested billions of dollars in antiretroviral treatment and other AIDS-related prevention and treatment initiatives.

In the latest study, the two investigators used data from the Creditor Reporting System of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the world’s most extensive source of information on foreign aid. While aid programs for health grew during the 36-year study period, the largest period of growth occurred between 2000 and 2010, they found.

Stepped-up investments

It was during this decade that many governments and private groups stepped up their investments in health, including PEPFAR; the World Bank; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the Gates Foundation; and the GAVI Alliance, among others, he said.

As a result, while health aid in 1990 accounted for 4 percent of total foreign aid, it now amounts to 15 percent of all aid, he said. And it’s become an important part of health budgets in recipient countries, accounting for 25-30 percent of all health-care spending in low-income countries, Bendavid said.

The researchers found that these funds were used effectively, largely because of the targeting of aid to disease priorities where improved technologies — such as new vaccines, insecticide-treated bed nets for malarial prevention and antiretroviral drugs for HIV — could make a real difference.

They observed the greatest health impacts between 2000 and 2010, when donor investments were at their peak. During the decade, under-5 child mortality declined from a mean of 109.2 to 72.4 deaths per 1,000, or 36.8 fewer deaths among those children in the countries that received the most health aid, the researchers found (a 34 percent reduction). In the countries receiving the least, under-5 mortality fell from 31.6 to 23.2 deaths per 1,000, or 8.4 fewer deaths per 1,000 live births (a 26 percent reduction), the researchers reported.

Life expectancy increases

During that period, life-expectancy figures also grew faster in countries with a greater infusion of health aid, Bendavid said. Life expectancy rose from 57.5 to 62.3 — an increase of 4.8 years — among the countries receiving the most aid. Among the countries receiving the least health aid, life expectancy increased by 2.7 years, from 69.8 to 72.5 years.

Bendavid said previous experience has shown that, on average, life expectancy has increased by nearly one year every four years in developed countries. But health-aid programs literally cut in half the time it took to reach this goal in developing countries. “In that same four-year span, they increased life expectancy by two years, rather than one year,” he said.

He said the results are not surprising if one considers some of the new health technologies made available to developing nations as a result of foreign aid. Childhood vaccines, including those for diphtheria, tetanus, polio and measles, have all but wiped out what used to be among the top killers of young children in the developing world. Health aid directed to providing insecticide-treated malarial bed nets also has been credited in recent studies with reducing malarial deaths among young children, he noted.

Among both adults and children, aid that has expanded the availability of antiretroviral drugs in the developing world has had a major impact on reducing deaths and improving overall life expectancies, he said. For instance, in a study published in 2012, Bendavid and colleagues found that PEPFAR’s health aid resulted in more than 740,000 lives saved between 2004 and 2008 in nine countries.

The researchers also found that the benefits of aid have a lasting effect: The telltale signs of aid’s relationship to reducing under-5 mortality were detectable for three years following the distribution of aid. The correlation between health aid and longer life expectancy overall was detectable for five years after the aid was distributed.

With aid commitments flattening amid the economic downturn, Bendavid said donors will have to be that much smarter in how they invest future dollars, focusing on the most cost-effective interventions and technologies.

“To date, there has been little consideration of how to use development aid in the most cost-effective manner,” he said. “That will have to change now that the funding level has reached a plateau.”

The study was funded by the George Rosenkranz Fellowship for Health Policy Research in Developing Countries and by the National Institutes of Health (grant K01AI084582).

Information about Stanford’s Department of Medicine, which also supported the work, is available at http://medicine.stanford.edu.

Ruthann Richter is the director of media relations at the Stanford School of Medicine.

All News button
1
Paragraphs

Ongoing upheaval in Egypt and Tunisia since the 2011 revolutions indicates high levels of dissatisfaction with the political order, and expresses a deep desire for a drastic remodeling of the economic system. Well-educated young men and women still find themselves marginalized and excluded from the political and economic order in their countries. Their initial demands for freedom and social justice have hitherto gone unheeded. At the heart of the ongoing political turmoil lies the demand for a sweeping socio-economic reform that may eventually create an economy that offers inclusive-growth, higher levels of productivity and competitiveness, and more job creation. However, unless certain complex and long-term questions are tackled, it is unlikely that political reform will lead to the creation of stable democracies.

Entrepreneurship is one of the most dynamic approaches to socio-economic transformation and development. It is intimately related to private sector development, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise policies, job creation, innovation, and competitiveness. However, unlike the study of static policy and of regulatory areas or institutions and structures, analyzing the entrepreneurship ecosystem captures a picture in motion. Tackling the question of entrepreneurship links micro-level analysis that touches upon direct barriers to entry and growth with macro-level analysis that attempts to explain the lack of dynamism, low productivity, undercapitalization and the weak prospects of growth of the broadest base of the private sector in the region. Moreover, it may provide a way out of the spiral of failed development in which Egypt and Tunisia have been caught for decades.

This report wishes to answer two questions: Why has private entrepreneurship in Egypt and Tunisia remained that underdeveloped despite decades of economic liberalization and private sector-friendly incentives and reforms? And how can the entrepreneurship ecosystem in the two countries develop to meet the high expectations of the people of having a productive and just socio-economic order? 

See the following link to view the feature service article from the two sponsoring institutions: http://www.cipe.org/publications/detail/understanding-entrepreneurship-ecosystem-tunisia-and-egypt

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Policy Briefs
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the Center for International Private Enterprise
Authors
Amr Adly
-

This event is co-sponsored by the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN).

Abstract: Who bears the costs associated with the foreign policy decisions of dictators? And to what extent are the burdens of war borne by particular ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society? Using internal Iraqi government documents amassed in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as well as survey data collected shortly after the fall of the regime, I provide evidence for the unequal distribution of war costs associated with the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War as well as the impact of the international sanctions regime, what some have deemed an "invisible" economic war. I find that Shi`a Iraqis were more likely than their Sunni counterparts - and much more likely than Iraqi Kurds - to have been killed, become prisoners of war or to have gone missing in action during the first half of the Iran-Iraq War. Shi`a families were also more likely to have had a brother or father martyred in either the Iran-Iraq War or the First Gulf War while simultaneously being less likely to enjoy a "Friend of the President" designation, which afforded families certain rights and privileges vis-à-vis the regime. At the end of the sanctions period immediately following the fall of the regime, Shi`a Iraqis were also three times more likely to be living in poverty or extreme poverty than Sunnis from Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit but only about 20 percent more likely to be poverty stricken when compared to Sunnis from Iraq's far western provinces. These results provide strong evidence for the existence of a hierarchy of burden associated with the foreign policy decisions of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein.

About the Speaker: Lisa Blaydes is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.  She is the author of Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-9 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies.  She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor

Lisa Blaydes Speaker Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford

Encina Hall West, Room 408
Stanford, CA 94305-6044

(650) 723-0649
0
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Political Science
lisa_blaydes_108_vert_final.jpg

Lisa Blaydes is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. She is the author of State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018) and Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Professor Blaydes received the 2009 Gabriel Almond Award for best dissertation in the field of comparative politics from the American Political Science Association for this project.  Her articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Middle East Journal, and World Politics. During the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 academic years, Professor Blaydes was an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. She holds degrees in Political Science (PhD) from the University of California, Los Angeles, and International Relations (BA, MA) from Johns Hopkins University.

 

Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Date Label
Lisa Blaydes Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University Speaker

CDDRL
Encina Hall, C139
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

0
Greif_HS.jpg

Adi Greif is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Yale University and a pre-doc at CDDRL from 2013-2015. Her dissertation, "The Long-Term Impact of Colonization on Gender", investigates why gender equality varies by former colonizer (French or British) in the Middle East and globally. It uses cross-national statistics, a regression discontinuity across the former colonial border in Cameroon, and interviews from Egypt and Jordan. Her research abroad was supported by a Macmillan Dissertation Fellowship.

Adi's research interests are colonialism, international alliances, state formation and comparative gender policies with focus on the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. She has lived in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and visited Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. Adi holds an M.A. in Political Science from (Yale University) and a B.A with honors in Political Science and a minor in Math (Stanford University). Before coming to Yale, she worked at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. through the Tom Ford Fellowship in Philanthropy.

CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow, 2015; CDDRL Pre-doctoral Fellow, 2013-2014
Adi Greif CDDRL Pre-doctoral Fellow Commentator
Seminars
Subscribe to Middle East and North Africa