On Sunday February 20, Morocco experienced its first encounter with the wave of democratic change that has been sweeping across the Arab world. In each of several major cities, tens of thousands of Moroccans demonstrated for the same kinds of demands that we have seen elsewhere: to replace arbitrary and absolute uses of power with real, open democracy, to end the corruption and clientalism that stifles economic life, and to assert the rights of citizens to be treated with dignity and respect and to have a decent life for themselves and their families. Like these other demonstrations, those in Morocco also give us a glimpse of a new kind of movement -- one that brings together disaffected youth, impoverished working people, Islamists, traditional political dissidents, human rights groups, and others, in a kind of "leaderless" movement without a fixed ideological agenda. Unlike some other movements, the Moroccan demonstrations were predominately oriented toward reform, not overthrow; they did not attack the person of the King or the institution of the monarchy, and - what is most likely to keep them on that path - they were not met with brutal repression.

It would be possible for the regime to ignore what this means - there, after all, is no occupation of a central square to contend with. It would be better, however, for everyone to heed what it means - there is, clearly, a widespread, persistent discontent, affecting a broad swath of the populace. We have only seen the beginning of a process through which that discontent will manifest itself and find its political expression. How things develop from here is not known or predictable, and will depend on how the different forces react and interact going forward, but, in the present context, it is unlikely that expressions of that discontent will simply disappear. 

The welcome lack of bloody conflict has produced a curious uncertainty on both sides, a kind of double-double-bind situation that seems good for everyone: for the movement, the lack of fierce confrontation and overly radical demands helps legitimize the protest, and may make more people comfortable with and in it; but it may also be perceived as a sign of weakness. For the regime, the avoidance of brutal repression redounds to its credit, but it may also embolden the movement and help it grow. Neither side should underestimate the complexity of the pas de deux in which they are now engaged. For the regime, especially, to react with complacency and condescension - treating this movement as something that can either be ignored or absorbed in the usual ways, would be a very risky bet.

Much more productive, and much smarter, would be to heed the message of this movement - which, right now, is nothing else than to recapture the spirit of the new reign of Mohammed VI that the country had twelve years ago, to restart a hopeful process that so many feel has been rudely interrupted and replaced with disappointing new versions of business-as-usual. We started with the Justice and Reconciliation Authority (IER) and a promise of a new era of justice and accountability, and have arrived instead, post-16 May, with new waves of mass arrests, anti-"Islamist" fear-mongering, torture, and rendition [sous-traitance]. We started with a new era of freedom of the press, and have arrived at a state of censorship and legal harassment that has closed much of the independent press, and silenced or driven into exile many of its strongest voices. We began with a promise of economic transparency, and have ended in a state of economic predation, conducted by lobbies and vested interests in the name of the monarchy. We began with alternance, welcoming opposition parties and political dissidents into a new era of open democracy, and have passed through technocratic fixes to arrive at a return to "political normalcy," only to be undermined by ad-hoc commissions. The latest "new" political stratagem is a frankly royalist party, which may accrue more power to the monarchy in the short term, but, by bringing it further down into the arena of day-to-day political infighting, undermines the legitimacy it was recently accorded by all actors.

In short, many feel that the hopes and promises - the very spirit -- of the new reign have been abandoned. This is because they were not subject to a participatory process of constitutionalization and institutionalization, which is the only way that would have become permanent and irreversible. They were instead, once again, left discretionary. The monarchy has not submitted to a new, viable contract with the people. What the movement of February 20 is telling us is that these hopes and promises -- these rights -- can't be discretionary anymore. We have to return to them, and quickly begin a process that people can see is making them fixed and irrevocable. We have, that is, to revive and recast the spirit of the new reign with new urgency -- because there are new actors on the political stage who won't go away. Our nation has been put on notice: Change must and will come, and it will not be top-down anymore.  The commander [commandant de bord] now has a co-pilot, the Moroccan people, who will not fall asleep at the wheel.

Q. While the ROK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will come into force on July 1, the ROK-U.S. FTA is still awaiting approval from the U.S. Congress. Could you tell us about the prospects for Congressional approval of the deal?

"It was such a significant issue that even President Barack Obama mentioned the trade deal during his State of the Union address in January, and he also called on Congress to ratify it ‘as soon as possible.' Therefore, you will likely see in the coming weeks the submission of the legislation to Congress, and I expect that it will pass through both the House and the Senate after a robust discussion of it. I think that with the Administration and many stakeholders in the United States from business to workers to individual states and communities saying how important this is for the American economy and for Korea-U.S. relations, I'm very optimistic about the ratification process."

Q. The Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue have been at a stalemate for more than two years. Some officials, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, argue that the United States should have bilateral dialogue with the North to smooth the way for the resumption of the [Six-Party] Talks. What do you think we need now to resume the stalled Six-Party Talks?

"U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth already mentioned this issue in details at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the North Korean issue yesterday (March 1). We all agree that it is very important to improve inter-Korean relations, and we also understand that when we verify that the North truly wants to see a tangible improvement in its relations with the ROK, we should be ready to accept bilateral and multilateral dialogue."

Q. Regarding Mr. Bosworth's mention about food aid to the North, some observers speculate that there will be some change in the stalled U.S.-North Korea relations.

"(Shaking her head) The U.S. approach on the provision of humanitarian assistance including food assistance internationally has always been a principled one based upon an assessment of the need and the ability to monitor in an appropriate way to ensure the assistance gets to those who are most needy. We are applying those same principles to any consideration of humanitarian assistance to North Korea, and therefore, he [Amb. Bosworth] did not indicate any particular change."

Q. The "Jasmine Revolution" is sweeping the Middle East. Considering the lack of social networking services and a different type of regime in North Korea, it may be difficult to draw a direct comparison [between the Middle East and North Korea,] but do you think that the pro-democracy movements in the Middle East could affect North Korea?

"To be honest with you, I do not know. It is difficult to speculate on it because North Korea is certainly one of the most isolated places in the world when it comes to the availability of news about the outside world."

Q. While the ROK-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) will come into force on July 1, the ROK-U.S. FTA is still awaiting approval from the U.S. Congress. Could you tell us about the prospects for Congressional approval of the deal?

"It was such a significant issue that even President Barack Obama mentioned the trade deal during his State of the Union address in January, and he also called on Congress to ratify it ‘as soon as possible.' Therefore, you will likely see in the coming weeks the submission of the legislation to Congress, and I expect that it will pass through both the House and the Senate after a robust discussion of it. I think that with the Administration and many stakeholders in the United States from business to workers to individual states and communities saying how important this is for the American economy and for Korea-U.S. relations, I'm very optimistic about the ratification process."

Q. Recently, the issue of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the ROK in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula stirred up some controversy. Some observers also point out that it is possible for the United States to assist the ROK with tactical nuclear weapons as part of its extended deterrence. If the ROK wants, is there a possibility that the United States will redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons to USFK?

"Our position is very clear on this, and we reaffirmed it at a Senate hearing yesterday (March 1). We want to see the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That means no nuclear weapons in North Korea. There are no nuclear weapons right now in South Korea. In terms of the ROK, it's our assessment that the reintroduction of these weapons is neither desirable nor needed."

Q. President Obama, in his speeches, praised the ROK especially for its education. In the ROK, however, many people point out that the education problem is very serious. What is your take on this?

"So many Koreans talked about it. Those who are currently living in the ROK or those who have been watching the ROK's education system may know that education is such an important issue for Koreans. Personally, I am also well aware of (Koreans') education fervor as well as the stress incurred by children and families due to excessive [education-related] competition.

President Obama seems to think that every education system has some problems, and he appears to want to introduce Korea's education fervor and parents' active interest in education to the United States. In my opinion, President Obama believes that in this aspect, the ROK is a good model.

However, as everybody knows it, there is no such thing as a perfect education system. Therefore, while the United States learns education fervor from the ROK's education system, the ROK could learn a wider variety of teaching methods from the United States."

Q. Would you raise your child in a Korean-style education system?

"Since my son has already grown up, I can only give you a hypothetical answer. The biggest challenge would be language, but I can say 'Yes.' This is because I know that the ROK also has many good schools and teachers. However, when it comes to sending my child to ‘hagwon,' a private institute, I would need to discuss with Korean parents, teachers and friends."

Q.  Could you tell us about U.S.-ROK relations and public sentiments in both countries now and at the time of your assignment to the ROK? When you arrived in the ROK, U.S. beef imports were a "big issue."

"The ROK and the United States have a very friendly alliance, and they are deepening and expanding it day by day. In addition, I think that I am lucky that I have served in the ROK at a time when I can contribute to creating the best and strongest relationship in the world.

When I arrived in the ROK in September, 2008, I received a truly warm welcome from the ROK—although it is a Korean tradition. When I went out on the streets, many people, who had concerns or expectations about ROK-U.S. relations, recognized and approached me and said that they wanted to see an improvement in ROK-U.S. relations. This is a message showing that the ROK-U.S. relations are very important, and we are actually working together to maintain a good relationship. 

Even President Obama said that (the bilateral relationship) ‘has never been better than it is today.' (A fluent Korean speaker, Stephens repeated the same phrase in Korean.)"

Q. Unlike other U.S. Ambassadors to the ROK, you travel across the ROK to reach out to Koreans, even gaining the nickname "Star Ambassador." Is there any special reason?

"Thank you very much for appreciating my efforts. Whenever I am assigned to a certain nation, I think that I must understand the nation and its people because that is what a diplomat and an Ambassador is supposed to do. To me, Korea this may have been a little easier than it was for my predecessors. This is because I lived in the ROK before, I speak Korean, and I feel comfortable with Korean culture.

I visited the ROK in 1975 for the first time, and I wanted to know how much the ROK and Koreans' thought have changed ever since, and I watched actual changes with interest.   

Q.  This might be a little premature, but you are going to leave office in six months. Do you have any future plans? Are you going to continue to work to strengthen ROK-U.S. relations?

"(Laughter) This is my third time to live in the ROK. It is a great honor to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK. In my third year in office, I still have many things to do, including the ROK-U.S. FTA, but after leaving office, I hope to continue to make contributions to this great (U.S.-Korea) relationship for the rest of my life. In fact, I do not know what to do after leaving office, but I will always carry a huge interest in and commitment to this relationship."

Q. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Peace Corps. You actually worked as a Peace Corps volunteer in the ROK. What does the Peace Corps mean for you? How did your service in the ROK affect you today?

"Thank you for asking that question. The Peace Corps is still engaging in various activities around the world, and I think that it is the best program ever from the United States Government. I can say that this program has inspired the United States and people around the world throughout many generations.

It is true that while serving in the ROK as a Peace Corps member, I underwent a series of difficulties which I had never experienced before. It was not easy for a young woman to adapt to living and working in a nation which she hardly knew.

At that time, I needed to completely assimilate into a Korean organization. I serve in many countries as a diplomat, but it is about working at a U.S. Embassy, a U.S. institution.  Therefore, it is difficult to compare it with Peace Corps activities. I think that at that time, I had experience which was totally new mentally, physically, and emotionally. However, any Peace Corps member has such experience.

[Through such experience,] I witnessed the strength and various talents of Koreans in person, and that has had an enormous impact on my life.  

Translation by Yonhap News. Republished with permission.

After the peaceful mass uprising that toppled one of the world's oldest autocracies, it is now possible to imagine the emergence of a genuine democracy in Egypt-the most important country in the Arab world. The very possibility of it marks an historic turning point for the entire region. However, there is a long and often treacherous distance between the demise of an authoritarian regime and the rise of a democracy.

With no experience of democracy in recent decades, and no apparent government leadership that is committed to bringing it about, Egypt's transition faces more formidable challenges than the transitions that led to democracy in recent decades in countries like Spain, Greece, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, and Ukraine. (Which isn't to say these were easy: We forget how difficult each of these transitions seemed at the time, and how fraught they were with dangers and uncertainties.) With an energized civil society and deep resources of youthful talent, creativity, and mobilizing skill, Egypt has a real chance to get to democracy in the next few years. But doing so will require a keen analysis of the numerous potential traps that could sandbag the process.

The first trap is the Machiavellian opaqueness of the aging generals who are now running the country. Beginning with the Defense Minister (and now junta leader) Mohamed Tantawi, until a few days ago a close ally of the deposed President Mubarak, Egypt's new military rulers cannot be trusted to structure the political process and emergent rules in a way that will favor genuine democracy. Their principal goal, it appears, is to preserve as much of the old order as possible-Mubarakism without Mubarak (the father or the son). This means another round of the old shell game of Arab regimes-what Daniel Brumberg has called "liberalized autocracy." The process of liberalization-which runs in cycles, and which countries like Morocco and Jordan have seen many iterations of-institutes just enough change in the rules and faces to give the appearance of movement toward democracy without any of the dangers (for the ruling elite). But the changes, imposed from above, stop well short of the sweeping institutional transformations that would open wide the political arena (and the functioning of government) while leveling the playing field.

In their initial "communiqués," Egypt's ruling generals show signs of treading down this duplicitous path. Their initial choices have evinced the seductive veneer of democratic change but the closure and control of authoritarian continuity. To begin with, there appears so far to be little consultation with democratic forces in determining the character and pace of transition. Despite opposition demands, emergency rule remains in place, and so do many political prisoners. The military's initial decisions have been unilateral and preemptory. We learn there will be a constitution drafted within two months, followed by a referendum. A respected retired judge will head the process. This will produce "amendments" to the now-suspended authoritarian constitution. But what will be the role for Egyptian opposition and civil society in this process? What will be the scope down the road to draft a completely new, more democratic and legitimate constitution with broad popular participation and support? Will the president to be elected later this year serve another imperial six-year term, or be a caretaker heading a neutral government until a new constitution can be adopted and fresh elections held? At this point, if anyone knows the answers to these questions, it is only the junta.

The military is talking about early presidential and legislative elections, within six months. What could be more democratic than that? But, in fact, after the fall of a longstanding autocracy, it typically takes a lot longer than six months to organize competitive, free, and fair elections. Think of the steps. A neutral and independent electoral administration must be established. This requires not just legal authorization but also new leadership, and recruitment, training, funding, and deployment of new staff and equipment. If Egypt's generals intend to have elections administered by the same Ministry of Interior that shamelessly rigged the vote for Mubarak and his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), that will be a sure sign that they do not intend to deliver democracy-or are too incompetent and cavalier to care. Then, the next step must be to produce a new register of voters. Experts believe only a quarter of eligible Egyptians are registered to vote today. The exclusion was very useful to perpetuating autocracy but could be deadly for an emerging democracy. That will take months, money, and far-reaching organization to do even reasonably well.

It will be one thing to elect a new president and quite another to choose a new parliament in Egypt's transitional flux. The military now suggests the two elections can be held together within six months. But they will have very different logics and requirements. A presidential election will be much simpler. The old order will no doubt throw up a somewhat more palatable face, perhaps the former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. The democratic opposition may well rally behind a single candidate (though the regime, no longer able to exclude a democratic alternative, will probably try to fragment the field with as many opposition candidates as possible). Still, voters will be faced with a few principal choices for national leadership, and it won't matter where people vote, so long as they are of voting age and only vote once. This kind of election can be done more roughly and quickly, tossing aside the voter register and just dipping every forefinger in indelible ink after it has marked a ballot for one presidential candidate or another. It will be important in this election-and every future one-to ensure transparency and citizen monitoring of the vote, as well as to have Egypt's judiciary oversee the balloting (as it did in previous elections until the judges got too good at it and Mubarak cut them out). But, otherwise, a presidential election won't be a complicated affair.

By contrast, new parliamentary elections present formidable challenges. First, Egyptians (and hopefully not just the military) must decide what electoral system will be used. This choice can invoke arcane debate, but it may be one of the most important that Egypt makes in pursuit of democracy. If the electoral rules are "majoritarian," in that they make it hard for small minorities to get elected, they will work to the disadvantage of not just small ideological tendencies but also the welter of new, emerging parties and political forces-many of them liberal and secular-that will just be taking shape and starting to test their strength. This will inflate the strength of the only two political forces that now have effective political organizations on the ground-the old ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood (with a smattering of some of the other older opposition parties). If Egypt retains the current electoral system of two-member districts (with each voter getting two votes), these two established political forces could sweep most of the seats between them, marginalizing the moderates, polarizing the parliament and political system, and dooming democracy from the start. Creating a liberal center in democratic politics requires more than moral and technical support for these parties to function; it also requires rules that enable them to get traction.

A much better-and fairer-alternative would be to elect the new parliament using some form of proportional representation, so that parties would win seats roughly in proportion to their vote shares. That way, new parties could begin to gain a foothold in the political process. Perhaps ironically, the best way to do this might be the way Iraq now does, by using the existing governorates (29 in Egypt) as multimember districts, and having each district then elect a share of seats equivalent to its share of the population. This would allow for very proportional results, with districts generally containing ten to 25 seats, while still enabling some accountability and candidate familiarity at the local level.

A truly democratic parliamentary election in Egypt cannot be pulled off in six months. In fact, it might require well over a year to prepare. But the alternative would be to rush to a vote with a flawed system that would leave Egypt's new democratic forces on the margins not just of legislating but of constitution-making as well.

How a new permanent constitution will be drafted-if it is even intended by the military-also remains a mystery at this point. The worst option would be to have a closed and hurried process dominated from above by the military. But that seems to be what the junta intends for the transitional period. Successful democratic transitions either use an expert but broadly representative constitutional drafting commission, and then a popular referendum to confirm the draft, or an elected constitutional assembly (often acting simultaneously as a parliament), possibly followed also by a popular referendum (as in Iraq). Some have used all of these methods combined. Experience of recent decades underscores the importance for future democratic legitimacy and stability of eliciting extensive public dialogue and broad popular participation in the constitution-making process, with adequate preparation and civic education and widespread media exposure, as in South Africa. A thorough, inclusive, and deliberate process of constitutional drafting and debate can also help to breed a more democratic culture at both the elite and mass levels. A rushed and closed process perpetuates authoritarian mentalities (and, often, authoritarian rules as well).

Prior to all of this is the most basic question of who writes the rules, the timetable, and the mode of transition. Egypt has now entered a classic transition game where the authoritarian regime and the democratic opposition have sharply different interests and little basis for cooperation and trust. As an institution, Egypt's military may not be hated the way Mubarak and his cronies were, but many of the generals were Mubarak's cronies. And the military's core interests are not freedom and democracy for the people, but preserving their own power, wealth, privilege, and impunity. The core lesson of numerous prior transitions is the need for a negotiated way out of this potentially fatal impasse. Democrats want democracy with no guarantees to autocrats. Autocrats want guarantees, with no real democracy.

There is an obvious generic compromise, and every successful negotiated transition-from Spain and Brazil to Poland, South Africa, and Indonesia-has settled on a version of it. The old order gets to hang on to most of its wealth and privilege, along with military autonomy at least for a time. Few, if any, henchmen of the old order are prosecuted for their past crimes, unless it is for the last, desperate excesses of a few diehards trying to hang on during the transition. Real accountability waits for a later day. Democrats get democracy. Autocrats (mostly) retain their wealth and influence, but they cannot bid for power unless they play the democratic game. The Yale political scientist Robert Dahl coined a term for this type of bargain. He called it "mutual security." From the Spanish transition on, the generic bargain became known as a political pact.

Only a negotiated pact between Egypt's surviving authoritarian regime and its emergent democratic forces can steer the transition through the current treacherous straits to calmer and freer waters. For that to happen, Egypt's disparate democratic forces must unify in a broad negotiating front that unites the "outside" opposition of the youthful movements with the "inside" opposition of the "wise persons" and established parties who have so far dominated, on an ad hoc basis, the discussions with the old order.

Opposition unity will give Egypt's democrats strategic leverage; if negotiations stall due to regime intransigence, then the unified opposition can more credibly threaten to turn out people by the millions again in protest. But, if negotiations move forward to ensure the essential conditions for a democratic transition-an end to emergency rule; freedom of organization, expression, and assembly; judicial independence; and new and fair electoral administration-then a unified opposition can guarantee social peace and political stability. Opposition coherence enables clear negotiating priorities to level the playing field and ensure a democratic transition. It will also give the old order a clear set of interlocutors who can credibly commit to deliver popular support behind a difficult compromise agreement. No condition is more important for a successful transition.

The role for the United States and other international actors is not to dictate terms for the transition or structures for the new political order. That is not our place, and Egyptians of every political stripe will resent it. But international actors should offer training to political parties and technical and financial assistance to the new civil society organizations and state institutions needed to make democracy work. For the United States., this will mean millions of dollars in new assistance for democracy in Egypt-but that is a trifle compared to the $68 billion we have invested in dictatorship (even if it was to buy peace). No less importantly, other democracies (including leaders of recent democratic transitions) can encourage Egypt's opposition groups to coalesce and share lessons of the strategies and choices that have led to democratic outcomes. And the Obama administration can make it clear to Egypt's military rulers that nothing less than a real transition to democracy-with broad consultation, serious negotiations, and a new climate of freedom-will return Egypt to stability and a lasting partnership with the United States.

Sherman’s introduction to the psyche of the soldier was personal: Her father, a World War II veteran, carried his dog tags on his keychain with him for 65 years before passing away just over a year ago. Sherman perceived her father’s choice to carry his dog tags not as one of honor, but instead as an obligation he felt to carry the moral load of his war. “He was a medic; he never fired an arm. But he carried the war, and what he saw in the war, with him.” 

To understand the moral psyche of the soldier, Sherman studies three forms of guilt: accident guilt, “luck” guilt and collateral-damage guilt. Accident guilt occurs when soldiers blame themselves for an accident that occurred under their watch. Sherman told the story of Capt. John Prior, who came to speak to her after the gun on a Bradley Fighting Vehicle accidentally fired, blowing off the face of a private under Prior’s watch. “It was as if an ice-cream scoop scooped out his face in front of me,” Prior told Sherman. “It was one of the few times in my life I’ve really cried.” Objectively, Sherman explained, one would not place blame on Prior because he was simply part of a causal chain and not the culpable link. But this fails to explain the despair, the self-indictment and the empathy that still invade Prior’s mind. “I’m the one who placed the vehicles. I’m the one who set the security. And as with most accidents, I’m not in jail right now,” he told Sherman. “Probably not a day goes by that I don’t think about it, even fleetingly.” In the case of Prior, Sherman says a deep moral accountability is at the heart of the soldier’s guilt, similar to the philosopher Nietzsche’s concept of “bad conscience.”

Luck guilt occurs when soldiers feel that by remaining alive following a catastrophic event of war, they betray those who gave their lives to battle, or feel, if they are not on the field of battle, that they are not sharing the burden shouldered by their comrades. Sherman told of when she visited the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and spoke to marines who felt that they did not deserve to be surrounded by green scenery while their brothers fought in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The same was the case at the Army’s Walter Reed Medical Center, Sherman said. Even a student of Sherman’s at Georgetown spoke to her of the “dereliction of duty” he felt when insurgents in the Iraqi city of Tal Afar attacked a unit he formerly led, killing his friend. Sherman’s student yearned to have shielded his unit, even from thousands of miles away, and only after waging a moral battle within himself did he come to the reasonable conclusion that he could not, in fact, re-assimilate at home while also still protecting his friends on the war front.

Collateral-damage guilt affects soldiers whose actions result in the death of civilians. Sherman told the story of Col. Bob Durkin, who led a battalion in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom 2. Durkin told Sherman that his unit was “emotionally devastated” when children were killed in attacks on vehicle checkpoints. Soldiers would often go out of their way to order a medical evacuation for children, even when their own lives were still at risk. One might speculate that these soldiers rationally feel guilty, but Sherman believes that a deeper, moral intuition is at play: The soldiers internalize that they are not fighters at checkpoints; they are police, social developers – and healers. Their job is to remove children from the chaos that war has become, not watch as they are killed by a bomb meant for the soldiers.

Studying soldier guilt is especially pertinent to the current war in Afghanistan because the U.S. strategy there is grounded in population-centric, counterinsurgency warfare. Such operations require soldiers to restrain themselves from all-out battle and instead win the hearts and minds of the population they aim to protect from insurgent forces. Sherman argues that soldiers should be better trained and prepared to exercise restraint, thereby reducing the moral burden they carry in and after war. At the same time, she acknowledges the difficulty: When a soldier returns from war, the uniform does not come off so easily. As Will Quinn, a student of Sherman’s who once interrogated prisoners at Abu Ghraib, told her: “War takes place in a different time and space. But I know I’m the same person who was doing those things, and that’s what tears at your soul.”

The Drell Lecture series is an annual public event sponsored by CISAC. It is named for Sidney Drell, CISAC’s founding co-director.

The toppling of Egypt's modern-day pharaoh through peaceful mass protests, aided by Facebook and Twitter, marks a watershed for Egypt and the entire Arab world. Contrary to widespread anxieties in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, it will also serve the long-term interests of the United States - and Israel.

Many analysts of Egypt have been warning for years that the status quo under Hosni Mubarak was not sustainable. A repressive and deeply corrupt dictatorship was sitting on top of a social volcano - an increasingly young, urbanized, digitally connected population seething over the lack of freedom, dignity and economic opportunity. A quarter of Egypt's working-age youth are unemployed and many more under-employed. Over the past two decades, average incomes in Egypt stagnated while they doubled or tripled elsewhere in the region.

Think of what could have happened. Many observers (including myself) worried that the growing alienation of young Egyptians might flow in anti-American, anti-Israeli and radical Islamist directions. The inevitable eruption could have turned violent, resulting in the kind of bloody suppression that gripped Algeria in the early 1990s, when 200,000 died. Or it might have been hijacked by radical Islamists who would ride the popular revolution to power, as in Iran in 1979.

So far, none of these have happened. The millions of Egyptians who have poured into the streets of Cairo and other cities have not been chanting "down with America," nor have their protests been about Israel (or the Palestinians). Rather, they want freedom, justice and accountability in Egypt. They have mobilized for democratic change with extraordinary discipline, imagination and moderation. In the face of killings, provocations, arrests and torture, they have adhered to nonviolence as a sacred principle.

In achieving the first condition for Egypt's liberation, the departure of the pharaoh, through peaceful grassroots mobilization, a huge chip has been lifted from their shoulders. Now Egyptians feel a new sense of pride, confidence and empowerment. And they are beginning to view the United States in a fresh and more hopeful light, not because of President Obama's Cairo Speech in 2009 but because of what he said and subtly did in the last two weeks (after several rhetorical blunders by some in his administration). As the mass protests grew, Obama aligned the United States more explicitly behind the goal of peaceful democratic change, warned the regime against the use of force, and urged Mubarak to step aside. The experience could mark a turning point not just for Egypt but for Barack Obama personally. He now has the chance to nurture democratic change in the Arab world through artful diplomacy and timely assistance, where George W. Bush failed with blunter rhetoric and means.

Israel as well should be reassured by developments so far. Egypt's new (and hopefully temporary) military junta has quickly reaffirmed the country's treaty obligations. Few protesters are calling for abrogation of Egypt's peace with Israel. Most protesters resent Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and want an independent Palestinian state, but mainly they want to transform their own country politically and economically. They know their aspirations for human dignity and economic opportunity can only be met with far-reaching internal reforms, and that the worn-out theme of anti-Zionism is a divergence from that. Israel and its friends should thus welcome democratic change in Egypt. The only way to guarantee a lasting Middle East peace is to root negotiated agreements in the same democratic legitimacy that undergirds the stability and resilience of Israel's political system. As Thomas Friedman recently observed, it is a better bet to make peace with 82 million people than with one man.

The challenge now is to ensure that Egypt's revolution produces a genuine pluralist democracy. This is far from assured.

Egypt's military rulers may well seek to sabotage the transition and restore the old order with a slightly more democratic façade. Or the Muslim Brotherhood (which rejects violent means but clings to Islamist political ends) could gain the upper hand in popular mobilization or elections. But the second scenario will be much more likely to follow, rather than prompt, the first. If a democratic transition unfolds seriously and peacefully through negotiations and reform, and if democratic institutions are well designed, the Muslim Brotherhood will be a significant but minority player.

For Egypt, Mubarak's fall is only the first step along a tortuous path. If its transition leads to democracy, it will produce a much more reliable partner for peace and progress in the Middle East. That is why other democracies in the world should support it in every way possible.