The Presidential election campaign is in the home stretch. Neither the President nor Senator Kerry has secured a decisive advantage.

Iraq is now the central issue of debate, as one would expect, since the war is going badly, and the economy is reasonably robust. The debate is finally beginning to focus on substantive differences between the candidates after a summer in which they mainly exchanged personal attacks on their respective Vietnam records. Their strategies are now clear: Bush will challenge Kerry's steadiness and consistency; Kerry will challenge the necessity of the campaign in Iraq and the competence of the administration's efforts there. But while their diagnoses of the situation differ, their proposals for dealing with what is clearly a mess are not so clearly differentiated. Both propose to seek additional help from members of the international community; both emphasize the need to train and arm Iraqi security forces; and both are hopeful that elections will enhance the legitimacy of Iraqi leaders, fortify their efforts to dry up the insurgency, and allow American forces to be reduced and eventually withdrawn.

Historically, wars have been unkind to presidents on whose watch they occurred. The Korean War reduced Harry Truman's popularity so dramatically by 1952 that he gave up his quest for a second full term. The Vietnam War drove Lyndon Johnson from office, despite impressive domestic achievements. Victory in the Gulf War of 1991 sent George H.W. Bush's approval ratings soaring, but within a year he was defeated by an obscure Arkansas governor.

Yet President Bush still clings to a narrow lead in the polls. Why?

Senator Kerry has argued that the Iraqi campaign is a "war of choice." Perhaps so. But Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on the United States nearly a decade ago. Whatever the outcome in Iraq, war with Islamic extremists will continue. And American voters remain nearly evenly divided as to whether John Kerry has the steadfast character and consistent judgment they want in a wartime leader.

Uneasiness about the financial and human costs of the war is growing. Casualty figures in Iraq are high compared to the numbers killed or wounded in post-cold war American interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Yet, those earlier conflicts involved humanitarian interventions in which Americans perceived little strategic stake. However, military personnel killed in Iraq - now more than 1000 - still number less than a third of the civilians who perished in New York and Washington on 9/11. And ours is a volunteer military that is highly motivated.

When confronted by an attack, Americans have consistently taken the fight to the enemy, engaging them in combat as far from our shores as possible. The president has portrayed the campaign in Iraq as an integral feature of the war on terrorism. To at least a number of voters, the absence of any terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 provides evidence that his approach, while not without significant costs, is working.

Victory at the polls may be a dubious prize. Whoever is sworn in on January 20, 2005 will face daunting choices. American options in Iraq range from the "potentially disastrous" to the "extremely distasteful." We cannot simply walk away. And a host of other dilemmas - e.g. nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea, a Middle East peace process that has gotten off track, strains in the trans-Atlantic relations, a multilateral trade round that has lost momentum - demand urgent attention. Beyond this, the next president will be hampered by a gigantic fiscal deficit and a military that is stretched thin. In short, he will have few easy choices. It makes one wonder why politicians yearn for this job.

President Bush describes Afghanistan, the first front on the war on terrorism, as a success. In comparison to Iraq, perhaps it is. But if you look at Afghanistan on its own merits, the lack of progress is disheartening. In 2002, President Bush promised a "Marshall Plan" for the country, with the goal of turning Afghanistan into a stable, democratic state. On Tuesday, before the United Nations General Assembly, the president said that "the Afghan people are on the path to democracy and freedom." Yet in nearly three years we have failed to create security, stability, prosperity or the rule of law in Afghanistan.

These failings are not just a reflection of the great difficulties of nation-building in places like Afghanistan, they are also the direct result of the Bush administration's policy decisions. Our efforts in Afghanistan are underfinanced and undermanned, and our attention is waning.

The root of the problem is that we invaded Afghanistan to destroy something - the Taliban and Al Qaeda - but we didn't think much about what would grow in its place. While we focused on fighting the terrorists (and even there our effectiveness has been questionable), Afghanistan has become a collection of warlord-run fiefs fueled by a multibillion-dollar opium economy. We armed and financed warlord armies with records of drug-running and human rights abuses stretching back two decades. Then we blocked the expansion of an international security force meant to rein in the militias. These decisions were made for short-term battlefield gain - with disregard for the long-term implications for the mission there.

Our Army continues to hunt insurgents in the mountains, but we have refused to take the steps necessary to secure the rest of the country, and it shows. More coalition and Afghan government soldiers and aid workers have died this year than in each of the previous two. This summer, Doctors Without Borders, which has worked in the most desperate and dangerous conditions around the world, pulled out of Afghanistan after 24 years. In other words, the group felt safer in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and the civil war that followed than it did three years after the United States-led coalition toppled the Taliban.

Last month, after a United Nations-backed voter registration office was bombed, the vice president of the United Nations Staff Union urged Secretary General Kofi Annan to pull employees out of Afghanistan. The opium trade is also out of control, fueling lawlessness and financing terrorists. Last year, the trade brought in $2.3 billion; this year, opium production is expected to increase 50 to 100 percent.

Amid terrorist attacks and fighting among regional warlords, the country is preparing for presidential elections on Oct. 9. A recent United Nations report warned that warlords were intimidating voters and candidates. This month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has monitored post-conflict elections in trouble spots like Bosnia and Kosovo, declared that Afghanistan was too dangerous for its election monitors (it is sending a small "election support team'' instead). President Hamid Karzai narrowly escaped assassination last week on his first campaign trip outside Kabul, and eight other presidential candidates have called for elections to be delayed, saying it's been too dangerous for them to campaign.

Many of these problems flow from early mistakes. Rather than moving quickly to establish security and then gradually turning over control to a legitimate domestic authority, we have done the opposite. As fighting among warlord militias in the countryside intensifies, we are slowly expanding our presence and being dragged into conflicts. The American "advisers" in Afghan Army units, the ubiquitous heavily armed "private" security forces and the fortress-like American Embassy are garnering comparisons to the day of the Soviets.

In Kabul, the effort to build a stable, capable government has also lagged dangerously. President Karzai has begun to show great fortitude in challenging warlords. But his factious cabinet, born of political compromise, has collapsed under the pressure of the country's hurried presidential elections. Outside Kabul, his control remains tenuous in some places, nonexistent in others. Kabul's Supreme Court, the only other branch of government, is controlled by Islamic fundamentalists unconcerned with the dictates of Afghanistan's new Constitution. On Sept. 1, without any case before the court, the chief justice ordered that Latif Pedram, a presidential candidate, be barred from the elections and investigated for blasphemy. His crime? Mr. Pedram had suggested that polygamy was unfair to women. These clerics are trying to establish a system like that in Iran, using Islam as a bludgeon against democracy.

It's true that there have been several important accomplishments in these three years: the Taliban and Al Qaeda no longer sit in Kabul's Presidential Palace; girls are back in school in many parts of the country; some roads and buildings have been rebuilt; and more than 10 million Afghans have registered to vote for the presidential elections. Thousands of international aid workers have been working with the Afghans, often at great risk, to make things better. Despite the slow progress, most Afghans are more hopeful about their future than they have been in years.

But many people working there are left with the nagging feeling that much more could have been done both to help Afghanistan and fight terrorism over the last three years. Our experience demonstrates that you can't fight wars, or do nation-building, on the cheap. Afghanistan should be a critical election issue this year, but Iraq looms much larger in the public mind. Unless the next administration steps up to the plate, it may well be an issue in four years, when we start asking, "Who lost Afghanistan?"

J Alexander Thier, a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, was a legal adviser to Afghanistan's constitutional and judicial reform commissions.

Faced with the deadly menace posed by transnational terror organizations, the nations of the world must redouble their cooperative efforts. The tasks ahead -- to disrupt terror groups and preempt their attacks -- require intense coordination among a multitude of national intelligence, national law enforcement, and military organizations. Unprecedented cooperation among all of the nuclear powers is needed to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terror groups.

Yet, paradoxically, the two nations that have suffered the worst terror attacks -- the United States and Russia -- are regressing more and more to national strategies. They have been unwilling to make the extra effort to reap the benefits of real international cooperation.

I believe that the United States' strategic vision of the war on terrorism is flawed. I fear it is following the isolationist path of the United States after World War I rather than pursuing the broad international programs it successfully undertook to protect its security interests after World War II.

The terrorists posing the greatest threat to the United States and to Russia are transnational, with cells in many different countries. To support their training and operations, they raise funds in many countries and maintain these in international bank accounts. They use satellite-based television as their principal means of propaganda, the World Wide Web as their principal means of communication and international airlines as their principal means of transportation. Their efforts to get weapons of mass destruction are based on penetrating the weakest security links among the nations possessing these weapons, and their successful guerrilla operations depend on their ability to get support from sympathizers among the more than 1 billion Islamic people around the world.

An international operation is clearly needed to successfully deal with this threat. But the United States is not making full use of other nations and international institutions to dry up the terrorists' funds in international bank accounts, to gain intelligence on their planning for future attacks, to penetrate their cells so that it has a chance of preempting these attacks, to organize all nuclear powers with effective security of their nuclear weapons and fissile material, and to conduct counterinsurgency operations wherever they are needed. Dealing effectively with transnational terror groups that operate with impunity across borders requires an international operation with the full cooperation of allies and partners in Europe and Asia.

This is not "mission impossible." In 1993, the United States was able to get all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact to join up with NATO in forming the Partnership for Peace to cooperate in peacekeeping operations. In 1994, the United States with the full cooperation of Russia was able to negotiate an agreement by which all nuclear weapons were removed from Uzbekistan, Belarus and Kazakhstan and by which substantial improvements were made in the security of nuclear weapons in Russia. In 1995, the United States was able to get an agreement under which NATO took responsibility for the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, an operation that was believed at the time to be as dangerous and filled with religious and sectarian strife as Iraq today, and it was able to get dozens of non-NATO nations -- notably including Russia -- to join it in that operation.

Securing Russian cooperation required listening to Russian views and making accommodations wherever possible. As U.S. defense secretary, I had to meet with my Russian counterpart four different times before I came to understand how to structure the command in Bosnia in a way acceptable to both Russians and NATO. The general lesson from this example, which is still applicable today, was best expressed by Winston Churchill, who observed during World War II, "The problem with allies is they sometimes have ideas of their own." But in reflecting on that problem, he also said, "The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is trying to fight a war without allies."

What lessons can we learn from Churchill today? Had the Bush administration understood better the dangers of the post-conflict phase, surely it would have worked harder to get the support of those countries before invading Iraq. In any event, after the war it would have reached out to them and tried to achieve an accommodation that would have allowed their support during the reconstruction phase.

Instead, the administration took the position that any nation that was not with the United States during the war would not have a role in the reconstruction. To compound the problem, the United States did not seek meaningful assistance from the United Nations. Today, in the light of the difficulties experienced in restoring security in Iraq, the administration is reaching out to the United Nations and requesting that it play a major role in the political reconstitution of Iraq, but it is still not working effectively with the governments of France, Germany and Russia.

Just as the United States erred in believing that it did not need more international support in Iraq, so did the Russian government err in believing that it did not need more international support as it reconstituted its government after the Soviet era. The Putin administration believed -- correctly -- that it could turn around the Russian economy without significant assistance from other countries, and it believed that it could deal most effectively with its terrorist threat without interference from other countries. It also apparently believed that moving toward a level of democracy conflicted with the controls necessary for economic recovery and for fighting its terror war. So today we see a Russia that has enjoyed a healthy 7 percent growth rate each of these past five years, but has stopped -- indeed reversed -- its move towards becoming a liberal democracy. This reversal over the long term will have profoundly negative consequences for the Russian economy and for the Russian people, and unquestionably it is setting Russia on a course that will alienate it both from the United States and the European Union.

Both the Bush administration and the Putin administration have apparently made the decision that they can achieve their goals without broad international support. Both governments have erred in that judgment. But it is not too late to correct the judgment, and I fervently hope that both of governments will do so. The most important step in that process is reviving cooperation between the United States and Russia.

WASHINGTON - Take Jamey Bennett. When he first began selling his LightWedge personal reading lamp a few years ago, everything was made in China. Then the headaches began: Numerous conference calls in the middle of the night. Shipment delays because of a dockworker strike in California. And many problems related to language differences. The problems became so acute that Bennett transferred the manufacturing to Virginia two months ago.

"Managing a significant manufacturing effort in China remotely with a business of our size is very difficult," Bennett says.

"Firms that just believe that this is going to be simple ... very often get burned," says Martin Kenney, a University of California-Davis professor who recently completed a study of firms doing work in India. "This is a very, very complicated business activity, and there are a thousand ways it can go wrong."

Examples of the perils of moving work abroad keep cropping up. Last month, Indiana said it was halting a contract with an Indian company to upgrade its computer system for its unemployment benefits office after politicians and others started an uproar about the work leaving the state, not to mention the country.

Dell recently shifted some of its computer call center work from India. After moving some of its appliance call center work to India a few years ago, GE in May moved the work back to the Phoenix area. It found that workers in India, who don't own many appliances, couldn't relate to the customers' problems. U.S. workers can take more calls because they resolve issues faster, boosting productivity.

Highlighting how sensitive the topic of moving work outside the USA is, spokesmen for Dell and GE declined to comment. But Dell CEO Michael Dell recently told USA TODAY his company sticks with U.S. employees for many jobs for their skills.

"Most of our (employees) are in the U.S., and it's probably going to remain that way for a long time," Dell said. "The fear of jobs moving from one country to another, at least in our case, is probably greater than the reality."

That doesn't mean the trend will go away. Repetitive and low-skilled manufacturing and services work will likely continue to be sent abroad. But some firms' experiences suggest the hysteria about work going outside the USA may be overblown.

'Lost in the translation'

Several major issues confront businesses when they shift manufacturing outside the USA:

?Culture, language. U.S. firms are finding the do-it-now culture of the USA and some American tastes don't easily translate overseas.

Wells Fargo chief economist Sung Won Sohn says companies he has come in contact with have complained of productivity problems. A U.S. furniture importer has had a tough time persuading his overseas manufacturers to "distress" furniture, a popular style in some U.S. markets that evokes an antique feel. His workers don't see the point in taking a new product and making it look older.

And there are language issues. Although many people overseas speak English, phrasing and other issues can crop up when English is not the first language.

"Quite a bit was sort of lost in the translation," LightWedge's Bennett says.

A Dell spokesman told the Associated Press the company was shifting some corporate clients from Bangalore, India, to Texas, Idaho and Tennessee after receiving service complaints.

Gary Beach, publisher of CIO Magazine, recently was on the phone with a Dell agent in Bangalore for 11/2 hours after having problems with a notebook computer. "The guy was very polite, but he had to go to his supervisor after 65 minutes," Beach says. "It was a change in power options in your control panel. You had to switch to 'always on.' ... Duh!"

-Expertise. Many countries are churning out well-educated engineers, scientists and others while some foreigners are coming to the USA to be educated and then return home. But such education often does not replace experience.

Bethlehem, Pa.-based Air Products and Chemicals makes liquefied natural gas machinery in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. The firm has no plans to move the factory, even though none of the products is sold in the USA.

"We have spent a number of years building up this plant, making major investments and also building up a skilled workforce," spokeswoman Kassie Hilgert says. "Both the workforce and the technology are not transferable to anywhere else in the world."

Kenney notes that some of the businesses overseas are so new that there are few trained managers who know how to properly oversee both service and manufacturing operations.

-Shipping. Some manufacturers are finding the time, money and extra regulatory burdens associated with shipping products to the USA prohibitive. Those issues were compounded after the Sept. 11 attacks, because import regulations were strengthened.

Sanjay Chandra, co-founder of American Leather, a furniture producer in Dallas, does all manufacturing in-house. With hundreds of combinations of styles and fabrics and other attributes to choose from, the firm waits to produce the furniture until orders are received and prides itself on getting the products shipped out in a matter of weeks. Shipments from China are estimated to take about six weeks, after production, according to manufacturers.

"Special order, quick ship doesn't really lend itself to foreign manufacturing because of the time issues," Chandra says.

The shipping headaches may grow. Under rules starting this month, importers are required to electronically send lists to the government in advance of shipments, to help Customs and border protection agents identify high-risk cargo that deserves special attention because of terrorism fears. That is upsetting some importers who say the lists will cost them time and money if there are delays at the borders.

The challenges of importing were also highlighted a little more than a year ago when dockworkers in California were locked out during a labor dispute, stranding Asian imports at sea. The 10-day action that led to the closure of 29 docks was estimated to cost the U.S. economy up to $2 billion a day and forced some manufacturers who rely on foreign parts to shut down.

Keeping supplies flowing

The dockworker strike persuaded Alan Schulman, owner of Glentronics, to stick to his supply method. Schulman, who sells battery-operated, backup sump pumps, has suppliers both overseas and near his headquarters in Wheeling, Ill. When the dock strike started, he was able to switch to his local supplier and continued without any interruptions.

"I always want Plan B."

There are numerous other issues that U.S. firms are bumping into when it comes to working abroad. Many companies find themselves holding more inventory in case there is a supply disruption. That means added costs, because more inventory requires extra space, financing and, sometimes, employees.

"Supply Chain 101 says the most important thing is continuity of supply," says Norbert Ore, who organizes a regular survey of manufacturers for the Institute for Supply Management. "And when you establish a supply line that is 12,000 miles long ... you have to weigh the costs of additional inventory and logistics costs vs. what you can save in terms of lower costs per unit or labor costs."

Shipping business abroad also means relinquishing some control, which for some business owners is easier said than done. And, unless you own the facility and have an employee on-site, fixing any problems that require in-person work involves a lot of time and money. The contracts to set up facilities abroad can also be lengthy, involving months of negotiations and lawyer and consultant costs.

Regional conflicts, such as the periodic clashes between India and Pakistan, also must be considered.

Some move despite challenges

Despite all those issues, for some, moving work abroad is the way to go.

Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs estimates that of the 2.7 million U.S. factory jobs cut in the last three years, 1 million have been relocated abroad.

A wide range of service jobs, such as customer call centers, medical billing and architectural drafting, are also moving outside the USA. In the next 15 years, U.S. employers will move about 3.3 million white-collar jobs abroad, Forrester Research predicts.

The main motivation: money. UC-Davis' Kenney and co-author Rafiq Dossani of Stanford University estimate a call center worker who costs clients $12.47 an hour - including equipment and other costs - in Kansas City costs $4.12 an hour in Mumbai, the Indian city formerly known as Bombay. Indiana originally went with the Indian company after its bid for the computer work came in at $15 million, $8 million below the closest competitor.

After working in Asia and Europe for 15 years, Philip Ison, president of Ison International, bought an upholstery factory in Tennessee in 1999 and shut it down after two years.

"There was just no profit margin to be made," he says. "With all of the headaches between health insurance, workman's comp, OSHA, you can just keep on going down the list. It's not economically feasible to produce something here that takes a lot of labor."

Ison now produces furniture in Romania and ships the products to Norfolk, Va., before selling in the USA.

"With the Internet and the communication systems that are available at this point in time, it's no big deal to sit here and run the factory," he says.

But while some jobs may continue to be sent overseas, it's clear that others - especially those requiring special skills, quick turnaround times or customer contact - will stay in the USA.

"Most companies believe it's going to be easier (to shift work)," says Rudy Puryear of Bain and Co., who has consulted with clients on setting up operations abroad. He says he's seen some firms pull back two or three years after shifting to foreign workers or suppliers. "It is a buyer beware situation."