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Professor Walter Scheidel examines the history of peace and economic inequality over the past 10,000 years.

 

What price do we pay for civilization? For Walter Scheidel, a professor of history and classics at Stanford, civilization has come at the cost of glaring economic inequality since the Stone Age. The sole exception, in his account, is widespread violence – wars, pandemics, civil unrest; only violent shocks like these have substantially reduced inequality over the millennia.

“It is almost universally true that violence has been necessary to ensure the redistribution of wealth at any point in time,” said Scheidel, summarizing the thesis of The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century, his newly published book.

Surveying long stretches of human history, Scheidel said that “the big equalizing moments in history may not have always had the same cause, but they shared one common root: massive and violent disruptions of the established order.”

This idea is connected to Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2013), a New York Times bestseller Scheidel admires. Piketty found that “inequality does not go down by itself because we have economic development,” Scheidel said. “His book covers only 200 years and argues that only violent intervention can make that happen.”

But Scheidel, who has taught a freshman seminar on long-term inequality, wanted to know if this insight can be applied to all of history. He enlisted the help of Andrew Granato, a senior majoring in economics, to compile a bibliography of more than 1,000 titles. The result is a sweeping narrative about the link between inequality and peace that harkens back to the beginning of human civilization.

Formulating such a narrative is no simple task. The Great Leveler primarily relies on the published works of other historians – a challenge, in Scheidel’s view, of trying “to synthesize highly fragmented and specialized scholarship and create a single narrative.”

As an expert on ancient Rome, however, Scheidel is well aware that pre-modern sources are limited and some are invalid. His familiarity with scant ancient sources prepared him to grapple with an abundance of more reliable modern records.

“Looking at the distant past would have been more difficult for a modernist economist or historian,” said Scheidel, for whom it is “generally easier to deal with modern evidence because it is more familiar and thoroughly studied.”

A grim view

Scheidel acknowledges his pessimism about resolving inequality. “Reversing the trend toward greater concentrations of income, in the United States and across the world, might be, in fact, nearly impossible,” he said.

Among the wide variety of catastrophes that level societies, Scheidel identifies what he calls “four horsemen”: mass mobilization or state warfare, transformative revolution, state collapse and plague.

A textbook example of mass mobilization is World War II, a conflict that embroiled many developed countries and, key for Scheidel, “uniformly hugely reduced inequality.” As with Europe and Japan, he said, “in the U.S. there were massive tax increases, state intervention in the economy to support the war effort and increase output, which triggered a redistribution of resources, benefiting workers and harming the interests of the top 1 percent.”

Another “horseman” was the outbreak of the bubonic plague in 14th-century Eurasia. While war wreaks havoc on everything, a pandemic of this magnitude “kills a third of the population, but does not damage the physical infrastructure,” Scheidel said. “As a result, labor becomes scarce, wages grow and the gap between the rich and the poor narrows.”

But inequality ratcheted up the moment the plague subsided and the population began to increase. Soon, large swaths of society would see their benefits erased – a loss that in Scheidel’s account would be briefly reversed after the two world wars in the 20th century.

State collapse has also been crucial in the history of inequality. “The rich are beneficiaries of the state,” Scheidel said, adding that “if states fall apart, everybody is worse off; but the rich have more to lose. Their wealth is wiped out by the destruction of the state, such as in the fall of the Mayan civilization or Chinese dynasties.”

Is change possible?

As for whether reducing inequality will ever be possible in peacetime, Scheidel simply said, “History does not determine the future. Things can change, but change is slow.”

“Business as usual may not be enough,” he said. “We have to think harder about how to bring change in today’s world.”

A peaceful remedy to economic inequality may start with what Scheidel calls “an understanding of historical context, because simply electing the right politicians who promise that everything will be OK is a short-term view.”

For the longer term, Scheidel said, “I am not advocating war, but repeating the same old ideas ignores the lessons of history. Something truly innovative and original may have to happen in order to create lasting change.”

 

Media Contacts

Chris Kark, Director of Humanities Communications: (650) 724-8156, ckark@stanford.edu

 

This article was originally published in the Stanford Report on January 24, 2017.
For more information about this book, visit Princeton University Press.

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Widespread violence and disease have been the most successful factors in reducing economic inequality over thousands of years, according to Stanford Professor Walter Scheidel.
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Space is more important than ever for the security of the United States, but it’s almost like the Wild West in terms of behavior, a top general said today.

Air Force Gen. John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, spoke Jan. 24 at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His talk was titled, “U.S. Strategic Command Perspectives on Deterrence and Assurance.”

Hyten said, “Space is fundamental to every single military operation that occurs on the planet today.” He added that “there is no such thing as a war in space,” because it would affect all realms of human existence, due to the satellite systems. Hyten advocates “strategic deterrence” and “norms of behavior” across space as well as land, water and cyberspace.

Otherwise, rivals like China and Russia will only threaten U.S. interests in space and wreak havoc for humanity below, he said. Most of contemporary life depends on systems connected to space.

Hyten also addressed other topics, including recent proposals by some to upgrade the country’s missile defense systems.

“You just don’t snap your fingers and build a state-of-the-art anything overnight,” Hyten said, adding that he has not yet spoken to Trump administration officials about the issue. “We need a powerful military,” but a severe budget crunch makes “reasonable solutions” more likely than expensive and unrealistic ones.

On the upgrade front, Hyten said he favors a long-range strike missile system to replace existing cruise missiles; a better air-to-air missile for the Air Force; and an improved missile defense ground base interceptor.

‘Critically dependent’

From satellites to global-positioning systems (GPS), space has transformed human life – and the military – in the 21st century, Hyten said. In terms of defining "space," the U.S. designates people who travel above an altitude of 50 miles as astronauts.

As the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Hyten oversees the control of U.S. strategic forces, providing options for the president and secretary of defense. In particular, this command is charged with space operations (such as military satellites), information operations (such as information warfare), missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, global strike and strategic deterrence (the U.S. nuclear arsenal), and combating weapons of mass destruction.

Hyten explained that every drone, fighter jet, bomber, ship and soldier is “critically dependent” on space to conduct their own operations. All cell phones use space, and the GPS command systems overall are managed at Strategic Command, he said.

“No soldier has to worry about what’s over the next hill,” he said, describing GPS capabilities, which have fundamentally transformed humanity’s way of life.

Space needs to be available for exploration, he said.

“I watch what goes on in space, and I worry about us destroying that environment for future generations.” He said that too many drifting objects and debris exist – about 22,000 right now. A recent Chinese satellite interception created a couple thousand more debris objects that now circle about the Earth at various altitudes and pose the risk of striking satellites.

“We track every object in space” now, Hyten said, urging “international norms of behavior in space.”

He added, “We have to deter bad behavior on space. We have to deter war in space. It’s bad for everybody. We could trash that forever.”

But now rivals like China and Russia are building weapons to deploy in the lower levels of space. “How do we prevent this? It’s bigger than a space problem,” he said.

Deterring conflict in the cyber, nuclear and space realms is the strategic deterrence goal of the 21st century, Hyten said.

“The best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war,” he said.

Hyten believes the U.S. needs a fundamentally different debate about deterrence. And it all starts with nuclear weapons.

“In my deepest heart, I wish I didn’t have to worry about nuclear weapons,” he said. Hyten described his job as “pretty sobering, it’s not easy.”

But he also noted the mass violence of the world prior to 1945 when the first atomic bomb was used. Roughly 80 million people died from 1939 to 1945 during World War II. Consider that in the 10-plus years of the Vietnam War, 58,000 Americans were killed. That’s equivalent to two days of deaths in WWII, he said.

In a world without nuclear weapons, a rise in conventional warfare would produce great numbers of mass casualties, Hyten said. About war, he said, “Once you see it up close, no human will ever want to experience it.”

Though America has “crazy enemies” right now, in many ways the world is more safe than during WWII, Hyten said. The irony is that nuclear weapons deterrence has kept us from the type of mass killings known in events like WWII. But the U.S. must know how to use its nuclear deterrence effectively.

Looking ahead, Hyten said the U.S. needs to think about space as a potential war environment. An attack in space might not mean a response in space, but on the Earth.

Hyten describes space as the domain that people look up at it and still dream about. “I love to look at the stars,” but said he wants to make sure he’s not looking up at junk orbiting in the atmosphere.

‘Space geek’

Hyten has served in the Air Force for 35 years. He originally wanted to be an astronaut, but his eyesight was too bad. He got a waiver, and graduated Harvard in 1981 with an engineering degree on a ROTC scholarship. He entered the Air Force thinking he would only do four years. But then he had a close-up view of what a young Air Force officer could find in the last frontier of space as satellites and military space science were booming.

“God, I love space,” he said.

In introducing Hyten, Amy Zegart, co-director of CISAC, described him as a person of unwavering dedication and profound insights who understands the gravity of situations. “A self-described space geek,” she said.

Hyten lauded CISAC for its research and educational work on national security, and said he enjoyed being around people willing to test out new ideas and discuss potential solutions for vexing problems.

Earlier in the day on campus, Hyten met with William J. Perry, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense and senior fellow at CISAC; George Shultz, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Condoleezza Rice, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Hoover Institution.

General Hyten was nominated for reassignment to head the U.S. Strategic Command on Sept. 8, 2016. He commanded Air Force Space Command from 2014 to 2016.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

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Air Force Gen. John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, spoke Jan. 24 at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
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Event Recap: The European Crises, Andrew Moravcsik (Princeton University)

 

The Europe Center kicked off its winter quarter talks by continuing its series on the European Union. Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton, spoke on the topic of "The European Crises."

Andrew MoravcsikIn his talk, Moravcsik spoke about the four major crises currently facing the European Union and argued that these crises present less cause for concern than current discourse would suggest. The first crisis is Europe's purported decline in geopolitical power, particularly vis-à-vis China. Contrary to these claims, however, Moravcsik presented evidence indicating that the European Union outstrips China on various measures, including military spending, the number of combat and non-combat forces deployed abroad, number of aircraft carriers, number of allies, relative economic power, civilian foreign economic assistance, and its effective use of non-military intervention. The second crisis is one of Euroscepticism, as exemplified by Brexit. Moravcsik noted that the current British negotiating position largely reflects the status quo. Moreover, he is skeptical that the there will be a domino effect. Specifically, mainstream political parties are unlikely to call for a referendum on the EU, particularly given the results of the British vote, and that the anti-EU parties, even at their most successful, gain too little national political power to successfully hold a referendum. Migration constitutes the third crisis, and Moravcsik argues that this crisis is as serious as it is being portrayed. However, this crisis is unlikely to undermine the entire European project, as there is a clear and effective political solution - closing the border using fences, criminal law, and repatriation agreements. The final crisis is the lack of economic growth. Again, this crisis is exaggerated as both the EU-28 and the Eurozone have had higher per capita growth over the past decade than has the U.S. or Japan. However, that growth has been uneven across the EU member states and has been either stagnant or negative in countries such as Portugal and Greece. Moravcsik's ultimate take away was that in order to undo the European Union, a crisis must be serious and lacking a clear policy solution, and none of the four crises currently facing the EU meet both of these criteria.


Featured Faculty Research: Vincent Barletta

We would like to introduce you to some of The Europe Center’s faculty affiliates and the projects on which they are working. Our featured faculty member this month is Vincent Barletta. Vincent is an Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and of Iberian and Latin American Cultures. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles in 1998 and joined the faculty at Stanford in 2007.

Vincent's research and teaching focus on medieval and early modern Iberian literatures; Portuguese literature, empire and humanism; Islam and Aljamiado literature; comparative literature; literature and linguistic anthropology; and literature and philosophy. In a recent article, Vincent examines the translation practices of sixteenth-century Ibero-Muslims. As Christian kingdoms expanded into the Muslim territories of the Iberian Peninsula throughout the first half of the second millennium, so the dominant jurisprudence shifted from Islamic law to Christian law. This process culminated in the early sixteenth century, when non-Christians were forced to convert to Christianity. Vincent examines the ways in which clandestine Muslim communities during this period translated and adapted juridical Islamic texts. He argues that the translations themselves and the structure of the texts reflect an interest in "closeness." In order to explicate his arguments, he presents analysis of Abū al-Ḥassan cAli ibn cIsa al-Ṭulayṭulī’s Mukhtaṣar (Compendium), which is a tenth-century guidebook to obligatory religious devotions.

Barletta, Vincent. 2016. "Closeness Before the Law: Purity, Prayer, and al-Tulaytilī's Mukhtasa." Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 17(3):271-284.


Featured Graduate Student Research: Justin Tackett

We would like to introduce you to some of the graduate students that we support and the projects on which they are working. Our featured graduate student this month is Justin Tackett (English). Justin is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of English at Stanford University.

Justin TackettIn his research, Justin is interested in 19th and 20th century British and American literature, with a focus on sound studies, poetics, Victorianism, transatlantic modernism, periodicals, technology, and urbanization. In his dissertation Justin examines sound technology and poetry in Britain and America from 1816 to 1914. In one of his dissertation chapters, Justin focuses on the work of the little-known Irish poet, James Henry. Supported by The Europe Center, Justin traveled to Dublin in October 2016 in order to examine the only known repository of Henry's manuscripts, which is housed in the Trinity College archives. In addition to his work in the archives, Justin was able to meet with Emeritus Professor John Richmond, now in his nineties and housebound, who wrote the first Henry biography in 1976. His book is now extremely rare and prohibitively expensive, but he generously gave Justin a copy, which will be of great value for his continuing research. In addition to his work towards the chapter on Henry, Justin was able to advance the research for various other chapters of his dissertation by meeting with other scholars and visiting sites of historical importance. Justin plans to return to Trinity in order to finish cataloging Henry's papers.

Please visit our website for more information about our Graduate Student Grant program.

Call for Applications: The Europe Center's Undergraduate Internship Program

Application Deadline: February 7, 2017

A key priority of The Europe Center is to provide Stanford’s undergraduate student community with opportunities to develop a deep understanding of contemporary European society and affairs. By promoting knowledge about the opportunities and challenges facing one of the world’s most economically and politically integrated regions, the Center strives to equip our future leaders with the tools necessary to tackle complex problems related to governance, geopolitics, and economic interdependence both in Europe and in the world more broadly.

In order to facilitate this goal, The Europe Center is sponsoring undergraduate internships to be completed in summer 2017. Sponsored internships are available with the following entities:

  • The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Brussels, Belgium
    ALDE is a transnational political party comprised of national political parties represented in the European Parliament.
    Positions Available: 2
    Program Dates: June 12, 2017 to July 21, 2017
  • Bruegel Brussels, Belgium
    Bruegel is a think-tank devoted to policy research on international economic issues.
    Positions Available: 3
    Program Dates: July 31, 2017 to September 8, 2017
  • Carnegie Europe Brussels, Belgium
    Carnegie Europe is an independent policy research center providing foreign policy analysis and policy recommendations on the strategic issues facing Europe and its role in the world.
    Positions Available: 1
    Program Dates: 9 consecutive weeks, with some flexibility to adjust this to work with the intern's summer schedule, between June 19, 2017 and September 15, 2017 (start and end dates to be determined by the host and the student)
  • The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Brussels, Belgium
    CEPS is a policy think-tank providing research and activities on economic and international policy matters.
    Positions Available: 1
    Program Dates: 6 consecutive weeks between June 19, 2017 and September 15, 2017 (start and end dates to be determined by the host and the student)

We invite applications from Stanford University undergraduate students interested in these exciting opportunities. For more information on The Europe Center's Undergraduate Internship Program, please visit our website.


Visiting Scholar: Dirk Rupnow

The Europe Center is pleased to welcome Dirk Rupnow to Stanford as the 2016-2017 Distinguished Visiting Austrian Chair Professor. Dirk is a Professor of Contemporary History, Head of the Institute for Contemporary History, and Founding Coordinator of the Center for Migration and Globalization at the University of Innsbruck.

Dirk RupnowDirk is a historian who is interested in 20th century European history, Holocaust and Jewish studies, cultures and politics of memory, and intellectual and migration history. His current research focuses on developing an inclusive narrative of post-war Austrian history, one that reflects the current plurality and diversity of Austrian society. In order to do so, Dirk will be working primarily on two projects during his time at The Europe Center. In the first project, he is examining the so-called "guest worker“ migration to Austria during the 1960s and 1970s. Because labor migration was viewed as temporary, it somehow remained a blank spot in narratives of post-war Austrian history. But in fact, it has had a lasting effect on Austrian society. The migrants remain nonetheless invisible and have no voice in the discourse on the national history. Dirk seeks to uncover greater information and new sources in order to provide a more complete and multiperspective portrayal of contemporary Austrian history as both a European and global transnational history. In the second project, Dirk seeks to understand how museums can be used to present an inclusive historical narrative to the public. He will lead a group of Austrian museum curators and museologists on a tour of the historical museums in Washington, D.C. - including the National Museum of the American Indian and the National Museum of African American History and Culture - in order to observe how the U.S. presents the history of both minority and marginalized groups. As a member of the Advisory Board for the planned House of Austrian History in Vienna, Dirk intends for this work to facilitate a compelling and inclusive presentation of Austrian history. Please join us in welcoming Dirk to Stanford.


The Europe Center Sponsored Events

January 31, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:30PM 
Lukas Schmid, University of Lucerne 
Human Barriers to International Trade
CISAC Central Conference Room, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor
RSVP by 5:00PM January 27, 2017.

February 2, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:30PM 
Amie Kreppel, University of Florida 
The Political and Institutional Effects of Brexit 
CISAC Central Conference Room, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor
RSVP by 5:00PM January 30, 2017.

February 9, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:30PM 
Walter Scheidel, Stanford University 
Book Talk: The Great Leveler
CISAC Central Conference Room, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor 
RSVP by 5:00PM February 6, 2017.

February 16, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:30PM 
Norman Naimark, Stanford University 
Book Talk: Genocide: A World History
Oksenberg Conference Room, Encina Hall, 3rd Floor 
RSVP by 5:00PM February 13, 2017.

Save the Date: March 3, 2017 
4:00PM - 5:30PM 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Former President of the French Republic (1974 - 1981)
This event is sponsored by the France-Stanford Center and co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Save the Date: April 3, 2017 
11:30AM - 1:00PM 
Guido Tabellini, Bocconi University
Room 400 (Graham Stuart Lounge), Encina Hall West 
No RSVP required. 
This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

April 11, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:30PM 
Philippe Van Parijs, University of Louvain
Europe's Destiny: A View from Brussels 
CISAC Central Conference Room, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor 
RSVP by 5:00PM April 7, 2017.

Save the Date: April 24, 2017 
11:30AM - 1:00PM 
Torun Dewan, London School of Economics
Room 400 (Graham Stuart Lounge), Encina Hall West 
No RSVP required. 
This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Save the Date: June 5, 2017 
11:30AM - 1:00PM 
Daniel Stegmuller, University of Mannheim
Room 400 (Graham Stuart Lounge), Encina Hall West 
No RSVP required. 
This seminar is part of the Comparative Politics Workshop in the Department of Political Science and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

European Security Initiative Events

January 26, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:15PM 
Andrei Kozyrev, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations
Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall
RSVP by 5:00PM January 20, 2017.

Save the Date: January 30, 2017 
12:00PM - 1:15PM 
Marie Mendras, Sciences Po and National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
Reuben Hills Conference Room, Encina Hall, 2nd Floor 
RSVP by 5:00PM January 25, 2017.

Save the Date: April 10, 2017 
Time TBA 
Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, Bulgaria


We welcome you to visit our website for additional details.

 

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Why is terrorism such a vexing problem for policy makers to solve?

The details – and not sloganeering – are important in grappling with the terrorist threat against the U.S. and West, a Stanford scholar suggests. One reason is that the study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating, says Martha Crenshaw, a Stanford terrorism expert and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“The conceptual and empirical requirements of defining, classifying, explaining, and responding to terrorist attacks are more complex than is usually acknowledged by politicians and academics, which complicates the task of crafting effective counterterrorism policy,” wrote Crenshaw in a new book, Countering Terrorism, with her co-author Gary LaFree, a criminal justice professor at the University of Maryland.

The researchers examined about 157,000 terrorist attacks that have occurred around the world since 1970. These are catalogued in the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland. Crenshaw founded the Mapping Militant Organizations project at Stanford to identify militant organizations globally and trace how they arise, their root causes and their connections. Understanding the nature of terrorism, the diverse groups and ever-changing aspect of how they adapt is a key theme in her research.

Crenshaw said the stakes in fighting terrorism today are especially high since the consequences of missteps and miscalculations can be catastrophic. While research in what is now known as terrorism studies has made significant strides, more progress is needed on the analytical and academic fronts.

“Terrorist attacks are rare, yet they encourage immediate and far-reaching responses that are not easily rolled back. Most attempts actually fail or are foiled, so that examining only successful terrorist attacks gives an incomplete picture,” the scholars wrote.

Obstacles and hindrances

After 9/11, the U.S. reshaped its policies and institutions to deal with terrorism. Fifteen years later, Crenshaw and LaFree analyzed the lessons learned from 9/11 and how governments responded. Both authors are participating in a Jan. 25 panel discussion at Stanford on the subject of their book. Crenshaw and Lafree suggest three key principles emerge from their research. Countries like the U.S. should prepare for change, disruption, and surprise from terrorist groups.

Second, countries should resist the temptation to magnify the image of the destructive power of terrorism as well as the vulnerability of its targets. Finally, the U.S. needs to accept limits to its ability to totally manage and control the jihadist threat. As Crenshaw and LaFree noted, “Even superpowers cannot completely control their environments. Terrorist threats are constantly evolving, never static.”

A realistic understanding of the actual extent of terrorist capacity to harm national security interests is the best approach, she said. “Governments, especially the American government, should avoid both overreacting and promising or threatening overreaction, which means entertaining modest expectations about what can be accomplished in an extremely complex and uncertain threat environment that requires constant adaptation and adjustment,” they wrote.

Counterterrorism policy should be reasonable, practical, and balanced – in a word, sensible, Crenshaw said.

“There is no perfect solution,” she and LaFree said.

The top priority of the U.S. government is to prevent attacks on American soil, she said. While this is a clear goal, no one in political leadership can guarantee the public absolute security. “If the goal is set as the complete absence of terrorist attacks, then policymakers become so anxious that a terrorist will slip through the preventive security net that they risk panic or overreaction. Fear of being blamed in the aftermath of an attack starts to take precedence over all other considerations,” they wrote.

Policy paradoxes

Crenshaw and Lafree’s research revealed some policy paradoxes. One involved counterterrorism: policymakers tend to set overly ambitious policies to eradicate terrorism completely, rather than risk being called “reactive” rather than “proactive.” But Crenshaw said such goals lack clarity and realism, and can lead to unwise and unattainable objectives. For example, in the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government believed that overthrowing authoritarian regimes in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen in favor of “democratic change” would serve as the antidote to terrorism.

However, the change did not take place, and the U.S. has since had to intervene militarily to restore or establish security and stability for weak and embattled allies facing terrorism. One aim for American policy should be greater precision about the strategic goals of military action abroad and that connection to security at home, said Crenshaw and LaFree.

“If the contradictions behind the paradox cannot be resolved, policymakers must find a middle ground between the tactical and strategic,” they wrote.

Another problem is measuring progress against terrorism, Crenshaw and LaFree said. Significant skepticism exists about what the metrics mean in regard to drone strikes, bombs dropped, targets struck, arrests made and cases prosecuted, convictions secured, territory seized or regained, plots foiled, websites taken down, Facebook postings and Twitter accounts deleted, and so on.

“Are these measures of success against terrorism or measures of the extent of the government’s efforts? These metrics calculate what government has done, not necessarily the effect of its actions on adversaries’ calculations and capabilities,” the researchers said, adding that government measures may be taken before a specific adversary exists.

Finally, the real agents behind terrorism are extremely difficult to identify, Crenshaw and LaFree said, because there is no standard “terrorist organization,” and groups evolve, mutate and adapt. Meanwhile, governments and researchers often struggle to establish responsibility for specific attacks. 

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC or  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS

Martha Crenshaw, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies: (650) 723-0126, crenshaw@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

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The study of terrorism is often confused and contentious, and the study of counterterrorism can be even more frustrating, says Martha Crenshaw, a Stanford terrorism expert and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
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This paper investigates the impact of human barriers on international trade using data on common ancestry. Using data on 172 countries covering the near universe of international trade, our analysis documents that country pairs with a large ancestral distance are less likely to trade with each other (extensive margin) and, if they do trade, they trade fewer goods (intensive margin). The results are robust to including a vast array of micro-geographic and political control variables. We explore the role of several proximate determinants that lead to this negative relationship, including differences in values, preferences, technology, as well as migration patterns. Our findings offer a partial explanation to the distance puzzle, the observation that estimates of geographic distance have remained persistently high despite substantial decreases in transportation costs in recent years.

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Lukas Schmid is an Assistant Professor at the University of Lucerne -- where he teaches empirical methods. His research interests include political economy, labor economics, and international economics. On-going projects explore the interaction between institutions and political and economic behavior, the impact of language and common ancestry on economic outcomes as well as the long-term consequences of education. His articles have been published in American Journal of Political Science, Review of Economics and Statistics, Economic Journal, and elsewhere.

 

Lukas Schmid Assistant Professor speaker University of Lucerne
Lectures
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"Europe-Russia: a lasting confrontation"

European states expect the confrontation with Russia to last. And they are adjusting to a continued deterioration of relations with Moscow, short of armed conflict, as Moscow shows no sign of changing its position on Ukraine, Crimea, the status of the “in-between states” (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia…) and European security more broadly. The new US administration will most likely fail to improve the West-Russia relationship, and maybe worsen it further if they overplay their hand. New governments in the Netherlands, France and Germany in 2017 will face limited options to start anew a serious dialogue with Vladimir Putin. The Russian president does not appear to be much in demand of a repaired partnership.

Marie Mendras is an expert at the Kennan Institute,  and a Professor at Sciences Po - Paris School of International Affairs.

This event has reached full capacity. Please contact Magdalena Fitipaldi at magdafb@stanford.edu to get on the waiting list. 

This event is co-sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies.

Lectures
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Due to the overwhelming interest in this event,  we have reached full capacity and are no longer able to accept further RSVPs or further requests to be added to the wait list.  Thank you.

 

With the financial crisis, the euro crisis, the refugee crisis and powerful anti-European populist revolts in several member states, one of them leading to the first secession ever, the European Union is facing an unprecedented accumulation of challenges. Do these various challenges stem from one common cause? Can they be addressed through the disintegration of the European Union? Or in any other way? Among feasible scenarios for the future of the European continent, which is the most desirable one?

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Image of Philippe Van Parijs

 

Philippe Van Parijs is a professor at the University of Louvain (Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics). From 2004 to 2010 he was a regular visiting professor at Harvard University and from 2011 to 2015 at the University of Oxford. His books include Real Freedom for All (Oxford U.P. 1995), Just Democracy (ECPR 2011), Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford U.P. 2011), After the Storm: How to Save Democracy in Europe (Lannoo 2015, with L. van Middelaar) and Basic Income: A radical proposal for a free society and a sane economy (Harvard U.P. 2017, with Y. Vanderborght).

 

 

Philippe Van Parijs Professor of Economics speaker University of Louvain
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Distinguished Visiting Austrian Chair Professor (2016-2017)
Professor of Contemporary History, University of Innsbruck
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Prof. Dr. Dirk Rupnow studied history, German literature, art history and philosophy in Berlin and Vienna, earning his M.A. in 1999 (Vienna), Ph.D. in 2002 (Klagenfurt) and Habilitation in 2009 (Vienna). Prof. Rupnow was Project Researcher with the Historian’s Commission of the Republic of Austria in 1999/2000. He has been awarded numerous research stays and fellowships in Austria, Germany, France, Israel, and the USA and the 2009 Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History of the Wiener Library, London. Prof. Rupnow has been on faculty at the University of Innsbruck since 2009 and the Head of the Institute for Contemporary History since 2010. His main research interests are 20th Century European History, Holocaust and Jewish Studies, Cultures and Politics of Memory, Intellectual and Migration History.

Prof. Rupnow will be teaching the course "The Holocaust and its Aftermath" for the Department of History in the Spring Quarter.

 

Head, Institute for Contemporary History, University of Innsbruck
Founding Coordinator, Center for Migration & Globalization, University of Innsbruck
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The following essay by CISAC's Amy Zegart -- "Trump vs. the Spies: In defense of the Intelligence Community" -- appeared in The Atlantic on Jan. 6.

Something stunning happened on Capitol Hill yesterday: Republican and Democratic members of the Senate Armed Services Committee practically stood shoulder to shoulder with senior officials from the U.S. intelligence community as they declared that America’s spies were right after all: The Russian government sought to interfere in the U.S. presidential election by hacking into election-related email and leaking information. It was a striking bipartisan rebuke to President-elect Donald Trump, who has consistently cast skepticism on allegations of Russian involvement and seemed to disparage the intelligence community. Perhaps in anticipation of that committee hearing, Trump was already backpedaling on Twitter before it started, declaring, “The media lies to make it look like I am against ‘Intelligence’ when in fact I am a big fan!”

Trump’s “never mind” tweet is unlikely to repair the dangerous breach between the incoming president and the intelligence agencies that serve him. Presidents often throw intelligence agencies under the bus when they fail. Never before has a president-elect thrown them under the bus for succeeding. But that’s exactly what Trump has been doing for weeks, in an unrelenting frenzy. Since his election, Trump has spent more time fighting Langley than ISIS. He has called the CIA’s assessment of the Russian government’s role in election hacking “ridiculous” and has insisted, repeatedly, that the culprit could be anyone, including a 400-pound hacker or “somebody sitting in a bed some place.” His transition team has disparaged and discredited the CIA as “the same people who thought Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction”—even though they aren’t the same people, Russian cyber hacking isn’t the same intelligence target as Iraq WMD, the Iraq failure was 14 years ago, and intelligence agencies have radically overhauled their analytic process since then. The president-elect has also said he won’t bother getting daily intelligence briefings—making him the first president since 9/11 to skip them—because he’s smart. And just a day before Trump declared himself an intelligence fan, The Wall Street Journal reported that his team was cooking up a Nixon-esque scheme to purge the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence of suspected politicization in the ranks by trimming and reorganizing both agencies. (The Trump team has denied this report, which was based on the accounts of sources “familiar with the planning,” including at least one close to the transition.)

With fans like this, who needs enemies?

Some skepticism toward intelligence is healthy. And tension between presidents and their intelligence agencies is nothing new. Lyndon Johnson was said to compare the intelligence community to his boyhood cow, Bessie, who would swing her “shit smeared” tail through a bucket of milk as soon as he’d finished milking her. Bill Clinton met so infrequently with his CIA Director, Jim Woolsey, that when a plane crashed on the White House lawn, aides joked that it was Woolsey trying to get a meeting. (Woolsey, incidentally, had been advising the Trump transition team until resigning yesterday, reportedly due to “growing tensions over Trump’s vision for intelligence agencies.”) Nearly all presidents leave office disappointed and disgruntled with their intelligence apparatus, for two reasons: because presidents want crystal balls and even the CIA’s smartest people don’t have them; and because presidents resort to covert operations for the toughest of problems, when all else fails—which is why covert operations usually fail, too. But no president until now has entered office with such a profound, publicly vented distrust of his own intelligence establishment.

Trump’s doubts are both understandable and alarming. Understandable because we live in an era where threats are moving faster than bureaucrats, and where hacks, tweets, leaks, and internet “news” (both real and fake) make information available everywhere, all the time, instantly. In this digital age, it is reasonable to ask just what America’s intelligence community still brings to the table.

The answer is a lot. U.S. intelligence agencies have one overriding mission: giving the president decision-making advantage in a dangerous and deceptive world. Intelligence officials risk their lives to recruit foreign assets, they intercept foreign email and cell-phone communications, they build and deploy spy satellites, they track obscure foreign government reports and trends for vital clues about the stability of a regime or the health of a foreign economy. Sure, you can find a Wikipedia page on just about anything these days. Where intelligence agencies add value is by integrating the best open-source information and integrating it with the secret nuggets they gather. All intelligence is information. But not all information is intelligence. Agencies like the CIA or NSA sort through a crushing daily stream of information and marry it with secrets to yield insights that keep Americans safe and advance the country’s national interests.

Do they get it wrong sometimes? Of course. In 1962, just weeks before an American U-2 spy plane discovered unmistakable evidence of Soviet nuclear missile installations in Cuba, the intelligence community completed an assessment that concluded the Soviets would not dare place missiles in Cuba. Today Americans remember the U-2 photos but forget the intelligence failure that preceded them and led the United States to the nuclear brink. The intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraq WMD are still fresh and searing.

But castigating intelligence officials because they don’t succeed every time is like saying Stephen Curry is a terrible NBA basketball player because he doesn’t make every 3-point shot he takes. Intelligence agencies are paid to pierce the fog of the future as best they can. They tackle the toughest targets—trying to divine the capabilities and intentions of adversaries who hide in caves, send children to be suicide bombers, enrich uranium in secret underground facilities, seek space weapons that could destroy GPS and every digital system people use, and would detonate a nuclear bomb in a New York minute to take out New York City if they ever got one. As one former senior intelligence official told me, if the intelligence community is getting it right 100 percent of the time, then they should be fired because they aren’t asking hard enough questions.

This is serious business, and intelligence agencies take it deadly seriously. They are the silent warriors of America. There’s no holiday in their honor. There’s no big public memorial on the National Mall. There are no Air Force flyovers or standing ovations at football games for them. There are only unmarked stars on the walls at Langley and Fort Meade honoring those at CIA and NSA who died in silent service to their country. Mr. Trump should visit those walls and feel their sacrifice. Better yet, he should honor America’s intelligence professionals by listening to what they have to say—starting with the daily intelligence briefing.

The president cannot afford to delegate intelligence briefings to underlings in today’s threat environment, for three reasons that Mr. Trump should know well from his experience in the business world. First, nothing generates knowledge and results like face-to-face meetings. That’s why CEOs fly around the world to meet in person instead of Skyping. Whether in the boardroom or the Oval Office, good briefings are two-way interactions that build trust and insight. They’re golden moments for a senior intelligence official to converse with the nation’s leader, to better understand what’s on his mind, what he wants to know, what he finds unconvincing, and how the vast assets of the intelligence community can better serve him. Second, good briefings inform—they arm the commander-in-chief with a view of what matters right now and what could matter tomorrow, so that he isn’t surprised. Because in foreign policy, surprises are never the good kind. Third and finally, the daily briefing boosts morale. It says to the men and women of the intelligence community, “you matter.” Nothing signals importance like minutes of the president’s schedule. Given the dangers America confronts, the nation needs the intelligence community now more than ever. The 45th president needs to show that he thinks so, too.

Amy Zegart is the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. She is the author of three books examining U.S. intelligence challenges, including Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.

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Defense Undersecretary for Intelligence Marcell Lettre II, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and United States Cyber Command and National Security Agency Director Admiral Michael Rogers testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Capitol Hill, Jan. 5, 2017 in Washington, DC. The intelligence chiefs testified to the committee about cyber threats to the United States and fielded questions about effects of Russian government hacking on the 2016 presidential election.
Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
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