-

Too often, the debate over NATO enlargement avoids a discussion of the alternative policies and the pros and cons of each. Even if take a NATO-centric approach to the question of European security after the Cold War, there were three major alternatives to the policy chosen: pursuing Partnership for Peace and setting aside enlargement; opting for including some but not all of the countries that joined NATO after 1999; and inviting Russia to join. Each of these options had its proponents within the US government. This seminar will compare and contrast the costs and benefits of the policy chosen against its alternatives in order to evaluate NATO enlargement.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Image
Jim Goldgeier
James Goldgeier is a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service at American University, where he served as Dean from 2011-17. He is a past president of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs. He is a senior adviser to the Bridging the Gap initiative, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Raymond Frankel Foundation, and he serves as co-editor of the Bridging the Gap book series at Oxford University Press. He has authored or co-authored four books.

 

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Didi Kuo

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Jim Goldgeier
Seminars

Incumbent president Emmanuel Macron is favorite to win reelection on April 24, but the outcome remains uncertain; it will largely depend on the results of the first round of voting on April 10. Three candidates, all on the Right and far Right, can still potentially defeat Macron. Even if Macron he is reelected, this should not be construed as an endorsement of the status quo. French politics is in the midst of a major partisan and ideological realignment.


Photo of Patrick Chamorel
Patrick Chamorel teaches transatlantic relations and comparative US and European politics at Stanford in Washington as well as, occasionally, at FSI's Ford Dorsey master in international policy. His research focuses on elections, political elites and democratic institutions in both the US and Europe. He is a frequent commentator on French, European and US media. Chamorel is a member of the editorial board of "American Purpose". At Stanford, he has been a Research scholar at CDDRL as well as a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was an adviser to the French minister of industry as well as the Prime Minister. Chamorel holds a PhD in political science from Sciences-Po in Paris and a masters in public law from the university of Paris.


*If you need any disability-related accommodation, please contact: Shannon Johnson (sj1874@stanford.edu) by March 24, 2022.

0
Senior Resident Scholar at the Stanford Center in Washington
chamorel_patrick_photo.jpg

Patrick Chamorel conducts research on elections, populism, political movements and cleavages in Western democracies; Comparative US/European politics; Transatlantic relations; European politics; French politics, economic and foreign policy. He was most recently a Research Scholar at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Stanford University.

Chamorel teaches comparative American and European politics, public policy and political economy, as well as transatlantic relations both at Stanford in Washington and at FSI’s Ford Dorsey Master in International Policy. He has also taught at the Stanford in Paris campus, the Reims Euro-American campus of Sciences-Po Paris, the University of California (Berkeley and Santa Cruz), George Washington University, and Claremont McKenna College where he was the Crown Visiting professor of Government in 2001-5.

Patrick Chamorel was a Fellow of the Institute for Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley, the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC and the Hoover Institution at Stanford, as well as a Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association (Offices of Harry Reid in the U.S. Senate and Norman Mineta in the House of Representatives).

Patrick Chamorel has written and lectured extensively on US and European politics. His research has focused on US and European elections and the rise of populism; US strategic, political and economic relations with Europe; American and European political and business elites; the impact of globalization on government, business and civil society, as well as the rise of Euro-skepticism in America.

He regularly contributes to the media, including the Wall Street Journal, Die Welt, Les Echos, Atlantico.fr, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Al-Jazeera, i24news, RMC, Talk Media News, BFM-TV, Le Figaro TV and CNN International. He is also a regular consultant to the US State Department.

In the 1990s, Patrick Chamorel was a Senior Advisor to the Minister of Industry and in the Policy Planning Office of the Prime Minister in Paris. He is a graduate of Sciences-Po in Paris where he also earned his Ph.D. in Political Science after doing research at UC Berkeley and Stanford University. He holds a Master in Public Law from the University of Paris.

Senior Resident Scholar speaker Stanford Center in Washington
Governance

Image
Facebook's Faces event flyer on blue and red background with photo of Chinmayi Arun
Join us on Tuesday, March 1 from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for a panel discussion on “Facebook’s Faces” featuring Chinmayi Arun, Resident Fellow at the Yale Law School in conversation with Nate Persily of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Scholarship about social media platforms discusses their relationship with states and users. It is time to expand this theorization to account for differences among states, the varying influence of different publics and the internal complexity of companies. Viewing Facebook’s relationships this way includes less influential states and publics that are otherwise obscured. It reveals that Facebook engages with states and publics through multiple, parallel regulatory conversations, further complicated by the fact that Facebook itself is not a monolith. Arun argues that Facebook has many faces – different teams working towards different goals, and engaging with different ministries, institutions, scholars and civil society organizations. Content moderation exists within this ecosystem.
 
This account of Facebook’s faces and relationships shows that less influential publics can influence the company through strategic alliances with strong publics or powerful states. It also suggests that Facebook’s carelessness with a seemingly weak state or a group, may affect its relationship with a strong public or state that cares about the outcome.

To be seen as independent and legitimate, the Oversight Board needs to show its willingness to curtail Facebook’s flexibility in its engagement with political leaders where there is a real risk of harm. This essay hopes to show that Facebook’s fear of short-term retaliation from some states should be balanced out by accounting for the long-term reputational gains with powerful publics and powerful states who may appreciate its willingness to set profit-making goals aside in favor of human flourishing.

About the Speakers:

Image
Chinmayi Arun
Chinmayi Arun is a resident fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School, and an affiliate of the Berkman Klein Center of Internet & Society at Harvard University. She has served on the faculties of two of the most highly regarded law schools in India for over a decade, and was the founder Director of the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi. She has been a Human Rights Officer with the United Nations and is a member of the United Nations Global Pulse Advisory Group on the Governance of Data and AI, and of UNESCO India’s Media Freedom Advisory Group.

Chinmayi serves on the Global Network Initiative Board, and is an expert affiliated with the Columbia Global Freedom of Expression project. She has been consultant to the Law Commission of India and member of the Indian government’s multi stakeholder advisory group for the India Internet Governance Forum in the past.

Image
Nate Persily
Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, which supported local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.

 

Seminars
-

When backsliding occurs at the hands of populist presidents who were elected in landslide elections, producing dominant executives with few institutional checks and weak opposition parties, should we blame the decline in democracy on their populist ideology, their presidential powers, or their parties’ dominance in the legislature? The literature on democratic backsliding has mostly arrived at a consensus on what backsliding entails and collectively has revealed its growing prevalence around the globe. Yet, scholars have not settled on causal explanations for this phenomenon. We assess the evidence for recent ideology-centered arguments for democratic backsliding relative to previous institutional arguments among all democratically elected executives serving in all regions of the world since 1970. We use newly available datasets on populist leaders and parties to evaluate the danger of populists in government, and we employ matching methods to distinguish the effects of populist executives, popularly-elected presidents, and dominant executives on the extent of decline in liberal democracy.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Image
Marisa Kellam
Marisa Kellam is associate professor of political science at Waseda University (Tokyo, Japan). Her research focuses on the quality of democracy in Latin America. In her work, she links institutional analysis to governance outcomes within three lines of inquiry: (1) political parties and coalitional politics, (2) media freedom and democratic accountability, and (3) populism and democratic backsliding. She has published her research in peer-reviewed journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and Political Communication. After earning a Ph.D. in political science from UCLA, she spent several years as an assistant professor at Texas A&M University. Since 2013, Marisa Kellam has been teaching international and Japanese students in the English-based degree programs of Waseda University’s School of Political Science & Economics.

At this time, in-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only. We continue to welcome our greater community to join virtually via Zoom.

Didi Kuo

Online, via Zoom

Encina Hall

616 Jane Stanford Way

Stanford, CA 94305-6055

0
CDDRL Visiting Scholar, 2021-23
marisa_kellam_2022.jpg

Marisa Kellam researches the quality of democracy with a focus on Latin America and a growing interest in East Asia. Her research links institutional analysis to various governance outcomes in democracies along three lines of inquiry: political parties and coalitional politics; mass electoral behavior and party system change; and democratic accountability and media freedom. She has published her research in various peer-reviewed journals, including The British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and Political Communication. Originally from Santa Rosa, California, Marisa Kellam earned her Ph.D. in political science from UCLA and spent several years as an assistant professor at Texas A&M University. Since 2013, she has been Associate Professor at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, where she also served as Director of the English-based degree programs for the School of Political Science & Economics. Currently she is a steering committee member for the V-Dem Regional Center for East Asia.

CV
Seminars
Governance
-

Never in history has a democracy succeeded in being both diverse and equal, treating members of many different ethnic or religious groups fairly. And yet achieving that goal is now central to the democratic project in countries around the world. It is “the great experiment” of our time.

Why is it so hard to build diverse democracies? Would principles and policies do we need to adopt to maximize the chances of making them work? And how good are the chances of success? The project of building thriving diverse democracies may well fail. But the chances of success, this talk argues, are better than the pessimism which is now dominant suggests.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Image
yascha_mounk.jpg
Yascha Mounk is a Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, a Contributing Editor at The Atlantic, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Founder of Persuasion. The host of The Good Fight podcast, his latest book is The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure.

 

 

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Didi Kuo

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to E008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Yascha Mounk Professor of the Practice of International Affairs Johns Hopkins University
Seminars
-

The Trump presidency generated concern about democratic backsliding and renewed interest in measuring the national democratic performance of the United States. However, the U.S. has a decentralized form of federalism that administers democratic institutions at the state level.

Using 51 indicators of electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018, we develop a measure of subnational democratic performance, the State Democracy Index. We then test theories of democratic expansion and backsliding based in party competition, polarization, demographic change, and the group interests of national party coalitions. Difference-in-differences results suggest a minimal role for all factors except Republican control of state government, which dramatically reduces states' democratic performance during this period. This result calls into question theories focused on changes within states. The racial, geographic, and economic incentives of groups in national party coalitions may instead determine the health of democracy in the states.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Image
Jacob M. Grumbach Headshot
Jacob M. Grumbach is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington and a Faculty Associate with the Harry Bridges Center for Labor Studies. Grumbach’s research focuses broadly on the political economy of the United States, with an emphasis on public policy, racial and economic inequality, American federalism, and statistical methods.

 

At this time, in-person attendance is limited to Stanford affiliates only. We continue to welcome our greater community to join virtually via Zoom.

Didi Kuo
Jacob Grumbach Assistant Professor University of Washington
Seminars
Authors
Oriana Skylar Mastro
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This commentary was originally published by The Wall Street Journal.


A Russian invasion of Ukraine would be the most consequential use of military force in Europe since World War II and could put Moscow in a position to threaten U.S. allies in Europe. Many in the American foreign-policy establishment argue that the appropriate U.S. response to any such invasion is a major American troop deployment to the Continent. This would be a grave mistake.

The U.S. can no longer afford to spread its military across the world. The reason is simple: an increasingly aggressive China, the most powerful state to rise in the international system since the U.S. itself. By some measures, China’s economy is now the world’s largest. And it has built a military to match its economic heft. Twenty-five years ago, the Chinese military was backward and obsolete. But extraordinary increases in Beijing’s defense budget over more than two decades, and top political leaders’ razor-sharp focus, have transformed the People’s Liberation Army into one of the strongest militaries the world has ever seen.


Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our experts' commentary and analysis.


China’s new military is capable not only of territorial defense but of projecting power. Besides boasting the largest navy in the world by ship count, China enjoys some capabilities, like certain types of hypersonic weapons, that even the U.S. hasn’t developed.

Most urgently, China poses an increasingly imminent threat to Taiwan. Xi Jinping has made clear that his platform of “national rejuvenation” can’t be successful until Taiwan unifies with the mainland—whether it wants to or not. The PLA is growing more confident in its ability to conquer Taiwan even if the U.S. intervenes. Given China’s military and economic strength, China’s leaders reasonably doubt that the U.S. or anyone else would mount a meaningful response to an invasion of Taiwan. To give a sense of his resolve, Mr. Xi warned that any “foreign forces” standing in China’s way would have “their heads . . . bashed bloody against a Great Wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people.”

If Taiwan falls into Chinese hands, the U.S. will find it harder to defend critical allies like Japan and the Philippines, while China will be able to project its naval, air and other forces close to the U.S. and its territories

The U.S. must defend Taiwan to retain its credibility as the leader of a coalition for a free and open Indo-Pacific. From a military perspective, Taiwan is a vital link in the first island chain of the Western Pacific. If Taiwan falls into Chinese hands, the U.S. will find it harder to defend critical allies like Japan and the Philippines, while China will be able to project its naval, air and other forces close to the U.S. and its territories. Taiwan is also an economic dynamo, the ninth-largest U.S. trading partner of goods with a near-monopoly on the most advanced semiconductor technology—to which the U.S. would most certainly lose access after a war.

The Biden administration this month ordered more than 6,000 additional U.S. troops deployed to Eastern Europe, with many more potentially on the way. These deployments would involve major additional uncounted commitments of air, space, naval and logistics forces needed to enable and protect them. These are precisely the kinds of forces needed to defend Taiwan. The critical assets—munitions, top-end aviation, submarines, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities—that are needed to fight Russia or China are in short supply. For example, stealthy heavy bombers are the crown jewel of U.S. military power, but there are only 20 in the entire Air Force.

The U.S. has no hope of competing with China and ensuring Taiwan’s defense if it is distracted elsewhere. It is a delusion that the U.S. can, as Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said recently, “walk and chew gum at the same time” with respect to Russia and China. Sending more resources to Europe is the definition of getting distracted. Rather than increasing forces in Europe, the U.S. should be moving toward reductions.

To be blunt: Taiwan is more important than Ukraine. America’s European allies are in a better position to take on Russia than America’s Asian allies are to deal with China.

There is a viable alternative for Europe’s defense: The Europeans themselves can step up and do more for themselves, especially with regard to conventional arms. This is well within Europe’s capacity, as the combined economic power of the NATO states dwarfs that of Russia. NATO allies spend far more on their militaries than Russia. To aid its European allies, the U.S. can provide various forms of support, including lethal weapons, while continuing to remain committed to NATO’s defense, albeit in a more constrained fashion, by providing high-end and fungible military capabilities. The U.S. can also continue to extend its nuclear deterrent to NATO.

The U.S. should remain committed to NATO’s defense but husband its critical resources for the primary fight in Asia, and Taiwan in particular. Denying China the ability to dominate Asia is more important than anything that happens in Europe. To be blunt: Taiwan is more important than Ukraine. America’s European allies are in a better position to take on Russia than America’s Asian allies are to deal with China. The Chinese can’t be allowed to think that America’s distraction in Ukraine provides them with a window of opportunity to invade Taiwan. The U.S. needs to act accordingly, crisis or not.

Ms. Mastro is a center fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, part of Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative and author of “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.”

Headshot of Oriana Skylar Mastro

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Full Biography

Read More

President Xi and Kim Jong Un meet on a TV screen
Commentary

North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China

Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Fracture America’s Alliances
North Korea Is Becoming an Asset for China
Chinese military propaganda depicting the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958.
News

Reassessing China’s Capabilities and Goals for Strategic Competition

On the World Class podcast, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that in order to set effective policy toward China, the United States needs to better understand how and why China is projecting power.
Reassessing China’s Capabilities and Goals for Strategic Competition
Taiwan Wall
Commentary

Would the United States Come to Taiwan's Defense?

On CNN's GPS with Fareed Zakaria, APARC Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro shares insights about China's aspirations to take Taiwan by force and the United States' role, should a forceful reunification come to pass.
Would the United States Come to Taiwan's Defense?
Hero Image
Army Reserve members during practice
U.S. Army Reserve members during a Cold Weather Operations Course near Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, Jan. 13, 2022.
U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt. 1st Class Clinton Wood
All News button
1
Subtitle

Getting bogged down in Europe will impede the U.S.’s ability to compete with China in the Pacific.

Date Label
-
course poster
İBB President Ekrem İmamoğlu visits the district market in Avcılar Yeşilkent Neighborhood on January 20, 2022. | İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi

In 2019, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition candidate in Istanbul, defeated the city's ruling party for a second time. The ruling party had governed Istanbul for the previous 25 years and Turkey for 17. This triumph of Turkey’s opposition against President Erdogan’s regime took place in a tilted playing field marked with heavy censorship on media, criminalization of opposition politicians and journalists, and the government’s control of the election authority. Among the forces behind this victory was a successful election campaign.

Necati Özkan, the director of the İmamoğlu Campaign, will explain the background of Istanbul's elections, the opposition’s challenges, and campaign strategies in beating populist authoritarian regimes as Turkey is preparing for its next general elections scheduled in June 2023.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Image
 Necati Özkan
Necati Özkan is the founder and president of ÖYKÜ / Dialogue International (an Istanbul-based independent creative agency) and Reform Institute (an Istanbul-based think tank). He has been managing the marketing campaigns of national and international brands for more than 30 years. He has also served as a political consultant and/or campaign manager for political parties, mayors, candidates, and NGOs. He managed more than 160 local, national, presidential, and international political campaigns in Turkey and around. He won more than 70 awards; including 17 Pollie Awards, 11 Reed Awards, 15 Polaris Awards, 11 Goldie Awards, 2 Adrian Awards, 7 Felis Awards, and several national awards. Mr. Özkan is a former president of EAPC, former chairman of Dialogue International (A Pan-European independent agencies network), and a member of EAPC, AAPC, IAPC, IAA. He teaches "Strategy" at the Brand School of Istanbul Bilgi University. He has 5 books on strategy and campaign management.

Ayça Alemdaroğlu
Aytuğ Şaşmaz

Online via Zoom

Necati Özkan Founder and President OYKU / Dialogue International Istanbul
Subscribe to Europe