While U.S. policymakers and military planners have been heavily focused on China’s maritime expansion in the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, Beijing has been steadily growing its capacity in the Indian Ocean region. The United States and its partners should take realistic and effective steps that address the strategic risks they face in the region and realize their vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” writes APARC’s South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore in the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly.

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The United States’ strategic competition with China now extends to the Indian Ocean region, albeit it takes a different form compared with the heavily militarized territorial disputes of the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet is increasingly designed for oceanic deployments beyond China’s near seas and is rapidly expanding its amphibious capability. The PLAN conducts frequent oceanographic survey and submarine deployments, maintaining a constant presence of at least seven or eight navy ships in the Indian Ocean at any time. Having established its first-ever overseas military base on the western edge of the ocean, in Djibouti in 2017, China continues to develop other ports from Tanzania to Indonesia under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is also expanding security cooperation with regional states.

“This military expansion poses strategic risks for the United States and its allies and partners,” argues Tarapore. “It gives China rapidly increasing capacity to use military coercion in the Indian Ocean region, both directly, through military intervention, and indirectly, by compelling changes in regional states’ security policies.” It also gives China advantages in case of a potential war in the region.

The United States and its partners have proclaimed their commitment to the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision. However, the four powers with the greatest interest and capacity to push back on China’s inroads —namely, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which banded together as the “Quad” — have failed to mitigate Beijing’s challenge. Their haphazard response “does little to curtail China’s capacity to coerce small states or posture for war,” says Tarapore.

He then offers a strategic assessment and a conceptual framework by which the United States and its partners can more effectively mitigate the risks of Chinese military expansion. Their most urgent task, he claims, is to build “strategic leverage,” that is, develop their political relationships and military capabilities in ways that consolidate their advantages. By doing so, they would ideally convince Beijing that coercive policies are unworkable or prohibitively costly, which would then impede China’s capacity to coerce regional states or posture for wartime. Tarapore is convinced that India has a key role to play within this framework if the latter also accounts for India’s particular resource and policy constraints.

India-China border tensions along the disputed Line of Actual Control show no signs of letting up and the prospects of peace in the conflict between the nuclear-armed rivals are daunting. How do the Indian and Chinese militaries compare against each other?

FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro and our South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore join the Observer Research Foundation’s ‘Armchair Strategist’ podcast to discuss the Indian and Chinese strategic power postures, military modernization and reform by the two Asian neighbors, the ways they can marshal both military and non-military forces, and the possible outcomes of a confrontation along their Himalayan border. Listen here:

Based in Delhi, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a leading South Asian nonprofit policy research institution whose work spans a wide range of topics, including national security, economic development, cyber issues and media, and climate and energy.

This analysis by Arzan Tarapore was originally published at The Monkey Cage by The Washington Post.

Last week, the India-China border standoff came the closest it has yet to war. As Taylor Fravel explained, the long-standing border dispute dates from the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The dispute came to a boil in May when a large force of Chinese soldiers crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed border between the two countries since 1962. A deadly skirmish in June temporarily raised tensions, but it was the result of tragic happenstance rather than large and risky military maneuvers.

Tensions have escalated more seriously since late August because both sides have jostled for tactical advantage, creating incentives for each side to outflank or even fight the other.

Here’s where things stand in this crisis.

Aggressive tactical maneuvers led to rising tensions

A new phase of the four-month-long border crisis opened when Indian special forces quietly occupied several peaks in the mountainous Chushul sector of Ladakh during the night of Aug. 29-30. These peaks sit on India’s side of the LAC, just south of a divided lake — Pangong Tso — but had been left unoccupied in accordance with confidence-building agreements. They were the site of tenacious fighting in the 1962 border war and hold particular tactical significance because they overlook an important pathway through the mountains between India and China.

Occupying the high ground in Chushul was designed to prevent Chinese forces from establishing an even stronger position. India also may have calculated that it could negotiate a withdrawal from those tactically valuable peaks in return for a Chinese withdrawal from areas seized after May.

Tensions rose. Indian and Chinese troops also scrambled to secure high ground overlooking new Chinese fortifications on the north bank of Pangong Tso. They reinforced their positions with additional aircraft and armor and accused each other of firing the first gunshots on the LAC since 1975. Some Indian analysts warned that China might risk war to reverse India’s occupation of the Chushul peaks.

Continue reading Arzan's full analysis on Monkey Cage at The Washington Post >>

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This op-ed by Arzan Tarapore originally appeared in The Hindu.

Over four months ago, the Chinese army entered territory that India has long considered its own, and never left. In effect, the multiple incursions have changed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and India has lost territory, at least for the time being. How could this happen?

In part, it was a failure of the warning-intelligence system. Either Indian intelligence services did not collect sufficient data of Chinese intentions and early moves, or they did not interpret it correctly, or their policy and military customers failed to take the warning seriously. Wherever the fault lay, the system apparently failed.

In part, however, the problem also lay in the Army’s concepts for defending the country’s borders. It is, as the current crisis shows, simply not postured or prepared for the type of security threat China presents. (Continue reading the full article in The Hindu.)

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U.S. policymakers are counting on India as a natural strategic partner. They focus on India’s increasing national power and its enticing potential as a counterbalance to China. But what happens if India’s strategic preferences shift? Will it fulfill its potential so that the U.S. strategic bet pays off?

In a special report, Exploring India's Strategic Futures, published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), APARC South Asia Research Scholar and NBR Nonresident Fellow Arzan Tarapore identifies a set of challenges for American strategists, illustrating alternative futures of India as a strategic actor and focusing on futures that may pose challenges to U.S. security interests.

Tarapore uses a novel method of major/minor trends to demonstrate that India’s strategic preferences are not fixed but could vary discontinuously under different environmental conditions. Based on detailed historical analysis, this method offers a powerful tool to sensitize decision makers to a range of possible futures. He analyzes three plausible scenarios:

First, a revisionist India driven by Hindu-nationalist ideology to settle the score with Pakistan, which will require it to keep the China front quiet and accommodate China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Eurasia. This scenario may severely complicate U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific and its efforts to counterbalance China.

Second, a risk-acceptant Indian military that engages in brinkmanship, which may endanger strategic stability with both Pakistan and China. In this scenario, rather than keeping the Chinese military in check, India may paradoxically have the opposite effect.

Third, an India that expands its competition with China into continental Eurasia, making common cause with U.S. rivals such as Russia and Iran. This scenario illustrates the tensions in a U.S. global strategy that lacks prioritization and prompts Washington to more carefully consider its preferences in Central Asia.

Tarapore by no means suggests that such futures are likely — they are decidedly unlikely — but rather that U.S. strategists should consider them plausible. Indeed, the three scenarios are all grounded in political processes that have long existed in India, from communalism to military adaptation, to the balancing of external threats. Therefore, argues Tarapore, U.S. policymakers should not assume Indian strategic preferences are stable. They must consider scenarios in which India might challenge U.S. security interests.

Amid the intensifying security rivalry between the United States and China and the rapidly changing power balances in the Indo-Pacific, India has emerged as an increasingly important partner for U.S. interests in the region. What factors will shape India’s relationships with the world’s two largest superpowers? How should Washington interpret New Delhi’s evolving understanding of strategic autonomy? And is Indian defense policy equipped to meet today’s security threats?  

These are some of the questions that occupy Arzan Tarapore, our new research scholar on South Asia effective September 1. At APARC, Tarapore will continue his research on Indo-Pacific security and military effectiveness. He will also be at the forefront of advancing the Center’s South Asia research and engagement effort – a role to which he brings his experience that combines academic scholarship with over a decade of government service. Before his appointment at Stanford, Tarapore was an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. He continues to serve as a nonresident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research and an adjunct researcher at the RAND Corporation.

Here, Tarapore explains how “internal balancing” may shape India’s relationships with China and the United States, considers what’s at stake for India’s military strategy, and shares some of his plans for APARC’s South Asia initiative.

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How is India’s own tense relationship with China, which burst into view in the recent border clash in the Himalayas, poised to affect its ties with the United States and its approach to strategic partnerships with other countries, such as Japan and Australia?

Tarapore: In the last two decades, Washington has latched on to India as a strategic partner in large part because it recognizes that India is a natural competitor to China. This is rooted in structural reasons – because of India and China’s geography, history, and strategic interests. So India has pursued its own brand of strategic competition with China for over half a century – it’s just that its tactics may sometimes appear desultory to some American (and Indian!) observers. Those tactics, which in the recent past have included back-slapping summitry and avoidance of provocations, are largely rooted, at bottom, in India’s relatively modest power.

Now, some observers have asserted (or hoped) that the current border crisis in Ladakh may shake New Delhi out of this posture and catalyze a closer relationship – even an alliance – with the United States. As I’ve argued elsewhere, an alliance with the U.S. is neither plausible nor necessary. India has forged a much closer defense relationship with the United States and other like-minded regional states like Japan and Australia. The current crisis may accelerate some of that alignment a little, but this trend was already well underway. To be sure, the crisis – and especially the Indian fatalities – has hardened popular opinion against China. But Indian officialdom did not need to be convinced of the China threat, or the merits of cooperation with the United States. Their inhibitions to an alliance – just like their threat perceptions of China – are structural and not likely to be dispelled anytime soon.

Rather than focusing just on India’s alignments – what scholars call “external balancing” – we should watch closely for changes in India’s defense policy and military modernization – or “internal balancing.” There is a chance this crisis will prompt India to correct some of the long-standing distortions in defense policy. If it does, those changes – rather than any outward displays of alignment – will have a far greater impact on India’s competition with China, and on its partnership with the United States.

One of your research areas is focused on strategic effectiveness, particularly Indian military strategy-making. In your recent Carnegie India paper, The Army in Indian Military Strategy, you argue that the Indian army must rethink its use of force to meet today’s new challenges. What is the problem with its prevailing doctrine and what are your specific recommendations for it and Indian defense policy?   

Tarapore: I’ve argued that Indian military strategy over at least the past half-century has been dominated by an army doctrine that is designed to fight large conventional wars. This doctrine drives the Indian military’s force structure and its ideas about how to use force. The problem is, the doctrine is unsuited to the more-common security challenges that India currently faces – challenges exemplified perfectly by China’s borderland grab in Ladakh this past summer.

The Indian Army should certainly still prepare for major wars, but I argue in this paper that it also needs to develop new concepts for dealing with threats below the threshold of war. If it does not rethink its doctrine, it risks becoming less and less relevant as a tool of statecraft. Specifically, I argue that the Indian Army should consider new “theories of victory” that focus on denying the enemy’s goals rather than threatening to punish it; consider how to better support the air force and navy; and consider emphasizing certain niche capabilities of modern warfighting.

What are some of the projects and activities you plan to focus on at APARC, both in your research and as part of the effort to revitalize the Center’s research and education initiative on South Asia?

Tarapore: As mentioned at the outset, Washington sees India as a central partner in the Indo-Pacific. I want to position APARC and Stanford to effectively support that policy. My research, at least for now, focuses on Indian defense issues. For example, I have a book project that looks at how India has historically approached the use of force – our policymakers need to understand India’s particular constraints and patterns. Second, I will continue to engage in a stream of research on how the United States, India, and their like-minded partners can manage security risks in the Indian Ocean region.

Beyond my own research, I want to take advantage of Stanford’s community of scholars, and build on my network in the region, to work on issues that are often overlooked by Washington-based policy tribes. For example, I am keen to explore the effects of climate change across South Asia – the challenges it poses to security and governance, and how it may force regional states to respond. These issues are critically important but often overshadowed by more urgent crises.

Your career combines both academic scholarship and government experience. Tell us more about your government service, what drew you to it, and how you became interested in Indo-Pacific security issues.

Tarapore: My government work completely shaped my scholarship. I served for 13 years in the Australian Defence Department, as an analyst, leader, and liaison officer. My time there was dominated by the post-9/11 wars and security crises – so even as a civilian, I deployed on operations and worked closely with the military. This has left me with an abiding dedication to being task-oriented – ensuring that my scholarship has direct utility for decision makers – and an abiding preference for working among teams of people smarter than I am. With my professional background in Australia, my academic interest in India, and my new home in the United States, I’m entirely comfortable with the concept and the region of the “Indo-Pacific.” This is why Stanford and APARC, with policy focus and community of scholars working on Asia, are so exciting.

What is it like to begin a new academic post remotely in a COVID-19 world? How has the pandemic affected your work?

Tarapore: I’ve often thought about how fortunate I am to work in a field where I can keep working, with some adjustments, even amid a global pandemic. If we’re honest, I suspect some people even thrive on the enforced solitude. For me, it’s a nuisance and it requires adjustments – none more so than rethinking childcare arrangements. From a professional perspective, one of the biggest obstacles it creates is the inability to travel to India for fieldwork, or around the region to build our professional networks. The other, more quotidian difficulty is the obstacle to in-person teamwork. Obviously, something is lost when we have to stare at each other through screens, so I can’t wait to walk the halls of Encina Hall.

Shorenstein APARC is pleased to announce that Arzan Tarapore has been appointed a research scholar supporting the Center’s efforts to promote policy-relevant research, education, and public engagement on contemporary South Asia. In addition to conducting research and providing mentorship on South Asia security and geopolitical issues, Tarapore will organize public programming exploring the trends and challenges shaping the region. He will also cultivate cooperative relationships with stakeholders in the academic and policy communities in South Asia. His appointment is effective September 1, 2020.

Tarapore is currently a non-resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, as well as an adjunct professor with the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and an adjunct researcher at the RAND Corporation. His research focuses on security issues in South Asia and the rapidly evolving strategic landscape of the wider Indo-Pacific. Prior to his scholarly career, he served for thirteen years in the Australian Defence Department in various analytic, management, and liaison positions, including operational deployments and a diplomatic posting to the Australian Embassy in Washington, DC.

“We are delighted to have Arzan join APARC,” said Center Director Gi-Wook Shin. “APARC has more than a decade-long record of South Asia research and publishing activities as part of a previous initiative, which we are keen to revitalize. Arzan’s unique experience, combining scholarship with government service and diplomatic assignments, will be a tremendous asset to our community as we advance policy-relevant research and training on South Asia and U.S. strategy in the larger Indo-Pacific. We look forward to welcoming him to Stanford in September.”

Tarapore’s academic work has been published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Asia Policy, and Joint Force Quarterly, among others, and his policy commentary frequently appears on platforms such as the Hindu, the Indian Express, The National Interest, the Lowy Institute's Interpreter, the Brookings Institution’s Lawfare, and War on the Rocks.

"I am enormously excited to join Stanford's world-class community of scholars, and especially to be at the forefront of APARC's renewed focus on South Asia,” said Tarapore. “Our work will center on the opportunity – and the pressing need – to deepen our connections with the region, and to meaningfully inform debates on U.S. policy in the wider Indo-Pacific." 

Tarapore holds a PhD in war studies from King's College London, an MSc from the London School of Economics, and a BA (Hons) from the University of New South Wales. His research experience includes previous roles at the East-West Center in Washington and the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

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