Aging
Authors
Daniel C. Sneider
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Japan's ruling party suffered a historic defeat Sunday. For the first time since the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was formed in 1955, an opposition party has become the largest party in the upper house.

The powerful message delivered by Japanese voters has significant implications not only for Japan but also for the rest of the world, not least for its close ally, the United States.

The election result revives momentum in Japan toward creation of a viable two-party system, potentially ending the conservative postwar monopoly on power. Japanese voters expressed deep anxiety about the impact of economic change upon their treasured social order. They embraced the campaign of the Democratic Party (the main opposition) against growing income inequality and the failure of the state to take care of an aging population.

Equally important, the vote was a humiliating defeat for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's agenda of giving priority to revising Japan's antiwar Constitution and allowing its military to take on a global role in support of the US. Democratic Party leader Ichiro Ozawa effectively portrayed Mr. Abe as a man out of touch with the concerns of ordinary Japanese. But he also articulated an alternative vision of Japan's international role, calling for closer ties to its Asian neighbors and sending troops overseas only under the auspices of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Since 9/11, Japan has been among the most loyal, if not unquestioning, of US allies. It sent troops to Iraq, provided logistical support to the war in Afghanistan, and outdid the US in putting pressure on North Korea. Most recently, Abe echoed the rhetoric of the Bush administration, calling for formation of a "values-based" alliance of democracies along with India and Australia, implicitly aimed at containing a rising China. The election results will certainly slow, if not reverse, this tight synchronization.

For the business community, the vote will raise concerns that needed economic policy actions such as fiscal reforms will get stalled in a gridlocked parliament. The vote reminds politicians that the economic recovery has left an awful lot of Japanese behind, with real wages falling, youth unemployment high, and the elderly drawing down their savings to survive. Abe's feel-good rhetoric and focus on security just angered those Japanese.

There remains strong support for gradual change. Most Japanese want the country to take on a more "normal" security role, but one that will stop far short of overdrawn fears of a remilitarized Japan. And many Japanese, particularly in the younger generation, back economic reform, though not at the expense of social stability.

The most intriguing question is the future of Japan's democracy. Abe is resisting calls for his resignation, attributing the vote to a series of scandals in his Cabinet and most of all to the revelation that the government's national pension system had lost the records of some 50 million people. The election result was bad luck, Abe claimed, not a repudiation of his administration's overall policies -- a view shared by Washington policymakers.

Exit polls do confirm that voters were strongly motivated by these issues. But they also express little faith in the personal leadership of Abe, who tried to cover up the pension debacle. He suffered from an unfavorable comparison to his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, one of Japan's most popular postwar leaders.

But the election suggests that Mr. Koizumi's personal charisma only temporarily reversed a longer trend of drift away from the ruling conservatives, particularly by unaffiliated swing voters in Japan's cities and suburbs. Mr. Ozawa, one of Japan's most brilliant politicians, managed to both regain those voters and steal away traditional conservative backers in rural areas among farmers and pensioners worried about their future.

Ozawa, whom I have known for more than two decades, is a man of uncommon political vision. He is a former LDP stalwart who has relentlessly pursued the goal of creating a clearly defined two-party system that can create real competition. He was the architect of a split in the LDP that briefly brought the opposition to power in the early 1990s.

Over dinner last fall, Ozawa laid out to me what seemed then like an incredibly audacious plan to regain power. First to win a series of local elections, leading up to a defeat of the LDP in the upper house election, forcing in turn the dissolution of the lower house and new elections. He clearly hopes to split the LDP again and pry away its coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, as part of his strategy of realignment.

The Democratic Party has yet to demonstrate its own ability to rule, but it would be unwise to underestimate Ozawa. And it would be foolish to dismiss the desire for change delivered by Japanese voters on Sunday.

Reprinted with permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

All News button
1

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9072 (650) 723-6530
0
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Center Fellow at the Center for Health Policy and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research
Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
karen-0320_cropprd.jpg PhD

Karen Eggleston is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University and Director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a Fellow with the Center for Innovation in Global Health at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Her research focuses on government and market roles in the health sector and Asia health policy, especially in China, India, Japan, and Korea; healthcare productivity; and the economics of the demographic transition.

Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University and has MA degrees in economics and Asian studies from the University of Hawaii and a BA in Asian studies summa cum laude (valedictorian) from Dartmouth College. Eggleston studied in China for two years and was a Fulbright scholar in Korea. She served on the Strategic Technical Advisory Committee for the Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and has been a consultant to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the WHO regarding health system reforms in the PRC.

Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Stanford Health Policy Associate
Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University, June and August of 2016
CV
Date Label
-

Japan is at the forefront of the trend in developed nations to have an increasing proportion of the population represented by the elderly. By 2030, people over 65 years of age are expected to reach 30 % of Japan's population. Despite the significance of this demographic group, remarkably little is known about how the elderly adjust to the social changes that they experience with aging. The focus of this talk is on the issue of change as it impacts on the aging individual and how this change is discursively interpreted and negotiated. Recorded informal conversations of elderly Japanese women both with peers and with younger acquaintances will be used to illustrate the speaker's continuing adjustment of her established persona, identity and attitudes in recognition of the changing reality associated with age.

Co-sponsored by the Center for East Asian Studies.

Philippines Conference Room

Yoshiko Matsumoto Associate Professor Speaker Japanese Language and Linguistics, Stanford University
Seminars

"Ethnicity in Today's Europe" will commence with a Related Presidential Lecture featuring Partha Chatterjee.

Conference Statement

Headlines today blaze with stories about the fate of Europe. There is a sense, both in Europe and around the world, that a sort of "tipping point" has been reached. A recurrent theme is the question of demographics. For instance, how are European social welfare systems going to cope with an aging population? What role will immigrants from outside Europe's borders, both recent and less recent, play in European society? What will be the impact of immigration between the member states of the European Union? What place will Europe's growing population of Muslims have in twenty-first century Europe?

As the ongoing process of unification redraws Europe's borders, as the populations of major European cities become more and more diverse, the question of ethnicity is at the forefront of many of the most important debates on the continent. On the one hand the long history of European national and ethnic identities is at play, as is the legacy of colonialism. On the other, a significant recent upswing in the movement of peoples around the globe has changed the face of Europe, often literally. Movement, of course, from outside Europe's borders into European states. But also, and crucially, movement within the space between Portugal and the Urals. Such movement certainly responds to a number of economic and social needs. At the same time, European conceptions of citizenship, equity, and nationhood often exist in tension with the realities of changing ethnic populations.

The conference "Ethnicity in Today's Europe" at Stanford will address this topic in an interdisciplinary manner. Participants will focus on the question: "What's new about the situation in Europe today?" Bringing together scholars from different disciplines, the conference will provide a historical perspective together with contributions addressing economic, social, cultural, and political issues. Some themes that may be discussed include: how the current situation mirrors or departs from the past; the role of the media in portraying the interaction between different groups; the different perspectives of specific populations within Europe; whether Europe's diversity is best described under the rubric of ethnicity, nationality, race, or some other term; similarities and differences between European nation-states with regard to diversity within their borders. Above all, participants will use their own disciplinary perspective to assess what is at stake in the interaction between peoples in Europe as the twenty-first century gets underway.

"Ethnicity in Today's Europe" is jointly presented by the Forum on Contemporary Europe and the Stanford Humanities Center.

November 7 - Related Presidential Lecture:
Bechtel Conference Center
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street

November 8-9 - Conference Panels:
Stanford Humanities Center
424 Santa Teresa Avenue
Stanford University

Rogers Brubaker Sociology, UCLA Panelist
Leslie Adelson German Studies, Cornell University Panelist
Partha Chatterjee Related Presidential Lecture; Director and Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University, New York Keynote Speaker
Salvador Cardús Ros Sociology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Panelist
Carole Fink History, Ohio State University Panelist
Alec Hargreaves French, Florida State University Panelist
Kader Konuk Germanic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan Panelist
Saskia Sassen Sociology, Columbia University Panelist
Bassam Tibi International Relations, University of Göttingen, Germany Panelist
Zelimir Zilnik filmmaker Speaker
Conferences
-

One aspect of globalization that is receiving increasing scholarly attention is international migration, especially the transnational migration of workers. Practically every country of the world is affected in one way or another as either a sending or a receiving country. There are reportedly more than 500,000 foreigners residing in South Korea, with unskilled transnational migrant workers accounting for about a half of these.

Although the country's reliance on imported foreign labor is likely to continue unabated, the Korean government and society as a whole have been generally intolerant of foreigners living in Korea.

This paper examines various social factors, including the country's record-low fertility rate and rapid aging of its population, that all point to the continuation of labor importation. Such immigration will contribute to the making of a multiethnic Korean society.

The paper then analyzes the cultural factors that account for Koreans' low receptivity to foreigners and argues that it is the cultural ideology of ethnic homogeneity, based on the "one ancestor myth," that fuels an intense pride and stake in cultural uniqueness, linguistic homogeneity, and historical collectivity-sensibilities that government policy reinforces.

Andrew Eungi Kim is an Associate Professor in the Division of International Studies at Korea University and is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his Ph. D. in sociology from the University of Toronto in 1996. His primary research interests pertain to cultural studies, sociology of religion, social change, sociology of work, and comparative sociology.

Currently, he is revising two book-length manuscripts for publication: "The Rise of Protestant Christianity in South Korea: Religious and Non-Religious Factors in Conversion" and "Understanding Korean Culture: The Persistence of Shamanistic and Confucian Values in Contemporary Korea."

Philippines Conference Room

Andrew Eungi Kim Associate Professor Speaker Korea University
Seminars

"Ambiguity aversion" occurs when people prefer making no choice at all to making an ambiguous risky choice, even if the ambiguous choice holds higher expected value. Behavioral evidence suggests that a majority of individuals show some degree of ambiguity aversion, and older adults may be especially prone to this bias, which could have specific consequences for healthcare decisions. In this study the investigators examine ambiguity aversion in young and old adults using a standard experimental "Ellsberg Paradox" task as well as a more generalizable healthcare decision-making task.

What accounts for differences in "ideal affect," or the affective states that people value and ideally want to feel? The investigators predict that ideal affect influences what people do to feel good and what decisions they make. Preliminary studies suggest that younger adults value excitement states more and calm states less than do older adults, with middle age adults falling in between the groups. Therefore, age differences in mood-producing behaviors and decision making may be mediated by ideal affect.

The perceptions of policy makers regarding the ability and desire of Medicare beneficiaries to make choices regarding their health insurance coverage has shaped the development of the Medicare program in fundamental, yet sometimes contradictory, ways. Yet relatively little is known about the factors that affect the decision making of older adults in this context.

Authors
Daniel C. Sneider
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Shorenstein APARC Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel C. Sneider compares the effects of dual-class immigration policies in Singapore with those of the United States. "Rather than guest workers," he asks, "isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?"

The fierce debate on immigration ignores a crucial reality -- what is happening to the United States is only one piece, although a big one, of a much larger global picture.

That hit me a couple of weeks ago when I was in Singapore. The Southeast Asian island nation has long been hailed as an economic model, the business capital for the entire region.

But it is an economy facing demographic peril. Its small population of 4 million is shrinking, thanks to a very low fertility rate. Prosperous Singaporean couples work hard, have fewer children and worry about how to take care of their aging parents. By 2050, Singapore will have a median age of over 52, one of the oldest in the world.

Singapore's answer is to import labor. A third of its workforce are migrants, from construction workers to maids. One out of seven households employs a domestic worker -- low-paid women mostly from neighboring Philippines and Indonesia.

Singapore tries to lure "talents'' -- highly skilled and affluent migrants -- to stay permanently. But the men hauling bricks and the maids washing laundry are in a separate class of temporary guest workers, with no chance to join Singaporean society. If a maid becomes pregnant, she is shipped out within seven days. Employers have to post bonds that must be paid should their servants break the rules and try to stay, putting them in the role of migrant police.

Problems of abuse of domestic workers, including physical and sexual violence and confinement, are serious enough to have prompted a report last December by Human Rights Watch.

Singapore's dependence on migrant labor and its guest-worker policy may be at the extreme end but it's very much on the global spectrum. Labor, like capital and goods before it, is part of a global market. The movement of people across borders in search of wages and work, most of it from developing countries to developed, is growing at a phenomenal pace.

The numbers are staggering. From 1980 to 2000, the number of migrants living in the developed world more than doubled from 48 million to 110 million. Migrants make up an average 12 percent of the workforce in high-income countries. About 4 million migrants cross borders illegally every year.

The demand for labor is driven in part by a demographic disaster -- the falling birth rates of developed countries. Almost all of those countries now have fertility rates that are well below 2.1, the level at which a population replaces itself. At the very low end are Hong Kong (0.94), Korea (1.22) and Singapore in Asia (1.24), along with much of Eastern Europe.

Low fertility means shrinking workforces and aging populations. Without migration, according to a recent study, Europe's population would have declined by 4.4 million from 1995 to 2000. Immigration accounted for 75 percent of U.S. population growth during the same period.

This movement of people cannot be stopped, certainly not by hundreds of miles of fences or even by tens of thousands of border guards. It is an issue that cries out for global cooperation, for common policies that cut across national boundaries. Already, we can benefit from looking at what has worked -- and not worked -- elsewhere.

A Global Commission on International Migration, formed in 2003 by the United Nations secretary-general, has taken an initial stab. Their report, issued last winter, supports the growth of guest-worker programs.

The Senate immigration bill now up for debate includes a provision for a guest-worker program. The bill is clearly preferable to the punitive and ineffective approach of the House version. But the Singapore experience -- and previous guest-worker programs like the German import of Turks -- should prompt second thoughts about going down this road.

One problem is that the guests don't leave. The United States has its own experience with this in the bracero program to import farmworkers, and more recently with the supposedly temporary H1-B visas used so extensively by the high-tech industry here in Silicon Valley.

Most troubling to me, these programs create an underclass of migrants who are never assimilated, as happened in Germany. It sets us on the Singapore road, encouraging inhumane policing mechanisms. And it is a gilded invitation to employers to depress the wages and incomes of American workers, and not just in the dirty jobs that are supposedly so hard to fill.

The United States has been rightfully proud of a tradition that treats all immigrants as citizens in the making. Rather than guest workers, isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?

All News button
1
Subscribe to Aging