Governments and multi-lateral donor organizations are increasingly targeting development aid to conflict affected areas with the hope that this aid will help government efforts to reduce conflict and stabilize these areas. 

The expectation is that implementing development projects such as roads, schools, and hospitals will increase popular support for the government – effectively  “winning hearts and minds” of the people- and reduce popular support for insurgents making it more difficult for them to recruit rebels and carry out attacks.

Joe Felter, a Senior Research Scholar at CISAC, with Benjamin Crost at the University of Illinois and Patrick Johnston from the RAND Corporation published Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict in the June edition of the American Economic Review that challenges this conventional wisdom.

In this article, Felter and his coauthors provide evidence that a “winning hearts and minds” strategy can backfire in some cases. When insurgents believe that that the successful implementation of government sponsored development projects will lead to an increase in support for the government and undermine their position they have incentives to attack or otherwise sabotage them thus exacerbating conflict in the near term.  

Ironically, increases in violence associated with government sponsored development efforts can in some cases be interpreted as an indicator that these efforts are targeting insurgent vulnerabilities effectively.

This article adds to Felter’s previously published research on the challenges of stabilizing conflict areas through development aid and economic assistance. See

Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones with Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro and Erin Troland in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 2013

Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq with Eli Berman and Jacob Shapiro in the Journal of Political Economy 2011

Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines with Eli Berman, Jacob Shapiro and Michael Callen Journal of Conflict Resolution 2011.

Abstract:

Why have militarized interventions to curtail violence by drug cartels had wildly divergent results? In the past six years, state crackdowns drove a nine-fold increase in cartel-state violence in Mexico, versus a two-thirds decrease in Brazil. Prevailing analyses of drug wars as a criminal subtype of insurgency provide little traction, because they elide differences in rebels’ and cartels’ aims. Cartels, I argue, fight states not to conquer territory or political control, but to coerce state actors and influence policy outcomes. The empirically predominant channel is violent corruption— threatening enforcers while negotiating bribes. A formal model reveals that greater state repression raises bribe prices, leading cartels to fight back whenever (a) corruption is sufficiently rampant, and (b) repression is insufficiently conditional on cartels’ use of violence. Variation in conditionality helps explain observed outcomes: switching to conditional repression pushed Brazilian cartels into nonviolent strategies, while Mexico’s war “without distinctions” inadvertently made fighting advantageous.

Abstract:

The state’s central function is to establish authority through its monopoly on violence; the very attempt, however, can be counterproductive. Punishment incapacitates and deters individuals, but can empower destructive collective forces. Prison gangs, their ranks swelled by mass incarceration, transform the core of the coercive apparatus into a headquarters for organizing and taxing streetlevel criminal activity, supplanting state authority in communities, and orchestrating mass violence and protest. Drawing on a formal model, fieldwork, and case studies from the US and Latin America, I show how gangs use control over prison life, plus the state-provided threat of incarceration, to project power. The model predicts that common state responses—crackdowns and harsher sentencing— can strengthen prison gangs’ leverage over outside actors, consistent with the observed expansion of prison gangs during mass-incarceration initiatives. These gang-strengthening effects of incarceration can have increasing returns, implying a point beyond which additional punishment erodes state authority.

Southeast Asia Program director Donald K. Emmerson's essay by the above title appears in the just-published volume, Producing Indonesia: The State of the Field of Indonesian Studies, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo, available for purchase at the Cornell University Press.

The book's authors, to quote the publisher, reflect on "the development of Indonesian studies over recent tumultuous decades...Not everyone sees the development of Indonesian studies in the same way. Yet one senses—and this collection confirms—that disagreements among its practitioners have fostered a vibrant, resilient intellectual community."

The disagreements featured in Emmerson's chapter, to quote him, "arose over how to interpret two consequential changes of regime in Indonesia," namely, "the demise of liberal democracy and the rise of President Sukarno's leftward 'Guided Democracy' in 1959, and the latter's replacement by General Suharto's anti-leftist 'New Order' starting in 1965." At stake in these controversies were facts, minds, and formats: "perspectival commitments developed inside the minds, disciplines, and careers of professional analysts of Indonesia."

At the center of his essay lies a consequential question of choice: whether to maintain or to change one's argument in the face of evidence against it. The issue is framed at the outset of the essay by two contrasting quotations:  

“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?”

                                      -- John Maynard Keynes on the Great Depression

"I didn't change. The world changed."

                                      -- Dick Cheney on 9/11

About the Essay

The 26 scholars contributing to this volume, Producing Indonesia: The State of the Field of Indonesian Studies, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo, have helped shape the field of Indonesian studies over the last three decades. They represent a broad geographic background—Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Canada—and have studied in a wide array of key disciplines—anthropology, history, linguistics and literature, government and politics, art history, and ethnomusicology. Together they reflect on the “arc of our field,” the development of Indonesian studies over recent tumultuous decades. They consider what has been achieved and what still needs to be accomplished as they interpret the groundbreaking works of their predecessors and colleagues.

This volume is the product of a lively conference sponsored by Cornell University, with contributions revised following those interactions. Not everyone sees the development of Indonesian studies in the same way. Yet one senses—and this collection confirms—that disagreements among its practitioners have fostered a vibrant, resilient intellectual community. Contributors discuss photography and the creation of identity, the power of ethnic pop music, cross-border influences on Indonesian contemporary art, violence in the margins, and the shadows inherent in Indonesian literature. These various perspectives illuminate a diverse nation in flux and provide direction for its future exploration.