Khaled Abou El Fadl is one of the leading authorities in Islamic law in the United States and Europe who has frequently criticized contemporary Islamic legal interpretation as deviating from its original diversity and moderation. He teaches Islamic Law, Middle Eastern Investment Law, Immigration Law, and courses related to human rights and terrorism. Professor Abou El Fadl's books include: Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam (2001); Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (2001); Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (2001); And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse (2nd ed. revised and expanded, 2001) and The Place of Tolerance in Islam (2002).

Over the last two years in Southeast Asia, acts of terror done in the name of Islam have divided analysts into two broad camps. Academic specialists on Islam in Southeast Asia have tended to emphasize the moderation of the vast majority of Muslims in the region and the local roots of so-called jihadist violence there. While not denying the moderation of most Muslims, Western journalists and officials have relied more on intelligence reports and detainee confessions to situate Southeast Asian jihadists within a global terrorist network organized and inspired by Al Qaeda. Compared with Western journalists and officials, scholars have also tended to portray Islam as a basically tolerant religion and to seek nonreligious explanations and motivations for seemingly Islamist violence. If the scholars have had faith in explanatory contexts--distinctively local, historical, cultural, socioeconomic, and political--their counterparts in media and policy circles have been more inclined to showcase conspiratorial texts: interrogation transcripts, recordings of clandestine conversations, and the selectively Koranic rhetoric of militant Islamists urging global jihad. Which of these contrasting perspectives is superior, analytically and as a basis for counter-terror policy? Are the perpetrators of apparently Islamist terror in Southeast Asia thinking and acting locally? Or globally? Is there a demonstrably Al Qaeda network in the region? If so, what sort of a structure is it? How does it operate? Can a "war" against it succeed? If not, what might be a better approach? Zachary Abuza is an assistant professor of political science and international relations at Simmons College. His most recent book is Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (2001). Foreign-affairs journals that have published his work include Asian Survey and Contemporary Southeast Asia. He has spoken on Southeast Asian subjects before Congress, at the State Department, on Jim Lehrer's "NewsHour," and in the pages of the Wall Street Journal and Time, among other media. He received his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1998. In 1995-96 he was a visiting researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Hanoi.

Following the success of the first conference held in January 2002, the Asia/Pacific Research Center and the US Army War College plan to hold a second conference in January 2003. Its theme is "The Prospects for Peace in South Asia." The participants will address several topics: the role of religion in the politics of the region (primarily in Kashmir, but also in Indian and Pakistani politics), the political role of the Pakistani army, and the new challenges that nuclear weapons and the global war on terrorism have introduced. Possible lessons for the United States in trying to prevent war in South Asia as well as furthering its aims in the war on terrorism will be discussed. The conference speakers will provide an understanding of Kashmir, the role of religion in South Asian politics, local culture and attitudes, US military perspectives on South Asia and the situations and politics in India and Pakistan.

When Shorenstein APARC's 2002 South Asia conference was being planned at Shorenstein APARC, the events of September 11, 2001 had not taken place. To Americans, September 11 is mostly associated with the war against terrorism. However, the impact of 9-11 on longstanding political relations between India and Pakistan is less understood. Without such an understanding, it is difficult to explain why India and Pakistan have twice almost gone to war in the past months due to acts of terrorism linked to September 11.

Kashmir is the main locus of the two countries' dispute. There is much history on why disagreements over Kashmir have created political problems: they began with the handing over of Kashmir to India in 1947 and have continued with rigged elections, poor governance, military occupation, and indigenous and Pakistani-supported militancy, up to the present day.

The risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan arising from the Kashmir dispute remains high. Local elections in both Pakistan and Kashmir over the next few months might prevent war till then, while affecting the dynamics of the future. The United States is keenly concerned with the possibility of war and has been actively engaged in diplomacy, with more senior American officials visiting South Asia in 2002 than at any time in the past.

Indian and Pakistani politics have also taken new turns. In India, the ruling NDA is dominated by the BJP, a party with past links to militant Hinduism. India is constitutionally secular and Muslims have played an important political role, though more as a vote-bank (comprising 14 percent of the population) and less, particularly in recent times, as influential decision-makers. This influence may be set to decline further. Economic uncertainties and the polarization of religious communities in some areas (after sectarian riots) have led the BJP to believe that a return to its aggressive roots might be politically successful. This leads to a need for understanding of how India's future will be affected by its great religions, Hinduism and Islam.

In Pakistan, recent political developments have concentrated power almost entirely in the hands of President Musharraf, a situation that may persist after its upcoming elections. This lack of institutionalization of political processes and power poses new risks to the security environment in the subcontinent.

Nearly 200 died in the bombing of Paddy's Irish Bar and the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali, Indonesia, on 12 October -- the worst toll from terror anywhere since 11 September 2001. In the Philippines, terrorists have struck five times in the last month alone. Also in September, suspected terrorist Omar al-Faruq apparently told his CIA interrogators that US $74,000 had been transferred from the Middle East to Southeast Asia to fund a planned attack on U.S. Navy ships docked in Indonesia. Cutting off terrorist financing has been and remains a priority in the American war on terror. What exactly is the nature of the problem of terrorist financing in Southeast Asia? How should the United States, other governments, and international agencies respond to this challenge? What strategies and tactics are most and least likely to succeed? What are the obstacles to that success, and how can these too be addressed? What has been and will be the role of the U.S. Pacific Command in seeking and implementing the answers to these questions? Leif Rosenberger has been the economic adviser to the commander of American forces in the Pacific since 1998. As chair of the Pacific Command's Economics and Security Working Group, he works at the intersection of economic and security issues related to the war on terrorism in the Asia Pacific region. Prior to coming to Camp Smith, where the Command is headquartered, Dr. Rosenberger was a professor of economics at the U.S. Army War College, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Academic Chair of Research.

The act of suicide can take many forms and is an old "way out". However, the act always engenders some sort of statement in the community left behind. The recent political and war-like statements of suicide bombers trigger both general concerns and scholarly questions. Suicide is an individual act, but at the same time it can give shape to a movement. How can we understand the current acts of suicide bombing? In what way does it raise new ways of thinking about the underlying assumptions and mechanisms behind social behavior?

Papers Presented:

1. "Inside the Terrorist Mind" by Arie Kruglanski, University of Maryland. Paper presented to the National Academy of Science, April 29, 2002, Washington D.C.

2. "Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?" by Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, Working Paper 9074, National Bureau of Economic Research.

3. "The Interpersonal Influence Systems and Organized Suicides of Death Cults" by Noah E. Friedkin, Department of Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

4. "The Paradox of Suicide in Solidary Groups" by Douglas D. Heckathorn, Cornell University.

5. "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias" by Eli Berman, Rice University, National Bureau of Economic Research.

6. "Suicide Missions: Motivations and Beliefs" by Jon Elster, Columbia University.

7. "Suicide Bombing: What is the Answer?" by Howard Rosenthal, Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism conducted by non-state actors have radically changed the manner in which science and technology can support national security. We no longer have a primary geographically focused enemy and may be confronted by improvised weapons that, as we have learned, are very effective. Additionally, dealing with terrorism within the boundaries of the country raises organizational and political questions that do not occur in military operations abroad. This talk explores these difficulties and suggests some technical and operational priorities for dealing with the new set of threats that have emerged.