Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates
Dara Kay Cohen is a PhD candidate in political science at Stanford University and was a fellow and research assistant at CISAC in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006. Her research at CISAC involved studying the politics of national security; she examined the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, how security issues have affected congressional elections and co-wrote a paper with Jacob N. Shapiro on the failure of the homeland security alert system. Her current dissertation research focuses on the use of sexual violence during civil wars, and she spend last summer in Sierra Leone conducting initial field work. She previously worked at the Department of Justice as a paralegal in the Outstanding Scholars Program in the Counterterrorism Section and at the u.S. Embassy in London on terrorist financing issues. She received her a.B. in political science and philosophy with honors from Brown University in 2001.
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, with a PhD in political science from Stanford as well as a law degree from Yale, focuses his scholarship on how organizations cope with the legal responsibility for managing complex criminal justice, regulatory, and international security problems. He has published the leading academic paper on the operation of federal money laundering laws, and one of the most exhaustive empirical case studies of public participation in regulatory rulemaking proceedings. Recent projects address the role of criminal enforcement in managing transnational threats, the physical safety of refugee communities in the developing world, legislative and budgetary dynamics affecting the federal Department of Homeland Security, and the impact of bureaucratic structure on how institutions implement legal mandates. Professor Cuéllar is an affiliated faculty member at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a member of the Executive committee for the Stanford International Initiative. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 2001, he served as senior advisor to the u.S. Treasury Department's Undersecretary for Enforcement and clerked for Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Bary R. Weingast is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution as well as the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University; he served as chair of that department from 1996 to 2001. He is also a professor of economics, by courtesy, at the university. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences from 1993 to 1994. Weingast is an expert in political economy and public policy, the political foundation of markets and economic reform, U.S. politics, and regulation. His current research focuses on the political determinants of public policymaking and the political foundations of markets and democracy. Weingast is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is the 2006 recipient of the William H. Riker Prize in Political Science. He received the Heinz Eulau Award for Best paper from the American Political Science Review in 1987. With Charles Stewart, he received the Award for Best Paper n Political History b the American Political Science Association in 1994 and again in 1998. He is also the recipient, along with Kenneth Schultz, of the Franklin L. Burdette Award for Best paper Presented at the 1994 Political Science Association Meeting.
Paul Stockton is a senior research scholar at CISAC. He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the former director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His teaching and research focus son how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangement.s Stockton joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School in August 1990. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS's Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS's School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Customer: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance
Matthew Kroenig is a doctoral candidate in the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, the Herbert York Fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. His dissertation explains the strategic incentives that drive states to provide nuclear weapons technology to nonnuclear-weapon states. His other research focuses on international security, nuclear weapons proliferation, homeland security, terrorism, and civil war. His writings have appeared in such publications as Democratization, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Newsday, and Security Studies.
Kroenig has also served as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was a principal author of key national security strategy and defense review documents and where he led the development of a U.S. government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For his work, Kroenig received the Department of Defense's Award for Outstanding Achievement.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
The prospect of civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India has stirred controversy for its potential impact on nuclear proliferation. I will discuss the origins or the U.S.-India nuclear deal, its current political prospects in the United States and India, and evaluate its impact on the nonproliferation regime. My talk will be based on part on the report U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward.
Michael Levi is a fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He was previously a science and technology fellow at the Brookings Institution. Levi is the author of two books, The Future of Arms Control (Brookings, 2005, with Michael O'Hanlon), and Rethinking Nuclear Terrorism (Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Strategies for Combating Terrorism
Bioterrorism is a growing threat. While the U.S. government has spent considerable sums on programs designed to protect the United States from a biological attack, no clear strategy has been articulated to guide planning and expenditures. This talk will present the outlines of a coherent strategy for coping with bioterrorism that includes diplomacy, deterrence and defense, with the emphasis on defense.
Dean Wilkening directs the Science Program at CISAC. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard University and spent 13 years at the RAND Corporation prior to coming to Stanford in 1996. His major research interests have been nuclear strategy and policy, arms control, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missile defense, and conventional force modernization. His most recent research focuses on ballistic missile defense and biological terrorism. His work on missile defense focuses on the broad strategic and political implications of deploying national and theater missile defenses, in particular, the impact of theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, and the technical feasibility of boost-phase interceptors for national and theater missile defense. His work on biological weapons focuses on understanding the scientific and technical uncertainties associated with predicting the outcome of hypothetical airborne biological weapon attacks, with the aim of devising more effective civil defenses, and a reanalysis of the accidental anthrax release in 1979 from a Russian military compound in Sverdlovsk with the aim of improving our understanding of the human effects of inhalation anthrax.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Why Terrorism Does Not Work
This study analyzes the political plights of twenty-eight terrorist groups- the complete list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) as designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001.7 The data yield two unexpected findings. First, the groups accomplished their forty-two policy objectives only 7 percent of the time. Second, although the groups achieved certain types of policy objectives more than others, the key variable for terrorist success was a tactical one: target selection. Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. These findings suggest that (1) terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and (2) the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. Together, the data challenge the dominant scholarly opinion that terrorism is strategically rational behavior.8 The bulk of the article develops a theory to explain why terrorist groups are unable to achieve their policy objectives by targeting civilians.
This article has five main sections. The first section summarizes the conventional wisdom that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy and highlights the deficit of empirical research sustaining this position. The second section explicates the methods used to assess the outcomes of the forty-two terrorist objectives included in this study and finds that terrorist success rates are actually extremely low. The third section examines the antecedent conditions for terrorism to work. It demonstrates that although terrorist groups are more likely to succeed in coercing target countries into making territorial concessions than ideological concessions, groups that primarily attack civilian targets do not achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. The fourth section develops a theory derived from the social psychology literature for why terrorist groups that target civilians are unable to compel policy change. Its external validity is then tested against three case studies: the September 1999 Russian apartment bombings, the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, and Palestinian terrorism in the first intifada. The article concludes with four policy implications for the war on terrorism and suggestions for future research.
Preventing the Importation of Illicit Nuclear Materials in Shipping Containers
We develop a mathematical model to find the optimal inspection strategy for detecting a nuclear weapon (or nuclear material to make a weapon) from being smuggled into the United States in a shipping container, subject to constraints of port congestion and an overall budget. We consider an 11-layer security system consisting of shipper certification, container seals, and a targeting software system, followed by passive (neutron and gamma), active (gamma radiography), and manual testing at overseas and domestic ports. Currently implemented policies achieve a low detection probability, and improved security requires passive and active testing of trusted containers and manually opening containers that cannot be penetrated by radiography. The annual cost of achieving a high detection probability of a plutonium weapon using existing equipment in traditional ways is roughly several billion dollars if testing is done domestically, and is approximately five times higher if testing is performed overseas. Our results suggest that employing high-energy x-ray radiography and elongating the passive neutron tests at overseas ports may provide significant cost savings, and several developing technologies, radiation sensors inside containers and tamper-resistant electronic seals, should be pursued aggressively. Further effort is critically needed to develop a practical neutron interrogation scheme that reliably detects moderately shielded, highly enriched uranium.
Roundtable Forum - Anxious Times: Seeing Beyond a World of Perpetual Threats
Timely reunion panel hosted by Stanford president John Hennessy, moderated by Stanford alum Ted Koppel, and featuring Bill Perry and George Shultz.
The final decade of the 20th century was a time of great optimism. The fall of the Iron Curtain ushered in a new era of democracy and freedom for millions. The expansion of the European Union promised to open borders to trade and opportunity. The technology revolutions of the 1990s promised to bridge cultural gaps and unite diverse people.
Yet, in the first decade of the 21st century, this optimism has faded in the face of myriad threats: the menace of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the danger of virulent pandemics, the global dependence on oil from volatile regions, and the far-reaching and often unsettling implications of an interconnected planet.
In such uneasy times, is it safe to feel safe? What is the way forward in the midst of these challenges? What will it take? What is Stanford doing to help address these issues?
Panelists
John L. Hennessy, Stanford President and Bing Presidential Professor
Jean-Pierre Garnier, MBA '74, CEO, GlaxoSmithKline
The Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, '58, Supreme Court Justice
William J. Perry, '49, MS '50, former Secretary of Defense, Berberian Professor in the School of Engineering
Dr. Lucy Shapiro, Ludwig Professor of developmental biology and cancer researcher
George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State, Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution
Jerry Yang, '90, MS '90, co-founder, Yahoo!
Austria's Immediate Past Presidency of the European Council
Ambassador Eva Nowotny is the official representative of the Republic of Austria in the United States and is responsible for all aspects of the relationship between the two countries. On December 04, 2003 she presented her credentials to President George W. Bush at the White House. She is also Permanent Representative of the Observer Mission of Austria to the Organization of American States (OAS) and Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.
Cosponsored by the Consulate General of Austria, Los Angeles http://www.austria.org
Audio Synopsis:
In this presentation, Ambassador Nowotny offers her thoughts on Austria's recent six month presidency of the European Union, which she points out has fostered an increase in positive attitudes toward the EU on behalf of Austrian citizens. While 2005 was a difficult year for the EU in light of the French and Dutch rejections of the latest treaty and disagreement about enlargement policy especially with respect to Turkey, the Austrian presidency has "reestablished a cooperative climate" and a degree of optimism to the European Union. Several unexpected events early in Austria's presidency presented challenges, including Russia's decision to stop the flow of Gazprom gas to Ukraine, the Maoist uprising in Nepal, and Iran's declaration that it would continue developing nuclear weapons. Austria used these challenges as an opportunity to reinvigorate discussion of foreign policy and negotiate a coherent EU response to international conflicts.
The ambassador then highlights key issues dominating Austria's presidency. These include the debate over the future of Europe, centering on the constitutional treaty and enlargement; the internal development of the European project, especially fostering economic competitiveness and addressing crime and terrorism; and the role of Europe in the world, where Austria has contributed strongly by helping to resolve conflicts like those in the Balkans, and helping to develop Europe's "neighborhood policy."
Finally, Ambassador Nowotny emphasizes the importance of the transatlantic relationship, which she feels the US and Europe attach equal weight to. Key areas of cooperation in years to come will include resolving international conflicts and dealing with crises, fostering the transatlantic economic partnership, improving international governance structures, and combatting terrorism.
A discussion session following the presentation raised such questions as: Where are there differences between the interests of Austria and of the European Union? In a post-9/11 world, do we have the institutional structure necessary to deal with new issues such as terrorism, and can we rely on those left over from WWII (NATO, OSCE, etc.)? Does Austria approach Southern and Eastern European countries as one group or does it prefer to deal with them individually?
CISAC Conference Room
Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crises
To reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, we must prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or materials. This will require, among other things, a sustained effort to keep dangerous nations from going nuclear--in particular North Korea. This article reviews the efforts the United States has undertaken through the years to keep North Korea from building a nuclear arsenal, arguing that the history of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula is marked by five nuclear crises. A sixth could be on the horizon, further compromising American efforts to lessen the likelihood of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil.