Forecasting Drug Violence in Guatemala: An Application of a Probabilistic Tactical Warning Model
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science. He is a Senior Fellow at FSI, affiliated with CISAC and CDDRL. His research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy and the evaluation of foreign aid projects promoting improved governance. Fearon was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. Some of his current research projects include work on the costs of collective and interpersonal violence, democratization and conflict in Myanmar, nuclear weapons and U.S. foreign policy, and the long-run persistence of armed conflict.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science. He is a Senior Fellow at FSI, affiliated with CISAC and CDDRL. His research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the international spread of democracy and the evaluation of foreign aid projects promoting improved governance. Fearon was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2012 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. Some of his current research projects include work on the costs of collective and interpersonal violence, democratization and conflict in Myanmar, nuclear weapons and U.S. foreign policy, and the long-run persistence of armed conflict.
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), an independent advisory committee tasked with providing guidance on the biosecurity oversight of dual use research, announced on March 30 that it would recommend the publication of controversial research on the H5N1 avian flu. The issue ignited a debate in the scientific community on publishing research that could threaten public health. The committee sent its recommendations to the federal government for review.
On March 12, Professor Paul Keim, chairman of the NSABB, and Dr. David Relman, a NSABB board member and CISAC affiliated faculty and professor of infectious diseases and microbiology and immunology at Stanford, discussed the debate over whether to make public scientific papers about the adaptation of the avian flu virus H5N1 to transmission in a mammal. The NSABB had not announced its decision to publish the research at the time of the presentation.
Audio from the March 12 seminar is available online.
A Wake-up Call for America: We Must Connect with the World
Former U.S. Sen. Russ Feingold, currently the Mimi and Peter E. Haas Distinguished Visitor at Stanford’s Haas Center for Public Service, uses an anecdote in his new book, While America Sleeps: A Wake-up Call for the Post-9/11 Era, to illustrate his concern that Americans have become too insular as a result of the 2001 terrorist attacks. While teaching at Marquette University Law School during the Arab Spring of last year, an undergraduate penned a column lamenting that so many students not only could not find Tunisia on the map – they could spell Kardashian before Kazakhstan.
Feingold writes that he admired this student for his confession about his lack of knowledge on global affairs, then quotes the final thought of the young columnist: “We are connected to the rest of the world in ways few of us can fully fathom, from the shoes we wear and coffee we drink to the cell phones we carry and the tweets we post.”
In a recent interview, CISAC Co-Director Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar and Feingold discuss steps to be taken to ensure that all Americans – young and old, inside the Washington beltway and out on the farm in Wisconsin – take a patriotic stand by engaging with the world to restore our national unity and regain global respect.
Senator Feingold, what prompted you to write this book now?
Feingold: For me, as for many Americans, 9/11 was a life-changing event, the wake-up call in which we all understood that we no longer could be safe just assuming the world would take care of itself. We got misdirected with things like Iraq and we developed this sort of invade-one-country-at-a-time approach. There was also exploitation of the fears from 9/11 for domestic agendas, from the Patriot Act to the way that Muslims and Arabs are treated in this country. And then, finally, with the rise of the tea party, I feel like we went back to sleep. But there are signals all over the place, of the continued presence of al-Qaida and the continued potency of al-Qaida, not to mention so many other trends from the Chinese influence in Africa to the Iranian influence in Latin America. We aren’t connecting as a government or as a people in a way that I think is commensurate with our place in the 21st century. I’m trying to issue a warning that we’re going to get fooled or surprised again if we think we can just go back to being just sort of safely over here across the oceans. That’s just not the world anymore.
So how do you wake up Americans and make them realize we cannot, as you say, survive as a nation without being active and aware of global events and trends?
Feingold: It’s at all levels. I happen to think we have a good president and I think he’s going to be a great president by the end of his second term. And I think he’s started the process of alerting Americans to the need to connect to all places in the world; he’s leading us toward a global vision of the kind that I think we have to have to be safe and to be competitively successful and to be well perceived by the rest of the world. The president and other leaders should call on each of us to try and become citizen diplomats. Three hundred million people should be urged as part of their patriotic duty not just to go to the moon as we once were, but go to the rest of the world. This isn’t Pollyanna; this is about being safe. I don’t think this country is geared up to make that connection and I think it’s a fatal flaw. The Russians, the Chinese and the Iranians, they’re all over the world and they have a plan for what they’re doing. We don’t.
What do you see as the most pressing global security issues today?
Cuéllar: The United States is confronting a changing world, where countries like India, Brazil, and China are evolving and assuming greater importance. Engaging these countries to address problems like nuclear proliferation will be critical in the years ahead. The world also faces a persistent problem involving failed or failing states. In places like Somalia, piracy is not only a regional problem in the Gulf of Aden. The problem is an example of how threats can affect multiple countries and impact flows of commodities, disrupting the rule of law, highlighting the challenges of governing common resources such as international sea lanes. Another challenge is the enormous potential of technology to change people’s lives for the better, coupled with risks that arise which we are only in a very imperfect and incomplete way managing; risks of vulnerabilities in our infrastructure; risks of theft of intellectual property, risks of disruption of organizations.
Feingold: I like this answer because Prof. Cuéllar did not just say, “Well, it’s Russia and Iran and Colombia.” There’s this tendency to just speak of countries. We’re just trained to say, “OK what’s the hot spot and let’s just worry about that.” Like right now it’s Iran; a few months ago it was Yemen. In my book what I’m trying to point out is that you have to look at trends and overall tendencies around the world and somehow we have to have the capacity to deal with more than one thing at a time.
Senator Feingold, you called the Bush Administration’s terrorist surveillance program – the wiretapping and surveillance of emails and financial records without court approval – one of the worst assaults on the Constitution in American history. How does the government protect our constitutional rights to privacy and probable cause while monitoring criminal and terrorist networks in a digital age?
Feingold: The assault on the Constitutional by the administration was not about whether we could do those things, its whether or not the president would basically make up his own laws just because we’re in a crisis. That to me is completely unconstitutional. We understand that a president might have to take emergency action and he may have to come to Congress and say, you know I did this, it may be beyond the law, would you please pass a law to approve it, or I’ll stop doing it. That’s not what Bush did. Bush hid it. Bush hid what he was doing on torture; Bush hid what he was doing on wiretapping. That’s a very dangerous thing that completely saps our strength from within and is completely unnecessary to stop the terrorists.
Cuéllar: The challenge of living up to our constitutional values while we secure the country is always critical. It requires organizations that can learn from their mistakes to be honest with each other enough and recognize when they have overstepped their bounds, that make good use of entities like inspectors-general, that leverage the ability of Congress to do oversight. These are all elements of making our constitutional values relevant. So me the challenge has always been how to you leverage all the information technology and all our ability to make smart, thoughtful, careful decisions – including decisions that do permit appropriate degrees of surveillance and intelligence – in order to avoid superficial reactions against individuals who simply appear threatening.
What key steps should the U.S. government take to improve its counter-terrorism efforts both at home and abroad?
Feingold: The first thing is to recognize the nature of the threat. One of the chapters in the book is called A Game of Risk, where we seem to think the way to counter terrorism is to invade a country and stay there forever and say we have to stay there or the terrorist are going to come back. But this isn’t the nature of al-Qaida or similar organizations. President Bush used to say there were 60 countries where al-Qaida was operating and, of course, one thing that was embarrassing about it was that Iraq wasn’t one of them. But we’re still in this place today. Al-Shabab in Somalia; al-Qaida and the Islamic Maghreb in northern Africa; a group called Boko Haram in Nigeria, which looks very much like an al-Qaida group, has pulled off some 70 attacks in the last year. So this is an international organization that communicates with each other and they’re not done just because Osama bin Laden is gone. So let’s not get caught unawares again.
Senator Feingold, what was your most memorable, defining challenge in Congress and how did that change the way you see yourself and the world around you?
It had to do with recognizing when 9/11 occurred that there really was a group of people out there who would love to kill all of us and, despite the fact that I’m progressive and I voted against most military interventions, just saying to myself: look, there are times when threats are real. And it caused me to actually seek to be on the Intelligence Committee which is something I never wanted to do; I was not sure of the importance of intelligence in the post Cold War era and it was a real change for me. I remember having an emotional response, saying, “You know what? This is real; what these folks did was real and they have intimidated an entire country if not the world.” I wanted to know everything I could about how they came to be and what they were planning next, and to be a person who could try to think ahead for other kinds of threats so we as Americans can get ahead of threats instead of being the people who are reacting.
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.
How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?
The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.
Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power.
What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?
Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.
U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.
Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?
I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.
I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage.
Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?
The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.
The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?
Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.
Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?
As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.
About the topic: This talk examines the organizational roots of disaster. Using the 2009 Fort Hood terrorist attack as a case study, she explores why the Defense Department and FBI were unable to stop a self-radicalizing terrorist within the Army who was openly espousing his beliefs, failing to perform his duties, and known, nearly a year before the attack, to be communicating with Anwar al-Aulaqi. In publicly released investigations of the attack, much attention has been paid to political correctness and failures of individual leadership. She finds, by contrast, that fundamental aspects of organizational life -- the structure of organizations, the incentives influencing employees' choice of tasks, and the cultural norms that color "how things are done around here" --- played a crucial and overlooked role. Organizational weaknesses, not human ones, were the root cause of disaster.
About the Speaker: Amy Zegart is an affiliated faculty member at CISAC and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before coming to Stanford, she served as professor of public policy at UCLA’s Luskin School of Public Affairs and as a fellow at the Burkle Center for International Relations. She is the author of two award-winning books. Flawed by Design, which won the highest national dissertation award in political science, and Spying Blind, which won the National Academy of Public Administration’s Brownlow Book Award.
Zegart was featured by the National Journal as one of the ten most influential experts in intelligence reform. Her commentary has been featured on national television and radio shows and in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E216
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Dr. Amy Zegart is the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. The author of five books, she specializes in U.S. intelligence, emerging technologies, and national security. At Hoover, she leads the Technology Policy Accelerator and the Oster National Security Affairs Fellows Program. She also is an associate director and senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI; a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute; and professor of political science by courtesy, teaching 100 students each year about how emerging technologies are transforming espionage.
Her award-winning research includes the leading academic study of intelligence failures before 9/11: Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, 2007) and the bestseller Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence (Princeton, 2022), which was nominated by Princeton University Press for the Pulitzer Prize. She also coauthored Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, with Condoleezza Rice (Twelve, 2018). Her op-eds and essays have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Politico, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal.
Zegart has advised senior officials about intelligence and foreign policy for more than two decades. She served on the National Security Council staff and as a presidential campaign foreign policy advisor and has testified before numerous congressional committees. Before her academic career, she spent several years as a McKinsey & Company consultant.
Zegart received an AB in East Asian studies from Harvard and an MA and a PhD in political science from Stanford. She serves on the boards of the Council on Foreign Relations, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, and the American Funds/Capital Group.
About the topic: Given the increased threat of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors, current global mechanisms addressing nuclear security have revealed serious limitations. As a result, after President Obama’s speech in 2009 at Prague, the first Nuclear Security Summit Meeting was successfully held in Washington D.C. Based on its success, the second Nuclear Security Summit Meeting is scheduled to be held in March 2012 in Seoul, Korea. In addition to the ongoing issues, the Seoul Meeting will deal with new issues such as nuclear safety in reflection of the recent Fukushima accident. The meeting may also take on other issues such as the framework agreement, further institutionalization of the Nuclear Security Summit Meeting and sustainable financing. Ultimately, this process should reinforce the effectiveness of global efforts to tackle nuclear terrorism and related issues.
About the Speaker: Professor Suh-Yong Chung is an international expert on international governance and institution building. His recent research interests include governance building in global climate change, Northeast Asian environmental cooperation institution building and nuclear security governance building. Dr. Chung has recently participated in various national and international conferences and seminars on nuclear security, such as the ROK-US Nuclear Security Experts Dialogue, and the WMD Study Group Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).
Dr. Chung is the Associate Professor of Division of International Studies of Korea University, an Adjunct Professor of The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the General Secretary of CSCAP Korea. Dr. Suh-Yong Chung holds degrees in law and international relations from Seoul National University, the London School of Economics and Stanford Law School.
CISAC Conference Room
OVER the last three years, as I delved into the world of American nuclear weapons, I felt increasingly as though I had stepped into a time warp. Despite the nearly total rearrangement of the international security landscape since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the rise of Islamic terrorism and the spread of nuclear materials and technology to volatile nations like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, the Defense Department remains enthralled by cold war nuclear strategies and practices.
Barack Obama took office determined to change that. He has made progress on many fronts. Last week, he outlined a new, no-frills defense strategy, downsizing conventional forces. He now needs to double down on his commitment to refashion nuclear forces. He should trim the American nuclear arsenal by two-thirds to bring it down to a sensible size, order the Pentagon to scale back nuclear war-fighting plans so they are relevant to contemporary threats, remove most American intercontinental, land-based missiles from high alert and drop the quaint notion that a fleet of aging B-52 bombers can effectively deliver nuclear weapons to distant targets.
This agenda is not only desirable, it is doable without undercutting American security. It would save tens of billions of dollars a year, a relatively small amount by Pentagon standards, but every billion counts as Leon E. Panetta, the defense secretary, trims his budget. And the steps can safely be taken without requiring reciprocal moves by Russia that must be codified in a treaty.
For the last few months, the Obama administration has been conducting a classified review of the doctrines and operations that determine the shape and potential uses of America’s nuclear armaments. If the president pushes back against the defenders of the old order at the Pentagon and other redoubts of the nuclear priesthood, he can preserve American security while making the United States a more credible leader on one of today’s most critical issues — containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Like a chain smoker asking others to give up cigarettes, the United States, with its bloated arsenal, sounds hypocritical when it puts pressure on other nations to cut weapons and stop producing bomb-grade highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient of a crude nuclear weapon.
American actions alone won’t end the proliferation danger, but American leadership is essential to any hope of containing the threat.
Sam Nunn, the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and anything but a dove over the years, rightly warns that the spread of weapons and the means to make them may soon reach a combustible stage where New York, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo or London is at risk of a nuclear terrorist attack.
Mr. Nunn and other keepers of America’s cold-war armory, George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, former Republican secretaries of state, and William J. Perry, a former Democratic defense secretary, have banded together in recent years to press, among other things, for cutting nuclear forces, de-alerting missiles and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear arms. Mr. Obama has embraced their aims and welcomed them to the Oval Office. Their high-powered, bipartisan alliance, if adroitly employed by the White House, ought to provide some political cover as Mr. Obama reshapes nuclear policy while running for a second term.
There is no national security rationale for maintaining an arsenal of some 5,000 warheads, with nearly 2,000 arms ready to use on short notice and the rest in reserve. We don’t need thousands of warheads, or even hundreds, to counter threats from countries like Iran or North Korea.
The only conceivable use of so many weapons would be a full-scale nuclear war with Russia, which has more warheads than the United States. But two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even Vladimir V. Putin, with his authoritarian bent, is not about to put Russia on a collision course with the United States that leads to nuclear war. China, equally unlikely to escalate tensions to the nuclear brink, probably has fewer than 400 warheads and a policy to use them only in self-defense. Pakistan has roughly 100, North Korea fewer than 10 and Iran, so far, zero.
The United States could live quite securely with fewer than 1,500 warheads, half in reserve. Defenders of the nuclear faith claim we need 5,000 weapons as a hedge against warheads that may become defective over time. But an elaborate Energy Department program to maintain and refurbish warheads, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, has proved highly effective.
Another oft-cited reason for increasing our arsenal is that the Pentagon’s nuclear war-fighting plans still call for striking hundreds of targets in Russia and China, as well as dozens of sites in a number of other publicly unidentified nations — presumably Iran, North Korea and Syria — considered potentially hostile to the United States and eager to possess unconventional weapons.
Washington’s current nuclear war plans remain far too outsize to deal with any plausible attack on America. Mr. Obama could remove some nations from the hit list, starting with China, and tell his generals to limit the number of targets in the countries that remain.
The oversize American nuclear arsenal features an equally outdated reliance on long-distance bombers. The days when lumbering B-52 bombers could play a central role in delivering nuclear weapons — memorably spoofed in Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove” — ended decades ago. Mr. Obama should ground the bombers and depend on land- and sea-based missiles.
The high-alert status of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles is another anachronism. There are few circumstances that might require the United States to quickly launch nuclear-tipped missiles, and missiles on high alert are an invitation to an accident, or impulsive action. In the first year of his presidency, Mr. Obama outlined an ambitious nuclear weapons agenda. Absent new action, Washington will remain frozen in a costly cold war posture.
Philip Taubman is a former New York Times bureau chief in Moscow and Washington and the author of “The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb.”
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room