When Kofi Annan announced his plans to step aside as special envoy for the conflict in Syria by the end of the month, he put much of the blame on the United Nations Security Council for the failure to make peace in the war-ravaged country.

"When the Syrian people desperately need action, there continues to be finger pointing and name calling in the Security Council," Annan said. "It is impossible for me or anyone to compel the Syrian government and also the opposition to take the steps to bring about the political process. As an envoy, I can't want peace more than the protagonists, more than Security Council or the international community, for that matter."

The uprising against Syrian President Bashar Assad began in March 2011 and rights activists say it has left more than 19,000 dead. Annan became the U.N.-Arab League envoy to Syria in February, with the goal of getting both sides to put down their weapons. He designed a six-point plan for peace, which was never fully implemented.

Stephen J. Stedman, FSI's Freeman Spogli Senior Fellow, and Larry Diamond — a senior fellow at FSI and the Hoover Institution as well as director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law — offer their analysis of the impact of Annan's resignation.

Does the resignation of Annan, who is well respected among diplomats, signal that there is no hope for peace in Syria?

Diamond: I think it's been apparent for several weeks, at least, that the peace mission was doomed, that the Assad regime was not prepared to negotiate, and that the refusal of Russia and China to agree to any kind of meaningful pressure on the Assad regime has left violent resistance by the opposition and the society as the only option.

Syria is sinking deeper and deeper into all-out civil war, and only an escalation of military pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and its principal leaders and supporters offers any hope of resolution. Sometimes, when one or both parties refuse to negotiate, the only way to end a civil war is for one side to win. Libya provides the most recent example of that. If Assad and his allies are going to negotiate a peaceful exit, it will only be because they are staring at the prospect of fairly imminent military defeat.

Could Annan have done something differently?

Diamond: It is very difficult to negotiate with a regime that is bent on repression and total domination, especially when you can't credibly threaten to impose formidable costs on the regime if it refuses to compromise. I don't think there was anything more that Annan could have done, because he had no leverage, no tools to work with, as a result of the inability of the Security Council to agree on tough sanctions.

Will the failure to make peace in Syria tarnish Annan's legacy?

Stedman: The failure to make peace in Syria should not and will not tarnish Annan's legacy. First, he is already a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and one failure in an extraordinarily difficult case does not diminish the rest of his diplomatic successes. With regards to Syria, no one expected him to succeed, but he needed to try and he needed to be seen to try. His position was special envoy of the Security Council, and if anyone is looking for a scapegoat they should start looking at the council.

Diamond: No, I don't think this will tarnish Annan's legacy. He had a nearly impossible mission; everyone knew that. The failure was a collective failure of the international system, not the failure of an individual mediator. Annan is a great man who has made major contributions to world peace and security. It's not his fault that a brutal regime, backed by the world's two most powerful authoritarian states, refused to negotiate.

Brooke Donald is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"

The indigenous population in Latin America ranks among the highest in underdevelopment in the world, experiencing high levels of illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, disease, discrimination, violence and expropriation of their lands. In an effort to examine the common trends, actors, and challenges affecting this vulnerable community, the Program on Human Rights (PHR) at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) together with the Center for Latin American Studies is hosting a one-day conference on Tuesday, May 8 2012 at Stanford University to shed light on the important human rights issues indigenous populations face.

Alejandro Toledo, the former president of Peru and its first president of indigenous descent will deliver the opening address. Toledo was a visiting scholar at CDDRL from 2007-2009. The conference will bring together a diverse group of scholars to present research papers on a range of topics relating to indigenous communities in Latin America and the Caribbean, including: violence and security, education, the effect of climate change, health challenges, cultural survival, national and international property rights and political movements.

According to Helen Stacy, the director of the Program on Human Rights, “The goal of the conference is to create an integrated network of professionals that includes Stanford University students, faculty and researchers, who will advance and support continuous research on human rights issues affecting indigenous people in Latin America.”

The lunchtime keynote address will be delivered by the former first lady of Peru, Eliane Karp-Toledo, an anthropologist and economist who specializes in Andean indigenous cultures. Conference speakers include: Alexia Romero, a second year JD candidate at Stanford University, who will address the issue of indigenous property rights; Oliver Kaplan, a postdoctoral research associate at Princeton University, who will explore civil war violence in Columbia; Paul Kim, assistant dean and chief technology officer for Stanford’s School of Education, who will speak about the impact of mobile phone technology for indigenous people in Latin America; and Claire Mantini-Briggs, visiting lecturer at UC Berkeley’s Department of Anthropology, who will discuss inequalities in epidemiology and human rights.

The Center on Latin American Studies and the Program on Human Rights view this conference as the beginning of an ongoing research initiative to examine the state of indigenous rights. 

The sessions begin at 9:00 am and will be held in the Bechtel Conference Center. They are free and open to the public. To view the complete program and RSVP to the conference, please click here.

Propelled by the need to develop new and more productive avenues of communication among scholars and policy-makers based in Europe, North America, and the Middle East, in 2010 the Europe Center at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute agreed to launch the multi-year collaborative project titled "Debating History, Democracy, Development, and Education in Conflicted Societies." Our joint initiative aims to promote research and policy projects with partners in Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East.

Viewed in an international context, with a focus on Europe and the Middle East, this collaborative project investigates how societies debate internally and attempt to reconcile differences of historical interpretation and political positions.  The first conference took place at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, and was dedicated to “Democracy in Adversity and Diversity” (May 18-19, 2011). Topics for the conference included democracy in comparative perspective, political reform, the notion and strategies of democracy promotion, regime transition, negotiating religion and democracy, immigration challenges, minorities and East-West relations, emergence or recovery of civil society, the role of non-governmental organizations in democratic societies, and human rights. 

The next conference, at Stanford University May 17-18, 2012 aims to deepen our understanding of the interplay between history and memory. Given the extensive discussion of memory and history across a variety of disciplines in recent decades, we would like to take stock of our current understanding of the concepts of memory and history as they affect society, politics and culture.  At the same time we wish to examine in what ways insights gained in the course of this cross-disciplinary and global discussion may be effective when considering the circumstances of the Middle East, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We are inviting new, innovative approaches to the study of memory and history as they affect different societies. We especially welcome contributions that engage the concepts of memory and history comparatively. Our goal is to advance beyond restating examples of conflicts between versions of history, and to seek new paths of research that may further the work in various cases, and also potentially offer guidance for engaging particular international and civil conflicts.

The questions that we seek to address at the conference include, among others:

• How do we understand the historians’ role and engagement in political and cultural conflicts about the past and present?
• What are the historians’ responsibilities in developing shared narratives about war, civil conflict, occupation, and genocide?
• How do we understand the relation between the work of professional historians and that of civic society organizations?
• How do we understand the roles and interplay of history and memory in efforts towards reconciliation?
• How should one think about the relative importance of historical commissions and truth commissions in “coming to terms with the past.”
• What is the relationship between the historian’s work on international and domestic conflict and that of judicial institutions?
• How do efforts in post-conflict situations to reach accurate assessments (“truth”) of the events meet the needs of healing social, ethnic, and/or religious wounds (“reconciliation”)?
• How do we understand the effectiveness, necessity, and/or legitimacy of remembering and forgetting in models of reconciliation?
• What are the consequences and meaning of actions of forgiveness, including the formal granting of amnesty? Do these actions conflict with the writing of history?

The conference committee consists of Norman Naimark (Core faculty member of The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor in East European Studies at Stanford), Yfaat Weiss (Director, The Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Gabriel Motzkin (Director, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute), and Amir Eshel (Director, The Europe Center and Edward Clark Crossett Professor of Humanistic Studies at Stanford).

Philanthropist and software giant Bill Gates spoke to a Stanford audience last week about the importance of foreign aid and product innovation in the fight against chronic hunger, poverty and disease in the developing world.

His message goes hand-in-hand with the ongoing work of researchers at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Much of that work is supported by FSI’s Global Underdevelopment Action Fund, which provides seed grants to help faculty members design research experiments and conduct fieldwork in some of the world’s poorest places.

Four FSI senior fellows – Larry Diamond, Jeremy Weinstein, Paul Wise and Walter Falcon – respond to some of the points made by Gates and share insight into their own research and ideas about how to advance and secure the most fragile nations.

Without first improving people’s health, Gates says it’s harder to build good governance and reliable infrastructure in a developing country. Is that the best way to prioritize when thinking about foreign aid?

Larry Diamond: I have immense admiration for what Bill Gates is doing to reduce childhood and maternal fatality and improve the quality of life in poor countries.  He is literally saving millions of lives.  But in two respects (at least), it's misguided to think that public health should come "before" improvements in governance.  

First, there is no reason why we need to choose, or why the two types of interventions should be in conflict.  People need vaccines against endemic and preventable diseases – and they need institutional reforms to strengthen societal resistance to corruption, a sociopolitical disease that drains society of the energy and resources to fight poverty, ignorance, and disease.  

Second, good governance is a vital facilitator of improved public health.  When corruption is controlled, public resources are used efficiently and justly to build modern sanitation and transportation systems, and to train and operate modern health care systems.  With good, accountable governance, public health and life expectancy improve much more dramatically.  When corruption is endemic, life-saving vaccines, drugs, and treatments too often fall beyond the reach of poor people who cannot make under-the-table payments. 

Foreign aid has come under criticism for not being effective, and most countries have very small foreign aid budgets. How do you make the case that foreign aid is a worthy investment?

Jeremy M. Weinstein: While foreign aid may be a small part of most countries’ national budgets, global development assistance has increased markedly in the past 50 years. Between 2000 and 2010, global aid increased from $78 billion to nearly $130 billion – and the U.S. continues to be the world’s leading donor.

The challenge in the next decade will be to sustain high aid volumes given the economic challenges that now confront developed countries. I am confident that we can and will sustain these volumes for three reasons.

First, a strong core of leading voices in both parties recognizes that promoting development serves our national interest. In this interconnected world, our security and prosperity depend in important ways on the security and prosperity of those who live beyond our borders.

Second, providing assistance is a reflection of our values – it is these humanitarian motives that drove the unprecedented U.S. commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS during the Bush Administration.

Perhaps most importantly, especially in tight budget times, development agencies are learning a great deal about what works in foreign assistance, and are putting taxpayers’ dollars to better use to reduce poverty, fight disease, increase productivity, and strengthen governance – with increasing evidence to show for it.

Some of the most dire situations in the developing world are found in conflict zones. How can philanthropists and nongovernmental organizations best work in places with unstable governments and public health crises? Is there a role for larger groups like the Gates Foundation to play in war-torn areas?

Paul H. Wise: As a pediatrician, the central challenge is this: The majority of preventable child deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa and in much of the world occur in areas of political instability and poor governance. 

This means that if we are to make real progress in improving child health we must be able to enhance the provision of critical, highly efficacious health interventions in areas that are characterized by complex political environments – often where corruption, civil conflict, and poor public management are the rule. 

Currently, most of the major global health funders tend to avoid working in such areas, as they would rather invest their efforts and resources in supportive, well-functioning locations.  This is understandable. However, given where the preventable deaths are occurring, it is not acceptable. 

Our efforts are directed at creating new strategies capable of bringing essential services to unstable regions of the world.  This will require new collaborations between health professionals, global security experts, political scientists, and management specialists in order to craft integrated child health strategies that respect both the technical requirements of critical health services and the political and management innovations that will ensure that these life-saving interventions reach all children in need.

Gates says innovation is essential to improving agricultural production for small farmers in the poorest places. What is the most-needed invention or idea that needs to be put into place to fight global hunger?

Walter P. Falcon: No single innovation will end hunger, but widespread use of cell phone technology could help.

Most poor agricultural communities receive few benefits from agricultural extension services, many of which were decimated during earlier periods of structural reform. But small farmers often have cell phones or live in villages where phones are present.

My priority innovation is for a  $10 smart phone, to be complemented with a series of very specific applications designed for transferring knowledge about new agricultural technologies to particular regions.  Using the wiki-like potential of these applications, it would also be possible for farmers from different villages to teach each other, share critical local knowledge, and also interact with crop and livestock specialists.

Language and visual qualities of the applications would be key, and literacy problems would be constraining.  But the potential payoff seems enormous.

This spring four social entrepreneurs will be descending on the Stanford campus from as far away as Bosnia, Palestine, and Kenya and as close as San Francisco, to spend the quarter at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) engaging researchers and students across the university. These social change leaders are part of the newly launched Program on Social Entrepreneurship at CDDRL, which brings the work of practitioners to the Stanford classroom where it is rarely on display.

Social entrepreneurs use new approaches and innovative methods to challenge existing systems that keep people socially, economically, and politically marginalized. Rather than generating personal or private wealth, dividends are paid directly to society through new programs, advocacy campaigns, and more.

The first cohort of Social Entrepreneurs in Residence at Stanford (SEERS) includes leaders working on the frontlines of gender justice and social reform in societies that have experienced civil war, ethnic division, and continued economic and social injustice. Zawadi Nyong'o and Taida Horozovic are both advancing the rights of women and girls in regions affected by violent conflict. Nyong'o, a Kenyan Afro-feminist, leads several initiatives across the African continent to advance the reproductive rights of women and sexual minorities, and works to promote a more participatory role for women in peace-building efforts. After fleeing the civil war in the 1990s, Horozovic returned to her home in Bosnia-Herzegovina to launch CURE, an organization committed to ending gender violence through educational awareness, media tools, and global campaigns.

The Program looks forward to welcoming the first class of Social Entrepreneurs-in-Residence to Stanford this April where they will have the opportunity to develop their initiatives further, enrich themselves in our academic community, and bring their experiences directly inside the classroom for students to learn first-hand about the realities on the ground.    Kavita Ramdas

Confronting racial and political injustice in their local communities, Ramzi Jaber and Steve Williams initiated innovative projects to give voice and resonance to these important issues. Jaber, a member of the Palestinian diaspora, returned to the West Bank to launch Visualizing Palestine, an initiative that uses visual stories and graphics to build international awareness around past and present injustices. Jaber was also the key organizer of the first TEDx conference in Ramallah in 2011, to give a global platform to Palestinian activists and change-makers. Williams, a Stanford graduate (‘92), co-founded the organization POWER, a grassroots organization that works to defend the rights of low income workers, immigrant women, and advocates for housing justice in some of San Francisco's poorer communities.

The Program on Social Entrepreneurship is led by two faculty co-directors, Kathryn Stoner, CDDRL deputy director and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and Deborah Rhode, the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and director of the Stanford Center on the Legal Profession at the Stanford Law School. Kavita N. Ramdas serves as the Program's executive director and brings her relevant experience as the former president and CEO of the Global Fund for Women where she worked to identify and support an international network of social entrepreneurs. 

Beginning in April, the SEERS will spend eight weeks at Stanford plugging into the academic community and benefiting from a brief respite from their professional lives to reflect on their experiences and recharge their batteries. Ramdas and Stoner-Weiss will be teaching a course (IR 142) examining how social entrepreneurs contribute to shaping democracy, development, and creating more just societies.According to Ramdas, "The Program looks forward to welcoming the first class of Social Entrepreneurs-in-Residence to Stanford this April where they will have the opportunity to develop their initiatives further, enrich themselves in our academic community, and bring their experiences directly inside the classroom for students to learn first-hand about the realities on the ground."

Students enrolled in the course will work with the social entrepreneurs to develop case studies that examine, document, and share lessons learned from their work. With little original research available on social entrepreneurship, this is a rare opportunity for the Stanford community to examine new practices and approaches to promoting social and economic change, highlighting what has worked and failed to work. Guest lecturers include leaders from IDEO.org and Lulan Artisans, as well as faculty members Sarah Soule of the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Professor Emeritus David Abernethy.

In addition to the course, the SEERS will be featured in events and gatherings on campus hosted by the Faculty Advisory Council whose members hail from the Haas Center for Public Service, the Clayman Institute for Gender Research, the Stanford Law School, the Stanford School of Medicine, the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society, and the Graduate School of Business. The Launch of the Program on Social Entrepreneurship will be hosted at CDDRL on April 5 at 5:30 pm to introduce the SEERS to the larger Stanford community and kick-off their eight-week residency. It is free and open to the general public.

The Program is planning to welcome the second class of social entrepreneurs to Stanford during the fall of the 2012-13 academic year. Focusing on using legal frameworks as a force for change, the program will solicit nominations from experts in the field who have engaged with leaders working to transform and improve legal structures that challenge prevailing inequalities or protect the rights of marginalized groups in society.

For more information on the Program on Social Entrepreneurship, the Social Entrepreneurs in Residence at Stanford, or to view the calendar of events during their stay, please visit: pse.stanford.edu.