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The world first became concerned about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1989 through satellite photos of a facility under construction near the town of Yongbyon. Since then, there have been on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea by the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other countries in the region to halt and dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

A consistent strategy focused on dialogue and diplomacy is essential to get out of the current quagmire, urged Song Min-soon, a member of the Korean National Assembly and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, at a Korean Studies Program public seminar on October 18. Although the United States and the ROK must lead efforts, China's active involvement is also crucial. Resolving the nuclear issue is necessary to help ensure the long-term peace and prosperity of not only the Korean Peninsula but also the entire East Asia region.

Song explored reasons why previous negotiation attempts failed, especially the lack of a shared vision among the concerned countries for the future of the peninsula and region. He suggested that this rendered China less willing to play a stronger role in the negotiations. The imbalance of power among the negotiating countries is another significant factor. North Korea's only effective bargaining card is its nuclear weapons program, argued Song, while countries like the United States have the capability to offer or withhold important aid, such as energy and development assistance.

Song advocated a firm, direct approach, stating that the United States has not adopted a real strategy for effecting nuclear disarmament. Instead, it has opted for the "slogan" of "strategic patience." He cautioned against taking a hard line, such as the current ROK administration is pursuing. Song expressed the hope that the United States would focus more on developing a well-planned diplomatic strategy for resolving the nuclear issue and that the ROK would adopt a more conciliatory approach toward North Korea.

To move forward in the Six-Party Talks-negotiations among the United States, the ROK, North Korea, China, the Russian Federation, and Japan-and effectively resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, Song made several recommendations. He pointed to the long-term benefit of building trust incrementally by fulfilling small, strategic commitments to North Korea. To balance the asymmetry of negotiating cards, Song suggested that the other countries proceed with fulfilling their commitments and allow North Korea more time to fulfill its own obligations. Bringing China fully on board by building a logical basis for its involvement is also a crucial element of the negotiations, he offered. Finally, Song asserted that the United States, the ROK, and China must develop a shared, solid vision for peaceful coexistence on the peninsula, taking into account different scenarios and the roles each country should play.

Song expressed confidence that the approach he outlined would not only eventually resolve the nuclear issue but would also open the way for stability and prosperity for everyone in East Asia, including North Korea.

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Angela Merkel was sworn in as Chancellor on November 22, 2005. She is the first woman and the first East German to hold this office. From 2002-2005, Chancellor Merkel was the Chairwoman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. She has been the Chairwoman of the Christian Democratic Union since 2000, and served as the General Secretary of the CDU from 1998 to 2000. In 2007, Merkel was the President of the European Council and chaired the G8, participating in the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Berlin Declaration. In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy presented Merkel the Charlemagne Prize for her work to reform the European Union.

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Angela Merkel German Chancellor Keynote Speaker
Gerhard Casper Speaker
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The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the leading international carbon market and a driving force for sustainable development globally. But the eruption of controversy over offsets from Chinese wind power has exposed cracks at the core of how carbon credits are verified in developing economies. It has become almost impossible to determine whether offsets from Chinese wind are "additional" and that they in fact represent "real" reductions beyond business as usual. Unless this problem can be resolved, it threatens to spread beyond wind in China and could threaten the ability of carbon markets to deliver the mitigation demanded by international climate policy.

In 2009 the CDM Executive Board (EB) shocked the carbon market by forcing an unprecedented review of whether multiple Chinese wind projects satisfied UNFCCC additionality requirements. CDM investors reeled as the safest CDM bet became the riskiest; the Chinese government publicly criticized the UN's oversight of carbon markets; and the CDM EB prepared itself for an unprecedented fight over how carbon offsets could be verified in the world's largest CDM market.

At the center of the controversy is the Chinese power tariff for wind.

When the EB observed decreases over time in power tariffs granted by China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to wind projects, it became concerned that China might be manipulating power tariffs in order to guarantee additionality and subsidize its domestic wind development with international finance. If the Chinese government were controlling additionality, then the CDM's ability to validate carbon offsets would be dealt a near‐lethal blow because the problems posed by Chinese wind extend to nearly all power sector projects in almost every developing country. If offsets cannot be credibly verified, then the integrity of emissions caps set by the Kyoto Protocol is directly threatened.

The Chinese wind controversy therefore has direct implications for the design and negotiation of any successor to the Kyoto Protocol. Despite largely failed negotiations in Copenhagen, the design of reliable, efficient carbon markets remains the world's most serious prospect for international cooperation. The developed world has committed USD 30 billion in climate aid by 2012, but the majority of these funds will likely have to be private capital delivered through markets. In order for carbon markets to avoid controversy and function effectively, the lessons from the Chinese wind controversy must be used to implement key reforms.

This report examines the application of additionality in the Chinese wind power market and draws implications for the design of effective global carbon offset policy. It demonstrates the causes of the wind power controversy, highlights underlying structural flaws in how additionality is applied in China, and charts a reform path that can strengthen the credibility of global carbon markets.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #90
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Gang He

Organized by Stanford Health Policy Director Alan Garber, the Payment Reform Project brings together a group of economists and researchers interested in creating and studying novel approaches to payment for health care. The Project is the combined effort of Stanford Health Policy, FRESH-Thinking and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. This is a venue for people who have thought deeply about similar issues in other contexts to contribute to a health care discussion.

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The global nuclear order is changing. Concerns about climate change, the volatility of oil prices, and the security of energy supplies have contributed to a widespread and still-growing interest in the future use of nuclear power. Thirty states operate one or more nuclear power plants today, and according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), some 50 others have requested technical assistance from the agency to explore the possibility of developing their own nuclear energy programs. This surge of interest in nuclear energy - labeled by some proponents as ‘the renaissance in nuclear power' - is occurring simultaneously with mounting concerns about the healthy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the regulatory framework that constrains and governs the world's civil and military- related nuclear affairs. The question then arises: is it possible to have nuclear power without nuclear proliferation? The answer is not clear, for the technical, economic, and political factors that will determine whether future generations will have more nuclear power without more nuclear proliferation are exceedingly complex and interrelated. Dr. Sagan will outline the current state of nuclear power and nuclear proliferation, before examining the weaknesses and promise of existing research on the subject. He argues that a key aspect of ensuring a safe nuclear future will be the strengthening of the NPT through "shared responsibility" for disarmament.

Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000) and the editor of Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2009). His most recent publications include "The Case for No First Use," Survival (June 2009) and "Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations" in George Perkovich and James A. Acton (eds.) Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Carnegie Endowment, 2009).

Allen S. Weiner is senior lecturer in law and co-director of the Stanford Program in International Law at Stanford Law School. He is also the co-director of the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation. His expertise is in the field of public international law and the foreign relations law of the United States. He is a seasoned international lawyer with experience in such wide-ranging fields as national security law, the law of war, international dispute resolution, and international criminal law. His current scholarship focuses on international law and the response to the contemporary security threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For more than a decade he practiced international law in the U.S. Department of State, serving as an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser and as legal counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague. In those capacities, he advised government policy-makers, negotiated international agreements, and represented the United States in litigation before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the International Court of Justice. He teaches courses in public international law, international conflict resolution, and international security matters at Stanford Law School. He received a BA from Harvard College and a JD from Stanford Law School.

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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Scott D. Sagan Co-Director of CISAC and Professor of Political Science Speaker
Allen S. Weiner Senior Lecturer in Law; Co-Director, Stanford Program in International Law; Co-Director, Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation; CDDRL and CISAC Faculty Member; Forum on Contemporary Europe Research Affiliate Speaker
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This project explores the revision of the treaties of the European Union using a multi-stage two-level-analysis. For the current revision of the Nice treaty, there are inferences between the domestic and European level, most obviously when referendums are carried. This time, a convention made a proposal for revision which was discussed by the member states at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), and this project examines how member states have formed their positions on the treaty revision in inter-ministerial coordination.

The Forum on Contemporary Europe designed and sponsored this meeting as part of its series on global conflict, and peace and reconciliation.  This session was conducted as a high level, by-invitation discussion to bring together policy leaders and FCE Research Affiliates aimed to consider the potential benefit of Stanford research on conflict and negotiation for the continuing process of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.  The meeting included the UK Permanent Secretary for Northern Ireland, with Stanford faculty and FSI/FCE Research Affiliates including

  • Helen Stacy, Principal Investigator, Project on Human Rights
  • Allen Weiner, Co-Director, Stanford Center for International Conflict Negotiation,
  • Byron Bland, Co-Director, Stanford Center for International Conflict Negotiation, and
  • Roland Hsu, Assistant Director, Stanford Forum on Contemporary Europe. 

Also participating were Robin Newman, UK Vice Consul Political, Press and Public Affairs, and Andy Pike, UK Consul for Northern Ireland in Washington, D.C.  Also invited were a select group of post-graduate scholars currently engaged in research with policy implications on human rights, global justice, and international law.

The meeting addressed multiple engagement and intervention strategies, including using the office of the Permanent Secretary with his deep knowledge of historically contested issues and parties, as well as appealing to international mediation from offices including the European Court of Justice and Court of Human Rights.  Participants also discussed possible lessons to be drawn from this peace process for long-standing conflicts in settings such as Darfur, Sri Lanka, and Sub-Saharan and Southern Africa.

The Forum on Contemporary Europe expresses its appreciation for the Office of the UK Consul General in San Francisco co-sponsorship for this event.

Forum on Contemporary Europe

Sir Jonathan Phillips UK Permanent Secretary for Northern Ireland Speaker
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Daishiro Nomiya
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In activist communities worldwide, globalization has had an enormous impact, both in the composition of activist groups and the content of their messages. At the same time, regional concerns are playing a significant role in the ways protests are organized, managed, and deployed.

Regardless of their location or their target, it is clear that protest campaigns have, on the one hand, become increasingly globalized. The protests that took place during the July 2008 G8 Toyako Summit in Japan offer a case in point. Approximately one hundred transnational activists flew into Sapporo, a city located near the summit site, and joined various civil and protest activities. Over a loudspeaker, they broadcast statements denouncing the summit meeting as “antidemocratic” and “discriminatory against the poor.” These activists were drawn from East, Southeast, and Central Asia, as well as Europe and North America, and they voiced correspondingly global concerns—for human rights, global peace, and democracy, and against inequality and poverty. These themes echoed those of other major global protests, including demonstrations that took place against the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, the latter most notably in 1999 in Seattle. Indeed, protests of this kind represent what might be called an antiglobalization movement

On the other hand, global movements of this kind also appear to be organized on an increasingly regional basis. Though the activists who protested the Toyako Summit came from all over the world, and addressed topics of global importance, most of the participants came mainly from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Given this apparent dichotomy, the question arises: Will global social movements become regional?

One could argue that global social movements are and will remain regional, at least for the time being, for two practical reasons. First, the costs associated with flight to activist hubs near protest sites can be expensive. Second, the amount of time spent in transition to the protest site becomes a burden. The time doubles when taking into consideration the time spent to return to the originating country. These factors can be prohibitive especially to those based far away, but are less burdensome to regional activists, thus making it easier for nearby protesters to participate.

While time and cost are no doubt a concern, they may not be as important when compared with the other factors. Language is among these factors. Cooperative activities beyond the national borders are on the rise, yet many foreign activists do not speak the languages spoken in the countries where they protest. They invariably rely on English, widely accepted as the “global” language. Yet the levels of English fluency differ among participating activists, and this is a key factor. With their English ability, activists from Europe and North America tend to communicate with others on an individual basis, while those from nearby countries often rely on interpreters, especially when discussions delve into the details of the planned activity and necessary arrangements associated with it. Typically, interpreters are group leaders, well educated and knowledgeable about regional and global issues—and these individuals facilitate most intergroup communication.

Preestablished ties and preexisting communication can influence negotiation and cooperation processes among activists. Global social movements tend to enhance crossnational cooperation among participating activists—that is, activists who come together from different countries often regroup elsewhere, building on their previous cooperative activities. In the case of the 2008 G8 summit protests, regionalization was very much at work. Several months prior to the summit, Japanese media activists planned a temporary umbrella organization called the G8 Media Network, which helped to accommodate incoming foreign media activists and arranged international cooperative activities during the summit. As it happened, the foreign activists and groups that interacted with the G8 Media Network were actually regional, originating mainly from South Korea and Hong Kong. Under the auspices of the G8 Media Network, these groups of activists arrived prior to the summit and stayed until it concluded. Afterward, the same media groups discussed the continuation of crossnational cooperation. Though technically foreign, the dominant actors and groups who sought to continue cooperative activities were, in fact, only from neighboring countries.

Looking more closely at participants in the global protest activities provides further insight into contemporary global protest movements. At the 2008 G8 Summit protests, two different types of foreign participants were on display—those who had prior ties to host activist groups in Japan, and those who did not. The former group could be described as professional activists, whose preestablished ties ensure that they have good knowledge of a given protest’s scheduled activities. The professional group also organizes its own plans of action, precoordinated with domestic groups. The latter group tends to be traveling activists, a more or less independent and unorganized collection of individuals who enjoy traveling the globe and joining the activities offered at protest sites worldwide. The professional activist group is often drawn largely from neighboring countries in the region.

Most global social movements feature participants from around the world. At the same time, signs of regionalization also exist, making most protests both global and regional in nature. One could claim that the future of global social movements is regional. But whether global or regional, it is vital that we continue to study the composition of global protest movements and their abiding impact on civil society.

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Somewhere on the long list of problems that President Barack Obama will inherit next January will be the ongoing negotiations to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The announcement on October 11, removing North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for a verification mechanism, has the virtue of keeping the diplomatic
avenue open. But if we look carefully at what it took even to get to this interim point,
there should be no illusions about the difficulties of finishing the job.

The latest deal merely closes the second phase of an agreement that was originally signed in February 2007. This phase was supposed to be completed in 60 days. Instead it has taken 19 months. This 19-month saga of negotiation over what may be the easiest step in the process—freezing the status quo—should caution against any expectation that the next administration can easily step in and pick up the negotiating reins.

There are three options it can reasonably consider come January. One would be to try to regain what has been given away in these talks—the inclusion of undeclared sites and proliferation activities—by returning to tactics of international sanctions and Chinese pressure. Japan, which is unhappy with the deal, may be ready for this but there is no evidence that Beijing or even the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government in South Korea is interested in returning to confrontation. At the other end of the spectrum would be an effort to leapfrog the drawn-out phases by offering Pyongyang most of what they claim to want—normalization of relations, economic aid, security assurances, a formal peace treaty to end the Korean war—in a "grand bargain."

Finally, there is the least attractive but most likely course: to lock in the gains of plutonium containment and to continue the diplomatic slog into the dismantling phase, albeit with a more rigorous approach. The U.S. could also try to encourage regime transformation in the North through both engagement and pressure. Given the uncertainties over the health of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, this may be the only viable path to ending the North Korean nuclear threat.

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The Oriental Economist
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Daniel C. Sneider
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