After eight years of marathon negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union are finally close to concluding a strategic-arms-reduction treaty (START). At the 1990 Washington summit, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a communique concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Although the agreement is not the long-awaited START, the two presidents reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990. The marked progress toward nuclear disarmament by the two superpowers has once again caused vast repercussions. While hailing progress, many people show more concern for the implications of the treaty for the future of arms control.

A warning system such as the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence system (C3I) for the U.S. nuclear forces operates on the basis of various sources of information, among which are signals from sensors. These sensors include, for example, radar receivers and satellites. A fundamental problem in the use of such signals is that the sensors provide only imperfect information. Two kinds of errors are possible: missed signals (Type I errors) and false alerts (Type II errors). Probability is therefore a key concept in the logical treatment of such signals. It is defined, in the Bayesian sense, as a degree of belief in the possibility ofeach event (in this case, attack or no attack, signal or no signal, and action or no action) (Savage 1954). One of the main problems in the use of the Bayesian method is that, because the base of evidence for estimation of these probabilities may be small, the figures may be fuzzy. A first issue is thus how to account, using probabilities, for the primary uncertainties about signals and events. A second issue is how to assess and treat uncertainties about these probabilities (epistemic uncertainties) while preserving probabilistic logic. A third issue is the relevance of these epistemic uncertainties in rational and prudent decision making when the stakes are as high as the possibility of an accidental nuclear attack.

This study of the naval-training system grew out of our larger project on the development of China's strategic weapons. After completing work on the history of Beijing's nuclear weapons program, we began research on Project 09, China's development program for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. This research brought to light important new materials on the overall growth of China's navy and led to interviews with Chinese naval specialists. The new data suggested important insights into questions related to military professionalism and the long-range strategy for Chinese military power. This review of the history of Chinese naval training thus illuminates larger issues of Chinese defense planning and security goals. It also provides a baseline for assessing the missions of the navy and its readiness for carrying out those missions.

Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation has been widely acclaimed in the few years since its publication. Given its promise for promoting cooperation in ‘prisoner's dilemma games' (PDGs), such praise is unsurprising. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy Axelrod recommends for achieving an evolution of cooperation in PD situations has application to the negotiation of arms control treaties.

ABOUT THE BOOK

We have seen in recent hijackings and other hostage-takings that the mightiest military machine in the world can be tied down like Gulliver. What would happen if tomorrow's Lilliputians had an atomic bomb, or used other means to cause nuclear violence? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is an insightful and provocative book that provides early warning of a threat that must be stopped from materializing at all costs. It points the way to avoiding a situation in which the world order, not just our nation, would be placed at risk. It warrants close scrutiny.
- Representative Richard Gephardt
Chairman, House Democratic Caucus

The old adage about an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure aptly describes the basic thrust of this valuable book. The book begins with a distinguished and balanced International Task Force of experts concluding that 'the probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing' and warning that 'the fact that so far there has been no serious act of nuclear terrorism is no reason for complacency.' The Task Force report is followed by 26 studies that provide valuable insight and perspective into all aspects of a world-threatening problem. This is a unique body of work that offers a realistic and urgently needed roadmap for steering clear of nuclear terrorism.
- Senator Sam Nunn
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

There is no greater challenge to the entire world than the prevention of a detonation, accidental or otherwise, of even a single nuclear weapon. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism makes a unique and valued contribution toward that end. It should be widely read, discussed, and acted upon.
- Senator John W. Warner
Secretary of the Navy, 1972-74

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large-scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident - or the misperceptions that might result from one - could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.' Those elements of the research covering the technical and 'mechanization' requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).