This paper describes the technologies needed for producing nuclear weapons, giving particular attention to those used in electromagnetic separation and laser uranium-235 enrichment.  The complexity of the technologies makes it clear that developing countries, to various degrees, need assistance from the developed world in order to build nuclear weapons.  Complete restriction of assistance could prevent the spread of these weapons.  Unfortunately, knowledge of the technology is already so widespread that preventing further spread is virtually impossible in the long run.  In practice, imposing rigorous control over the availability of key components of all of the possible technologies may delay access to nuclear weapons by the less-developed world for many years.  All of the recommendations in this discussion may be overtaken by the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union--rumors abound that its nuclear engineers, technology, weapons material, and the weapons themselves are potentially for sale.  A better method of preventing proliferation is needed, and some of the proposals for achieving improvements are discussed in this paper.

Under Article VI of the NPT, all parties agree "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The purpose of this paper is to consider the meaning of this language.

A solution to the nuclear dilemma has eluded mankind since the creation of nuclear weapons.  A visionary attempt by the United States to eliminate the threat at the beginning of the nuclear age (the "Baruch Plan" for the international control of atomic energy) fell victim to the Cold War.  However, in this new geopolitical era, the UN Security Council finally has the opportunity to function as its founders intended, and it may now be appropriate to reconsider the idea of a security regime that would bring all nuclear weapons under international control.

The internationalization of nuclear security would have to be implemented over a number of years through a systematic step-by-step process.  This paper suggests the following three-phase approach: in Phase I, a new international security regime would be established; in Phase II, a UN-owned international nuclear deterrent force (INDF) would be created; and finally, in Phase III, all national nuclear arsenals would be eliminated in favor of the INDF.

When a state develops a nuclear arsenal, these destructive weapons must be initially integrated into existing military forces and initially managed through existing civil and military institutions. The subsequent relationship between nuclear weapons and civil-military relations in possessor states is complex, however, and presents an important two-way puzzle. First, it is important to ask how existing patterns of civil-military relations in nuclear states have influenced the likelihood of nuclear-weapons use. Some scholars believe that military officers are less war-prone and hawkish than civilian leaders; others believe the opposite, that the military tends to be bellicose and biased in favor of aggressive military postures. Which view is right, especially when nuclear weapons are involved, is a question that has not been fully addressed in the literature. Second, it is important to flip the question around and also ask how nuclear weapons have influenced civil-military relations in the states that have acquired the ultimate weapon. Again, the answer is not clear. One might expect that the massive destructive power of these weapons would encourage much greater civilian involvement in military affairs. Yet, at the same time, one might predict that military organizations would maintain significant control over nuclear policy as they want to protect their operational autonomy, and because the perceived need for a prompt response would mitigate against tight civilian control.

Although may problems face international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries in the years ahead, none is more important than gaining a lengthy extension of the non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Action on extension will be taken by majority vote of the over 160 parties at a conference called to consider this question in 1995. This paper will consider why a lengthy extension of the NPT is important; what options for, and obstacles to, extension exist and what the NPT's strongest supporters can offer the NPT members who are skeptical about a long extension in order to win their votes.

A remarkable tripartite collaboration. . . . A new and highly revealing account of how the Korean War began, based on a careful comparison of Chinese, Soviet, and even North Korean sources. The authors' achievement, from a historian's perspective, is roughly the equivalent of making a first flight around the hidden side of the moon. . . . An exemplary standard for the "new" Cold War history. -Atlantic Monthly

A fascinating and exciting book. Every expert on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy and every student of international relations and the Cold War will have to read it. I am awed by the materials that have been put together in this book; it is international collaboration at its very best. 

-Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia

This title, the first using newly available resources from China and Russia, represents the opening of a new era in the study of Sino-Soviet relations and their effect on international politics. The credentials of the authors are the highest.
-Library Journal

This magisterial work provides the missing dimension of the Korean war - how policy was made on the communist side. Making use of previously unavailable Chinese and Soviet sources . . . this is likely to become the standard work on the subject.
-John Merrill, George Washington University.

The prevention of nuclear proliferation is intimately related to stringent restraints on the supply of fissionable material available for weapons. We review the practices of the United States in providing security and control of bomb-grade material and the problems that have been encountered. We then consider the challenges to security and control of nuclear weapons material posed by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).

The Trident sysem consists of the Ohio-class ballistic-missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), the C-4 and D-5 submarine-launched-ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the reentry vehicles (RVs) and thermonucler warheads comprising the Mk4/W76 and Mk5/W88 systems.  Trident is America's premiere strategic nuclear weapon because of its ability to evade detection and its capacity to rapidly destroy a wide range of important targets.

This study examines several technical questions bearing on Trident safety, and it enumerates important issues and options. The secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons restricts this effort, and, as a result, our study cannot be definitive. Moreover, no one can provide a reliable quantitative analysis of the probability of a serious accident. Nevertheless, in any situation that involves a small, yet finite, chance of a catastrophic event, the hazard must be weighed against the costs of reducing risk. 

"The 35-year goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban can best be attained, without compromising the integrity of the regime, by not defining precisely what constitutes a nuclear explosion."