India's nuclear tests in May 1998 shocked the world. On May 11 and 13, India conducted a total of five tests. According to official Indian statements, the tests comprised three low-yield explosions, a 12 kiloton (kt) fission bomb, and a 43 kt thermonuclear device. The Indian tests triggered a quick response from Pakistan. On May 28 Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests, followed by a further test on May 30. Although some Western analysts have cast doubt on whether the two countries actually carried out the number and size of tests they claimed, India and Pakistan did conduct nuclear testing. These tests run counter to the global trend of nuclear arms reduction and have undermined not only the peace and stability of South Asia but of the world as well.

India and Pakistan have long been regarded by the international arms-control community as "nuclear threshold" or "de facto" nuclear-weapon states. They have now become declared nuclear-weapon states. The nuclear testing in South Asia will inevitably have a serious impact on regional and world politics, security, and diplomacy. This paper, which draws upon Chinese sources, analyzes the motivations of India and Pakistan and the consequences of the nuclear tests.

History has demonstrated that national leadership, time, and diplomatic genius will be needed to solve the thorny issue of the nuclear arms race in South Asia, so closely connected is it to the underlying and enduring Indian-Pakistani hostility. A Chinese source has quoted a senior Indian official as saying: "[t]he Cold War does not end in South Asia." The Chinese estimate that this confrontation will last well into the twenty-first century. How the international community responds to the tests will be crucial in determining whether the nonproliferation norm survives with credibility or is further eroded.

The nuclear crisis in South Asia is serious. However, "crisis" in the Chinese language is composed of two characters: wei--danger--and ji--opportunity. The new international situation, characterized by the coexistence of "opportunity" and "challenge," does hold out some hope that the nuclear arms race in South Asia can be capped. The challenge that confronts the international community is to turn this threat into an opportunity. The international community must move urgently in the matter. China recognizes this challenge and will play its role in this regard.

Background: In the 1980s, many medical organizations identified the prevention of nuclear war as one of the medical profession's most important goals. An assessment of the current danger is warranted given the radically changed context of the post–Cold War era.

Methods: We reviewed the recent literature on the status of nuclear arsenals and the risk of nuclear war. We then estimated the likely medical effects of a scenario identified by leading experts as posing a serious danger: an accidental launch of nuclear weapons. We assessed possible measures to reduce the risk of such an event.

Results: U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain on high alert. This fact, combined with the aging of Russian technical systems, has recently increased the risk of an accidental nuclear attack. As a conservative estimate, an accidental intermediate-sized launch of weapons from a single Russian submarine would result in the deaths of 6,838,000 persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal radiation from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear missiles from high-level alert status and eliminate the capability of a rapid launch would put an end to this threat.

Conclusions: The risk of an accidental nuclear attack has increased in recent years, threatening a public health disaster of unprecedented scale. Physicians and medical organizations should work actively to help build support for the policy changes that would prevent such a disaster.

This report reviews Chinese participation in the international negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and provides background for China’s decision-making procedures during the negotiations.

The CTBT negotiations marked the first important international negotiations for a multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. They were the first important international negotiations in which China, as a nuclear power, had great influence. The Chinese delegation to the CD assumed a serious and responsible attitude during the entire course of the negotiations. In part to increase international confidence that it would sign the CTBT by 1996 as scheduled and in part to indicate its intent to adapt itself to the world trend toward increased international cooperation and nuclear arms reduction, China announced during the latter stage of the negotiations that it would suspend nuclear testing.

As an example of successful multilateral negotiations, the conclusion and signing of the treaty, although long postponed, is an important achievement in arms control. As the sole declared nuclear-weapon state of the Third World at that time and the last among the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) to cease nuclear testing, China’s stance toward the CTBT negotiations was the object of world attention and concern. The population of China accounts for nearly one-quarter of the world’s total; China’s positive position on the CTBT and its contributions toward this end has a major worldwide impact now and in the future.

Prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, China declared on October 5, 1993, that while supporting an early conclusion of the treaty it would “take an active part in the negotiating process and work together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996.” China kept its promise.

China pursued a fair, reasonable, and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration. During the negotiations, China presented many working papers, non-papers, and suggestions regarding the CTBT draft text (including a number of revisions), and dealt with a series of critical issues in the Preamble, Basic Obligations, Organization, Verification, and Entry into Force sections of the treaty. The Chinese delegation played an active role at the conference table, and contributed positively to the weekly P5 consultations that ran in parallel with the CTBT talks.

China adhered toughly to its positions on two issues in the latter stage of the CTBT negotiations. One concerned potential abuses of the on-site inspection procedures. The other was that all nuclear-test-capable states (assumed to be the P5, India, Israel, and Pakistan) must accede to the treaty in order for it to enter into full legal force. Although China was not entirely satisfied with the final draft CTBT, it accepted the treaty. It agreed to sign the CTBT in the belief that the treaty text represented the best achievable result of the negotiations of the preceding two and a half years, reflected by and large the state of the negotiations, and was in general balanced.

Signing the CTBT was in line with China’s consistent stand in support of “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” This was one of the major reasons China supported an early conclusion of the treaty. Of course, China’s desire to meet the trend of the modern world also motivated it to sign. Because economic development had long been Beijing’s top priority, China needed a peaceful security environment in order to devote itself completely to the modernization of the nation. To this end, its defense buildup had been steadily subordinated to national economic development. Beijing’s decision on the CTBT negotiations stemmed also from its self-defense and no-first-use nuclear policies. China had established an effective nuclear force for self-defense.

China is now making preparations for the treaty to enter into force. After the conclusion of the CTBT, China will continue efforts in pursuit of world peace, development, and cooperation. Meanwhile, China will continuously ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

In the 1990s, global concern over illicit trafficking in nuclear material to terrorists and nation-states has intensified. Two major changes are responsible: the evident new intent of terrorists to wound or kill thousands of civilians and the availability of inadequately protected "loose" nuclear materials in Russia and the newly independent former Soviet republics. These changes have made more likely attempts to acquire weapons-usable nuclear materials for terrorist use or for sale to state sponsors of terrorism. As a result, many efforts are being made to strengthen national and international standards for protection of nuclear material from theft and sabotage. One problem with current efforts is that national stnadards now vary widely. Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) mandates that non-nuclear weapon parties accept the safeguards requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their nuclear activities, the relevant international standards for physical protection are mostly advisory.

Russia's current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Strategic modernization is therefore essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the US. But modernization will be extremely difficult because of the country's economic and political turmoil. Russia can probably maintain slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I Treaty - roughly half of what the United States could, in theory, deploy. Under START II, Russia's strategic force will likely contain between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 for the US. Hence, the easiest - perhaps the only - way for Russia to recover rough parity with the United States would be through a START III Treaty that limits both sides to 2,000-2,500 warheads.

The majority of Russia's current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Hence, Russian strategic force modernization is essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the United States. Numerous uncertainties, especially financial uncertainties, prevent accurate estimates of Russia's future strategic force structure. Nevertheless, under the START I Treaty, Russia can probably maintain a force with slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads over the next two decades-about half the number of the United States. Under START II, Russia is likely to maintain a strategic force of between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 warheads for the United States. Therefore, Russia's main interest in ratifying the START II Treaty would be to pursue a START III Treaty that limits both sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads. This is the least expensive way to retain rough parity with the United States. Several reasons have been educed for why Russia should not ratify the START II Treaty, namely, because the Treaty allows a U.S. advantage in reconstitution capability and prompt hard-target-kill capability. However, these advantages are neither so great nor so consequential that Russia should reject the START II Treaty for these reasons alone. If Russia ratifies the START II Treaty, and presumably a follow-on START III Treaty, Russia's future strategic nuclear force will appear a lot different than its Soviet predecessor due to the reduced emphasis on land-based ICBMs. Nevertheless, the Russian force should remain a highly survivable, stable force-assuming Russian leaders allocate sufficient resources to ensure that their ballistic missile submarines, mobile ICBMs, and bombers can survive all plausible counterforce threats.

From the preface:

"Events in recent years have caused heightened concern about the security of weapons-usable nuclear material. The possibility of illicit trafficking in, or seizure of, such material, leading to nuclear terrorism, is a worry for all states and their citizens. And given the relatively small quantities required, material obtained in one part of the world could be made into a weapon in another and threaten lives in a third. It is truly a global problem.

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, the physical protection of fissile material has been a responsibility of the individual states possessing the material. These states have different organizational approaches for providing physical protection; and while cognizant of recommended general standards, they tend to follow their own practices, shaped by custom, costs, and threat perception. Moreover, the existence of military as well as civil programs in some states adds another dimension
to the physical protection issue.

Because physical protection is a sovereign matter and not part of an international regime (except for transit of civil material across borders), there has been less attention in much of the world community to the issues of physical protection than to the other elements of nuclear safeguards and controls. (An important exception to this situation is the effort being made to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in the disposition of their weapons-usable nuclear materials.) The lack of a general dialog about a problem of growing concern motivated us to hold a three-day workshop at Stanford University to develop a better understanding of some of the important underlying questions and issues, and to undertake a comparative examination of states' approaches to physical protection. We were pleased to have knowledgeable participants from a number of the countries and regions where physical protection of fissile materials is, or will become, a day-to-day matter.

The results of the workshop are reported in these Proceedings. It is our hope that this work will stimulate further analysis and discussion, and lead to greater interest in international standards, cooperation, and supporting programs.

James E. Goodby
1996-1997 Payne Distinguished Lecturer
Stanford University

Ronald F. Lehman II
Director of the Center for Global Security Research
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

William C. Potter
Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies"

This report on non-binding, non-treaty approaches to arms control draws upon research and discussion at the Center for International Security and Arms Control during 1990 and 1991, after the Cold War had ended but before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was apparent at the time that the traditional approach to arms control--through detailed treaties resulting from long negotiations--might not be adequate to deal with the new situation in which arms reductions could be made quickly but coordination would still be needed in order to preserve stability. We examined the possibility of using reciprocal unilateral measures (RUMs) in place of treaties as a mechanism for achieving arms control.

A striking example of the approach we were recommending was when Presidents Bush and Gorbachev announced major withdrawals of non-strategic nuclear weapons in September and October 1991 (We describe the Bush-Gorbachev RUMs in this paper.) The strategic picture changed dramatically soon after those measures were announced. The Soviet Union was replaced by the Russian Federation and 14 other newly independent states. For several years, the treaty method worked well in U.S.-Russian arms control, alongside other forms of cooperation such as the Nunn-Lugar program. We put aside our work on RUMs.

Although we are far from a resumption of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian relations are no longer as cooperative as they were in the early 1990s. Besides, the treaty method has slowed almost to a standstill. We have therefore returned to the draft final report of 1991 and drawn from it the history we thought is relevant to the current problem of reducing the strategic nuclear threat Russia and the United States pose to each other--and to the rest of the world.

There is a growing logjam of arms control treaties waiting for approval in both the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate. Without decisive action, this logjam will probably prevent approval by the world's two largest military powers of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) of 1993, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (CTBT), amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the protocols of the Treaty of Pelindaba (creating an African nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)) and the Treaty of Rarotonga (creating a South Pacific NWFZ) before the end of the century. It will also prevent progress towards START III and further bilateral nuclear reductions.

Since Brazil and West Germany surprised the world by announcing that they had reached the nuclear "deal of the century" in 1975, many national and international observers have feared that Brazil sought to develop atomic weapons. Brazilian rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Tlatelolco treaties, insistence on its legal right to develop so-called peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), aspirations to great power status, authoritarian military government, and tacit nuclear rivalry with Argentina aroused concern that this ambitious program of reactor construction and technology transfer would mask an effort to reach the bomb.

Although difficult financial circumstances derailed this program in the late 1970s, by the early 1980s press reports began to emerge indicating that a secretive "parallel" nuclear program under military direction was underway. Transition to democratic rule in 1985 failed to clarify the nature and objectives of this second effort, and provocative statements by senior military officers intensified concerns. This second effort persevered in the face of the severe economic conditions that made the 1980s a "lost decade" for Latin American countries, increasing international stress on nonproliferation, and protests from domestic anti-nuclear and environmental groups, as well as a 1990 investigation by the national congress.

By 1991, however, Brazil had formally renounced PNEs, agreed to establish bilateral safeguards with Argentina and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of formerly secret nuclear facilities, and committed to ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This marked the apparent reversal of a long trajectory toward the proliferation threshold, and thus assuaged apprehension within and outside the country. Yet military involvement in nuclear technological development continued essentially unaltered, and Brazil now enjoys the distinction of being one of the few states with the indigenous capacity to produce fissile material necessary to construct atomic weapons.

This paper seeks to answer two questions: Given limited resources and domestic and foreign opposition, how did the Brazilian military succeed in developing this capacity? Given their determined effort and enduring role in nuclear development, why did the armed forces stop short of the bomb?

This study answers these two questions through investigation of domestic political processes, which involve the formation and maintenance of programmatic coalitions that marshal human, material, and political resources for technological development. Such coalitions encounter constraints which include competition for scarce human and financial capital, international technological denial, and domestic and international opposition. Such programs must be either effectively insulated from domestic challenges, or politically defended and normatively legitimated in spite of them.