U.S. Nuclear Weapons Security - A "Silly" Notion
At first glance, the U.S. military's response to the incident at Minot Air Base involving the transportation of six nuclear warheads across the United States was reasonably thorough and harsh--three colonel-rank commanders were relieved of their positions, the bomber wing at Minot was decertified from its wartime missions, and a number of air force personnel lost their certifications. More action will probably come in the next few months. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked the Defense Science Board to review the incident, and the 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill will require the Defense and Energy departments to submit a report detailing what procedures and policies they use when handling nuclear weapons.
But a closer look at the investigation doesn't give much hope that Washington will learn the proper lessons from the incident. The U.S. military is clearly at the "scapegoat" stage of its understanding of what happened. It claims that the accident was caused by human error; according to a Defense representative, it was "a failure to follow procedures, procedures which have proven to be sound." The irony of this statement seemed to elude the official (and much of the press, for that matter).
Wired Magazine interviews Jeremy Carl on Clean Coal
Coal is dirty. But coal is driving the U.S., Chinese and Indian economies. And therefore, coal is not going away. Renewable energy sources like solar and wind generate only 1 percent of the world's electricity. Do the math: Making coal burn cleaner might be the most pressing environmental problem that no one talks about.
Despite recent estimates that pollution from China's booming coal industry reaches U.S. shores in as little as five days, the green-tech investment boom that has funded the rise of biofuels has bypassed coal. Even the head of the World Coal Institute recently proclaimed the last 10 years "a lost decade" for clean coal, saying it's time to play catch-up.
Stanford's Jeremy Carl, a research fellow in the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, couldn't agree more. He spoke on the phone with Wired News to discuss China, the holy grail of clean coal and how many coal plants he'd trade for Kyoto's accomplishments.
Stanford research fellow Jeremy Carl says, "Coal is as dirty as it gets," but warns against throwing the possibly cleaned-up baby out with the dirty bathwater.
Wired News: Why'd you get into clean coal?
Jeremy Carl: I looked at the numbers. It's a question of where the big sources of emissions are and where we can attack them.
WN: Can you give us an idea of the scale of coal power? Can you put coal in context as an energy source?
Carl: Only oil makes a bigger contribution to global energy. In terms of energy in the industrial world, it's about 40 percent of electricity production.
WN: How dirty is coal?
Carl: Coal is as dirty as it gets. Coal has every element in the periodic table. And depending where in the world you get it from, "coal" can mean 100 different substances. If you sent the sort of coal you might use in a typical Indian plant to a supermodern boiler in Japan, it would shut the place down.
WN: But there's got to be good things about coal.
Carl: It's cheap. And coal doesn't have the kind of extreme risk that nuclear power has. You're not going to build a dirty bomb out of coal. And unlike other fossil fuels, it is really widely distributed, so there is less of a coal OPEC.
WN: And that distribution would seem to make resource wars less likely to break out over coal?
Carl: Yes.
WN: Is there an energy source that could replace coal?
Carl: Natural gas is the only viable replacement, and it's not clear that the natural-gas supply could scale up to replace coal.
WN: So, how can we can make coal cleaner?
Carl: The most-well-known is flue-gas desulfurization, which takes sulfur dioxide out of smoke stacks, and came out of concerns about acid rain. There are other pollution-control devices for nitrogen oxide and mercury filters.
WN: What about up-and-coming technologies like carbon capture and sequestration? Can you tell us about that?
Carl: You're taking carbon from a smokestack and pressure-injecting it into a geological formation of some sort. We actually already do this process at an industrial level. We know how this works.
WN: Seems like we're spending a lot of time on the backend scrubbing pollutants out. Should we be designing in a cleaner process on the front end?
Carl: A lot of people point to integrated gasification-combined-cycle (IGCC) plants, which gasify coal before burning it, as the holy grail because they get you a cleaner process. It gives you a more concentrated stream of carbon that you can sequester underground more cheaply. The capital cost is very high, though, and we don't have a lot of experience in designing them.
WN: We hear a lot about China's coal industry. Can you compare it with the U.S. industry, which ranks second in the world?
Carl: We mine about (1.1 billion tons) of coal per year. China was at about 1.4 billion tons seven years ago. Now they are at 2.4 billion tons. So, they essentially took the second-biggest coal industry in the whole world and replicated it in seven years. And if you look at the Chinese plans, they plan to ramp it up even more in the future.
WN: Given the obvious environmental impacts of these plants, why don't we have better answers for these problems than the Kyoto Protocol (which the United States didn't sign, and which exempted China and India from emissions restrictions)?
Carl: I'll give you a speculative, personal answer. It has to do with the politics of the type of people who were negotiating Kyoto. And the pressure put on by environmental groups that were uncomfortable with coal. There was just so much pressure on the symbolic importance of getting a deal done.
WN: What would you have rather seen?
Carl: I think there has been some really good criticism that says, "Was the U.N. really a good forum for this? Or would it have been better to have taken the 10 countries who consume 60 percent of global energy and do something with real teeth in it?" I think that would have been a much better approach.
I would have happily traded every emissions gain from Kyoto for eight clean coal plants sequestering carbon in different countries. Because then we could have a real discussion that says, "This works. Now let's see who has to bear the cost."
WN: Why would that be such a big deal?
Carl: Because right now we're having a conversation with China and India where we're trying to get China and India to build clean coal plants by saying, "Here's this thing that's never been tried before at a mass scale. You should build one." And that's not going to work.
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner
On July 5, 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement pledging their governments to actions designed to culminate in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement that would end a three-decade U.S. nuclear embargo against India. Although the formal agreement has not yet received final approval from Congress, concerns about the consequences of the agreement, particularly its possible adverse effect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the worldwide nonproliferation regime, have made the agreement controversial. This article traces the events that led to the Bush-Singh meeting, explicates the current situation, examines the arguments for and against the proposed agreement, and makes some preliminary judgments regarding the agreement's effects on the nonproliferation regime. The failure to prevent India's 1998 nuclear tests with the threat of sanctions (because the Indians calculated that long-term U.S. resolve was not sustainable) set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately end the nuclear embargo. However, the conditions for a better U.S.-India nuclear agreement--from a nonproliferation perspective--will inevitably arise if the current proposed agreement is not adopted.
FSI welcomes new faculty
The Institute welcomes five new full-time faculty and two distinguished visitors in the current academic year. The latest additions represent consolidation of ongoing programs, such as those in homeland security and international relations and expansion of its research agenda into Asian comparative healthcare and issues in contemporary Europe.
Below are brief profiles of FSI's new faculty, all of whom have offices in Encina Hall.
Martha Crenshaw--FSI Senior Fellow, CISAC
Formerly a professor of government at Wesleyan University, Martha Crenshaw has a distinguished record of scholarship and policy engagement in the area of terrorism studies. Her early work on the National Liberation Front in Algeria 30 years ago made seminal contributions to the understanding of terrorist psychology and organizational structure, themes that are helping to animate the agenda for future research in the field. Her work with the U.S. Department of State and the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 has played an important role in a major Department of Homeland Security grant she brought to Stanford this year.
Karen Eggleston--FSI Center Fellow, Shorenstein APARC and CHP/PCOR
Karen Eggleston joined Stanford from Tufts as an Asian comparative healthcare scholar whose work focuses on health systems and design incentives, especially in lower- and middle-income countries. She has co-authored Welfare, Choice and Solidarity in Transition: Reforming the Health Sector in Eastern Europe with esteemed economist János Kornai, which has been translated into Chinese, Vietnamese, Polish, and Hungarian. Her current research examines the Chinese healthcare system and how ownership factors affect hospital performance.
Siegfried S. Hecker--FSI Senior Fellow, Professor (Research), Management Science and Engineering, and Co-director, CISAC
Director emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, material scientist Sig Hecker became CISAC's co-director in early 2007. His research interests include plutonium science, nuclear weapons policy and international security, nuclear security, including nonproliferation and counter terrorism, and cooperative nuclear threat reduction. Over the past 15 years, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials.
Josef Joffe--FSI Senior Fellow, Forum on Contemporary Europe, and the Marc and Anita Abramowitz Fellow, Hoover Institution
A journalist-scholar and publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, Joe Joffe is in residence at Stanford during fall quarter. His work focuses on U.S.-Europe relations, and is noteworthy for its ability to bridge the worlds of journalism, academics, and policy analysis. He serves on several editorial boards and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His work has been acclaimed through a number of awards, including Germany's Theodor Wolff Prize.
Phillip Lipscy--FSI Center Fellow and Assistant Professor, Political Science
Just completing his PhD in government at Harvard, Phillip Lipscy joins Stanford as a jointly held appointment in political science and FSI. His research focuses on international relations in Asia with particular attention to the domestic sources of foreign policy conduct. He is a comparativist with training in international relations, a rarity in the field of contemporary Japanese politics. He is bicultural, having grown up in Japan, and his foreign policy interests encompass the entire East Asia region.
William Howard Taft IV--The Warren Christopher Visiting Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, FSI and the Stanford Law School
Will Taft will be in residence at FSI and the Law School during the 2007-08 academic year as a visiting scholar and teaching Contemporary Issues in International Law and Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Law. Taft has held several private and public positions, including appointments at the Federal Trade Commission, Office of Management and Budget, and U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In 1981, he became general counsel to the Department of Defense followed by an appointment as the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1984. Taft also served as U.S. ambassador to NATO and the U.S. Department of State's legal advisor, the highest legal position in the department. Taft is currently counsel in the office of Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.
Alejandro Toledo--FSI Distinguished Payne Lecturer, CDDRL
Having overcome extreme childhood poverty, Alejandro Toledo became the first Peruvian president of indigenous descent to be democratically elected in 500 years. During his presidency, the Peruvian economy registered one of the fastest growing economies in Latin America. The central aim of his presidency was the fight against poverty through health and educational investment. Toledo will be in residence at CDDRL during the 2007-08 academic year. His work will be showcased in a series of talks, workshops, and other activities as part of his Payne lectureship.
Phillip Lipscy
Phillip Y. Lipscy was the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University until August 2019. His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international security, and the politics of East Asia, particularly Japan.
Lipscy’s book from Cambridge University Press, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, examines how countries seek greater international influence by reforming or creating international organizations. His research addresses a wide range of substantive topics such as international cooperation, the politics of energy, the politics of financial crises, the use of secrecy in international policy making, and the effect of domestic politics on trade. He has also published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.
Lipscy obtained his PhD in political science at Harvard University. He received his MA in international policy studies and BA in economics and political science at Stanford University. Lipscy has been affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, the Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for International Policy Studies.
For additional information such as C.V., publications, and working papers, please visit Phillip Lipscy's homepage.
CTBT Ratification and the Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The 2007 Entry-Into-Force Conference
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a pivotal litmus test to determine a nation's "walking-the-walk dedication" on nonproliferation matters. The September Article XIV conference to obtain Entrance-Into-Force was attended by delegations from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, and 101 other nations, but not the United States, North Korea, and India (1). The views of key global diplomats on the purpose and direction of the CTBT will be cited, followed by an analysis of funding and regional acceptance.
Official proceedings were adjourned for a two-hour session with three non-diplomats and Ambassador Jaap Ramaker (UN Conference on Disarmament chief CTBT negotiator) (2). The technical presentation on CTBT monitoring progress (2005-6 CISAC study) will be summarized (3). Monitoring has advanced since the 1999 Senate defeat by lowering the monitoring threshold from 1 kt to 0.1 kilotons (1-2 kt in a cavity), and by improvements in regional seismology (results of 2006-DPRK test and other data), correlation-wave seismology, interferometric synthetic aperture radar, cooperative monitoring at test sites without losing secrets, radionuclide monitoring improvement by a factor of 10, and other results. This presentation showed that the CTBT was effectively verifiable, in accordance with the Nitze-Baker definition.
CTBT has not been discharged from the Senate's Executive Calendar, thus the United States cannot legally resume nuclear testing without a Senate vote to discharge it. The NPT regime is in trouble; Article IV will mostly allow sensitive fuel cycle operations. The overlap between NPT and CTBT will be discussed. The statement of concern on CTBT by Senator Kyl (Cong. Record, 10-24-07) will be examined. Lastly, a path to Entrance-Into-Force for the CTBT will be described.
David Hafemeister was a 2005-2006 science fellow at CISAC. He is a professor (emeritus) of physics at California Polytechnic State University. He spent a dozen years in Washington as professional staff member for Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs (1990-93 on arms control treaties at the end of the Cold War), science advisor to Senator John Glenn (1975-77), special assistant to Under Secretary of State Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Nye (1977-78), visiting scientist in the State Department's Office of Nuclear Proliferation Policy (1979), the Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy (1987) and study director at the National Academy of Sciences (2000-02). He also held appointments at Carnegie Mellon, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, and the Lawrence-Berkeley, Argonne and Los Alamos national laboratories. He was chair of the APS Forum on Physics and Society (1985-6) and the APS Panel on Public Affairs (1996-7). He has written or edited ten books and 140 articles and was awarded the APS Szilard award in 1996.
(1) http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2007/article_xiv07_main.htm
(2) http://www.vertic.org/news.asp#ctbtreport
(3) D. Hafemeister, "Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since its 1999 Senate Defeat," Science and Global Security 15(3), 151-183 (2007).
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
India's Uranium Supply and Plutonium Production Capability
This presentation aims at answering questions regarding India's capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium and the impact of the U.S.-India deal, or the lack thereof, on India's nuclear weapons program. The basic answers provided here are that the U.S.-India deal does not significantly affect the military plutonium production program. Any reduction in weapons-grade plutonium production could be compensated for by any of several methods that would, however, require government decision and budget allocation. The uranium constraint is a serious long-term restraint, particularly, on the civilian power program, which is the major national consumer of natural uranium. There are ways of alleviating and ultimately resolving this constraint, relying on India's domestic uranium resources, which would more than suffice for the remaining life of all the currently existing and planned reactors, if mining and milling capacity could be commissioned on time. The U.S.-India deal would alleviate the near-term uranium supply-demand mismatch by allowing uranium imports into the country. In the meantime, India is pursuing several strategies discussed here to ease its impending uranium supply crunch.
Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with former CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Open Source Intelligence
This presentation provides an overview of the history of US satellite-based reconnaissance as has been publicly revealed by the US Government to date. Extrapolating from there, it will transition to the evolutionary and revolutionary role that commercial satellite imagery is now playing on the international stage in proving a heretofore-unimaginable basis for greater global transparency and the way it has helped, and will continue to help, to detect and monitor undeclared unconventional weapons related facilities and activities. In addition, new geospatial tools, which draw heavily upon commercial satellite imagery as well as augmenting it, have also become available over the internet. Among those Geospatial tools, "Digital Virtual Globes" (i.e., Google Earth, Virtual Earth, etc.) not only provide a much improved mapping capability over previously used simple plan-view line drawings used by various international inspection organizations such as the IAEA, but the offer much improved visualization of known and inspected sites. Such digital globes also provide a new, essentially free means to conduct broad area baseline search for possible "clandestine" sites...either allege through open source leads; identified on internet blogs and wiki layers with input from a "free" cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing country program knowledge. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better overall geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software, when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better international inspector training through pre-inspection walk-arounds or fly-around, and perhaps better IAEA safeguard decision making. In sum, these new geospatial visualization aids are ideal for international inspector training and orientation, as well as site characterization, monitoring and verification. But perhaps just as significantly, these new geospatial tools also now make it possible for anyone to conduct his or her own satellite-based reconnaissance for any application from the comfort of home, at a wi-fi enabled coffee shop, or even on the beach at a tropical island resort.
Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division. Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room