On July 15, 2007, the DPRK shut down and sealed the key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and allowed IAEA inspectors back to monitor the shut-down. DPRK workers began to disable these facilities under U.S. technical supervision a few months later. The shut-down halts the production of additional bomb fuel (plutonium) and the disablement makes it more difficult to restart plutonium production should the DPRK decide to do so.

Our visit leads me to conclude that the DPRK leadership has made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four parties live up to their Oct. 3, 2007 commitments. If the DPRK decides to break out of the six-party agreement and restart operations, it will have only limited capacity for plutonium production.

This report accompanied a trip report made by Keith Luse, senior staffer to Sen. Richard Lugar, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The search for solutions to two growing crises--human induced climate change and the loss of cheap oil--places nuclear energy front and center. Many see the expansion of nuclear power in the United States as a way to mitigate concerns over energy as well as national and environmental security brought on by the two global problems. Looking at the U.S. nuclear scene's past, present, and future, and focusing on a 21st-century approach to the underlying technical issues, one can see the potential for an expanded nuclear energy future.

This chapter is part of a yearly publication that compiles the edited and revised versions of papers presented at the Korea Economic Institute's (KEI) most recent Academic Symposium.

The chaper considers the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the foundation for the architecture of strategic stability in Northeast Asia that has endured for more than a half century. Along with the U.S. alliance with Japan, this security architecture has maintained the balance of power despite vast geopolitical changes, not least the end of the global Cold War. It provided an environment that fostered spectacular economic growth and the institutionalization of democratic governance.

The stability created under this strategic architecture is now challenged by a unique combination of three developments—the rise of China, North Korea’s bid to become a nuclear power, and the weakening of the United States in the wake of the Iraq War. These events disturb the carefully crafted balance of power that was created during the Cold War era. China’s growth as an economic and military power, combined with its aspirations for regional leadership, creates an alternative pole of power to the United States. The defiant decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to test a nuclear device threatens the security of Korea and Japan and opens the door to further proliferation in the region.

These two developments have been widely discussed among policymakers and experts in the region and in the United States. But there has been little examination of the dangerous dynamic between these events and the Iraq War. The deteriorating military and political situation in Iraq and in the Middle East more broadly has significantly weakened the United States in East Asia. It has swung public opinion against the United States and, as collateral damage, undermined support for the alliances. The focus of U.S. attention and resources on the Middle East feeds a perception that U.S. interest in East Asia is declining. More profoundly, it encourages powers such as China and Russia to assert more frequently and more boldly their desire for a more multipolar power structure.

This report was produced by a joint Working Group (WG) of the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Center Science, Technology and Security Policy.  The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement on the the state of the art of nuclear forensics; and assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential.  The WG formally met twice, once in Washington, D.C., and once in Palo Alto, California, to hear presentation from staff of the DOE/NNSA, the DHS, the DOS, the DTRA, and Congress.  The sessions were unclassified, although several members of the WG have access to classified material.

This chapter deals with the prospects for the expansion of the current Pakistani nuclear power program, and the dangers to national safety and security such expansion entails due to rapid expansion, and the potential military or terrorist attacks against future nuclear power plants. In terms of organization, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part, including the front two sections, summarizes the current status of the Pakistani nuclear power program, and the prospects for its expansion. The second part deals with the nuclear safety risks that the expansion of the Pakistani nuclear power program might entail, and the security risks related to military or terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations. A detailed conclusions section completes the presentation.

It is concluded here that Pakistan has maintained its currently small nuclear power program in a safe mode, though plant performance records are mediocre, given the limited integration of Pakistani plants into the global nuclear industry. That Pakistan provides many of the requisite plant maintenance and upgrade capabilities from its own resources attests to the potential for improved operations if Pakistan’s nonproliferation position could be resolved. Future expansion of the Pakistani program on the scale projected by the government depends on changes 278 in Pakistan’s nonproliferation stance that might be related to resolution of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. A similar agreement between Pakistan and China, if possible, might allow significant expansion of the Pakistani nuclear program. It is further concluded here that rapid expansion of the installed nuclear capacity might strain the regulatory agencies‘ capability to supervise safe construction and operation of the prospective new nuclear power stations. Fastrate capacity growth might strain Pakistan’s ability to train adequate numbers of station operating staffs, support infrastructure, and regulatory manpower. The combined effects of the above could lead to safety problems related to plant operations and supervision by poorly trained personnel with potentially severe consequences.

We make the point here that the overall security situation in Pakistan is unstable, with large numbers of terrorist groups allowed to operate within the country, with an armed insurrection ongoing in Balochistan, and with the government’s loss of control of several provinces to the Taliban and other Islamic and Arabic terror organizations. This generally unstable security situation is not conducive to stable long-term expansion of nuclear power capacity. An immediate problem may be the difficulty of security screening of all prospective nuclear stations and infrastructure employees, with the distinct possibility of terror supporters gaining access to power stations and providing insider support to putative terrorist attacks. Large multiunit nuclear power stations that likely will be constructed if the nuclear expansion plan is implemented would become vulnerable to terrorist attacks or attempted takeovers all supported by potential inside collaborators. Terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations could 279 be motivated by three factors:

1. the desire to obtain radioactive or fissile materials for the construction of radioactivity dispersion devices or nuclear weapons;
   
2. the intent to create significant damage to the station, nearby population, the environment, and the country as a whole as revenge for some government actions inimical to terrorist interests; or
   
3. the desire to force the government to accede to some terrorists demands and modify its policies accordingly.

In similar fashion, military action against nuclear power stations can not be ruled out, motivated possibly by the intent to change or reverse government decisions and policies to respond to military demands. Since the military already controls security at all nuclear facilities in Pakistan, military takeover of future nuclear power stations is that much simplified. We conclude here that installing large multiunit nuclear power stations is in the economic interest of any country, like Pakistan, projecting large scale nuclear capacity growth. However, given the less than stable situation in Pakistan such stations are vulnerable to future security threats against the government. Both economic and security trade-offs should be evaluated when considering large scale nuclear capacity expansion in Pakistan’s situation.

This book, completed just before Pakistani President Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in November 2007, reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years. It tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India.