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David Patel (speaker) is a 2006-2007 predoctoral fellow at CDDRL (fall quarter) and postdoctoral fellow at CISAC (winter and spring quarters). His dissertation examines questions of religious organization and collective action in the Middle East, with a theoretical focus on the relationship of organization and information in particular. Empirically, his study looks at Islamic institutions and their role in political action in a wide range of settings including 7th century garrison cities of the early Islamic empire, through the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Patel has spent a great deal of time in the Middle East over the last several years, including extended visits to Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, and Iraq, where he spent seven months in Basra conducting research beginning in the fall of 2003. He works with David Laitin, Jim Fearon, and Avner Greif at Stanford.

Patel received his PhD in political science from Stanford University in March 2007. In fall 2007 he will join the faculty at Cornell University as an assistant professor of political science.

Walter W. Powell (respondent) is a professor of education and affiliated professor of organizational behavior, sociology, and communications at Stanford University. He is also an external faculty member at the Santa Fe Institute. At Stanford, he is director of the Scandinavian Consortium on Organizational Research. Powell works in the areas of organization theory and economic sociology. He is coauthor of Books: The Culture and Commerce of Publishing (1983), an analysis of the transformation of book publishing from a family-run, craft-based field into a multinational media industry, and author of Getting Into Print (1985), an ethnographic study of decision-making processes in scholarly publishing houses. He edited The Nonprofit Sector (1987, referred to by reviewers as "the Bible of scholarship on the nonprofit sector"). Powell is currently directing a large scale study, Stanford Project on the Evolution of the Nonprofit Sector, of the circulation of managerial practices in the Bay Area nonprofit community, mapping the flow of ideas among consultants, philanthropists, founders, business leaders, government officials, and nonprofit managers. Powell is widely known for his contributions to institutional analysis, beginning with his article, with Paul DiMaggio, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields" (1983) and their subsequent edited book, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (1991). At Stanford, he is a faculty affiliate of the Center for Social Innovation at the Graduate School of Business, a member of the Public Policy faculty, and serves on the governing board of the France-Stanford program.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

David S. Patel Speaker
Walter W. Powell Professor of Education; Affiliated Professor of Organizational Behavior, Sociology, and Communications Commentator Stanford University
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Gi-Wook Shin
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Growing economic ties and a new interest in cultural exchanges are bringing the countries of Northeast Asia closer together. Yet wounds from past wrongs -- committed in times of colonialism, war, and dictatorship -- are not fully healed. All nations have some sense of victimization -- Japan vis-à-vis the United States and Russia, and China and Korea vis-à-vis Japan -- and often blame others, rather than taking responsibility.

As with many other cases around the world, reconciliation between countries in the region first occurred between governments. Japan established diplomatic rapprochement with countries it had once invaded or colonized: with the Republic of China in 1952, with the Republic of Korea in 1965, and with the People's Republic of China in 1972.

Yet Northeast Asian nations have failed to come to terms with the past. Japan paid no reparations to its former colonies -- though it gave "grants and aid" to South Korea for normalizing their relations -- and China and Korea were excluded from the

San Francisco Treaty that settled Japanese war crimes and atrocities. Historical issues such as disputed territories and Japan's colonial rule were largely swept under the rug in the Cold War system.

The failure to address historical injustice and to reconcile differing views of the past has strained Sino-Japanese relations and friction between Japan and South Korea over Japan's colonial past remains intense. Even South Korea and China are sparring over the history of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo. In addition, Taiwan is immersed in a reexamination of the past. The history question touches upon the most sensitive issues of national identity and now fuels the fires of nationalism in Northeast Asia.

In Korea, nationalism has offered a framework for dealing with victims of historical injustice such as the comfort women and forced laborers. It forces issues to be framed in binary opposition -- victims vs. aggressors -- and leaves little room for any alternative. Koreans are reluctant to acknowledge their atrocities during the Vietnam War, but readily criticize similar acts committed by the U.S. during the Korean War. Disputes over the kingdom of Goguryeo reflect lingering irredentist Korean nationalism as well as China's rising nationalism.

In Japan, uncertainties and anxieties created by the post-Cold War security environment and a decade of economic stagnation provided a fertile ground for nationalist politics. Nationalist scholars are making headway in producing textbooks to "make Japanese proud of themselves." Increased official use of such symbols as the flag and the national anthem used by imperial Japan are part of Japan's quest to become a "normal nation." The goodwill generated by Prime Minister Abe's visit to China and South Korea soon after taking office, suggesting a conciliatory policy toward Asia, has been undermined by his recent remarks on the comfort woman issue. If there is any difference between Korea and Japan, it is that the left in Korea -- as opposed to the right in Japan -- is at the forefront of nationalist politics.

China is promoting nationalism to bolster social and political cohesion. Beijing needs a new unifying force to mobilize the nation in pursuit of common goals, such as economic modernization, and the "glue" is nationalism. In the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese leadership appealed to nationalism (patriotism) to shore up their tainted legitimacy. Nationalism also underpins Chinese foreign policy, both in the region and elsewhere. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, nonproliferation issues -- all of these touch the nationalist nerves of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They do not want to jeopardize relations with their Asian neighbors, but neither do they want to lose face.

Thus, despite increased intra-Asian trade, cultural exchanges, and talk about an East Asian community, Korea, Japan, and China all still find politics of national identity appealing. After all, nationalism is not only about ideology, but also thrives on narrowly defined "national interests." Disputed territories always serve as symbols of national sovereignty that cannot be compromised. The mutual suspicion of Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial waters, as well as the recent escalation of Japan-Korean tension over Dokdo/Takeshima are but two potent reminders.

There is widespread recognition of the need for reconciliation and the final resolution of historical injustices. But there is a fundamental obstacle to reconciliation -- the existence of divided, even conflicting, historical memories. All of the nations involved are bound by very distinct perceptions of history, often contradictory and separated by different accounts of the past and of the context of events. These perceptions are deeply imbedded in public consciousness, transmitted by education, popular culture and through the mass media.

The most daunting task is coming to a common understanding of the past. Whereas a shared view of the past (World War II at least) served to unify (Western) Europe after two devastating wars, history still divides these three close Asian neighbors. Reconciliation has been "thin," and the history issue continues to mar regional cooperation. To achieve a "thicker" reconciliation, they need to move beyond nation-state-oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches, and understand reconciliation as a mutual, interactive process. Citizens' groups, NGOs, victim-activist groups -- be they domestic, transnational, or international, and regardless of political orientation -- should be more actively involved.

Second, Northeast Asian nations must recognize that elements in their shared past may contribute to promoting regional reconciliation. China, Japan, and Korea often argue over history, but it is nonetheless true that elements in their past may also contribute to a regional identity. Coping with Western influence since the 19th century is but one area of common ground. Their experience of building modern nation-states and economies is another example. There exist ample cases and instances of common experiences that can be readily used to formulate a shared view of Northeast Asia's modern history.

Third, we need to encourage and teach critical and independent thinking to young Asians about their respective pasts. In particular, we need to cultivate a mutually acceptable, new national history of each country, resituated in a shared regional identity. Nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism will always coexist, but they need not contradict one another. In this critical time of change and desire to cultivate a shared view, we need to redefine these mutually reinforcing ideologies beyond a narrow, exclusive sense of nation.

Ultimately, building a vision for Northeast Asia's future beyond narrow national and political interests requires enlightened political leadership. Unfortunately, until now, the region has not seen such a visionary leader who is committed to cultivating regional reconciliation. On the contrary, many leaders have politicized the history problem for domestic, nationalist consumption. Interpretations of the past are unavoidably political, producing divided memories, and there is strong temptation to politicize the process for current ideological purposes. However tempting, politically convenient, and even psychologically satisfying it may be to blame others, such an approach will neither heal past wounds nor provide a foundation for the future. We need political leadership that can build public support for sometimes unpopular policies aimed at regional reconciliation.

Reprinted with permission from the Korea Herald.

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About the speaker:

Robert D. Hormats is Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs International. He joined Goldman Sachs in 1982 and became a Managing Director in 1998.

Mr. Hormats served as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1981 to 1982, Ambassador and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from 1979 to 1981, and Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs at the Department of State from 1977 to 1979. He served as a Senior Staff Member for International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council from 1969 to 1977, where he was Senior Economic Advisor to Dr. Henry Kissinger, General Brent Scowcroft, and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Mr. Hormats was a recipient of the French Legion of Honor in 1982 and Arthur Fleming Award in 1974.

Mr. Hormats has been a visiting lecturer at Princeton University and is a member of the Board of Visitors of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the Dean's Council of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a board member of the Irvington Institute for Immunological Research, Engelhard Hanovia, Inc., The Economic Club of New York, and Freedom House.

Mr. Hormats' latest book is entitled The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars and was featured in Thomas Friedman's March 7, 2007, New York Times column "Don't Ask, Don't Know, Don't Help." Hormats' other publications include Abraham Lincoln and the Global Economy; American Albatross: The Foreign Debt Dilemma; and Reforming the International Monetary System.

Mr. Hormats earned a B.A. from Tufts University in 1965 with a concentration in economics and political science. In 1966 he earned an M.A. and, in 1970, a Ph.D. in international economics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

About the moderator:

Professor David M. Kennedy is the Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History at Stanford University. Reflecting his interdisciplinary training in American Studies, which combined the fields of history, literature, and economics, Professor Kennedy's scholarship is notable for its integration of economic and cultural analysis with social and political history. His 1970 book, Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger, embraced the medical, legal, political, and religious dimensions of the subject and helped to pioneer the emerging field of women's history. Over Here: The First World War and American Society (1980) used the history of American involvement in World War I to analyze the American political system, economy, and culture in the early twentieth century. Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War (1999) recounts the history of the United States in the two great crises of the Great Depression and World War II. In 2000, the book was awarded the Pulitzer Prize, the Francis Parkman Prize, the Ambassador's Prize, and the California Gold Medal for Literature.

Professor Kennedy teaches both undergraduate and graduate courses in the history of the twentieth-century United States, American political and social thought, American foreign policy, American literature, and the comparative development of democracy in Europe and America.

About The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars:

In a bracing work of history, a leading international finance expert reveals how our national security depends on our financial security

More than two centuries ago, America's first secretary of the treasury, Alexander Hamilton, identified the Revolutionary War debt as a threat to the nation's creditworthiness and its very existence. In response, he established financial principles for securing the country--principles that endure to this day. In this provocative history, Robert D. Hormats, one of America's leading experts on international finance, shows how leaders from Madison and Lincoln to FDR and Reagan have followed Hamilton's ideals, from the greenback and a progressive income tax to the Victory Bond and Victory Garden campaigns and cost-sharing with allies.

Drawing on these historical lessons, Hormats argues that the rampant borrowing to pay for the war in Iraq and the short-sighted tax cuts in the face of a long-term war on terrorism run counter to American tradition and place our country's security in peril. To meet the threats facing us, Hormats contends, we must significantly realign our economic policies--on taxes, Social Security, Medicare, and oil dependency--to safeguard our liberty and our future.

Quotes in praise of The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars:

"Bob Hormats has taken on the impossible: making lively history of the fiscal side of America's wars. Taxes and spending, economics and politics, all mixed up together in times of national crisis, from the Revolution and Alexander Hamilton to Iraq and both George Bushes. There are lessons to be learned and too often forgotten, even for the financing of the new 'War on Terror.'"--Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve

"The Price of Liberty is both a superb history and an urgent call for appropriate fiscal policy in the current campaign against terrorism. Hormats shows that, time and again, how wars were paid for determined how wars were fought--and won or lost. An important and timely book."--David M. Kennedy, author of Freedom from Fear

"Robert Hormats mounts a compelling argument that America faces large-scale economic catastrophe due to lack of a long-term, fiscally sound strategy for meeting military and security needs as well as domestic obligations. The Price of Liberty is a fascinating book and its message is hard to ignore."--Henry Kissinger

CISAC Conference Room

Robert D. Hormats Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs International Speaker
David M. Kennedy (Moderator) Donald J. McLachlan Professor, History, Stanford University, and Winner of the 2000 Pulitzer Prize Moderator
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The Symposium on Technology and Culture is open to the entire Stanford community, but is designed primarily for Stanford faculty to share their work with other faculty as a means of promoting collaborative interdisciplinary work on various aspects of the symposium's theme. "Technology" and "culture" are two of six global challenges and cross-cutting drivers that are the focus of the Stanford International Initiative.

8:00 - 8:30 AM Continental breakfast

8:30 - 10:00 AM Panel 1: Impact of Technology on Gender

10:15 - 11:45 AM Panel 2: Culture, Technological Change, and Development

11:45 - 12:30 PM Lunch (RSVP strongly suggested)

12:30 - 1:15 PM Keynote: David Kennedy

Does the United States Have a Mercenary Army?

How Technology Has Made it Too Easy to Go to War

1:30 - 2:45 PM Panel 3: Technology, Culture, and National Security

3:00 - 4:30 PM Panel 4: Health Technology Adoption

Impact of Technology on Gender

Richard Saller, Dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences, moderator

Denise Johnson, Associate Professor of Surgery

Clifford Nass, Professor of Communication

Christine Min Wotipka, Assistant Professor of Education

Culture, Technological Change, and Development

Jeremy Weinstein, Assistant Professor of Political Science, moderator

Avner Greif, The Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences

Jessica Riskin, Associate Professor of History

Romain Wacziarg, Associate Professor of Economics, GSB

Technology, Culture, and National Security

Scott Sagan, Professor of Political Science, moderator

David Kennedy, The Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History

Rebecca Slayton, Lecturer in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society

Health Technology Adoption

Grant Miller, Assistant Professor of Medicine, moderator

Lynn Hildemann, Associate Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Science

David Katzenstein, Professor (Research) of Medicine (Infectious Diseases and Geographic Medicine)

Aprajit Mahajan, Assistant Professor of Economics

Bechtel Conference Center

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Shibley Telhami holds the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, and is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Previously, he was the Director of the Near Eastern Studies Program at Cornell University and has taught at Ohio State University, the University of Southern California, Princeton University, Columbia University, Swarthmore College, and the University of California at Berkeley. His publications include Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (Columbia University Press, 1990); International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, ed. with Milton Esman (Cornell University Press, 1995); and Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East , ed. with Michael Barnett (forthcoming, Cornell University Press, 2001); and numerous articles on international politics and Middle Eastern affairs.

Professor Telhami has actively been bridging the academic and policy world. He served as advisor to the United States delegation to the United Nations during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, and was on the staff of Congressman Lee Hamilton. He is the author of a report on Persian Gulf security for the Council on Foreign Relations, and the co-drafter of a Council report on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Professor Telhami is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. He has been a member of the American delegation of the Trilateral American/Israeli/Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee mandated by the Wye River Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and has a weekly radio commentary broadcasting widely over the Middle East.

He received his B.A. from the Queens College of the City University of New York (1974), M.A. from the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley (1978), and Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley (1986).

Professor Telhami will be reporting on his latest poll of Arab public opinion and interpreting the results on key issues.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Shibley Telhami Senior Fellow Speaker Brookings Institution
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Submitted by fsid9admin on
10,000 Shovels examines China's breakneck growth through a short documentary that integrates statistics, video footage, and satellite images. The documentary focuses on China's Pearl River Delta region while the accompanying teacher's guide takes a broader perspective, exploring many current national issues.
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This talk will analyze the evolution of lawfare, what Jeremy Bentham called "an irregular system of warfare." Meierhenrich introduces lawfare as a conceptually and analytically distinct type of warfare, and a political strategy not previously theorized in any systematic fashion. In his conceptualization, lawfare is a revolutionary strategy for broadcasting power, by which he means a strategy aimed at the systematic and comprehensive overhaul of the foundations of politics and society. This strategy comprises, inter alia, constitutional enactments, ordinary legislation, presidential decrees, and other regulatory instruments. Based on evidence from cases, Meierhenrich illustrates the economy with which the strategy of lawfare may be used and the ingenuity that it requires. Restating an influential aphorism, he shows how law made the state, and the state made law. By so doing, he explains why this irregular system of warfare stands in much higher favor with men in general than that which is carried on by open force -- illustrating the dark side of democracy and the rule of law.

About the speaker:

Jens Meierhenrich is Assistant Professor of Government and of Social Studies at Harvard University, where he is also a Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He recently served as the Carlo Schmid Fellow in Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and has previously worked with Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Professor Meierhenrich is the author of a genocide trilogy, forthcoming from Princeton University Press, comprising "The Rationality of Genocide," "The Structure of Genocide," and "The Culture of Genocide." His book "The Legacies of Law" on the function of legal norms and institutions in the transition to - and from - apartheid, is currently under review. Meierhenrich's publications also include a series of articles on comparative and international law and politics. Work in progress includes a book on judicial responses to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a comparative analysis of international courts and tribunals, and a long-term project on state formation and state collapse. He has conducted extensive field research in several international organizations as well as in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Jens Meierhenrich was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, where he earned a D.Phil. in politics and international relations.

CISAC Conference Room

Jens Meierhenrich Assistant Professor of Government and of Social Studies Speaker Harvard University
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The 14th Informal APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting concluded on Nov. 19, 2006, and the participants had their photo taken in colorful Vietnamese traditional costumes called ao dai. Still in the shadow of the congressional election failure, President George W. Bush, realizing that a stable Asia is very important for the U.S. geostrategy, took advantage of the occasion to enhance the prestige of the United States. Just as American experts said, the Bush administration has probably become a lame duck now, but even a healthy duck needs to find a quiet pond.

"APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is an important political reason for U.S. to strengthen the group," Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum of Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University, explained. "While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence."

However, the U.S. effort to save the Doha Round of trade talks with the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement has yielded little. The Doha Round aimed to remove trade barriers in the world but was suspended due to some countries' agriculture protection policies. Washington had wanted to model the Doha Round upon the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement. But U.S. officials never expected that there would be so many differences among the Asia-Pacific leaders, and that the economic development of Pacific Rim countries differ in thousands of ways. Despite the fact that the Hanoi Statement reiterated that supporting the Doha Round was APEC's priority, no material progress has been made.

"The U.S. is urging a last ditch effort to restart the talks through APEC," Professor Charles Morrison, president of the East-West Center located in Hawaii, says. "Whether or not APEC can do more than make a rhetorical statement of support is unsure. I feel that the APEC economies should agree to prepare new offers within a short period of time -- three weeks, for example -- to challenge the Europeans, Brazilians, Indians and others."

United States Steps Out to "Please" ASEAN

Seventeen years after its establishment, APEC now plays a decisive role in the international political arena. It has 40 percent of the world's population, 48 percent of the world trade volume and 56 percent of the world GDP. Since 1989, the economy in this region has grown by 26 percent, compared to only 8 percent economic growth rate in the rest of the world. With the double advantage of economic strength and rapid growth, China, being one of APEC's main economies and its "engine," has fully taken the limelight. On the other hand, the United States has been weighed down with countering terrorism in the Middle East.

"China has done very well in enhancing its relations with Southeast Asia in recent years," Sheldon Simon, professor of the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University, points out. "China has not only established a free trade forum for China and ASEAN countries, but also helped and influenced the area with its economy and culture. But I think that the United States has realized the importance of this area and come back to fasten its friendly relationship with the region."

The United States coming back to Southeast Asia and repairing its relations with the ASEAN countries is partly activated by China's increasing influence in the area.

"The naissance and growth of some democratic countries in Southeast Asia has received sympathetic response of democratic values from Washington," said Simon. "With the traditional friendly relations between the area and the United States, these countries value their friendship with the United States sometimes more than the trust in their neighboring countries. Geopolitics is also very important factor. The Asia-Pacific area is a very important to the world economy and the U.S. power structure. Therefore, the United States will not easily give it up."

Another motive for the United States to foster closer relations in the area is the common interest of countering terrorism. There are still some terrorist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and southern Thailand.

"President Bush has a perfect attendance record at APEC meetings (Clinton missed two of them), which says that he does take APEC seriously and believes Asia is important to U.S. interests," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an interview with the Washington Observer Weekly.

Besides attending the APEC summit meetings annually, Washington has recently activated several plans to "please" the ASEAN countries, including setting up a ministerial dialogue system with them and a platform for maintaining contact at the deputy finance minister level, even increased exchanges at the deputy defense secretary level.

The extent of U.S. efforts to foster cordial relations with Southeast Asian countries can also be seen in the increasingly friendly U.S.-Vietnamese economic and trade relations. The Bush administration is not only supporting Vietnam to enter the WTO, but has even proposed giving Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status.

"The reason that Bush failed to bring the gift of PNTR status to the APEC Hanoi summit is that the Congress dominated by the Republicans was lacking efficiency and could not pass the proposal in time," Simon explained. "But I think that it will be passed as soon as possible in the next month or by the Democrats who begin to dominate the Congress from next January."

Simon and Cossa both admit that Burma is an unharmonious element in U.S. relations with ASEAN. The Burmese dictatorial military government is really the most typical negative example of democracy for the United States. But ASEAN countries are reluctant to see Burma "punished" by the United States for ideological reasons. So Burma has become a sensitive issue in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

"This is a good way for him to interact with ASEAN since Myanmar is not there and this issue does not have to be addressed," said Cossa.

Simon, an expert of Southeast Asia affairs, points out ASEAN countries should be happy about the advantage they have with China and the United States vying for their attention. Being able to juggle the two big powers, Southeast Asia has gained many practical interests and financial aid for its economy, trade, security, culture and education.

"In a short period, there will not be any serious interest conflicts in the triangle balance of China, the United States and ASEAN," Simon told the Washington Observer Weekly. "ASEAN countries' only worry, if there is any, is an accidental spark in the U.S.-China military interaction in Southeast Asia such as the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits."

Turning the Asia-Pacific into a "Gigantic Enterprise?"

"The United States wants to demonstrate its continuing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. It is urging for a study of an Asia Pacific free trade area and support for an APEC business card, and both shifts of approach, illustrate its interest in and support for the APEC process," said Morrison.

An important subject for the APEC Hanoi summit is the "active discussion" of establishing an APEC free trade region. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton proposed for the first time in 1993 the setting up of such an economic zone. Before Bush's visit, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Karan Bhatia suggested that establishing an APEC free trade zone would be a subject worth serious discussion. But his proposal did not receive a warm response from the host. The Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung stressed that establishing a free trade zone is a long-term objective and will not affect progress of negotiations with the WTO or other bilateral trade agreements.

"Regarding the study of the Asia Pacific free trade area, a number of economies were skeptical because it would be such a large undertaking," said Morrison. A similar plan was once axed in an APEC ministerial statement and the leaders attending this summit do not seem to have much interest in it.

Simon explained Bush's thinking on the subject: "Washington reiterated its intention to establish an Asia-Pacific free trade zone in order to save the precarious WTO Doha Round. Breaking the tariff barriers in the Asia-Pacific region will help continue to press relevant countries to concede in granting agricultural tax subsidies and hopefully open the door to the Doha Round."

The five-year Doha Round was suspended in July this year because six major WTO members -- the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India -- failed to reach agreement on market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products. Given the situation, the organizer said that the informal APEC economic leaders' meeting would provide a "good opportunity" to help restore the Doha Round talks. However, the Hanoi summit joint declaration just vaguely indicated that APEC will pursue further integration on issues such as energy in 2007. It would be extremely optimistic to expect that APEC will be able to remove all the tariff barriers in the region before 2010. Although the area produces 50 percent of the world's economic value, the styles and stages of economic development, the cultural backgrounds and political systems of the countries in the region vary a great deal, making it very difficult for these Asian countries to eliminate all these discrepancies and become fully integrated.

"Out of different worries, many Southeast Asian countries are actually not interested in the proposal though they do not speak out. Or we may say that it's not time yet now to change the Asia-Pacific region into a gigantic enterprise," Simon told Washington Observer Weekly.

Quite apart from who concedes what in return for what concession over the APEC free trade mechanism, the question arises: What geographical scope should a regional trade arrangement have? Who should be a party to the agreement and who should not?

There would appear to be three different ideas on the table: (a) the APEC-wide free trade area that the United States proposed at the recent summit in Hanoi; (b) the East Asia Summit-wide framework that Japan reportedly favors, which would include ASEAN + 6 (China, Japan, South Korea, India, New Zealand, Australia) but not the United States; and (c) the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) context that China seems to prefer, in which the exact positions of Tokyo and Beijing are not entirely clear.

"Without discussing the merits or demerits of each of these arrangements, suffice it to note that since ASEAN is common to all of them, the net effect of these alternative ideas is to strengthen the negotiating position of ASEAN," said Emmerson. "Then again, ASEAN will not necessarily be unified as to its preference for the three proposals. It will be interesting to look for the positions to be taken by individual ASEAN countries and for their collective effort to arrive at a single negotiating position, e.g., in the run-up to the ASEAN summit and the second the East Asia Summit in the Philippines next month."

Cossa has hope for 2007. "The U.S. in particular would like to see APEC moving faster, and will look ahead to next year, with Australia in the chair, for some real progress."

American Public Doesn't Share Washington's Interest in Southeast Asia

The prospect of economic and strategic cooperation brought about by APEC made for a lively week in Southeast Asia. But it stirred little response in the United States. According to the interviewed experts of Southeast affairs, the American public is still haunted by the situation in Iraq and the mid-term election. Even the U.S. media framed the event as Bush's first visit to a foreign country since the Republicans were defeated in the mid-term election.

"Because of the Congressional election, President Bush will want to show leadership rather than simply respond to the new Congress. Both Doha and the nuclear proliferation issue are examples," said Morrison.

Cossa holds a different view: "I don't think the elections will have any major impact on what Bush does or how he does it during this trip. Iraq is his legacy. What he does in Asia can make things better or worse at the margins but will likely be overshadowed by Iraq."

Simon echoed the sentiment. "On one hand, the Republican Party's defeat in the election cannot directly influence Bush's trip to Asia. On the other hand, Bush's economic achievements in the Southeast region will not add to his political record. In Asia, only the North Korea issue may sway the public opinion in the United States."

Yan Li, Washington Observer weekly - Issue No. 201, November 22, 2006

Reprinted by Permission February 12, 2007.

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"More than a Club in the World" has long been the slogan of the largest and perhaps greatest soccer club in the world. FC Barcelona was one of the first soccer clubs to be founded in Spain. It became a haven for Catalan sentiment when Catalan self-government and Catalan culture were proscribed during the dictatorship. It has since become a global enterprise with global commitments, while continuing to identify Europe's largest and most developed non-state culture.

About the Speaker

Joan Laporta is the president of Football Club Barcelona. He has a law degree from the University of Barcelona. He specializes in civil and trading law, and has his own firm, Laporta & Arbós Advocats Associats.

Mr. Laporta became president of FC Barcelona on June 15, 2003 and won a second presidential term in summer 2006. Under his leadership, the club has striven to promote the values that have traditionally been associated with Barça: Catalan nationalism, civilian duty, and universality. FC Barcelona has since become a club with an enormous public resonance. Their recent partnership with UNICEF is a statement of the club's continuing efforts to be at the forefront of solidarity projects with a global reach.

Sponsored by the Iberian Studies Program, Forum on Contemporary Europe, the Office of the Provost, Department of Athletics, and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

 

Event Synopsis:

Mr. Laporta details the early leadership of the club and the political challenges the club has faced, including the shooting of the club's president by Franco's troops during the Spanish Civil War, the opening of police files on the club when it did not support the regime, and attempts to change the club's name to "Espana." He emphasizes the club's strong history of integration, international spirit, and defense of rights and liberties. He explains that FC Barcelona survived the many obstacles of the 20th century because it is "more than a club" - it defends Catalan rights in Catalonia, democratic rights in Spain, and human rights worldwide. The club's social commitments include donating 7% of revenue to a foundation aimed at furthering the Millennium Development Goals, and partnering with UNICEF on development initiatives. 

With more than 4% of the population (247 million people) involved in soccer around the world, and more countries affiliated with FIFA than with the United Nations, FC Barcelona aims to adapt to a global environment while preserving its Catalan identity. Its players recognize that they are role models to fans across the world, and the club recognizes that its sporting, economic, and social facets work together to make the club successful. Mr. Laporta concludes by asserting that FC Barcelona today is in one of the best positions of the club's history.

 

Kissick Auditorium
Arrillaga Family Sports Center
Stanford University
641 Campus Drive
Stanford, CA 94305-6150

Joan Laporta President, Futbol Club Barcelona Speaker
Lectures
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