The Center for International Security and Cooperation is pleased to announce the selection of 13 rising seniors for participation in its Undergraduate Honors Program in International Security Studies. 

The program provides an opportunity for eligible students focusing on international security subjects in any field to earn an honors certificate.

Students selected intern with a security-related organization, attend the program's honors college in Washington, D.C. in September, participate in a year-long core seminar on international security research, and produce an honors thesis with policy implications.

Joshua Alvarez

International Relations, Minor in Economics

Identity and Security: Turkey's Grand Strategy in the Middle East

Keshia Bonner

International Relations, Minor in Economics

United States Policy Towards Hamas and Hezbollah as State Actors

Stephen Craig

Political Science

Security Issues and Domestic Constraints on European Integration

Noura Elfarra

Political Science

How does Regime Change and Revolution Affect the Secret Police?

Alison Epstein

International Relations

British and American Intelligence Cooperation: the Iraq Inquiry and the New Face of the Special Relationship

Peter Hong

Political Science

Recalibrating and Resolving Deficiencies in Multinational Nuclear Fuel Cycle Initiatives

Mohammad Islam

Electrical Engineering, Minor in International Relations

Domestic Terrorism Prevention Strategies in the US and UK

Suraya Omar

Materials Science and Engineering

North Korea's Ambitions for a Light Water Reactor

Clay Ramel

Science, Technology & Society – Energy Engineering Concentration

National Security Dimensions of Developing an Energy Secure United States 

Nick Rosellini

International Relations, Minor in Economics & Modern Languages

The NATO Strategic Concept: Evolution of a Nuclear Posture 1957-2010

Ram Sachs

Earth Systems, Minor in Modern Languages

Environmental Dimensions of Security - Yemen and Violent Extremism

Jeffrey Sweet

Materials Science and Engineering

The Effect of Public Perceptions of Diseases such as HIV, H1N1, SARS, and Anthrax on the Effectiveness of Controlling Epidemics

Reagan Thompson

International Relations, Minor in Chinese

The Chinese Influence in Africa: Case Studies of Ghana and Angola

After his death, will Osama Bin Laden become a myth?

For the West perhaps, but not for Arabs. Bin Laden’s influence has been in decline since 2004, when people realized that most of his victims were Muslims.

You have never stopped making the case for the democratization of the Arab world. It got to the point, in 1995, that Hassan II banned you from the palace for several months. How do you explain the wave of protests that we see today, from the Gulf to the Atlantic, sparing no country?

Aside from the conjunctural factors, there are some underlying reasons. To begin with, there is the character of the regimes that exists. Some are completely closed, while others have a façade of openness. All of a sudden, the structures of mediation — parties, unions, associations, etc. — that were supposed to represent civil society were completely discredited. At the end of the day, we were left with the dominant elites, alienated and cut off from the rest of the country, relying on the security apparatus. Also, in reality, the economic opening imposed by globalization and promoted by international financial institutions only profited the elites. In the absence of any serious policy of redistribution, GDP growth was accompanied up by an increase in poverty and social insecurity that made life more precarious even for the middle classes. Finally, we cannot ignore the demographic evolution of these countries. The transition from the extended family to the nuclear family, and the entrance of women into active public life on a greater scale considerably changed the social landscape. At the same time, widespread access to new means of communication broke the spell of the state’s monopoly on information, and brought more and more people into contact with the wider world. Even before the rise of new media technologies, the arrival of Al-Jazeera in the living rooms of the region had created a revolution!

And what was the trigger?

The sense of insult. The sense that one’s dignity was being insulted. This notion of dignity is essential to understanding what is happening right now. Until now, the prevailing concepts, especially that of national honor, were elements of a collective attitude. Dignity is a demand of the individual. I will add that the WikiLeaks revelations played a role in laying bare the disdain in which the governments held their citizens.

This revolt led to a set of demands that were democratic, and virtually never religious, even if Islamist movements tried to hop aboard the train.  Why?

Because this is a movement of the citizen! Its young organizers are challenging at once the authoritarianism of the regimes and the ideological discourse of the Islamists. They want neither despotism nor theocracy. They belong to a globalized, post-ideological generation, which privileges the autonomy of the subject and the individual. They refuse the identity gambit, Islamist or not, and aspire to universal values. We are in the full enthusiasm of the 1848 “springtime of the peoples,” with the romantic twist of May ’68. It remains to be seen if these young protesters will be able to transform their efforts into something that has a more concrete political content. Right now, we are entering into the kind of trench warfare between the besieged regimes and the democratic movements.

How do you understand the evolution of the situation in Tunisia and Egypt?  Are you optimistic?

The two situations are not identical. I’m optimistic regarding the transition to democracy in Tunisia, and more circumspect regarding Egypt. In Egypt, the army was always the spine of the regime. Under the pressure of the street, it broke from the head of state, but it remains very much in business, and will, in my opinion, hold onto its role as kingmaker for a long time. The temptation to reconstitute a party that would restore an order from the bits and pieces of the old regime – bringing together Islamists, businessmen, former dissidents, etc.— to the detriment of the reformers, is very real.

Do you think the regime in Syria will fall in turn?

Yes, if the revolt persists, and widens so much that the regime would be obliged to call on the army, which might hesitate to fire on the people. Right now, it’s the Republican Guard, controlled by the Alaouite minority, with the support of paramilitary groups, which is carrying out the repression. But it’s not clear that they would be able to stand against a general uprising. This is the problem that all the closed regimes face, once they’re confronted with an insurrection.

In the monarchies, the demonstrators don’t demand that the sovereign “leave,” but that the system be reformed. Could it be that Kings are more legitimate and republican dictators? The monarchy is at once an institution of arbitration and the symbol of national identity. For the most part, the populations of these countries accept this concept. But, eventually, this could cease to be the case, if these monarchies do not respond to their peoples’ aspiration for change. Right now, they — especially the divine-right monarchies — are struggling to find a response to this urgency.

To that point: In Morocco, where Mohammed VI named a commission to consider the reform of institutions, the religious powers of the king are today widely debated. The youth who organized the February 20th movement and the following demonstrations are calling into question the article of the constitution that emphasizes the sacred character of the person of the king. They are also questioning his role as commander of the faithful. How far must this reform go?

“Sacrality” is not compatible with democracy. One can understand that the person of the king should be inviolable, because he is the representative of the nation. One can preserve the role of “commander of the faithful,” if it is understood as having a moral dimension --somewhat like the Queen of England is the head of the Church of England and Defender of the Faith. But it’s necessary to give up the idea of the sacred character of the person of the king. If one keeps that notion, which was copied from French absolutism, in the midst of an institutional arrangement that is otherwise democratic, everything will be skewed. In the end, that won’t work.

Can the commission named by Mohamed VI go so far as to propose the suppression of the sacrality of the person who of the king?

I think that the Moroccan monarchy has understood the depth of the challenge, even if it has barely responded to it.  The commission is advisory. It’s the king who will decide.

In Morocco today, the ultraleft is part of the February 20 Movement, demanding the election of a constituent assembly…

That’s unrealistic. That would mean the end of the regime. Historically, constituent assemblies consummated the end of a regime.

Fundamentally, must it move towards a Spanish-style monarchy, as some demand? Or should we rather have a constitution in which the king would more or less have the powers of the French president, with a two-headed executive, as one sometimes hears in Morocco?

In France, the Head of State and the Prime Minister are both determined by popular sovereignty. In Morocco, there are two sources of legitimacy – that of ballots, and that of tradition. One can’t transpose the logic of the philosophy of cohabitation with that of a protected space. We have to turn the page, and do it without ambiguity. Morocco should draw on the experiences of the European monarchies, while preserving its own traditions and culture.

Do you think the reform will go that far?

Either the reform will stop short, because it doesn’t go far enough, and the contestation will continue. Or the king will choose to take the process to its conclusion. But in that case he risks to be brought to account, particularly for the choices of his entourage. Because the regime has waited too long, and time is pressing, there is a risk that everything will have to be done all at once. It’s an enormous challenge, without precedent. To reform the constitution is not only to define the equilibrium of power and give a moral dimension to the “commander of the faithful,” it is also to make sure that all the activities of state are inscribed in a legal and rational framework.

Is the challenge the same for the other Arab monarchies?

The problem is practically the same in Jordan, with the added fragility that derives from the institution’s lack of historical depth. In the Gulf, a process will take longer because civil society is not as well developed. Oil rents also allow problems to be postponed. That being said, in Bahrain, the monarchy, by choosing one side rather than another, is playing a dangerous game. And in Kuwait, they have already known ten years of repetitive crises.

How do you evaluate the West’s attitude toward the “Arab Spring”?

Westerners are blinded by the Islamist bogeyman. But France, in particular, which should rejoice to see young Arabs coming into the street in the name of its own values, seems to me turned in on itself and completely confounded. The United States is more pragmatic. It is acting in accordance with its strategic interests, case by case.

Is it true that you were one of the consultants who, in 2009, participated in crafting Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo?

Among others, I was consulted. Unlike other American presidents, Obama knows and understands the region. But when he made that speech he was not as well aware as his predecessors had been of the constraints of the American system – particularly the strength, in the United States, of the pro-Israel lobby.

How does one become the advocate of the democratic opening of the Arab monarchies when one is the nephew of Hassan II?

From studying abroad, undoubtedly an opening to the world. And an interest, acquired very early, in social problems…

But you remain a monarchist?

Yes. I remain convinced that a change in the framework of a reformed monarchy represents the least costly solution for Morocco. I would be lying if I were to claim that biology had nothing to do with this conviction.

The stands that you’ve taken have caused you several difficulties with your Uncle Hassan II. Then with your cousin Mohammed VI…

With Mohammed VI above all, insofar as his entourage brings more influence to bear than did that of Hassan II, I have been hassled, and made the object of campaigns against me…

How are your relations with him today?

During the last ten years, I was in the royal palace once. I have only seen the king two or three times, in the context of family reunions. The memories of the shared childhood and youth remain. The sense also of belonging to the same family. This is a constitutive element of my identity.

A year has passed since the South Korean warship Cheonan sank into the depths of the Yellow Sea, an event attributed to an attack from North Korea and one that rekindled afresh the ongoing tensions between South and North. In that time, Pyongyang has transmitted confusing signals to the world about the strength of its leadership and its intentions toward South Korea, including publishing photos of a steely but frail-looking Kim Jong Il alongside his young heir apparent Kim Jong Un and unexpectedly attacking Yeonpyong Island in late November. It is clear that the Kim Jong Il regime still maintains strong control over its citizens and that the country's nuclear program continues to grow. Nevertheless, there are hints of instability and signs of information from the outside world trickling into North Korea that point to coming change.

During an April 21 television interview, visiting fellow Sang-Hun Choe, an International Herald Tribune journalist with many years of experience reporting on North Korea, addressed the complexity of the country's current political situation, noting the lack of firsthand information and the mixture of fear and genuine belief motivating adherence to the longstanding official party line. Choe emphasized the importance for the countries most closely tied to North Korean political developments—especially South Korea, the United States, and China—to consider the key questions regarding the future of North Korea, including what shape a transfer of power or a regime collapse could take.

Media coverage of North Korea

Reporting on North Korea is no simple matter, due in large part to the government's tight control on the flow of information in and out of the country. "North Korea is so closed that it is almost impossible for journalists to gather firsthand information," stresses Choe. Television and radio broadcasts and the internet are closely monitored in North Korea, and there is a recent move to confiscate mobile phones as they are smuggled into the country.

Choe suggests that a journalist's own interests and the political agenda of his or her country often shape the angle of their coverage of North Korea. For example, the U.S. media tends to focus on North Korean nuclear developments and the resumption of the Six Party Talks, a reflection of the official U.S. defense agenda. Reporting in South Korea is not quite as straightforward. "South Korea's relationship with North Korea is very complex," Choe states. While there is deep resentment toward North Korean attacks on the South, there is also a sense of shared Korean identity that influences South Korean news coverage of North Korea, he says.

Juche and the Kim family dynasty

Tapping into the deeply rooted sense of nationalism that emerged in Korea as a result of great power competition over the peninsula, North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung masterfully applied the principle of juche to found his family's political dynasty. "It [‘juche'] is very difficult to translate," says Choe. "One of the most common English translations is ‘self reliance,' but that does not really explain everything. It is more like ‘in our own way of living' or ‘in charge of our own fate.'"

North Korean citizens do not mindlessly follow the official party ideology, stresses Choe. Some people are motivated by fear of punishment, while others firmly believe in juche. "We have to take these two elements into account when we try to understand North Korea," he says. "There is fear, but there is also pride in their system. Whether you call it ‘brainwashing' or not, it is the reality."

Kim Jong Il's apparently failing health and heir Kim Jong Un's youth and lack of experience weigh heavily on the minds of political analysts. Photos suggest that Kim Jong Il is recovering from a stroke, a fact confirmed several months ago by the South Korean government. According to Choe, the key question now is how long Kim Jong Il will live. "[He] did not expect that he would have a stroke," he says, "so the transition [of power] is being prepared in a hurry." Kim Jong Il's own rise to power was gradual and he held numerous political positions over the years. Despite being made a military general in September, Kim Jong Un's political experience is comparatively limited.

Future concerns and possible scenarios

Despite uncertainties about the transfer of power in North Korea, recent reports suggest that the country continues to develop its nuclear program. In addition to the regional security concerns this poses, the nuclear accident in Japan this March raises environmental safety questions. For example, how would North Korea prepare for or respond to damage to a nuclear facility caused by a natural disaster? "Despite being a very technologically advanced country, Japan has still had a lot of difficulties dealing with its nuclear disaster," Choe emphasizes.

While North Korea's juche ideology continues to legitimize the Kim family dynasty, Choe suggests that the current system cannot last forever, especially with the country's ongoing food shortages and the significant regional economic and political developments of the past few decades. "If you look at Northeast Asia, all of the other former communist countries are more or less thriving by adopting market reforms/economies, and North Korea is left alone," he says. "It is a very poor, isolated country in a very well-to-do neighborhood of the world—it cannot last forever."

Choe downplays the possibility of an Egypt-style revolution in North Korea, but suggests that China, South Korea, and the United States should consider the potential scenarios for the future of North Korean politics. "The big question is when and how change will come," he states. "If the regime collapses, will there be some kind of power struggle between factions? Is China going to intervene?"

China does not necessarily support North Korea's political decisions, including its nuclear program and economic policies, Choe suggests, but the collapse of North Korea could lead to a mass exodus of refugees into its northeastern provinces. Furthermore, he says, "Another concern for China is what will happen on the Korean Peninsula if North Korea collapses. Is South Korea going to take over the northern half of the peninsula and create one unified Korea, or is America? China might not be happy to have a small, but well-to-do pro-America unified Korea right on its border . . . That explains its attitude seemingly ambiguous [toward North Korea.]"

It is certain that the current North Korean political situation is a very puzzling and complex one, with apparently more questions than answers at this time. As Choe suggests, it is most important now for the world—especially China, South Korea, and the United States—to examine the possible future issues and scenarios facing North Korea, and to identify the related key questions in an effort to prepare for the inevitable change that will one day come.

A full recording of Choe's interview is available online at the KEMS TV website (Korean language).