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This paper identifies the key features of successful electricity market designs that are particularly relevant to the experience of low-income countries. Important features include: (1) the match between the short-term market used to dispatch generation units and the physical operation of the electricity network, (2) effective regulatory and market mechanisms to ensure long-term generation resource adequacy, (3) appropriate mechanisms to mitigate local market power, and (4) mechanisms to allow the active involvement of final demand in a short-term market. The paper provides a recommended baseline market design that reflects the experience of the past 25 years
with electricity restructuring processes. It then suggests a simplified version of this market design ideally suited to the proposed East and Western Sub-Sahara Africa regional wholesale market that is likely to realise a substantial amount of the economic benefits from forming a regional market with minimal implementation cost and regulatory burden. Recommendations are also provided for modifying the Southern African Power Pool to increase the economic benefits realised from its formation. How this market design supports the cost-effective integration of renewables is discussed and future enhancements are proposed that support the integration of a greater share
of intermittent renewables. The paper closes with proposed directions for future research in the area of electricity market design in developing countries.

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Working Papers
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Energy and Economic Growth
Authors
Goran Strbac
Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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The recent shift in the United States from coal to natural gas as a primary feedstock for the production of electric power has reduced the intensity of sectoral carbon dioxide emissions, but—due to gaps in monitoring—its downstream pollution-related effects have been less well understood. Here, I analyse old units that have been taken offline and new units that have come online to empirically link technology switches to observed aerosol and ozone changes and subsequent impacts on human health, crop yields and regional climate. Between 2005 and 2016 in the continental United States, decommissioning of a coal-fired unit was associated with reduced nearby pollution concentrations and subsequent reductions in mortality and increases in crop yield. In total during this period, the shutdown of coal-fired units saved an estimated 26,610 (5%–95% confidence intervals (CI), 2,725–49,680) lives and 570 million (249–878 million) bushels of corn, soybeans and wheat in their immediate vicinities; these estimates increase when pollution transport-related spillovers are included. Changes in primary and secondary aerosol burdens also altered regional atmospheric reflectivity, raising the average top of atmosphere instantaneous radiative forcing by 0.50 W m−2. Although there are considerable benefits of decommissioning older coal-fired units, the newer natural gas and coal-fired units that have supplanted them are not entirely benign.

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Journal Articles
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Nature Sustainability
Authors
Jennifer Burney
Authors
Mark C. Thurber
Mark Thurber
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News
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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak and Associate Director Mark Thurber conducted a workshop on December 3-4 in Brasília, at the offices of Brazil's electricity regulator ANEEL. Regulatory staff used PESD's energy market game to explore what it would mean for the country to move from a cost-based to a bid-based electricity market. Brazil's electricity supply is dominated by hydroelectric power, and a shift to a bid-based market could help the country manage variable hydro output. At the same time, regulators have to make sure the incentives of participants in a bid-based market are set so they align with desired social outcomes. By playing the roles of generating companies in the energy market game, regulators at ANEEL gained a deeper understanding of what these incentives would be under different market configurations -- and specifically, the workshop examined the relative strengths and weaknesses of capacity markets and forward contracts as mechanisms for ensuring resource adequacy in a high-renewables world.

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On November 2 at the University of Hawaii, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak gave a special seminar "How Should the Public Utilities Commission Regulate Hawaiian Electric Company for Better Integration of Renewable Energy?" He summarized inefficiencies in Hawaii's electricity system and advocates a "cost based" market in which long-term competitive contracts for power would be used in conjunction with a regulated optimization model that would set real-time prices for buying and selling of electricity and grid services.  

Read more (includes links to video of Professor Wolak's talk and slides)

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak, Associate DIrector Mark Thurber, and doctoral candidate Trevor Davis led an Electricity Market Simulation Workshop as part of the 2018 Western Electricity Market Forum September 20-21 in Boise, Idaho.  The audience was comprised of regulators and regulatory staff as well as policy makers representing states from across the western U.S.

The workshop used the PESD-developed Energy Market Game to explore timely questions about how electricity markets with a high share of renewable resources might function. “The Energy Market Game allows people of diverse backgrounds to understand market dynamics,” Thurber explained. “It can help policy makers and regulators set up incentives for market participants which naturally align with desired outcomes.”

The PESD team ran games with two contrasting policy approaches aimed at ensuring resource adequacy, with workshop participants playing the role of generating companies (“gencos”). In a high-renewable world, the specific resource adequacy concern is that thermal power plants won’t run enough to be profitable, and gencos therefore won’t build or keep enough thermal power plants to back up renewables when wind and sun aren’t available.

In the first game scenario, capacity markets were used to spur gencos to build enough gas-fired power plants to meet demand. Capacity markets straight-out pay gencos for holding generation capacity. They are used in a number of real-world electricity markets, but the games suggested they may not result in the cheapest power for consumers.

 

wemf 18 PESD Director Frank Wolak helps a workshop participant set up an Energy Market Game scenario.

PESD Director Frank Wolak helps a workshop participant set up an Energy Market Game scenario.
Photo Credit:  Maury Galbraith, Western Energy Board

 

In the second game scenario, forward contracts for electricity created the incentive for gencos to build power plants. If a genco doesn’t produce enough electricity to cover its forward contract, it risks having to buy the shortfall out of the spot market at high prices. Forward contracts therefore encourage gencos not only to build adequate generation capacity, but also to bid that capacity into the market at competitive prices. As this second game scenario showed, that can mean cheaper power for consumers.

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Abstract

 

As an increasing number of California households install solar panels, the current approach to retail electricity pricing makes it harder for the state’s utilities to recover their costs. Unless policymakers change how they price grid-supplied electricity, a regulatory crisis where a declining number of less affluent customers will be asked to pay for a growing share of the costs is likely to occur.

 

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Policy Briefs
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Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Authors
Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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We report on the results of a field experiment in Puebla, Mexico that informed randomly-selected households facing a nonlinear price schedule about how different electricity-consuming actions might change their electricity bills. Households that received this 20-minute, in-person intervention reduced their electricity use, with much of this reduction driven by those that paid the highest marginal price for electricity. The estimated impacts were durable with no observed rebound for at least a year. Households with less educational attainment reduced use the most, consistent with the conclusion that the intervention imparted new knowledge to consumers that led to this observed behavior change. The high rate at which customers accepted the intervention, the resulting consumption decrease, and low implementation costs make this intervention cost-effective relative to several previous energy conservation campaigns in Mexico.

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Working Papers
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SSRN
Authors
Ognen Stojanovski
Ognen Stojanovski
Gordon Leslie
Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
Juan Enrique Huerta Wong
Mark C. Thurber
Mark C. Thurber
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