While the United States and NATO have sided squarely with Ukraine, the victim of an unprovoked invasion by Russia, US and NATO officials have also made clear their desire to avoid a direct military clash with Russia. The Kremlin, despite its blustering, also presumably wishes to avoid war with NATO, particularly at a time when some 70 percent of its ground force units are engaged in Ukraine.

A set of rules appears to be tacitly developing that should reduce the prospect of a NATO-Russia conflict, though risks remain where the rules and red lines may not be clear.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

The Pentagon estimates that 600 Russian missiles have been fired at Ukrainian targets in the first 10 days of war alone. Additionally, the infamous abandoned Chernobyl nuclear plant has been seized by Russian forces and, most recently, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station in Enerhodar has been attacked and occupied by armed Russian soldiers. Zaporizhzhia is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and Russian projectiles started a localized fire in an auxiliary building on the site on March 3, 2020.

Russian forces have also cut off the power supply to the Chernobyl reactor and containment site. This means that spent nuclear fuel is not being cooled at the site in accordance to internationally recognized standards. The head of the Chernobyl nuclear plant has said that the back-up generators have enough fuel to power the site for 48 hours. We can only guess what might happen after that. If this were not enough, there is still ongoing shelling at a nuclear research facility in Kharkiv. The current conditions there are unknown.

Despite these chaotic circumstances, the SaveEcoBot team, in coordination with the Ministry of Environmental Protection, has put a lot of effort into radiation monitoring and informing the public about changes in background radiation. We’ve been set back in this critical work by the damages done to our monitoring equipment by Russians, but Ukrainian technicians are restoring the systems as fast as they can.

The assaults on the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia power plants have already had implications for the environment. The radioactive dust raised by the wheels and trucks of the Russian combat vehicles in the Chernobyl zone has raised the background radiation levels to a hundredfold excess of the normal threshold. Just imagine what chaotic attacks, with Russians shooting, firing missiles, and bombing other parts of Ukrainian territory might lead to. In Ukraine, we have a saying, “мавпа з гранатою,” which means, “Like a monkey with a grenade." Russia is playing the monkey to all of Europe.

Russia continues to assert that its forces are in Ukraine for reasons of safety and security. The takeover of Chernobyl disturbed large amounts of radioactive soil, propelling it into the air. The attack on Zaporizhzhia resulted in a fire on the site of an active nuclear plant. This is not what safety looks like. To pretend that these actions are anything but a dangerous disregard for life is an insult to all sane, rational people. We are all very lucky that none of Zaporizhzhia’s six reactors were hit by the tank shell that started that fire.

Russia, the U.S. and the UK committed 20 years ago to ensure Ukraine’s peaceful sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons program. This agreement was built on the idea that Ukraine without nuclear weapons would never have cause to be the target of any attack. This assurance was guaranteed by the signers of the memorandum.

But Russia’s violent attacks have proven that a nuclear threat still exists in Ukraine. It is not a threat of Ukraine’s making, but one engineered by Russia’s own reckless assault on our civilian nuclear facilities. The consequences of this diabolical action go well beyond a potential environmental catastrophe for Ukraine; our neighbors, including Russia itself, and even countries outside of Europe could all be affected by nuclear fallout carried on high-atmosphere winds across continent and over oceans.

One way to mitigate this threat and to realize security assurances to Ukraine is to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The hesitance of the EU and U.S.  to implement a no-fly zone is understandable. But at the same time, it is critically important to develop options and generate models for other types of no-fly zones beyond the proposals being discussed today. Such alternative options could be the key to helping prevent a Ukrainian tragedy not only in terms of nuclear security, but also in averting a similar tragedy to what the world witnessed in Aleppo.

To do this, Ukraine needs more military support. We have gratefully received strong military support from our allies, but even this bounty is not enough to defend our country. Stinger missiles can shoot down small, low-flying aircraft from a fairly short distance, but are useless against ballistic missiles and high-altitude bombers. We need weapons that can shoot down planes at considerable distances and altitudes, systems to detect and shoot down cruise missiles, and planes to protect our airspace. Early Russian attacks targeted our airports to deplete our air defense capabilities and frustrate our ability to get planes in the air. But we still stand. But if we want to avert a second Chernobyl or another Aleppo, we need to strengthen our air defenses.

We learned in 1939 that making concessions to tyrants is no plan for peace. Putin is a bully. Like all bullies, he will take as much as he can get while treating all harm — including environmental harm — as merely incidental. Like all bullies, he will stop only when he meets strong resistance. Putin and the Russia propaganda machine frame all attempts to stymie Russian aggression as not only a provocation, but a provocation that could trigger a nuclear response. Such veiled threats of nuclear attacks are a form of prior restraint meant to constrain Ukraine’s allies from even suggesting that the Russian invasion is improper. But we must not accept this starkly irrational framework. Nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence, not tools to chill diplomatic criticism.

American analysts say that they expect the Russian attacks to become increasingly more brutal. Any increased risks to civilian and military targets commensurately increases risks to nuclear sites as well. And any compromised nuclear facility in Ukraine inherently becomes an international problem, not just a local one. Like Putin, radioactive fallout does not respect borders.

Just ten days ago, my life changed dramatically. I used to be a successful civil leader and entrepreneur with an innovative business. Now I sleep on the floor of an abandoned building with my gun in hand. My daughter knows exactly how the air raid siren sounds. But we are still Ukrainians. We are still Europeans. We still count on our allies. So to our allies, I say: close the Ukrainian sky. Provide us with enough weapons. We will do the rest.

As the evening ended, there was a moment when one of the Ukrainian students came to me to tell me that he was so sorry for #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar. I told him, “Thank you. I am sorry too. I can only imagine what you are going through.” In response he asked, “But you feel it, yeah?”

For a moment, we stood there, teared up, in silence. It was simply powerful. I felt understood. I felt the support. And this was all while I was trying my best to not make this about Myanmar and to give them space for their own grief and trauma. It was not empty words of sympathy. It was a shared moment.

This is why across-movement international solidarity is important. When you are in it together, when vocabulary falls short to describe the immense trauma you are going through, when you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.

Living By the Ideals of Democracy

In political science classes at Stanford, we talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.

A week ago, Russia invaded my home, bringing war to a peaceful democracy. Since then, my days and nights have been full of fear. However, my experience as a Ukrainian living abroad doesn't compare to what my friends and family are going through back home. Even under the constant threat of enemy fire, they still manage to help — collecting humanitarian aid,organizing transportation, coordinating national and local volunteering networks.

This way of living did not begin this month. For centuries, my nation has fought heroically for our independence and distinct cultural identity: our people defended Ukrainian symbols in the face of repressions, broke free of the Soviet Union, and shook off dictators time and time again to re-establish our democracy. For the first time, the world sees our fight. You see us face devastation the post-WWII world vowed would never happen again. As Russians bomb cities —destroying kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages, and schools — you witness our resilience. You watch our people take to the streets and stand against the occupying forces trying to enter our cities, singing the national anthem and telling Russians to leave our land.
 

This time, our fight is global, and, Ukrainians abroad are united in the fight. In under a week, the Ukrainian community at Stanford has launched a Joint Statement on Russia's War Against Ukraine, obtaining more than 800 signatures so far. We created the StandWithUkraine website with resources in 15 languages on organizations accepting donations, volunteering opportunities, reliable information sources, and templates for political advocacy.

The broader Stanford community has inspired me with their support as well. I appreciated Prof. McFaul's event that brought Ukrainians and MIP students together, especially because it demonstrated the FSI's community's unique ability to help. I hope that this potential can result in concrete actions, including further advocacy, donations, and volunteering. As scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of democracy, your time to act is now: join the fight to save Ukraine and Europe.

Uniting Abroad and at Home

As students of international policy, it is easy to distance ourselves from conflicts around the world. We are taught to examine them analytically through an international relations lens, hypothesizing what might be motivating a leader like Putin, Xi, or Biden to act in a certain way. But having the chance to hear from Ukrainian students and leaders across the Stanford community bridged what we study in the classroom and read in the news with what is actually happening to families and friends on the ground.
 

Listening to their stories and learning how we can assist, as policy students and citizens, was a reminder that we are not powerless — public opinion and advocacy can push policymakers to stand up for democracy and against violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Unfortunately, there have been too many instances of unnecessary fighting and occupying of foreign land, including by my own country the United States. The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this should future invasions occur anywhere around the world.

Doing All We Can

The tragedy that is unfolding in Ukraine hits especially close to home for me both physically and emotionally – even more so after hearing all the touching stories of our Ukrainian friends at professor McFaul’s house.

I am from Estonia, another country unlucky enough to have an aggressive Russia as a neighbor. Should Putin meet any success in Ukraine, my homeland very well may be picked as the next target. Ironically enough, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has only made NATO stronger, and as a member of the alliance, we should feel safe. But I also cannot overlook the irony and am even ashamed that the cost of NATO unity seems to be the complete destruction of Ukraine, who is essentially doing the fighting for all of us. Thousands of Ukrainian lives have ended, and millions will be emotionally damaged forever.

Emotionally, witnessing the thousands of casualties on both sides as a result of one man’s idea of a parallel universe and disregard of human life is heartbreaking. I also fear we are on the verge of making the same mistakes we have already made in the past. While the West has already done a lot to help Ukraine, are we doing enough? In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could? As of now, it seems like the answer is no.
 

We are dealing with consequences, not the cause. While it is controversial to advocate for NATO to get directly militarily involved for the defense of Ukraine, there is a good chance that if we don’t intervene now, we will have to do so at a much higher cost in the future. The risk is huge, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In that line of thought, my own Estonia would probably be among the first targets, should a NATO-Russia war break out.

But in moments like this, it is important to have a higher risk tolerance than in times of peace. We are past the diplomatic appeasement period. The Russian Army is not the mighty creature it was portrayed to be and can be defeated. But for that to happen, we must all stand up to it, and support the conditions for the Russian population to stand up and reclaim their country from the dictator. There is no more peace in Europe, and peace elsewhere will also not last if Putin is not stopped now. My heart is broken for Ukraine already. I do not want it to be broken again for Estonia or Latvia, or for Germany and France.

As an international policy student and as a citizen of the free world, I invite all Western decision-makers to ask themselves this: when Ukraine may be in complete rubbles, when a ruthless dictator has gotten his way at the cost of an entire nation and is hungry for more, when the history books are written, will I be able to comfortably say that I did everything I could to prevent it? If the answer is no, then it’s time to get back to work. Long live free Ukraine!

The faculty and staff of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University condemn in the strongest terms the unprovoked Russian assault on Ukraine.

This attack was not motivated by any legitimate security concerns on the part of Moscow. Rather, it was designed to undermine the current democratically-elected government in Ukraine, and demonstrate the impossibility of democracy anywhere in Russia’s neighborhood. President Putin has stated clearly that he does not believe in Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent, sovereign nation; rather, he believes it is part of a greater Russia. For all the flaws in Ukrainian democracy, the vast majority of Ukrainians cherish their independence and do not want to be absorbed into a kleptocratic dictatorship.

CDDRL has a special relationship with Ukraine. For more than a decade, we have hosted a series of leadership programs that included many, many Ukrainians. These programs include the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, the Leadership Academy for Development, and the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program. We made these investments in citizens of Ukraine out of a belief that Ukraine constituted the front line in a struggle over democracy globally. There are today about 150 Ukrainian graduates of our different programs, and among them, we have many close friends and colleagues who remain in their country today fighting bravely against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. All of them are in grave danger today. In the coming days and weeks, we will do whatever we can to support them, and can only wish for the best in these very dark times.

We hope that the US government, our NATO allies, and all countries and people who cherish democracy will do their utmost to push back against this Russian aggression, and help to restore an independent, democratic Ukraine.

~ The faculty and staff of CDDRL

In 1991, some 50 years after NATO’s establishment for the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet military threat, the Warsaw Pact disbanded and the Soviet Union collapsed.  Taking office in 1993, President Bill Clinton and his administration saw an opportunity to reshape Europe and bridge the divides that had emerged after World War II. By late 1994, U.S. policy with regard to NATO envisaged a three-track approach.

The first track entailed enlargement. This was provided for by Article 10 of the NATO Treaty and was consistent with the goal of building a united and free Europe. Many former Warsaw Pact members sought NATO membership, and many in the West saw enlargement as a way to underpin the democratic and economic transitions in those countries. With uncertainties about how Russia might evolve, the Alliance provided an insurance policy.  

The second track aimed to forge a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. Clinton hoped to build positive relations with Russia  — “an alliance with the Alliance” — in hopes that such a relationship could allay concerns in Moscow about enlargement. He asked, “What if Russia sought membership?” His staff advised that Russia should be considered if it met the Alliance’s criteria, including military, economic and political reform. However, Moscow appeared to see NATO as “the United States and everyone else”, and being one of everyone else held little appeal for the Kremlin. It instead pursued the idea of a special NATO-Russia relationship.

The third track dealt with Ukraine. A NATO-Ukraine partnership would solidify links between Kyiv, the capital city formerly known as Kiev (Kyiv), and the West. This would address Kyiv’s concerns about being left in a gray zone of insecurity between the Alliance and Russia, and encourage Ukraine’s reform efforts.

The New Strategy’s Promising Start

The tracks came together in 1997. In May, Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with NATO leaders in Paris for the signature of the “Founding Act” on NATO-Russia relations. Among other things, the document contained two key security assurances for Russia: first, NATO had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear arms in new member states, and second, NATO did not envisage “the additional permanent stationing of substantial [conventional] combat forces” in new members.

That July, in Madrid, NATO leaders invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become members. The “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership” between NATO and Ukraine also was signed, strengthening links between NATO and Kyiv. They would join the Alliance in time to take part in NATO’s 50th-anniversary summit in April 1999.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 led NATO to invoke Article 5 (an attack against one “shall be considered” an attack against all).  In addition to enlargement and stabilization operations in the Balkans, the Alliance began sending troops to support the U.S. military in Afghanistan.

The NATO-Russia relationship, which had suffered a setback in 1999 due to Russian anger over Alliance air strikes against Serbia for its ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, got a restart in May 2002. President Vladimir Putin met NATO leaders in Rome and agreed to expand on and strengthen the Founding Act, including consultations on certain issues on the basis of individual NATO member positions, not an agreed Alliance position. NATO’s then-Secretary General George Robertson recalled that Putin even asked about joining NATO, but indicated that he did not want to wait in line and go through the process required of other applicants.

Later that year, NATO leaders invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join. They did so in 2004. Putin and the Kremlin expressed little objection to the 2002 membership invitations. By 2021, NATO would number 30 members, up from the 16 it comprised in 1991. Russian attitudes subsequently hardened, however, and Russia fiercely opposed requests by Ukraine and Georgia for membership action plans in 2008.

Talks Falter and Animosity Returns

In Europe, NATO members nevertheless continued the process begun in the early 1990s of reducing their nuclear and conventional force capabilities. The U.S. force presence in Europe shrank to less than one-fourth the size of its Cold War numbers. Aside from small squadrons of fighter aircraft providing a Baltic air policing mission and a missile defense site in Romania, NATO had no real military presence on the territory of new members prior to 2014.

Russia’s military seizure of Crimea and its use of so-called “separatists” to provoke a conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 prompted a true breakdown in NATO-Russia relations. The Alliance suspended all practical cooperation. (The suspension of all cooperation was a mistake; one rationale for a NATO-Russia relationship was to have a mechanism to jointly manage crises.)

After two decades of force reductions, NATO leaders agreed at their Wales summit in September 2014 to strengthen their defense capabilities. They pledged to boost members’ defense spending to at least 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024. Given concerns, especially in Poland and the Baltic states, about aggressive Russian actions, NATO deployed multinational battlegroups to each of the four countries. The U.S. Army deployed an additional brigade and prepositioned equipment for a second brigade in the region.

As Russia continued its low-intensity war against Ukraine, NATO took further steps to bolster its deterrent and defense posture. Moscow ignored NATO offers in 2020 and 2021 to convene the NATO-Russia Council, and NATO-Russia relations went into a tail-spin. In October 2021, Russia announced the suspension of its mission in Brussels and effectively closed the NATO mission in Moscow.

Why NATO Must Stay Its Course

The Kremlin is unhappy with NATO enlargement, but enlargement critics in the West may well overstate how much it contributed to the decline in West-Russia relations. Russian pressure on Ukraine prior to the Maidan Revolution was intended to dissuade Kyiv from deepening integration with the European Union; the Ukrainian government then had ruled out drawing closer to NATO.

Critics also appear to downplay the impact of Russian domestic politics on Kremlin policy. In retrospect, Washington and NATO underestimated the degree of antipathy in Moscow towards the Alliance, and NATO had no way to deal with the domestic political factors driving the Kremlin policy. During Vladimir Putin’s first years as president, when a growing economy provided a strong basis for regime legitimacy, NATO enlargement did not seem to trouble him. He termed the 2002 enlargement “no tragedy.” However, as the Russian economy began to stagnate, he could no longer cite rising living standards as justification for his continued rule. He began to stress nationalism, particularly when returning to the presidency in 2011-2012. He recast Russia as a great power reestablishing its position on the global stage, and called for a more aggressive foreign policy — all themes that resonated with much of his domestic constituency. This construction increasingly depicted the United States and NATO in adversarial terms.

NATO should ensure that its readiness and capability to act in defense of member states is not in doubt, to avoid any miscalculation by the Kremlin. At the same time, the Alliance should leave the door open for dialogue, even though Moscow appears uninterested, at least for now. The possibility of a Russian military attack on a NATO member is considered low, though the prospect would have been put at zero 10 years ago. While the primary motive for enlargement was to underpin democratic transitions, new members now breathe a sigh of relief that they have the protection of Article 5. NATO has come full circle over the past 30 years; its central purpose again centers on deterrence and collective defense against a threat on its eastern border.

Originally for Divided We Fall

Senior Ukrainian officials have voiced concern that NATO has provided no clarity regarding Ukraine’s membership prospects.  Specifically, when might Kyiv receive a membership action plan, known as MAP?

Ukraine has already waited a long time. It will have to wait longer. That is unfair, but that is the reality.

Speaking in New York on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly meetings, Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba complained that the MAP process “has been dragging on for an indecently long time…there can be no endless integration.  Everything must have its certainty and its clarity.”

President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed similar concerns earlier in the summer:  “If we are talking about NATO and MAP, I would really like to get specifics – yes or no.”

Kuleba and Zelensky’s frustrations are entirely understandable.  However, they will remain disappointed.

Over the past three decades, Ukraine’s interest in NATO has steadily grown.  In 1994, it was among the first to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  In 1997, NATO and Ukraine established a “distinctive partnership” aimed at deepening Kyiv’s relationship with the alliance.

In 2002, Ukraine announced that it would seek to join NATO, but Kyiv did little to prepare itself or follow up.  After the 2004 Orange Revolution, which led to the election of Viktor Yushchenko as president, the new Ukrainian government adopted a more serious approach. In the first half of 2006, it appeared headed for a MAP. Moscow did not express strong opposition, and many assumed that NATO leaders would approve a MAP at their November summit.  However, Yushchenko’s appointment of Victor Yanukovych as prime minister derailed things, especially in September when Yanukovych said he had no interest in a MAP.

Yushchenko asked again for a MAP in January 2008, with support from Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. This time, the Kremlin made its opposition loud and clear. President George W. Bush nevertheless supported the request.  However, Washington curiously did no lobbying with other NATO members on Kyiv’s behalf.  Only when alliance leaders gathered in Bucharest in April did Bush urge his counterparts to approve a MAP for Ukraine, but having heard nothing from Washington, positions had set against the idea in key European capitals, including Berlin and Paris. Ukraine did not get a MAP, though NATO leaders stated “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”

The language about “becoming” members seemed a concession to Bush, who failed in his MAP goal since, 13 years later, Ukraine continues to wait.

NATO has no fixed checklist of what countries must do to qualify for a MAP, that is, an aspirant for a MAP cannot present a fully checked scorecard and automatically claim one.  The decision to bestow one ultimately is a political call by alliance members. What is unfair is that Ukraine today arguably has made as much progress toward meeting the criteria for membership as had other countries when they received their MAPs, for example, Bulgaria and Romania in 1999 or Albania in 2007.  Indeed, Ukraine has probably done more.

The reason why Ukraine waits is also unfair. NATO’s 1995 enlargement study said, “No country outside the alliance should be given a veto or droit de regard over the process and decisions.”  Yet the Kremlin has, in effect, exercised such a veto. Allies appear unenthusiastic about a MAP now, particularly because there is no good answer to the question “if Ukraine joins NATO tomorrow, does the alliance then find itself at war with Russia?”

Unfortunately, life sometimes is not fair. That is the reality for Ukraine.  If the alliance could not reach a consensus on giving Kyiv a MAP in 2008, it will not do so now, when Ukraine remains mired in the low-intensity military conflict that Russia inflicted has inflicted on it since 2014.  Indeed, one reason why the Kremlin keeps that conflict simmering undoubtedly is to obstruct Ukraine’s efforts to forge stronger links with the West.

There should be candor between NATO and Ukrainian officials about the state of play with MAP, as there should be on Washington’s part.  True, corruption remains a problem that Ukrainians must deal more effectively with, but it does not block a MAP.

What should Kyiv do?  Here are three recommendations.

First, stop asking for a MAP, especially in public. In the current circumstances, the answer will either be silence or no. Neither helps NATO-Ukraine relations.

Second, load up Ukraine’s annual national program with the substance of a MAP – U.S., British, Polish, Lithuanian and Canadian diplomats at NATO can advise on this – but, critically, do not call it a MAP.  By all appearances, the negative reactions—both from Moscow and from within the alliance—are to the title, not the contents.

Third, having agreed a program with NATO, implement, implement and implement more.  Implementation has not always been Kyiv’s strong suit.  The more Ukraine does to strengthen interoperability with NATO military forces, meet alliance standards, and complete democratic, economic, military and security sector reforms, the better it will prepare itself for membership.

That should be Kyiv’s goal now.  It should seek, without a formal MAP, to do everything it can so that Ukraine is ready, when the political circumstances change, to take advantage and advance its membership bid.

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. 

Originally for Kyviv Post

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the privilege of hosting Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies​ (CSIS). The program, entitled "What’s ‘Communist’ about the Communist Party of China?," explored the goals and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as what they might mean for the future of China in the global community. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the goals of the CCP became less clear. As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In his talk, Blanchette discussed the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism. Watch now: