Adrian Bonifacio, a second generation Filipino-American from Chicago, is one of the recipients of the Program on Human Rights and the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society's 2012 Human Rights Fellowship.  The Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law together with the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society offer four annual summer fellowships in human rights open to Stanford undergraduates interested in working for organizations, government agencies, NGOs or international organizations that promote or defend human rights.

This summer, Bonifacio will work with the Asian Pacific Mission for Migrants, a non-governmental organization based in Hong Kong that promotes and defends the rights of migrant workers, a majority of whom are Filipino. Filipino immigrants in Hong Kong work predominately as domestic workers. The situation of Filipino diasporas is very complex with more than 10% of the Filipino population abroad, and over 4,000 Filipinos leaving the country every day.

Passionate about Filipino and Filipino-American issues relating to human rights such as migration, exploitation, and servitude, Stanford undergraduate Bonifacio has joined Filipino groups such as Stanford’s Pilipino American Student Union (PASU) and Anakbayan Silicon Valley, a youth organization based in Santa Clara County. He is currently pursuing a major in international relations with a minor in economics as well as co-term masters degree in sociology.

In the 1970s, Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos began the Labor Export Policy (LEP), a deliberate policy to send Filipino workers abroad. “This became a vicious cycle, the Philippines tried to achieve economic development based on remittances but because it sends both high skill and low skill workers abroad, and because the remittances they send are not usually put towards investment and long term development, there is not much progress happening in the country," explained Bonifacio. "Every president since Marcos has continued to promote the LEP in the name of national development.”

Last summer, Bonifacio worked for HURIGHTS OSAKA, a human rights non-profit organization, where he conducted research related to Filipino migrants in Japan to understand the link between human rights and remittances. “Although it was difficult integrating with the community in such a limited timeframe, a lot of different opportunities presented themselves—celebrating Philippine Independence Day, cooking Filipino food for events, even performing traditional dances," said Bonifacio. "My supervisor at work and all the migrants I have come to know made my transition into life in Japan, as well as my research, much easier.”

Japan and agencies in the Philippines that facilitate labor migration are notorious for abusing “entertainment visas” which allowed young women to be trafficked into Japan. Many Filipino women were promised jobs in high-end hotels as singers or dancers, but upon arrival in Japan, were trafficked into bars, with some entering prostitution rings and red light districts... Starting in the mid-1980s, many Japanese men in rural areas began to “import” Filipino women as mail-order brides, to solve the demographic problem of low birth rates caused largely by women moving out to cities to pursue professional careers.

Although the mail-order bride phenomenon has died down and Japan has since abolished the entertainment visa in 2006, there are still cases of abuse and human trafficking. Moreover, Filipino men have a history of working in construction, often as day laborers with insecure sources of income and housing. According to Bonifacio, “It is hard to determine the proportion of remittances that come from exploitation, but if you look at general trends and the types of employment Filipinos have all over the world—for example as “entertainers” in Japan or domestic workers in Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and even the United States—one could say that remittances and exploitation are closely connected.”

In preparation for his fellowship in Hong Kong Bonifacio says, “I was humbled by what I saw in Japan. I think that one of the best things one can do to educate oneself - and something that does not always happen in a classroom - is to understand the community we want to serve. We need to learn about the issues these communities face before considering fighting for change.”

Students interested in applying to the human rights fellowship for the summer of 2013 should contact Nadejda Marques to learn about the selection process and deadline for submission.

Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"

Propelled by the need to develop new and more productive avenues of communication among scholars and policy-makers based in Europe, North America, and the Middle East, in 2010 the Europe Center at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute agreed to launch the multi-year collaborative project titled "Debating History, Democracy, Development, and Education in Conflicted Societies." Our joint initiative aims to promote research and policy projects with partners in Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East.

Viewed in an international context, with a focus on Europe and the Middle East, this collaborative project investigates how societies debate internally and attempt to reconcile differences of historical interpretation and political positions.  The first conference took place at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, and was dedicated to “Democracy in Adversity and Diversity” (May 18-19, 2011). Topics for the conference included democracy in comparative perspective, political reform, the notion and strategies of democracy promotion, regime transition, negotiating religion and democracy, immigration challenges, minorities and East-West relations, emergence or recovery of civil society, the role of non-governmental organizations in democratic societies, and human rights. 

The next conference, at Stanford University May 17-18, 2012 aims to deepen our understanding of the interplay between history and memory. Given the extensive discussion of memory and history across a variety of disciplines in recent decades, we would like to take stock of our current understanding of the concepts of memory and history as they affect society, politics and culture.  At the same time we wish to examine in what ways insights gained in the course of this cross-disciplinary and global discussion may be effective when considering the circumstances of the Middle East, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We are inviting new, innovative approaches to the study of memory and history as they affect different societies. We especially welcome contributions that engage the concepts of memory and history comparatively. Our goal is to advance beyond restating examples of conflicts between versions of history, and to seek new paths of research that may further the work in various cases, and also potentially offer guidance for engaging particular international and civil conflicts.

The questions that we seek to address at the conference include, among others:

• How do we understand the historians’ role and engagement in political and cultural conflicts about the past and present?
• What are the historians’ responsibilities in developing shared narratives about war, civil conflict, occupation, and genocide?
• How do we understand the relation between the work of professional historians and that of civic society organizations?
• How do we understand the roles and interplay of history and memory in efforts towards reconciliation?
• How should one think about the relative importance of historical commissions and truth commissions in “coming to terms with the past.”
• What is the relationship between the historian’s work on international and domestic conflict and that of judicial institutions?
• How do efforts in post-conflict situations to reach accurate assessments (“truth”) of the events meet the needs of healing social, ethnic, and/or religious wounds (“reconciliation”)?
• How do we understand the effectiveness, necessity, and/or legitimacy of remembering and forgetting in models of reconciliation?
• What are the consequences and meaning of actions of forgiveness, including the formal granting of amnesty? Do these actions conflict with the writing of history?

The conference committee consists of Norman Naimark (Core faculty member of The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor in East European Studies at Stanford), Yfaat Weiss (Director, The Franz Rosenzweig Minerva Research Center for German-Jewish Literature and Cultural History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Gabriel Motzkin (Director, The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute), and Amir Eshel (Director, The Europe Center and Edward Clark Crossett Professor of Humanistic Studies at Stanford).