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*Please note the date has changed from September 23 to September 22*

A talk by Arnold Suppan, author of Hitler - Beneš - Tito: Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and South East Europe. The monograph explores the development of the political, legal, economic, social, cultural and military “communities of conflict” within Austria-Hungary (especially in the Bohemian and South Slav lands); the convulsion of World War I and the Czech, Slovak and South Slav break with the Habsburg Monarchy; the difficult formation of successor states and the strong discussions at Paris 1919/20; the domestic and foreign policies of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the question of national minorities (Sudeten Germans, Magyars in Slovakia and the Vojvodina, Danube Swabians, Germans in Slovenia); Hitler’s destruction of the Versailles order; the Nazi policies of conquest and occupation in Bohemia, Moravia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia; the genocide committed against the Jews in the Protectorate, Slovakia, the Ustaša-state and Serbia; the collaboration of the Tiso­- and Pavelić-regime with Nazi Germany; the retaliation against and expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and finally the issue of history and memory east and west of the Iron Curtain as well as in the post-communist states at the end of the 20th century.

Sponsored by The Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies and co-sponsored by The Europe Center and the Department of History.

Free and open to the public.

 

Pigott Hall (Building 260)
Room113

Arnold Suppan Professor of History University of Vienna
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With contributions by Stephan Braese, Barbara Hahn, Christine Ivanovic, Martin Klebes, Vivian Liska, Fred Moten, Sigrid Weigel, Liliane Weissberg, and Thomas Wild, this book explores the thoughts of Hannah Arendt which move in a border area between the disciplines and yet goes beyond the concept of interdisciplinarity.

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Wallstein Verlag GmbH
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Amir Eshel
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978-3835313736

Conference Agenda for Day 1, October 8, 2014:

 

9:00 AM

  • Welcome Remarks – Eric T. Wakin, Robert H. Malott Director of Hoover Institution Library & Archives

  • Opening Remarks – Amir Weiner, Stanford University

9:15-10:45 AM – Chair: Amir Weiner

  • Toomas Hiio, Estonian War Museum. Multi-ethnic (or Multi-national) Student Body of the University of Tartu and the WW I: Choices, Political Movements, Volunteers, Mobilizations, and Postwar Consequences

  • Darius Staliunas, Lithuanian Institute of History. Anti-Jewish Violence in Lithuania at the Turn of the 20th Century

11:00 AM – 12:30 PM Chair: Aivars Stranga, The University of Latvia

  • Ēriks Jēkabsons, University of Latvia. The War for Independence of Latvia and the United States

  • Tomas Balkelis, Vilnius University. Paramilitarism in Lithuania: Violence, Civic Activism and Nation-making, 1918–1920

  • Bert Patenaude, Stanford University. “Yankee Doodle: American Attitudes toward Baltic Independence, 1918–1921”

 

Conference organizers:  Professors Lazar Fleishman (Slavic Department) and Amir Weiner (History Department)

Sponsored by: Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Office of the Provost, Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford Global Studies Division, The Europe Center, Stanford University Libraries, Division of Literatures, Cultures, & Languages, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Department of History, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Stanford Humanities Center.

Stauffer Auditorium, Hoover Institution

Conferences
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Abstract: It is often said that economists in general, and CIA analysts in particular, failed to understand until very late in the game just how serious the USSR's economic problems were.  That failure, it was widely claimed, was the root cause of a more general failure on the part of the U.S. policy community to understand what was going on in the Soviet Union during the later Cold War period.  It turns out, however, that the Soviet economic problem was understood from the mid-1960s on;  in intellectual terms, the analysis was quite impressive.  The Soviets themselves, moreover, understood the problem in much the same way as Western economists did.   All this provides us with a key--perhaps the key--to understanding great power politics during the latter part of the Cold War.

 

About the Speaker: Marc Trachtenberg is Professor of Political Science at the University of California - Los Angeles. He studies national security strategy, diplomatic history, and international relations. He has been Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, the German Marshall Fund, and the SSRC/MacArthur Foundation. His award-winning book, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton University Press, 1999), explores the profound impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of international relations during the Cold War, making extensive use of newly opened documentary archives in Europe and the United States. History and Strategy (Princeton University Press, 1991) studies seminal events like the onset of World War I and the Cuban Missile Crisis to shed light on the role of force in international affairs. Professor Trachtenberg teaches courses on the history of international relations, international security, and historical research methods. 

 


The Soviet Economic Decline and Great Power Politics
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Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: A Failure of Intelligence?
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Marc Trachtenberg Professor of Political Science Speaker University of California - Los Angeles
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In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, an "open borders" United States absorbed millions of European immigrants in one of the largest mass migrations ever. New research by Stanford economist Ran Abramitzky challenges the perception that immigrants lagged behind native-born Americans in job pay and career growth.
 

BY CLIFTON B. PARKER

European immigrants to America during the country's largest migration wave in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had earnings comparable to native-born Americans, contrary to the popular perception, according to new Stanford research.

"Our paper challenges conventional wisdom and prior research about immigrant assimilation during this period," said Ran Abramitzky, an associate professor of economics at Stanford, faculty affiliate of The Europe Center and author of the research paper in the Journal of Political Economy.

New research challenges conventional wisdom about immigrant assimilation during the bygone era of open borders and mass migration.
Photo Credit: Lewis Hine/Library of Congress

New research challenges conventional wisdom about immigrant assimilation during the bygone era of open borders and mass migration.

Abramitzky and his colleagues found the average immigrant in that period did not face a substantial "earnings penalty" – lower pay than native-born workers – upon their arrival.

"The initial earnings penalty is overstated," said Abramitzky.

He said the conventional view is that the average European immigrants held substantially lower-paying jobs than native-born Americans upon first arrival and caught up with natives' earnings after spending some time in the United States. But that perception does not hold up to the facts, he said.

Abramitzky's co-authors include Leah Platt Boustan from the University of California, Los Angeles, and Katherine Eriksson from California Polytechnic State University.

The researchers examined records on 21,000 natives and immigrants from 16 European countries in U.S. Census Bureau data from 1900 to 1910 to 1920.

"Even when U.S. borders were open, the average immigrant who ended up settling in the United States over the long term held occupations that commanded pay similar to that of U.S. natives upon first arrival," Abramitzky said.

In that bygone era of "open borders," Abramitzky said, native-born Americans were concerned that immigrants were not assimilating properly into society – yet, on the whole, this concern appears to be unfounded. "Such concerns are echoed in today's debate over immigration policy," he added.

At the same time, Abramitzky said that immigrants from poorer countries started out with lower paid occupations relative to natives and did not manage to close this gap over time.

"This pattern casts doubt on the conventional view that, in the past, immigrants who arrived with few skills were able to invest in themselves and succeed in the U.S. economy within a single generation," Abramitzky and his colleagues wrote.

Age of migration

America took in more than 30 million immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1913), a period when the country had open borders. By 1910, 22 percent of the U.S. labor force – and 38 percent of workers in non-southern cities – was foreign-born (compared with 17 percent today).

As the research showed, immigrants then were more likely than natives to settle in states with a high-paying mix of occupations. Location choice was an important strategy they used to achieve occupational parity with native-born Americans.

"This Age of Mass Migration not only is of interest in itself, as one of the largest migration waves in modern history, but also is informative about the process of immigrant assimilation in a world without migration restrictions," Abramitzky said.

Over time, many of the immigrants came from the poorer regions of southern and eastern Europe.

Abramitzky pointed out that native-born Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were concerned about poverty in immigrant neighborhoods and low levels of education among children, many of whom left school early to work in industry.

Consequently, American political progressives championed a series of reforms, including U.S. child labor laws and compulsory schooling requirements.

Still, some natives believed that new arrivals would never fit into American society. And so, in 1924, Congress set a strict quota of 150,000 immigrant arrivals per year, with more slots allocated to immigrants from northern and western European countries than those from southern and eastern Europe.

But those early-20th-century fears of unassimilated immigrants were baseless, according to Abramitzky.

"Our results indicate that these concerns were unfounded: The average long-term immigrants in this era arrived with skills similar to those of natives and experienced identical rates of occupational upgrading over their life cycle," he wrote.

How does this lesson apply to today's immigration policy discussion? Should the numbers of immigrants and their countries of origin be limited and those with higher skills be given more entry slots?

Abramitzky said stereotyping immigrants has affected the political nature of the contemporary debate.

"These successful outcomes suggest that migration restrictions are not always necessary to ensure strong migrants' performance in the labor market," he said.

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Image of "First sight of New York Bay -- arrival of a European steamer" by James Wells Champney
First sight of New York Bay--arrival of a European steamer.
James Wells Champney/New York Public Library
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The paper that will be presented at this seminar, “Religion, Division of Labour and Conflict: Anti-Semitism in German Regions over 700 Years,” is co-authored by Luigi Pascali.

Part of the Economic History Seminar Series, co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Landau Economics Building, Room 351

Sascha Becker Professor of Economics and deputy director of the ESRC Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) Speaker University of Warwick, UK
Seminars
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Part of the Economic History Seminar Series, co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Fabian Waldinger Associate Professor of Economics Speaker University of Warwick, UK
Seminars
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Nicholas Craft will present new estimates of TFP growth at the sectoral level and an account of sectoral contributions to overall productivity growth, from his paper co-authored by Gerben Bakker (London School of Economics) and Pieter Woltjer (Wageningen University).  They improve on Kendrick (1961) in several ways including expanding the coverage of sectors, extending estimates to 1941, and better accounting for labor quality.  The results have important implications including that the pattern of productivity growth was generally ‘yeasty’ rather than ‘mushroomy’, that the 1930s did not experience the fastest TFP growth of the 20th century, and that the role of electricity as a general purpose technology does not explain the ‘yeastiness’ of manufacturing in the 1920s.

The link for a PDF copy of the paper may be found below.

Part of the Economic History Seminar Series, co-sponsored by The Europe Center.

Paper: A Vision of the Growth Process in a Technologically progressive Economy: the United States, 1899-1941
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Landau Economics Building, Room 351

Nicholas Crafts Professor of Economics and director of the ESRC Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) Speaker University of Warwick, UK
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Appeared in Stanford Report, June 9, 2014

By Clifton B. Parker

A new chapter in the Scottish independence movement could reshape the future of that country and the rest of the United Kingdom, Stanford faculty say.

Scotland will hold an election on Sept. 18 to decide whether it should break away from the United Kingdom. With the official kickoff of the Scottish independence referendum on May 30, the 4.1 million Scots who make up the country's electorate are mulling over how independence would affect a range of issues including agriculture, education, defense, health care and more.

Now, momentum seems to be on the side of the independence vote, said Christophe Crombez, a consulting professor in Stanford's Europe Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

"If you had asked me a year ago whether Scotland would vote for independence, I would have said no. Now I am not so sure. The current UK government has not handled this issue well. Threats, such as warnings that Scotland could not keep the pound, have backfired," said Crombez.

Economics and the EU

Scotland, which has significant – though somewhat dwindling – oil operations in the North Sea, would likely remain part of the European Union if it leaves the UK, Crombez said. Scotland highly favors membership, whereas Britain's view is more mixed about the 28-member bloc.

"The economic consequences of leaving the UK will be minimal for Scotland. Scotland would remain part of the EU single market. It could possibly keep more of its oil revenues," he said.

The political ramifications for a redrawn Great Britain are significant. "Great Britain would lose more of its prominent status in world politics. England would have to deal with an identity crisis, having lost its empire after World War II and now witnessing the unraveling of the UK," he said.

Extracting Scotland from the Great Britain political equation would likely give more power to conservative British voters, as Scotland tends to vote on the left side, Crombez said.

"Also, the British government wants to put the issue behind them. So when the vote goes down, they can finally move on one way or another from the Scottish independence issue," he said.

If Scottish voters elect to remain part of the United Kingdom, the British government has said Scotland will not get another chance at independence.

Historical origins

The current move toward independence stems from the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher was Britain's prime minister.

"Thatcher's policies were intensely disliked in Scotland," Crombez said. "While she kept on winning elections in England, her party's support in Scotland dwindled. Scotland felt that England was imposing policies on it that it did not want. Devolution and independence were seen as ways to get out of that situation."

As a result, since the early 1990s the conservatives have not played a significant role in Scottish politics, he said. And in 1997, voters in Scotland approved "devolution," which granted them legislative powers in the form of the Scottish Parliament.

"In my opinion, calls for independence would have been even stronger if Scotland had not been granted the autonomy it got in the 1990s," he said.

The roots of Scotland's drive for independence stretch deep into Great Britain's past, said Priya Satia, associate professor of modern British history and Europe Center faculty affiliate.

According to Satia, "Some might say as far back as the Jacobite rebellion against the union of Scotland with England and Wales in 1707. Others might point to a much later originary moment – regional nationalisms like Scotland's emerged in the latter half of the 20th century as part of the British reaction to the loss of empire."

From 1603, Scotland and England shared the same monarch when James VI of Scotland was declared King of England and Ireland as well. The two kingdoms united in 1707 to form the Kingdom of Great Britain. Prior to this, Scotland had been a sovereign state for more than 800 years.

Scotland, Wales, England and Ireland lost that sense of "common identity" to a shared British brotherhood once the "colonial 'other'" no longer existed in the post-WWII period, said Satia.

Historian Peter Stansky says it would not be wise for Scotland to exit the UK.

"I think it would probably be a mistake for Scotland to vote for independence. At the moment I think it has a good situation," said Stansky, the Frances and Charles Field Professor of History, Emeritus.

Stansky noted, "It can act independently in some areas, participate in some British decisions and has English backup. Independence would be a nice sentimental gesture, but a bad move."

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Britain's Prime Minister tours the Walcheren Barracks in Glasgow, Scotland
Britain's Prime Minister tours the Walcheren Barracks in Glasgow, Scotland May 15, 2014. Cameron urged Scots on Thursday to stay in the United Kingdom during an unusual two-day visit to Scotland to counter a rise in support for secession in opinion polls and criticism of the anti-independence campaign.
REUTERS/Russell Cheyne
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