This paper examines the evolution of Vladimir Putin’s social contract and its transformation from a performance-based arrangement into an identity- and mobilization-based model that supports Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The paper brings together several dimensions of the social contract — economic performance, political passivity, elite interests, and ideological legitimacy — to demonstrate how they evolved alongside one another rather than independently. It argues that the origins of this arrangement can be traced to the crises of the 1990s, when economic collapse and political instability left many Russians looking for stability more than political participation. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin gradually built an informal understanding with society: the state would provide order, improving living standards and relative freedom in private life, while citizens would largely stay out of politics. As this model became established, tighter control over the media, increasingly managed elections, pressure on independent political actors, and the growing acceptance of political disengagement all helped reinforce it. As economic growth slowed and the regime’s performance-based legitimacy weakened, the contract adapted by increasingly relying on militarized identity, patriotic mobilization, and narratives of external threat. The annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are interpreted as key moments in this transformation, enabling the regime to replace material incentives with identity-based legitimacy and the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. The article concludes that Putin’s social contract is not a static agreement but a flexible, state-imposed mechanism capable of adapting to changing political conditions. However, this flexibility also creates new vulnerabilities, as the regime becomes increasingly dependent on continuous ideological mobilization and public acceptance of militarized governance to sustain its legitimacy.