Introduction and Contribution

Large parts of the Arab world were convulsed by mass protests between 2010 and 2012. The protests were fueled by decades of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement by corrupt political parties and entrenched bureaucrats. Many of the region’s autocrats saw this as evidence that prior ways of “managing” politics — such as through unfree elections or parliamentary debate among relatively loyal politicians — were no longer reliable. Indeed, elections could serve as spaces to mobilize collective opposition while debate could quickly turn chaotic, stalemated, or critical of the autocrat. 

Accordingly, Arab autocrats became ever more reliant on two broad strategies. The first is repression: brutalizing, surveilling, jailing, and exiling their opponents, both real and suspected. The second is a more tightly controlled kind of management: creating parallel political institutions to produce a façade of genuine political engagement. This second strategy has been especially clear under Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (2014-) in his embrace of youth-led propaganda initiatives.

In “Youth and the Reinvention of State-managed Politics in Sisi’s Egypt,” Hesham Sallam shows how what he terms the “New Youth Project” has helped Sisi bypass elections and parliaments, groom a new class of pro-military civilian leaders, and portray his regime as modern and inclusive. These projects include highly choreographed youth forums and conferences, organizations to build support for his regime within political parties, and publications by purportedly independent national security experts. As a consequence, Sisi has effectively co-opted key segments of Egyptian youth in hopes of avoiding the fate of his predecessors. Sallam carefully unpacks the New Youth Project’s history, varied functions, and embeddedness within Sisi’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. 

Background to the New Youth Project

At the time of the Arab Uprisings, Egypt was ruled by President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). His National Democratic Party and cadre of corrupt bureaucrats played a key role in igniting the public outrage that led to his downfall. Mubarak was succeeded by the civilian President Mohamed Morsi, who then-General Sisi ousted in a military coup after just over a year in power. For Sallam, these years were formative for Sisi, convincing him that ruling parties and entrenched “political classes” were serious impediments to regime survival, as was cooperation between civilian and military authorities. As such, Sisi did not build a party of his own. Yet he understood the need to groom new cadres and deepen his administration’s legitimacy.

Sallam dates the New Youth Project to 2014, when the Nasser Military Academy began organizing programs to socialize young civilian leaders in military propaganda. The following year, Sisi founded a Presidential Youth Leadership Program that holds regular forums. Meanwhile, the regime tacitly supported the youth-led Nation’s Future Party until it was internally overtaken by Mubarak-era elites. Sisi responded by creating a Coordination Committee of Parties’ Youth Leaders and Politicians, helping the regime build its influence within various parties while giving it the appearance of cross-partisan support.

Functions of the New Youth Project

Sisi’s efforts to build parallel institutions, groom pro-military civilian leaders, and construct a façade of participation can be helpfully illustrated via Sallam’s examination of the National Youth Conference (NYC). NYC is a regime-led forum where young Sisi supporters gather to discuss public policy and make recommendations to the president. 

NYC is an extravagant endeavor, involving fireside chats and Q&As between Sisi and Egyptian youths, TED-style talks by young entrepreneurs, screenings of documentaries touting the regime’s initiatives, and mock simulations of official dialogue. NYC moderators raise (likely prepared) proposals to Sisi, which he promises to take into consideration. These activities give authoritarian Egypt an air of democratic accountability: the president is responsive, public policy is effective, and the state is open and transparent. Importantly, the regime also uses NYC to respond to episodes of mass dissatisfaction. For example, during an economic downturn in 2017, NYC featured presentations justifying Sisi’s monetary policies and efforts to counter price hikes. 

NYC also serves as a reliable forum for the grooming of pro-military civilian leaders. This complements existing military training programs for bureaucrats, journalists, and university employees, which have become de facto prerequisites for government employment. The conferences consistently uphold the military’s view of national security. In 2019, for example, the regime faced protests sparked by a former contractor who accused Sisi and his inner circle of corruption; accordingly, the year’s NYC centered on how terrorists use misinformation and fake news to undermine Egypt. Such narratives and propaganda would likely be less persuasive in an electoral or parliamentary forum than in the carefully managed NYC.

During the conference, young speakers tell the audience about their self-improvement or entrepreneurial success — the implication being that anyone can be successful in Sisi’s Egypt. Meanwhile, presentations filled with data and statistics provide a sense of scientific credibility. One presentation sought to convey that NYC had been a resounding democratic success because it was attended by Egyptians across gender, age, and geography; yet no mention was made of the exclusion of opposition perspectives or those regularly victimized by state repression. 

Finally, the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies has extended the regime’s efforts. Led by former security officials, the self-proclaimed independent think tank provides ostensibly expert analyses linking regime opponents, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to terrorism. Ultimately, Sallam shows that Sisi’s youth project is less about empowering young Egyptians than about creating new channels through which the regime can exercise authoritarian control.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.