For Safety or Profits
Thursday, November 9, 201712:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Second Floor, Central, C231
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
Abstract:
This paper provides evidence that innovative multinational firms attempt to use health and safety regulations to eliminate cheaper, generic products from the market, even when they themselves produce those products. Stricter regulations on generic products allow innovative firms to shift the market to patented alternatives while forcing out generic producers. Firms are able to win these preferential regulatory outcomes at both national and international levels of governance, despite the fact that these outcomes create trade barriers and tilt the playing field in favor of companies in developed nations. I utilize original data from the agrochemical sector to provide evidence that agrochemical producers request stricter standards on their own products when it could help them sell patented alternatives. Using longitudinal data on actual regulatory change at both national and international levels I find that regulatory institutions seemingly set up to protect consumers also appear to have helped innovative firms win preferential outcomes.
Speaker Bio: