Why do opposition parties so often struggle to challenge aspiring autocrats in elections? I argue that elite economic coercion—the credible threat of economic retaliation against opposition-aligned elites—is a core, overlooked authoritarian strategy that erodes opposition candidate quality and electoral appeal. Incumbents leverage control over state institutions and resources to punish candidates and their families through firings, blacklisting, tax audits, and contract denials. This deters state-dependents from political entry, shrinking opposition parties’ talent pool. I use original data from Hungary’s autocratization episode. New panel data on the performance of candidate-connected firms documents widespread economic retaliation upon opposition political entry. A survey experiment with opposition elites demonstrates its negative effect on political ambition, while data on candidate backgrounds indicate a decline in opposition quality, particularly the share of candidates in high-quality state-dependent occupations. The findings highlight the key role of coercive economic retaliation in preventing successful opposition challenge during democratic decline.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Hanna Folsz is a 6th-year PhD Candidate in Political Science at Stanford University and a Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. Her research examines the electoral challenges and opportunities in countering democratic decline. Her dissertation develops a theory of “opposition traps” to explain why opposition parties often struggle to challenge authoritarian dominant parties in autocratizing regimes, and why electoral turnover frequently emerges from new opposition formations. She brings evidence from Hungary’s autocratization since 2010 using a multi-method approach that combines original large-N datasets, text data, elite and mass surveys, and qualitative research.

Folsz grew up in Budapest, Hungary, and completed a B.A. in Economics and Politics at Durham University and an MSc in Political Science and Political Economy at the London School of Economics. In addition to English and Hungarian, she speaks Polish, Spanish, French, and German. She co-organizes the East European Politics Graduate Workshop (EEPGW) and is a member of the Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab (PovGov) and the Democracy and Polarization Lab (DPL) at Stanford.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E-008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.