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Democracy and Financial Crisis

Seminar

Speaker(s)

Phillip Lispcy, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Date and Time

January 17, 2019 12:00 PM - 1:30 PM

Availability

RSVP

Open to the public.

RSVP required by 5PM January 16.

Location

Ground Floor Conference Rm E008Encina Hall, 616 Serra St., Stanford, CA 94305-6055

Abstract:

Existing scholarship attributes various political and economic advantages to democratic governance. These advantages may make more democratic countries prone to financial crises. Democracy is characterized by constraints on executive authority, accountability through free and fair elections, protections for civil liberties, and large winning coalitions. These characteristics bring important benefits, but they can also have unintended consequences that increase the likelihood of financial instability and crises. Using data covering the past two centuries, I demonstrate a strong relationship between democracy and financial crisis onset: on average, democracies are about twice as likely to experience a crisis as autocracies. This is an empirical regularity that is robust across a wide range of model specifications and time periods.

 

Speaker Bio:

Phillip Y. Lipscy (Stanford University) is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.  His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international organizations, and the politics of East Asia, particularly Japan.  Lipscy’s book from Cambridge University Press, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, examines how countries seek greater international influence by reforming or creating international organizations.

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