Following the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies recognized that it was in their vital security interests to promote stable transitions in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. For the most part, such transitions would depend on the efforts of the states in transition themselves, including many that had been newly formed. However, one way in which the Western nations could help was by economic assistance -- both financial and technical.
Since the attacks on September 11, the Bush administration has seemed as determined as ever to move ahead with a national missile defense system, although it would have done nothing to prevent the attacks. Another question is how the rest of the world views U.S. plans. This article contains a sampling of perspectives from around the world.
The March 2000 presidential election was an important milestone in the democratic development of Taiwan, with the Kuomintang turned out of power after five decades of control and replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party.
President Bush signed the Patriot Act last week. The new anti-terrorism law has its critics. Some object to the law's intrusions on civil liberties. They cite the provisions for extended detention, new powers to spy on Americans, a lack of controls on use of information, a greater ability to freeze and seize assets and an overly broad definition of domestic terrorism.
Others express concern about the process. The Patriot Act represents the most radical change in police powers in decades, and codifies counterterrorist measures previously rejected by Congress as too intrusive.
The U.S. government is expert at presenting well-honed Pentagon briefings describing American military action. Decisions are made regularly about how much detail the military believes can be presented without endangering U.S. troops. But only late last week -- after two weeks of anthrax scares in the United States -- did we begin to see similarly professional efforts to inform U.S citizens about the domestic threat they faced.
The Bush administration has right stated that we are and must be prepared to use the full arsenal of our defense capabilities to respond to the heinous acts of terrorism directed against the United States and the world on 11 September 2001. President Bush clearly stated that the use of military force will be a part of our campaign to fight terrorism and defend our homeland. Administration officials also cautioned Americans not to expect a massive military response but rather a longer, and at times invisible, diplomatic and financial campaign aimed at crippling terrorists.
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have shown that well-organized global terriorist groups bent on causing mass murder and destruction are no longer hypothetical. There can now be little doubt that if such terrorists could acquire weapons-usable nuclear materials across a city, they would likely attempt that as well. Under these circumstances, measures to further strengthen the protection of nuclear materials and muclear installations are urgently needed.
For decades the United States has sought international standards to ensure that nuclear facilities and materials are physically protected against theft and sabotage. On September 11, the need for such an initiative became strikingly apparent as analysts pondered the other possible targets of a terrorist attack. What would have been the loss of life if, for example, a hijacker had crashed a fuel-laden jetliner into a nuclear reactor, causing a meltdown and dispersing radioactive material?
The horrifying events of 11 September 2001 serve notice that civilization will confront severe challenges in the twenty-first century. As national security budgets expand in response, we should recognize that only a broad conception of security will be adequate to meet some of the threats that we may face. Biological security provides a powerful example. It must address both the challenge of biological weapons and that of infectious disease. The right approach should benefit public health even if major acts of biological terrorism never occur.
STANFORD, Calif.- For the past seven years, the United States has been negotiating a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, hoping to put teeth into the convention's ban on biological weapons production. The Bush administration recently rejected the latest draft of the protocol, viewing it as irredeemably flawed. This is a good time to ask what a new American strategy should be for security against biological threats. It is difficult to predict the likelihood or scale of biological attack.
Over the several hundred years during which the rules of sovereignty including non-intervention and the exclusion of external authority have been widely understood, state control could never be taken for granted. States could never isolate themselves from the external environment. Globalization and intrusive international norms are old, not new, phenomena. Some aspects of the contemporary environment are uniquethe number of transnational nongovernmental organizations has grown dramatically, international organizations are more prominent; cyber crime could not exist without cyber space.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has presented unique opportunities as well as challenges for U.S. national interests and for U.S.-Russian relations--both in traditional security and non-security-related arenas. The last decade of transition has provided an opportunity for improved cooperation between the United States and Russia on both economic and political matters, as Russia has increasingly voiced the notion that "free-market democracy" (Russian-style) is a desired conclusion to its transitional period. Since 1991, there have been many collaborative efforts, involving the U.S.
Verifying nuclear disarmament is a complex technical process. This paper examines the techniques that could be used to verify future nuclear weapon reductions and analyzes the motivation for the nuclear states to accept deep weapon cuts and the prospect for future nuclear reductions.
The official U.S. government policy is to maintain "calculated ambiguity" about whether the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to an adversary's use of chemical weapons (CW) or biological weapons (BW) against U.S. allies, U.S. armed forces overseas, or the U.S. homeland. Since the 1991 Gulf War, numerous civilian and military leaders have stated that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to CW and BW threats or attacks, and some have even stated that the United States will use nuclear weapons in such circumstances.
A biological terrorist attack probably would first be detected by doctors or other health-care workers. The speed of a response would then depend on their rapid recognition and communication that certain illnesses appeared out of the ordinary. For this reason, preparing for biological terrorism has more in common with confronting the threat of emerging infectious diseases than with preparing for chemical or nuclear attacks. Defense against bioterrorism, like protection against emerging diseases, must therefore rely on improved national and international public-health surveillance.
A joint Stanford University-Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory team of scientists, nuclear engineers and arms control experts has concluded in a new study that North Korea's compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework can be verified to a satisfactory degree of accuracy. Special effort, however, will be needed from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as support from the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and perhaps other countries. Most importantly, cooperation and openness from North Korea are essential.
This book addresses the organization and management of the national security establishment, and especially the Department of Defense, to implement the policies the nation's leaders choose for it, to manage the programs they direct, and to adapt to a changing world.
This paper focuses on the question of how much protection a building provides its inhabitants from a BW attack. The reason for considering this problem is simple: most people spend the majority of their daily lives inside buildings. In fact, the U.S. EPA estimates that average Americans spend approximately 87% of their time indoors.5 However, most previous technical assessments of BW incidents ignore the effects of buildings, computing casualties based only on integrated outdoor surface dosage. The protective effects of buildings have been considered for other toxic releases. Karlsson, for
This paper develops a probabilistic model that can be used to determine the technical performance required for a defense to meet specific political/military objectives. The defense objective is stated as a certain probability that no warheads leak through the defense. The technical performance is captured by the interceptor single-shot probability of kill and the warhead detection, tracking, and classification probability. Attacks are characterized by the number of warheads and undiscriminated decoys.
For almost two centuries, Americans expected that their public schools would cultivate the personal, moral, and social development of individual students, create citizens, and bind diverse groups into one nation. Since the 1980s, however, a new generation of school reformers has been intent on using schools to solve the nations economic problems. An economic justification for public schoolsequipping students with marketable skills to help the nation compete in a global, information-based workplaceoverwhelmed other historically accepted purposes for tax-supported public schools.
This timely study is the first to examine the relationship between competition for energy resources and the propensity for conflict in the Caspian region. Taking the discussion well beyond issues of pipeline politics and the significance of Caspian oil and gas to the global market, the book offers significant new findings concerning the impact of energy wealth on the political life and economies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
Having undergone a transition from military authoritarian rule in 1987, Korea quickly became the most powerful democracy in East Asia other than Japan. But the onset of a major economic crisis revealed the dark side of the Korean model of democracy. With that crisis, and the subsequent election of the country's most determined opposition figure as president, serious questions have arisen about the new democracy's vitality.
The military campaign unleashed in Chechnya in September 1999 was portrayed by the Russian leadership as a limited and carefully targeted counter-terrorist operation aimed at eliminating the threat to Russia posed by "international terrorism." In a 14 November article in the New York Times, then Prime Minister Putin sought to deflect American criticism of Russian actions and to win acquiescence, if not sympathy, by likening Russias effort in Chechnya to U.S. anti-terrorist actions.
The proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is now the single most serious security concern for governments around the world. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz compare how military threats, strategic cultures, and organizations shape the way leaders intend to employ these armaments. They reveal the many frightening ways that emerging military powers and terrorist groups are planning the unthinkable by preparing to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in future conflicts.
The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project was initiated in 1997 to study the diffusion and absorption of the Internet to, and within, many diverse countries. This research has resulted in an ongoing series of reports and articles that have developed an analytic framework for evaluating the Internet within countries and applied it to more than 25 countries. (See http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/gdi.html for links to some of these reports and articles.)