The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security has formulated an encompassing working definition of global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs) that reflects diverse sources of risk and mechanisms...
The fact that biological weapons have never been used—at least in recent history—is not sufficient reason to dismiss concerns that terrorists or nations could acquire and use dangerous pathogens as...
In an article published by the Council on Foreign Relations' Foreign Affairs magazine, David Relman and Marc Lipsitch examine recent advances in biological engineering as well as lapses in...
This issue of CHP/PCOR's Quarterly Update covers news from the Winter 2008 quarter and includes articles about: the Russian Mortality Crisis and the effect of Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign on...
A National Academies panel commissioned by the State Department shed new light on a disturbing and still mysterious episode. Employees in the Cuban embassy reported headaches, pressure, nausea,...
Biosecurity leaders gathered at Stanford this week to offer new ideas and perspectives on a wide range of issues critical to societal health.The conference, “Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity,” began...
The United States needs better oversight of risky biological research to reduce the likelihood of a bioengineered super virus escaping from the lab or being deliberately unleashed, according three...
Abstract: The threat of biological catastrophes-- stemming from natural, accidental or intentional causes-- looms ever larger as populations urbanize, global temperatures rise, and the access to...
Abstract: Against a backdrop of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases of natural origin, fueled by changes in land use and global climate, there is an ongoing revolution in the life sciences...
The Nation's capacity to respond to bioterrorism depends in part on the ability of clinicians and public health officials to detect, manage, and communicate during a bioterrorism event.
Introduction to Issues in International Security is a collaboration between the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE).
Dr. Megan J. Palmer is the Executive Director of Bio Policy and Leadership Initiatives at Stanford University, Adjunct Professor in the department of Bioengineering, and Affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation.
