Democratic Governance and the Performance of Democracy

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About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)

CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law.
One of the most striking features of the growth of the “third wave” of global democratic expansion that began in 1974 has been its persistence. Yet there are worrisome signs of a democratic rollback in the world. First, the number of democracies in the world leveled off in the mid-1990s at about 120, and has not changed dramatically since then; according to Freedom House, there were 119 electoral democracies at the beginning of 2009. Since 1995, the percentage of states that could be called electoral democracies has oscillated within a narrow margin, between about 60 and 63 percent of all the independent states of the world. Second, levels of freedom in the world, as measured by Freedom House, have been declining for three straight years, as the number of countries with deteriorating freedom scores has significantly outstripped the number with improving scores.

Third, the incidence of democratic breakdowns has been increasing in the world during this long third wave. About one of every five democracies that have existed during the third wave has been reversed. And the incidence is rising. Of the 29 breakdowns of democracy in this 35-year period, 17 (about sixty percent) have occurred just in the last decade, since the military coup that overthrew democracy in Pakistan. Many of these breakdowns have occurred in large and strategically important states, such as Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Thailand, the Philippines and Bangladesh.
Of course, these negative trends are related. When democracy is lost freedom levels decline. But beyond this, many remaining democracies have relatively poor and declining freedom scores. There is a significant correlation between the quality of democracy and the political stability, legitimacy, and progress toward consolidation of democracy. All of the democracies that have broken down since 1999 were also illiberal, and a number of them had gradually been getting more so over time (see Table 1). Fragile democracies suffer similar problems (Table 2). But these troubled and failed democracies suffer from other problems as well. Generally speaking:

1. *They are poor.* It can no longer be said that poor countries are condemned to fail if they attempt to govern themselves through democracy. But poverty does reduce the margin for error and exacerbates other problems. Not all the democratically troubled states are poor. But they have other problems….

2. *They are poorly governed.* Most of the failed and deeply troubled democracies of the world fall into the bottom third of states in the world in controlling corruption. Three are in the top ten percent of “most corrupt.” And in addition, their states are simply not very effective. The relevant World Bank “Governance Matters” measure looks at perceptions of the quality and independence of the civil service, and of public services and policy formulation and implementation more generally.4 Naturally, post-conflict states like Liberia, Sierra-Leone, and East Timor are near the bottom in this category, but so are other countries on this list with feeble states that are highly personalized and politicized, including Haiti and Guinea-Bissau.

3. *They are politically unstable,* with significant levels of politically motivated violence, or a recent history of such that has not been put to rest, or a more general diffuse
sense that the government is fragile and could be overthrown. Thus some of these countries have depended for their stability on the presence of international troops, or the readiness of external powers to deploy troops if necessary to prevent a renewed descent into anarchy.

4. *They are deeply polarized on class, ethnic, or other lines of cleavage.* In Africa, the cleavages run along ethnic lines. In Bolivia and Ecuador, class divisions coincide with regional ones and with a deep ethnic cleavage between the indigenous peoples and those of European descent. In Bangladesh, the source of the paralyzing cleavage lies in the enmity between the two principal parties.

5. *Executive power is seriously abused.* Several of these countries have presidents with grandiose political projects that they believe require them to concentrate and aggrandize power. In some countries it is to remake the country along populist-left policy lines, while redistributing wealth and power to the countries’ historically dispossessed indigenous majorities (and to themselves and their supporters). In others it is to establish or maintain an ethnic, family, or party hegemony. But the outcome is always some version of the same: bad governance.

**Democratic Persistence and Democratic Performance**

I offer two propositions: Democracies last longer when they perform better. And when democracies have higher quality they also tend to perform better. These are testable propositions, and for some of them there is a considerable accumulation of evidence. One of the most
comprehensive quantitative studies of regime endurance (1950-90), by Adam Przeworski and his
colleagues, found a direct, steady relationship between the per capita income of a democracy and
its probability of dying in any given year. The richer a country, the lower is the probability that
democracy will fail. But more significantly for our purposes here, at every level of economic
development (up until the upper-middle-income level of $10,000 in current 2009 purchasing
power parity dollars), democracy is more vulnerable to collapse when the economy shrinks. As
Przeworski et al. note, “deaths of democracies follow a clear pattern: They are more likely when
a country experiences an economic crisis, and in most cases they are accompanied by one.”5

More recently, Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse reported a similar finding for young
democracies in the period from 1960 to 2004. They found that “higher GDP growth is
significantly associated with a reduced probability of democratic reversal,” while “high rates of
inflation in any one year were significantly associated with a substantial rise in the probability of
democratic reversal.”6 In other words, good economic performance helps to sustain
democracies and bad performance damages it.

In contrast to many findings and arguments in favor of parliamentary systems as more
stable, Kapstein and Converse found no support for the greater vulnerability of presidential
systems. The key political institutional variable in their analysis is the strength of constraints on
executive power. They write: “In cases where [institutional] constraints on the executive are
weak, democracy is reversed just over 70 percent of the time, compared to only 40 percent of the
time when constraints are strong.”7 In fact, this result proved strikingly robust. Thus they
“stress the importance of assessing the actual balance of power in new democracies, regardless
of whether the regime type is parliamentary or presidential.”8

This is precisely the argument of Steven Fish, who (with Matthew Kroenig) has
developed an index of parliamentary powers that cuts across the presidential/parliamentary distinction. Fish does finds that the power of legislatures at the moment of constitutional founding predicts the overall degree of democracy a decade or so later, much better than the other way around. In brief, countries with stronger parliaments at the outset eventually become freer; those with weaker parliaments do not. At least two causal mechanisms seem to be at work. In the absence of strong legislatures (and broader constraints on executive authority) elected executives tend to abuse and aggrandize their power, diminishing the quality of democracy. Second, “Legislative weakness also inhibits democratization by undermining the development of political parties. In polities with weak legislatures, political parties drift and stagnate rather than develop and mature.” As a result, citizens find it difficult to control to exercise vertical accountability over their elected representatives. It should be noted that each of these consequences—weak constraints on the executive, abuse of executive power, and weak, shapeless, feckless political parties—has been associated in the historical case study literature with democratic crisis and breakdown. Across the former communist states, there is a striking association between the initial failures to adopt strong legislatures and the rise or persistence of authoritarianism. And the relationship extends to Africa as well. Those African countries that adopted stronger parliamentary powers in their new constitutions during the early 1990s, like Ghana, Namibia, and Benin, became more democratic over time.

What the People Think

There is one additional source of evidence that is worth reviewing. That is what the people think about the performance of their own governments, as measured in public opinion
surveys. These surveys show that citizens are able to make discriminating judgments about the performance of their political systems on different dimensions of the quality of democracy, and that good political performance engenders support for democracy.

Beginning in the 1990s, surveys of public opinion in new democracies began to uncover what has become a recurrent finding. The legitimacy of democracy—as measured both directly by support for democracy as the best form of government and indirectly by the rejection of explicit authoritarian alternatives—seems to be shaped as much or more by the political performance of democracy as by its economic performance. Good political performance—in the sense that citizens perceive greater levels of political freedom, truly free and fair elections, or some other dimension of democracy or good governance—appears to be associated with higher levels of public support for democracy. During the 1990s Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer found that the most powerful determinants of rejection of authoritarian alternatives in the new postcommunist democracies of Europe were political: a negative evaluation of the former communist regime and the perception of greater political freedom in the new democratic regime. Moreover, objective indicators reinforced the pattern of subjective assessments: The degree of increase in the Freedom House ratings of a country had an independent positive effect on this measure of democratic legitimacy. However, economic experiences and perceptions also mattered to the growth of democratic legitimacy. Absolute deprivation in particular depressed support for democracy. To a lesser but still significant extent, higher household income and future expectations for the household and macro economy increased support for democracy.\textsuperscript{11}

Public opinion surveys in South Africa in the mid-1990s found what appeared to be “a close association between people’s beliefs about ethics and corruption on one hand, and their views on parliament and democracy.” Of those who believe that “almost all officials” are
corrupt, only 22 percent were satisfied with democracy. As perceptions of corruption abated, the levels of satisfaction rose, to 51 percent satisfied for those seeing “a few officials” as corrupt and 68 percent for those who believed no officials are corrupt. Assessments of the performance of parliament and of the national government, and a wide variety of other political factors, such as the feeling that “government represents people like me,” were also strongly associated with satisfaction with democracy.

Recent data from the Afrobarometer, conducted in 19 countries in 2008, point more strongly in the same direction. First, citizens seem quite able to judge reasonably well the extent of democracy in their country. At least, their assessments correlate very strongly (.68) with the combined scores on political rights and civil liberties of Freedom House. It seems the more that independent expert observers judge a country to be democratically governed, the more its people do as well. Second public judgments of the extent of democracy are substantially correlated (.45) with the satisfaction with the way that democracy is working in the country. Most people (81 percent) who are satisfied with democracy perceive that it is extensively supplied by the regime. But a majority of those not satisfied with democracy’s performance (63%) do not see an extensive supply of democracy.

Encouragingly, both the Afrobarometer and the Asian Barometer have shown that citizens are capable of making discrete judgments about different dimensions of the quality of democracy. In Africa, recent analysis shows that an overall index of democratic quality is strongly related to an aggregate measure of the supply of democracy (correlation = .795).

The Latin American data are not yet statistically analyzed in the same way, but liberal democracies like Costa Rica and Uruguay generally show strong support for and satisfaction with democracy, while some of the worst performing democracies, in the rest of Central
America, show difficulty on both measures. The breakdown of democracy in Honduras this year was foreshadowed by a decline from 31 percent to 24 percent (from 2007 to 2008) in the percentage satisfied with democracy (though support for democracy rose somewhat). Violence-ridden Guatemala also performs dismally on these measures, and is also at risk of failing.\textsuperscript{16}

Often the decline or demise of democracy is indicated by changes in public opinion in troubled democracies. Support for democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy was working declined precipitously in both the Philippines and Nigeria between 2001 and 2005. In each case, the deterioration occurred in the midst of palpable deterioration in the political performance of democracy, epitomized in particular by the revelations of electoral fraud. Declines in support for and especially satisfaction with democracy in Nigeria were heavily correlated with the collapse of trust in the president (who was by then beginning his campaign to breach the spirit of the constitution and try to bribe the National Assembly into allowing him to run for a third term) and with a dramatic drop, from 64\% to 36\%, in the proportion of Nigerians who believed the government was working to control corruption. By contrast, as one of the founders of the Afrobarometer, Michael Bratton, has shown, there is strong evidence from Africa that declines in support for democracy can be reversed and refreshed by electoral alternation. The more recent an election that produced a change in the ruling party, “the more optimistic citizens tended to be” and the more they tended to perceive “substantial increases in the extent of democracy.”\textsuperscript{17} In other words, when democracy works to deliver, for example, vertical accountability, citizens recognize it and appreciate it.
The Imperative of Controlling Corruption

There is a common, core problem in all badly governed democracies: pervasive corruption, cronyism, clientelism, and abuse of power. To change the way government works means changing the way politics and society work, changing the values and expectations of how people will behave when they acquire power and control over resources. That, in turn, requires sustained attention to how public officials utilize their offices.

Constraining the potential abuse of power by executives is only one part of the challenge of achieving a democracy that delivers. Legislatures can be corrupt, too. So can courts. If democracy is really to deliver and to become deeply and enduringly valued by its people, then it needs a comprehensive system of overlapping checks and balances to monitor, constrain, expose, and punish the abuse of power. We call this a system of “horizontal accountability.”

Integrity and transparency in government are best achieved when state agencies of horizontal accountability interlock and overlap in a systemic fashion. Overlapping authority ensures that if one agency fails in its duty to expose, question, punish, and deter corrupt behavior, another may initiate the process. Interlocking authority allows different agencies to become reinforcing, so that, for example, an audit agency uncovers fraud, a counter-corruption commission imposes civil penalties for it, the judiciary presses for criminal penalties, and an ombudsman stands by to investigate and report. Each overlapping and interlocking institution benefits from specific types of reforms to help sustain democracy. Some key obvious key elements of a comprehensive system of horizontal accountability are as follows:

First, the Law must clearly and effectively prohibit bribery and misuse of public funds. But more than this, it must forbid conflicts of interest and require public officials to make their
personal and family finances transparent. Actual corruption control requires that higher-level elected officials, political appointees, civil servants, military officers, and police officers declare their assets upon taking office, every year thereafter, and whenever their assets change in some significant, defined way. Declarations of assets should be filed with a counter-corruption commission, and made available for public inspection, ideally on the Internet.

*Second is the need for Freedom of Information,* giving citizens the legal right to request and receive information on all functions and decisions of government that are not a matter of national security or an infringement on individual rights of privacy. In the fight against corruption, the public must have access to information on government finance, procurement, and contracting, posted on the Internet in timely fashion. All government procurement above a modest, defined level should be done through competitive bidding that is advertised on government websites.

*Third is the need for tough Anti-Corruption Bodies.* Control of corruption requires a specific body to scrutinize the conduct of public officials for signs of malfeasance. The body must have the authority not only to receive but also to monitor and verify the assets declarations of all high-level elected and appointed officials, including cabinet ministers, provincial governors, and members of parliament. The commission must have the resources to annually investigate some significant percentage of officials’ declarations on a random basis and the country’s highest officials’ declarations systematically.

Scrutiny must be comprehensive if it is to be effective and if the threat of detection is to be credible. Necessary staff include accountants, investigators, and lawyers trained in the ways that wealth is moved, accumulated, and hidden. And they must be paid enough to deter temptation and establish a high esprit de corps. Counter-corruption bodies cannot succeed when
there is a severe (and as often happens, deliberate) shortage of resources.\textsuperscript{18}

If credible evidence of wrongdoing emerges, there must be an institutional means to try the suspected offender and impose punishment on the guilty. The single most crippling flaw in systems of corruption control is an inability to enforce this function free from interference by the highest levels of government. Counter-corruption bodies need the ability to prosecute suspected offenders before independent tribunals.

\textit{Fourth, an ombudsman's office} receives and investigates public complaints of abuses of office. It can provide a “redundant,” overlapping channel available to the public in the case that the counter-corruption commission does not seem to be doing its job or judges some abuse of power to lie outside its scope of authority. Members of the counter-corruption commission should also know that they themselves could be exposed to public outcry if they fail to move aggressively on evidence of corruption.

\textit{Fifth, Public Audits.} A dense, overlapping system of accountability requires that all major government bureaus, agencies, and ministries have their accounts regularly audited, and that they be open to inspection and evaluation of their performance more generally. To conduct these checks, each major government agency or bureau should have its own auditing office and inspector-general. Periodic external audits are also essential. The government should have an office of the auditor-general with the authority to conduct external audits on a periodic or random basis and responsibility for conducting an audit on any agency at any time when there is evidence of wrongdoing. One model is the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the United States, which is the investigative arm of, and is responsible to, the U.S. Congress, thus giving it substantial autonomy from executive-branch agencies.

These are only some of the mechanisms of controlling corruption and abuse of power.
No less important are parliamentary investigative committee, independent courts and electoral commissions, and statutory regulatory bodies.

Making Accountability Work

At this point many people yawn and say, “We know all this.” But if we know all this, why do we so frequently get so little real accountability in emerging (and even well established) democracies? The problem is not lack of knowledge, but lack of political will to have these institutions function seriously to control corruption and improve the quality of governance. The challenge is not simply to structure a system of horizontal accountability on paper, but to give it the authority, autonomy, and resources to do its job. The problems begin with the power to appoint. If a country cannot get high quality, vigorous, nonpartisan professionals into positions of horizontal accountability, all is lost. Institutions that look promising in scope and design are often vitiated because it is the president (or prime minister) who appoints their leaders, and an executive who has fought his or her way to the top in even a partially corrupt system is not going to welcome serious mechanisms of accountability.

Officials of accountability agencies must be appointed, funded, and supervised in ways that cannot be subverted or suborned. Once independent appointments are made, officials must have significant tenure, removable only for established cause, and then by complex and difficult means. In the United States, the GAO’s independence is supported by the relatively lengthy tenure of its head, the Comptroller General, who serves a fixed fifteen-year term.

The problem of neutrality has particularly vexed designs for electoral administration, one of the most sensitive of regulatory functions. In political systems with a tradition of corruption
and abuse of power, and in which democratic norms are not deeply rooted, the electoral administration must have constitutional autonomy. There are a number of possible models. In Costa Rica, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is virtually a fourth branch of government, whose members are elected to staggered six-year terms by a two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court. In India, the electoral commission’s independence is protected by explicit constitutional mandate and by a powerful chairman who is appointed by the nonpartisan president. In other countries, independence is attained through supervision by a judicial body or by being made accountable to the parliament rather than the executive branch.

There is plenty of room for innovation. The key point is this: If agencies of accountability do not have rigorous constitutional and legal autonomy, effective leadership, and ample human and financial resources, they will fail, because the interests with a stake in ensuring they fail are just too powerful. Change will only come with concerted coalitions for reform—from below, in civil society, from within the state and political system itself (among reform elements) and from outside, in the donor community.

Policy Implications

We need some tough and unsentimental consideration of how to generate the incentives for far-reaching reform of accountability structures. After more than four decades and over half a trillion dollars in aid, much of Africa remains about as poor as it was at independence. Yet aid to Africa has more than tripled in the past two decades, with little in the way of hard accountability. Around the world, aid continues to flow profusely to governments that have shown little or no inclination to control corruption. Despite tough talk about “good governance,”
it is still largely business as usual: predatory governments pretend to be promoting development, and the donors profess to be aiding it. The losers are the people of these so-called “developing countries,” who lack the schools, clinics, medicines, roads, housing, irrigation, sanitation, drinking water, credit, and justice that they need to be productive—or even survive—because ruling elites have stolen the resources.

The answer is not to simply double what we are already doing, with an indiscriminate increase in foreign aid. In too many badly governed countries around the world, that will simply mean more indiscriminate enrichment of corrupt politicians and officials, and more stimulus to violent conflict as contending elites struggle to get control of the booty. I am all for more aid, but only so long as it can either go directly to human beings in need or be used as a lever to improve governance.

We can begin by building on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which operates on the basis of incentives and “selectivity.” There have been problems with the MCA. The new principles of ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and investing in people still govern only a small proportion of overall US foreign aid, much of the rest of which continues to flow to deeply corrupt governments. Moreover, MCA assistance is awarded on a curve, so if most of the potential recipients have high levels of corruption and malfeasance, the aid simply goes to the “less bad.” There is no coherent strategy to demand that countries get serious about controlling corruption—by constructing strong institutions of accountability to uncover and punish it. And while other donors are gingerly moving toward good governance standards, only the U.S. has established an entire aid program based on these principles.

We need bolder reform. First, the entire American foreign aid budget should be organized around MCA principles, with a particular emphasis on institutions to control
corruption. Countries serious about governance and development should be rewarded with substantial aid increases. Venal governments should be largely cut off from official aid flows (unless the president signs and Congress approves a waiver for explicit national security reasons). Each country should come up with its own plan, as a result of free and spirited public discussion. But any credible plan must include some key components: a free press, an independent judiciary, and robust institutions of accountability, such as a counter-corruption commission, ombudsman, and audit agencies. Once they are established and given the necessary authority, the donors should provide generous financial and technical assistance to help train and equip them. This is one area that could really use more financial assistance, if the political will was there to make use of it.

Second, the practice of relieving the debts of bad governments, only to have them pile up fresh debt in new frenzies of corruption, should end. Future debts of low-income countries should not be forgiven in one fell swoop, but should be suspended and retired incrementally (for example, at 10 percent per year for every year that countries adhere to good-governance standards). Also, we need a new international legal effort to discourage and stigmatize the accumulation of odious debt by bad, irresponsible regimes.

Third, we need a global effort to promote accountability in aid programs. The World Bank should pursue more radical reform of its own structures and practices, both to root out corruption in its own projects and to insist on better governance as a condition for aid. The whole logic of global aid institutions has to change, so that officials are rewarded for stimulating real development, not for pushing money out the door.

Finally, we need a fundamental reorganization of American institutions to promote development. In its current badly understaffed, over-bureaucratized, demoralized state—still
lacking an Administrator, and too heavily reliant on for-profit corporations to implement its programs—the U.S. Agency for International Development cannot be the agent of a global “new deal” for development. It needs elevated status, control over its own budget and strategy, a dramatic expansion of career staff (back to the levels of the 1960s), enhancement of its democracy and governance assistance programs, and more capacity to move quickly into changing circumstances with diffuse engagement and small grants.

The battle for accountability and good governance—and thus sustainable democracy and development—will not be won by foreign actors or pressures. The most that international actors can do is to empower and partner with advocates of good governance—which includes freedom, human rights, accountability, and a rule of law. But throughout the emerging market countries, societies are organizing and demanding for these goals. It’s about time we gave them the full measure of political, financial and technical support they need to bring about a revolution in governance—a revolution that will transform the possibilities for democracy and development.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Freedom Scores, Year Before Democratic Reversal</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP PPP$, Yr of reversal*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan 1999</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia 2000</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>8,030</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal 2002</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>1,420</td>
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<td>Nigeria 2003</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela 2005</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>6,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand 2006</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>8,440</td>
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<td>Philippines 2007</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>3,730</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya 2007</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>1,540</td>
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<td>Georgia 2008</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>4,850</td>
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<td>Mauritania 2008</td>
<td>4,4</td>
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<td>Honduras 2009</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>3,880</td>
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<td>Madagascar 2009</td>
<td>4,3</td>
<td>1,040</td>
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<td>Niger 2009</td>
<td>3,4</td>
<td>680</td>
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*figures in some cases are off by one year
Table 2
Low-Quality and At-Risk Electoral Democracies, 2009

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4,4 4,4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>Political party polarization, corruption</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3, 3 3,3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4,140</td>
<td>Severe Political Polarization on class and ideological lines, constitutional disputes, presidential populism</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>4,5 3,5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>Highly illiberal democracy, ethnic polarization</td>
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<td>East Timor</td>
<td>3,4 3,3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>Ethnic tensions, weak state</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3,3 3,3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7,760</td>
<td>Severe Political Polarization, presidential populism</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3,4 4,4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>4,690</td>
<td>Severe inequality, high levels of violence and human rights abuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>4,4 3,4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>530</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>4,5 7,6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>Weak state, extensive violence and corruption</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>3,4 4,4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Weak state, post-conflict</td>
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<td>33.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>Tendency to executive abuse of power</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>32.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>3,210</td>
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<td>21.3</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>Ideological polarization, abusive president</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3,3 2,3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>Presidential abuse of power</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,3 4,3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>Weak state, post-conflict</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4,4 3,3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>4,480</td>
<td>Growing abuse of power, human rights violations, ethnic polarization persists in wake of civil war</td>
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</table>
1. For elaboration, see Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy*, chapter 3.
3. Some scholars prefer to view the surge of transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, beginning in 1989, as a “fourth wave” of democratic transitions in the world; see for example, Michael McFaul…. However, according to the theory of democratic waves propounded by Samuel Huntington in his famous book, *The Third Wave: Global Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), a wave of democratic expansion comes to an end only when it is terminated by a reverse wave, during which the transitions away from democracy substantially exceed the transitions to democracy. Since 1974, the world has not experienced such a clear and sustained reverse wave.
8. Ibid.
16. See the 2008 annual report of the Latinobarometer.