Emerging Land Issues in African Agriculture:
Implications for food security and poverty reduction strategies

T.S. Jayne, Jordan Chamberlin, and Milu Muyanga¹

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¹ All authors are with Michigan State University’s Food Security Group, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics. Jayne, International Development Professor, is currently resident at the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute in Lusaka, Zambia. Chamberlin and Muyanga are PhD candidates at MSU.
Abstract

Despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 contains much of the world’s unutilized and underutilized arable land, a significant and growing share of Africa’s farm households live in densely populated areas. Based on two alternative spatial databases capable of estimating populations at the level of one square kilometer and distinguishing between arable and non-arable land, we find that in at least five of the 10 countries analyzed, 25 percent of the rural population resides in areas exceeding 500 persons per square kilometer, estimated by secondary sources as an indicative maximum carrying capacity for areas of rain-fed agriculture in the region. The apparent paradox of a large proportion of Africa’s rural population living in densely populated conditions amidst a situation of massive unutilized land is resolved when the unit of observation is changed from land units to people.

A review of nationally representative farm surveys shows a tendency of (1) declining mean farm size over time within densely populated smallholder farming areas; (2) great disparities in landholding size within smallholder farming areas, leading to highly concentrated and skewed patterns of farm production and marketed surplus; (3) half or more of rural farm households are either buyers of grain or go hungry because they are too poor to afford to buy food; most households in this category control less than one hectare of land; and (4) a high proportion of farmers in densely populated areas perceive that it is not possible for them to acquire more land through customary land allocation procedures, even in areas where a significant portion of land appears to be unutilized.

Ironically, there has been little recognition of the potential challenges associated with increasingly densely populated and land-constrained areas of rural Africa, despite the fact that a sizeable and increasing share of its rural population live in such areas. Inadequate access to land and inability to exploit available unutilized land are issues that almost never feature in national development plans or poverty reduction strategies. In fact, since the rise of world food prices after the mid-2000s, many African governments have made concerted efforts to transfer land out of customary tenure systems (where the majority of rural people reside) to the state or to private individuals who, it is argued, can more effectively exploit the productive potential of the land to meet national food security objectives. Such efforts have nurtured the growth of a relatively well-capitalized class of “emergent” African farmers. The growing focus on how best to exploit unutilized land in Africa has arguably diverted attention from the more central and enduring challenge of implementing agricultural development strategies that effectively address the continent’s massive rural poverty and food insecurity problems, which require recognizing the growing land constraints faced by much of its still agrarian-based population. The final section of the paper considers research and policy options for addressing these problems.
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Introduction

In his 2010 Presidential Address of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Thomas Hertel raised the specter of a Malthusian “perfect storm” hitting the world’s arable land base. Could the rising demand for food, increased use of farmland for fuel, more extreme weather events, and reactive responses by rattled governments quickly exhaust the world’s remaining arable land? There is widespread agreement that accelerating productivity growth on existing farmland has the brightest prospects for relieving these pressures. But under very plausible scenarios, the global demand for new farmland could rise sharply, potentially triggering a rush for new arable land. Ironically, sub-Saharan Africa, the most food insecure continent in the world, has the largest and cheapest supply of unutilized arable land in the world (Fischer and Shah 2010).

This study assesses the potential impacts of rising demand for agricultural land in Africa in the context of the continent’s longstanding challenges: how to address its hunger problems and the livelihoods of its poor people, the majority of whom live in rural areas.

Our study is motivated by the need to understand the nature and magnitude of land constraints in African agriculture, the impacts of status-quo policies on food security and poverty, and the implications for development strategy. To our knowledge, there has been little recognition of the potential challenges associated with increasingly densely populated and land-constrained areas of rural Africa. Nor has there been sufficient discussion of how institutions and policies relating to land would need to be modified to provide the greatest prospects for achieving broad-based agricultural growth and reducing rural poverty.

The paper begins by casting these issues within two important conceptual models of development economics: the structural transformation and induced innovation processes. The structural transformation process has long been considered by development economists to be the main route through which poverty and hunger in Africa would be overcome. A major feature of the structural transformation processes achieved in other parts of the world was broad-based and small farm-led agricultural growth (Johnston and Kilby 1975; Mellor 1976; Lipton 2005). This paper examines the potential for this kind of growth in light of evidence that a growing proportion of the rural population is either landless or resides on farms under one hectare, dependent on rain-fed agriculture in semiarid conditions, largely unable to feed themselves, and increasingly vulnerable to pressures on customary authorities to relinquish land to non-local interests. The paper also draws upon theories of induced innovation (Binswanger and Ruttan 1978) to explain

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2 Fischer and Shah’s assessment is reported in Deininger and Byerlee 2011 (p.xxxiv). Of the 445.6 million hectares of uncultivated arable land in the world, 201.5 million hectares are in sub-Saharan Africa; over 60 percent more than in Latin America, which has the next most uncultivated arable land.

3 In recent years, a small number of scholars have questioned whether Africa’s development will follow this structural transformation trajectory (e.g., Collier and Dercon 2009), an issue taken up later in this paper.
how rising land pressures in many parts of Africa are likely to be affecting the evolution of farming systems and the welfare of African farmers.

The paper then presents recent household panel survey analysis on the distribution of land within African farming systems and the impacts of rising population densities on household behavior and welfare. We consider the potential for an agricultural development strategy focused on large-scale commercialized farms to absorb rural labor and support broader structural transformation processes. The final section of the paper considers the implications of these findings for the design of land policies that are holistically integrated with agricultural and poverty reduction strategies in Africa.

Data

This study draws on two types of data. The first are detailed spatial databases of rural populations and arable land. Estimates of rural population density are derived from two sources: the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) at Columbia University and the AfriPop Project hosted at the University of Florida. Both datasets provide gridded estimates of population densities at the level of one square kilometer grid cells, based on census data at the most localized units available. GRUMP and AfriPop differ principally in the means of allocation: the GRUMP separates the urban and rural components of local population, with the rural portion being equally allocated to all rural grid cells contained in the most disaggregated spatial reporting unit of the most recent census. The AfriPop dataset uses remotely-sensed data on land cover to weight this allocation, such that cells corresponding to areas with evidence of human settlement receive higher allocation weights (than, say, a cell that corresponds to forest or desert). Given the different sets of assumptions built into the construction of these datasets, both datasets are used to give robustness to our analytical conclusions.

Information on the portion of arable land within each grid cell was obtained from the Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ) 3.0 database. The GAEZ data consist of gridded estimates of local land and agro-climatic resources -- including soils, terrain, land cover, and a variety of climatic indicators -- as well as derived estimates of agricultural suitability and potential yields for a variety of commodities under given management levels. Drawing from the land cover components of the GAEZ database, the authors assembled three definitions of “arable land”: areas classified as (a) under cultivation; (b) under cultivation or grassland; and (c) under cultivation or grassland or forest/woodland. Analysis in this paper presents population density estimates based on definition (b). Future analysis will evaluate the robustness of our analyses to alternative definitions,

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5 Data available from http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/atatem/index_files/AfriPop.htm. See Tatem et al. (2007) for a description of the methods used to compile the dataset.
6 We excluded grid cells categorized as rural that exceed 2,000 persons per km² based on the assumption that population densities over this level were approaching peri-urban status or were mis-categorized.
with classification (a) reflecting currently available farmland, and (b) and (c) reflecting potential available farmland if sufficient costs are incurred to convert grassland and forest land to farming.\(^8\)

Use of these data allows for much greater localized variation in rural population densities than would be possible if estimated at more aggregated spatial units. As will be shown, this leads to some surprising insights.

The second source of data is drawn from farm household surveys. These datasets are generally nationally representative and carried out by the official national statistical agencies or by local universities. Details of data sets reported in this study are contained in Jayne et al. (2010).\(^9\)

**Conceptual framework: The role of land in affecting development trajectories**

*Structural transformation*

Smallholder-led structural transformation is considered by most development economists to be the major pathway from a semi-subsistence agrarian society to a more prosperous, food secure, and diversified economy. The pioneering work of Johnston and Mellor (1961), Johnston and Kilby (1975), and Mellor (1976) first documented the structural transformation process in the regions of Asia that experienced Green Revolutions. The structural transformation process starts with an exogenous productivity shock (e.g., the creation and mass adoption of new farm technology), causing a build-up of purchasing power by millions of small farmers. These millions of farmers subsequently spend and recycle more money through the economy, igniting demand and employment growth in non-farm sectors, which in turn increases the demand for food and other farm products in a virtuous cycle in which the rural and urban labor forces provide a market for each other. Rising demand for food and fiber products attracts private investment flows into the storage, transport, processing, and retailing stages of commodity value chains, further expanding employment and diversifying the economy. Over time, broad-based income growth causes the share of food in overall consumption to fall, making available more disposable income to fuel the development of non-farm sectors. As the demand for non-farm goods and services rise, the labor force responds by shifting gradually from the farm to non-farm sectors, the demand for education and job skills rises, and the economy becomes increasingly diversified and urban. Rural households are pulled off the farm by better paying non-farm jobs, not pushed into low-paying desperation jobs in the towns due to poor prospects in agriculture.

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\(^8\) Land pressures would be intensified further after accounting for land required for grazing and fallow. Rotational systems involving fallowing are necessary in many areas of Africa, e.g., Myiombo woodlands, where soils are leached and acidic. Under currently available technologies, there would be major constraints on sustainable intensification that involved the elimination of fallows (Holden, Otsuka, and Place 2009). Land issues that are particular to pastoral communities, while important, are outside the scope of this study.

\(^9\) Each of these survey instruments, which contain the details of the types of information collected and used in this study, can be viewed and downloaded at [http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/kenya/index.htm](http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/kenya/index.htm) and [http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/zambia/index.htm](http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/zambia/index.htm).
Recently, the feasibility of a small-farm based structural transformation in Africa has been questioned by some scholars (e.g., Collier and Dercon 2009), and, by their actions, a growing number of African policy makers. These views have been bolstered by frustration over the slow rate of development in African agriculture. There is increasing receptivity to viewing large-scale farm development in Africa at least as a complement if not an alternative to broad-based smallholder-led agricultural growth.

Yet, clearly, agricultural growth alone is not sufficient for poverty reduction; the distribution of the growth is critical. Johnston and Kilby (1975), Mellor (1976) and more recently Deininger and Squire (1998) and Vollrath (2007) have demonstrated that relatively egalitarian land distribution patterns have tended to generate more broadly based growth, and consequently higher rates of economic growth than in cases where land distribution was highly concentrated. The basic reason for this is that broad-based agricultural growth tends to generate greater second-round expenditures in support of local non-tradable goods and services in rural areas and towns. These multiplier effects tend to be much weaker when the source of agricultural growth is concentrated in relatively few hands. Another argument for small-farm led development has to do with the productivity advantages of farms operated primarily with family labor as opposed to hired labor (Hayami and Otsuka 1993; Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995; Vollrath 2007). Thus the rate of growth is likely to be affected by the distribution of assets in the agricultural sector, particularly land.

Moreover, evidence indicates that not only does the initial distribution of assets affect the rate of economic growth, but it also affects the poverty-reducing effects of the growth that does occur. For example, Ravallion and Datt (2002) found that the initial percentage of landless households significantly affected the elasticity of poverty to non-farm output in India. In a sample of 69 countries, Gugerty and Timmer (1999) found that, in countries with an initial “good” distribution of assets, both agricultural and non-agricultural growth greatly benefitted the poorest households with positive poverty reducing effects. In countries with a “bad” distribution of assets, however, economic growth was skewed toward wealthier households, causing the gap between rich and poor to widen. It is especially noteworthy that in this latter group of countries, agricultural growth was associated with greater increases in inequality than was non-agricultural growth. Mellor, Johnston, Lipton and others clearly documented that productivity growth on millions of small farms in Green Revolution Asia was crucial to structural transformation and rapid poverty reduction. They contrasted the Asian experience with parts of Latin America, which also achieved agricultural growth, but not in an inclusive way. Latifundia estates expanded production impressively in many cases while millions of small peasant farms remained mired in poverty and were often dispossessed of their land.

A major lesson for
Africa from these contrasting experiences of smallholder-led Asia and estate-led Latin America is that for agricultural growth to rapidly reduce poverty, it must be broad-based.

*Land intensification and yield gaps*

The brightest prospects for agricultural-led structural transformation would be if it could be achieved through productivity-enhancing yield growth on currently utilized farmland. Productivity growth on existing farmland would both ease the demand for new farmland being brought into production as well as help to conserve the world’s remaining forests from being destroyed to meet rising food needs (Hertel 2011). Land productivity growth could occur either through yield growth or shifts in crop area to higher-valued crops or a combination of both. Farm surveys are already showing evidence of gradual increases in the share of cropped area devoted to high-return agricultural activities in some regions, especially on relatively small farms. Much greater potential for this form of productivity growth will depend on the pace of food and input market development, improvements in physical infrastructure, investments in commodity value chains for high-value commodities, and stable marketing and trade policies.

The potential for yield growth of the basic staples is enormous. Actual yields in sub-Saharan Africa show a persistently yawning gap compared to attainable yields, i.e., yields that could be attained if available technologies and management practices were used (Fischer, Byerlee and Edmeades 2009; Licker et al. 2010). Maize yields even in the breadbasket regions of Africa average roughly 25 percent of attainable yields, and seldom exceed 40 percent (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). Given that roughly half of all cropland in sub-Saharan Africa is devoted to staple grains, closing the yield gap even partially could simultaneously improve the world’s supply-demand food balance and contribute to rural poverty reduction in Africa.

However, given current food and input prices, it is unclear how far yield gaps could be narrowed in a way that would be profitable for farmers. Recent studies from the region show that recommended fertilizer application rates are often not profitable or are highly risky given the soil conditions and drought-prone environments that farmers live in (Xu et al. 2009; Marenya and Barrett 2009; Smaling et al 1992; Sheahan 2011; Burke 2011). Other studies conclude that optimal fertilizer application rates on maize appear to be much lower than official recommendations, and that these optimal levels are fairly close to observed application rates on farmers’ fields given existing input and output prices and reduce rural poverty even during periods of rapid agricultural growth (Lopez and Valdes 2000; World Bank 2009). Latin America has the most concentrated farm structure of all regions of the world. Landholding size Gini coefficients reported by Vollrath (2007) range from 0.81 for Latin America to 0.59 for South Asia to 0.49 for sub-Saharan Africa.

Farm survey data from Kenya and Zambia show that fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy, and other forms of animal production are rising as a share of total farm production, and that this trend is associated with improvements in the reliability of food markets (Jayne et al. 2010). In Kenya, horticulture production as a share of total farm production is especially high on small farms, suggesting that land-constrained households may, at the margin, be devoting more of their scarce area to crops with relatively high returns (Kimenju and Tschirley 2009).

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response rates (Matsumoto and Yamano 2011; Sheahan 2011). Improvements in agronomic practices and measures to reduce transport costs could promote the profitability of fertilizer use and lead to higher optimal application rates. Along with output market development, these interventions could help farmers to close the currently high yield gap.

Another factor that would help farmers around the world close the yield gap is increased global food prices (Hertel 2011). If global food prices should rise, as they are projected to do for at least the next ten years (e.g., OECD 2011), farmers may have greater incentives to intensify their use of modern inputs and to use more intensive management practices. The issue of which African farmers would be able to respond to these price incentives and the potential income distributional effects is treated later.

**Rising population densities and induced innovation**

Increasing rural population density is a third factor that may contribute to closing the yield gap in African food production. The ways in which increasing population density affects the evolution of farming systems was first laid out in the pioneering work of Esther Boserup (1965). Growing population densities, land scarcity, and access to markets generally lead to the intensification of land use, the development of land and labor markets, investments in land-augmenting practices such as irrigation and drainage, and the gradual emergence of individual property rights for land. These ideas were later formalized in Ruttan and Hayami’s (1971) theory of induced innovation, which explains how changes in relative prices of land, labor, and capital affect the evolution of farming systems to make more productive use of the scarce factor of production. Seminal works in the induced innovation literature (e.g., Binswanger and Pingali 1988; Binswanger and McIntire 1987) argued that increases in rural population density in sub-Saharan Africa should induce a number of changes including greater intensification of land through the use of fertilizer and improved seed, decreased fallows, investment in land-augmenting technologies such as irrigation and drainage, more labor time devoted to each unit of land cultivated (e.g., weeding labor per unit of land rises), the development of land, labor and informal financial markets, increased landlessness, and declining availability of common land for livestock (Table 1). Given this kind of innovation, Binswanger and McIntire (1987) argue that through input intensification farmers can raise land productivity (i.e., either increase yields or shift to crops that offer higher net returns per unit of land), and maintain or raise labor productivity growth even in the context of rising labor/land factor proportions. This literature has explained how agricultural systems in many parts of Africa have, over the past century, transitioned from one end of the continuum in Table 1, shifting cultivation, to the other side of the continuum, intensive annual or multiple cropping with less and less land being held in fallow to restore soil productivity.

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13 Reasons commonly stated for a secular rise in global food prices include rising incomes in populous middle-income countries such as China and India, the rising use of food for fuel, and the apparent tightening supply/demand balance in world oil markets.
Table 1. Farming systems evolution in response to rising population density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Forest fallow system</th>
<th>Bush fallow system</th>
<th>Short-fallow system</th>
<th>Annual cultivation system</th>
<th>Multiple cropping system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor-land ratios (reflecting pop. density)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land preparation</td>
<td>no land preparation</td>
<td>use of hoe to loosen soil</td>
<td>plow</td>
<td>animal-drawn plow</td>
<td>animal drawn plow and tractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilization</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>ash</td>
<td>manure, green manure</td>
<td>green manure, inorganic fertilizer</td>
<td>intensive use of inorganic fertilizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeding</td>
<td>minimal</td>
<td>required as length of fallow decreases</td>
<td>weeding</td>
<td>intensive weeding</td>
<td>intensive weeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallows</td>
<td>extensive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor proportions</td>
<td>Low labor/land and capital/land ratios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High labor/land and capital/land ratios</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Condensed and adapted from Binswanger and Pingali (1988) and Boserup (1965).

**Outstanding policy questions deriving from rising land pressures**

The induced innovation literature for the most part has not considered what lies beyond the last stage of Boserup’s farming systems continuum in the context of more intense land pressures and ever smaller farm sizes in increasingly densely populated rural areas. Can land intensification and productivity growth be sustained in a linear trajectory as population density rises without incurring diminishing returns from soil nutrient depletion, the elimination of fallows, and scale-diseconomies on ever smaller farm sizes?

There are several reasons why declining farm size below a minimum level might be associated with higher production and marketing costs. The first reason concerns soil nutrient depletion. Using cross sectional data from 37 African countries, Dreschel et al. (2001) confirm a significant relationship between population density, reduced fallow periods, and soil nutrient depletion in sub-Saharan Africa farming systems. In their view, rising rural population density is a major cause of declining per capita food production in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Restoring and improving soil fertility requires much more than nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, hence greater use of conventional inorganic fertilizers, while necessary, certainly will not be sufficient to reach attainable yields. Second, the efficiency advantages of small farms in relation to large-scale farms do not apply when comparing, for example, 4-hectare vs. 0.5-hectare farm sizes. There may be scale economies in input procurement, output marketing, and ability to obtain...
financing that may disadvantage small farms (Collier and Dercon 2009). Survey data regardless of location in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that farms below one hectare tend to be net buyers of staple food (Jayne et al. 2010). The FAO/IFDC argues that the “carrying capacity” of land for sub-Saharan Africa agriculture ranges between 100-500 persons per km² depending on agro-ecological potential for intensive production and market access conditions (Henao and Baanante 1999). The evidence presented below shows that a surprisingly high percentage of the rural population lives in areas exceeding this upper range.

In fact, most of sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a gradual but steady decline in mean farm size over the past 50 years as rural population growth has outstripped the growth in arable land. Table 2 shows the changes in the ratio of land cultivated to agricultural population over the past five decades for a number of African countries. About half of the countries in Table 2 show a substantial decline in land-to-labor ratios in agriculture. In Kenya’s case, for example, cultivated land per person in agriculture has declined from 0.462 hectares in the 1960s to 0.219 hectares in the 2000-08 period. A consistent story emerges from farm survey data; most but not all countries show a gradual decline in median and mean farm size over time. More comprehensive evidence of mounting population pressures and land constraints in smallholder agriculture and why they sometimes exist in environments of apparent land abundance are reserved for the following section.

Table 2. Hectares of arable land per person in agriculture (10 year average) in selected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO STAT (2010).

Notes: Data on land utilization is only available for the period 2000 to 2008. Land-to-person ratio = (arable land and permanent crops)/(agricultural population). For the periods 1960-69 and 1970-79, agricultural population is estimated by multiplying rural population by an adjustment factor (mean agricultural population 1980-84/mean rural population 1980-84). This is because data on agricultural population was only collected from 1980 onward.
The following basic model synthesizes the challenges for farming areas facing rising land pressures in a structured way. Labor productivity in agriculture (Y/L) is defined as the product of two terms: net farm income per unit of land (Y/A) and the ratio of land to labor (A/L).

\[
\frac{Y}{L} = \frac{Y}{A} \cdot \frac{A}{L}
\]

We focus on labor productivity in agriculture because it is normally considered to be the closest reflection of returns to labor in agriculture. Y is defined as net farm income (gross value of output minus all input costs such as seed, fertilizer, hired labor, etc., except own family labor). In most of the countries shown in Table 2, A/L appears to be declining over time, as rural population grows at a faster rate than arable land. This implies that in order for labor productivity to rise over time, the net value of output Y/A (net value of output per unit land), must rise faster than the ratio A/L declines.

Raising the growth rate of Y/A puts a major burden on technology and changes in farmer management practices to outpace the decline in A/L, which may be especially challenging in the decades to come due to likely changes in weather patterns (Schlenker and Lobell 2010). To reduce the dependence on technology to save the day, some extensification of land might be needed (i.e., A may need to rise over time to sustain labor productivity growth in agriculture). Hence, important questions arise over the feasibility of area expansion, A, and whether and how arable land can be conserved for current and future generations of rural African farmers as part of a long-term and broad-based structural transformation development strategy. These questions relate front and center to current policy issues about how best to utilize Africa’s available arable lands.

**Evidence of land constraints in sub-Saharan Africa**

*Distribution of arable land by rural population*

There is a widespread view that sub-Saharan Africa is a land abundant region with low rural population density. Tables 3a and 3b present the distribution of rural population density in 10 countries according to the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project (GRUMP) and AfriPop spatial databases described in the data section. Use of these data allows for much greater localized variation in rural population densities than has been typically reported previously using more aggregated spatial units.

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1 See Appendix 1 for data on rural population growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa countries.
Table 3a. Rural population density distribution on land categorized as arable, GRUMP 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>10th</th>
<th>25th</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>75th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>95th</th>
<th>Mean across all pixels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>3,126</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>1,574</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Year 2010 population estimates from GRUMP.

Notes: These estimates are based on all 1 km² grid cells (“pixels”) categorized as rural. Urban and peri-urban areas, as defined by GRUMP, were not included. Pixels with more than 2000 persons were also not included in analysis. Arable land, used in the denominator of population density estimates, was defined as cultivated land + grasslands, as defined by GAEZ 3.0 database.

Table 3b. Rural population density distribution on land categorized as arable, AfriPop 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>10th</th>
<th>25th</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>75th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>95th</th>
<th>Mean across all pixels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>3,366</td>
<td>1,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>1,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>2,164</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Year 2010 population estimates from AfriPop.

Notes: These estimates are based on all 1 km² grid cells (“pixels”) categorized as rural. Urban and peri-urban areas, as defined by AfriPop, were not included. Pixels with more than 2000 persons were also not included in the analysis. Arable land, used in the denominator of population density estimates, was defined as cultivated land + grasslands, as defined by GAEZ 3.0 database.
Both data sources indicate great variation in rural population densities. While the bottom 50 percent of the rural population in all countries live in relatively sparsely populated areas, conforming to conventional perceptions, a sizeable proportion of the rural population are in heavily populated areas exceeding 500 persons per km$^2$ of arable land (defined as cultivated and fallow land plus grasslands). According to the GRUMP data in Table 3a, over 25 percent of the rural population lives in areas exceeding 500 persons per km$^2$ of arable land in five of the 10 countries examined in this study. According to AfriPop (Table 3b), at least 25 percent of the rural population lives in areas exceeding 500 persons per km$^2$ in six of these 10 countries. Because rural population growth is rising faster than land under cultivation in most countries, these proportions are most likely rising over time. Recall that according to a joint FAO/IFDC report, the maximum carrying capacity of the land for intensive cultivation in most areas is 500 persons per km$^2$ (Henao and Baanante 1999); while this threshold cannot be considered to be precise for all areas, e.g., those with multiple cropping seasons and/or irrigation potential, it does give a first-order approximation of land supporting capacity for the dryland farming conditions on which the vast majority of Africa’s rural population is located.\textsuperscript{15}

A visual representation of the dispersion in rural population density on arable land is shown for Kenya in Figure 1. Roughly 40 percent of Kenya’s rural population resides on five percent of its arable land. On the other end of the continuum, three percent of the population controls 20 percent of the nation’s arable land. An alternative visual impression of the dispersion of population density is shown in Figures 2 and 3 for Kenya and Zambia, respectively.

\textsuperscript{15} Binswanger and Pingali (1988) show that after accounting for soil and climate conditions as well as potential technological options, it is possible to compute standardized agroclimatic population densities for various countries measuring the number of people per million kilocalories of production potential. They report that when countries are ranked conventionally by population per square kilometer of agricultural land, Bangladesh comes first, India comes seventh, Kenya falls somewhere in the middle, and Niger is near the bottom. When ranked by agro-climatic population density, the rankings change dramatically: Niger and Kenya are more densely populated than Bangladesh is today, and India ranks only twenty-ninth on the list.
Figure 1. Lorenz curve showing the percentage of arable land by percentage of rural population in Kenya, 2009


Notes: Gini coefficient: 0.51. A Lorenz curve shows the degree of inequality that exists in the distributions of two variables, and is often used to illustrate the extent that income or wealth is distributed unequally in a particular society.

Figure 2. Population density in Kenya

Source: LandScan data for 1999 Census, Kenya.
Moreover, the effects of increasingly crowded rural areas are not confined to those living in such areas. At least some part of rapid urbanization and its associated problems of the spread of slums, health and sanitation problems, and congestion are due to inadequate living standards in rural areas giving rise to migration. Jayne and Muyanga (2012) show that the net outflow of adult labor is four times higher from the top 20 percent of villages ranked by population density than from the bottom 20 percent of villages. Therefore, the question of appropriate development strategies for densely populated rural areas would appear to be increasingly relevant to a significant portion of Africa’s population.

**Trends in farm size and land concentration in customary lands**\(^{16}\)

Despite widespread acceptance that “pro-poor” agricultural growth is strongly associated with equitable asset distribution, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to quantifying land distribution patterns within Africa’s small-scale farming sector.\(^{17}\) To examine the degree of concentration of land within African farming sectors, Table 4 presents basic information on farm size and distribution within the smallholder farm sector in six countries for which nationwide survey data were available. As shown in column b, mean farm size in the small farm sector range from 2.76 hectares in Zambia to

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\(^{16}\) Much of the material in this section draws from Jayne et al. (2003).

\(^{17}\) Some notable exceptions include Haggblade and Hazell (1988) and Holden, Otsuka, and Place (2009).
0.71 hectares in Rwanda in 2000. The three Rwanda surveys indicate that mean household land access has declined significantly over the past 15 years.\(^{18}\)

**Table 4. Land distribution within the smallholder farm sectors in selected African countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (year of survey)</th>
<th>(a) Sample size</th>
<th>(b) Mean farm size (ha)</th>
<th>(c) Farm Size (hectares per capita) Mean</th>
<th>Quartile 1</th>
<th>Quartile 2</th>
<th>Quartile 3</th>
<th>Quartile 4</th>
<th>Land per household</th>
<th>Land per capita</th>
<th>Land per adult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya, 1997</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya, 2010</td>
<td>1146</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia, 1996</td>
<td>2658</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, 1984</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, 1990</td>
<td>1181</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, 2000</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi, 1998</td>
<td>5657</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia, 2001</td>
<td>6618</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique, 1996</td>
<td>3851</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Numbers for Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Zambia, including Gini coefficients, are weighted to be nationally representative.

On a per capita basis, farm sizes range from 0.56 hectares per person in Zambia to 0.16 hectares per person in Rwanda in 2000 (Table 4, column c). Mean farm size figures mask great variations in land access within the smallholder sector. After ranking all smallholders by household per capita farm size, and dividing them into four equal quartiles, households in the highest per capita farm size quartile controlled between eight to 20 times more land than households in the lowest quartile. In Kenya, mean landholding size for the top and bottom land quartiles were 1.10 and 0.08 hectares per capita, respectively. These figures already include rented land, which is marginal for most countries examined. It was also found across all countries a tendency for the poorest households to control the least amount of land, and to have relatively high labor-to-land

\(^{18}\) Andre and Platteau (1998) present an in-depth case study which shows acute competition over land and suggests a connection between land disputes and the civil war in 1994.
ratios within their households. In this respect, Africa’s rural poor are similar to those in much of Asia as reported by Sen (1990).

In each country, the bottom 25 percent of small-scale farm households are approaching landlessness, controlling less than 0.12 hectares per capita. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, the bottom land quartile controlled less than 0.03 hectares per capita. It is important to stress that these surveys contain only households engaged in agricultural production; households not engaged in farming are not in the sample.

Nevertheless, it is possible that the bottom land quartile may contain mostly “Sunday farmers” who are engaged primarily in off-farm activities for their livelihoods. To examine this possibility, income shares from crop production, animal and animal-derived production, and off-farm income for each land quartile were computed. As expected, off-farm income shares are highest for the bottom land quartile and decline as landholding size rises. However, in none of the five countries do households in the bottom land quartile earn more than 50 percent of their total income, on average, from off-farm activities, despite having very small farms. In Zambia, Rwanda, Mozambique and Ethiopia, the off-farm income shares for households in the bottom land quartile were 38.5 percent, 34.5 percent, 15.9 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively. By contrast, this figure was 50 percent in Kenya, which can be attributed to that country’s relatively developed and diversified economy, and which affords land-constrained rural households greater opportunity to earn a livelihood through the labor market.

Survey evidence also indicates declining landholding sizes over time. A nationally representative survey of Kenya’s small-scale farm sector in 1977 carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics reports mean farm size ranging across provinces from 2.10 to 3.48 hectares (Greer and Thorbecke 1986). By contrast, mean farm size in Egerton University’s nationwide surveys from 1997 to 2010 show mean farm size to be 1.97 hectares per farm; these longitudinal surveys show a decline in farm size even within that 13-year period.

Using survey data from Kenya, Jayne and Muyanga (2012) examined how population density is related to the amount of land inherited from the previous generation. Respondents in a nationwide survey in 2007 were asked how much land the father of the household head owned. The previous generation had considerably larger farms (three times larger) than those of the current survey respondents themselves. After ranking respondents’ answers according to the population density of the village, the mean size of respondents’ parents’ farms was found to vary from 7.80 hectares in the low-density quintile of villages to 4.41 hectares in the high-density quintile. Survey respondents were also asked about the amount of land inherited by the household head from his father. This ranged from 1.49 hectares in villages in the low-density quintile to 0.89 hectares in the high-density quintile, where the mean amount of land inherited by survey respondents was roughly one-fifth of the total landholding size of the father. An important policy question is how the current generation of adults in the high population density areas with one hectare of land or less are going to subdivide their land among their children when they reach their old age (the average age of household heads was 48 years in 2010) and whether farming can provide a viable livelihood for those remaining on the land. These findings are consistent with Yamano et al. (2009) who found that roughly a quarter of
young men and women in rural Kenya start their families without inheriting any land from their parents, forcing them to either commit themselves to off-farm employment or buy land from an increasingly active land sales market. We speculate that, because farm sizes in the high density areas are already quite tiny and cannot be meaningfully subdivided much further, an increasingly smaller fraction of people born on farms in Kenya will be able to remain there. This may point to even higher rates of rural-to-urban migration in the future, or at least from agriculture to non-agriculture.

In all countries, the various Gini coefficients displayed in Table 4 column (d) also indicate a high degree of dispersion in farm size. The Ginis for these African countries are -- perhaps surprisingly -- comparable to those estimated for much of Asia during the 1960s and 1970s (Haggblade and Hazell 1988). If land is allocated according to household size or labor availability, more equal land distribution in household per capita or per adult land holdings than per household land holdings should be found. This would imply that the Gini coefficients of landholding by per capita and per adult measures should be smaller than those of landholding per household. This is not the case in any of the five countries examined in Table 4. The Gini coefficients of per capita and per adult land holdings are virtually unchanged in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, and are even higher in Mozambique and Zambia when family size is accounted for in the estimates of land distribution inequality.

What is the evidence on trends in landholding inequality over time within the small-farm sectors? This is difficult to assess because of inevitable differences in sample design and variable definitions across surveys; results must therefore be interpreted cautiously. However, Haggblade and Hazell’s (1988) survey of available landholding Gini estimates for Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s provides some grounds for comparison. They report that the basic sampling unit is landholdings, not households, and thus landless households are excluded from these calculations. At least in this way, their estimates are consistent with the data reported in this study. Their sample includes three of the same country/farm sector combinations as in this study: Ethiopia, from 1976/77 survey data; Kenya’s small-scale farming sector from 1960; and Mozambique’s smallholder sector from 1970.

On the basis of these comparisons, it appears that landholding concentration within the small-scale farm sector has increased slightly to moderately over the past 20 to 30 years. The Gini coefficients for landholdings per farm increased from 0.50 to 0.55 between 1960 and 1997 in Kenya; from 0.41 to 0.45 between 1970 and 1997 in Mozambique; and from 0.44 to 0.55 between 1976/77 and 1995/96 in Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s case is particularly intriguing because it had undergone a radical land reform program during the 1970s, yet land concentration appears to have increased.

 Probably the most robust case for changes in land concentration is in Rwanda, where the Ministry of Agriculture used relatively consistent survey methods across three surveys for 1984, 1990, and 2000. Changes in the distribution of land access in Rwanda are shown in Table 4. Civil disruption undoubtedly has had a critical effect on land distribution over this period. Mean household land access (use rights plus rented land) has declined by 43 percent over this 16-year period, from 0.28 to 0.16 hectares per capita. In absolute terms, the decline in farm size has been borne mostly by the relatively large
farms. Mean land access for households in the highest land quartile declined from 0.62 to 0.43 hectares per capita, while it declined from 0.07 to 0.02 hectares per capita for the bottom land quartile. In relative terms, however, the dispersion in land access across the distribution has widened. There was a nine-fold difference in mean land access per capita between the top and bottom land quartiles in 1984, but this has worsened to a 21-fold difference in 2000. While Gini coefficients from 1984 are not available, the Gini coefficients of household access to land between 1990 and 2000 increased from 0.43 to 0.52. These results, though tentative, indicate that land concentration may be worsening over time in many of the region’s small-scale farming sectors.

**Relationship between farm size and household income**

The importance of these findings for rural growth and poverty alleviation strategies depends in part on the degree to which land allocation patterns influence household income and poverty. If non-farm activities are able to compensate for small landholdings and provide land-poor households with adequate alternative income sources, then disparities in land ownership should not necessarily be a policy problem. To examine these issues, the bivariate graphs in Figure 4 relate household per capita landholding size to household per capita income, including non-farm income and crop income from rented land. The three dashed vertical lines show the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of sampled households along the x-axis. For example, 25 percent of the sample households in Kenya have between zero and approximately 0.10 hectares per capita, while the top quartile owns on average 1.1 hectares per capita.

**Figure 4. Log of per capita landholding size and per capita household incomes**

Note: The vertical lines are drawn at 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of per capita land owned for each country. The top five percent of observations are excluded from the graphs because lines are sensitive to a few extreme cases.
In each country, a positive association is found between household per capita land holdings and per capita income (the sum of crop, livestock, and off-farm income). The association between household income and land is especially steep among households whose land size is below the median level in each country (the middle dotted line in each country graph in Figure 4). Because the vertical axis showing per capita income is in log form, differences in numbers can be read as percent changes. For instance, the line for Kenya starts at the log of per capita income at 9.2 and has a kink at 9.6. The difference between these two points is 0.4, which indicates a 40 percent increase in per capita income when household per capita land size increases from zero to 0.25 hectares. The same increase in land holdings (from zero to 0.25 hectares) increases per capita income by more than 40 percent in Rwanda, just less than 40 percent in Mozambique, and about 30 percent in Ethiopia. In all four countries, the association between land and income becomes weaker somewhere within the third land size quartile, and nearly disappears in the fourth quartile.

What do such land-income relationships mean for feasible smallholder-led development pathways? Improving access to land among the most land-constrained smallholder households would be a seemingly effective way to reduce poverty. For small farms, a very small incremental addition to land access is associated with a large relative rise in income.

Another recent study from Kenya analyzed the impact of endogenous population density on the evolutions of farming systems and farm productivity (Jayne and Muyanga 2012). Household farm size, cropped area, and asset wealth were strongly inversely related to local population density, other factors held constant. Input intensity and farm productivity per unit land and labor all rise with population density to roughly 600-650 persons per km²; beyond this population density threshold input intensification and farm productivity decline. What would explain these threshold effects? Market participation studies consistently show that farm sales are related to farm size (Barrett 2008). If farm sizes decline beyond a given point due to sub-division and land fragmentation caused by population pressures, households are less likely to generate cash from crop sales that would allow them to purchase modern productivity-enhancing inputs. Less intensive input use then reinforces small farms’ difficulties in producing a surplus. Furthermore, access to farm credit also tends to be restricted for farmers with limited land and other assets that could otherwise act as collateral. For these reasons, population density threshold effects may be very plausible and may explain why in Kenya a number of important farm productivity indicators tend to decline beyond a certain level of population density. In 2009, according to Tables 3a and 3b, roughly 35 percent of Kenya’s rural population resides in areas exceeding 650 persons per km² of arable land.

The structural transformation processes in Asia, as documented by Johnston and Kilby (1975) and Mellor (1976), show that a smallholder-led agricultural strategy was necessary to rapidly reduce rural poverty and induce demographic changes associated

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19 The major determinants of district-level population density in 2009 were found to be distances to infrastructural facilities, the population and stock of arable land of the district at independence, and village-level rainfall, rainfall variability, soil quality, and agro-ecological potential.
with structural transformation. An inclusive smallholder-led strategy is likely to provide the greatest potential to achieve agricultural growth with broad-based reductions in rural poverty in most of sub-Saharan Africa as well. However, it is not at all clear how such a smallholder-led agricultural strategy must be adapted to address the limitations of very small and declining farm sizes in densely populated areas that are dependent on rain-fed production systems with only one growing season per year.

Of course, nothing presented so far necessarily confirms that inadequate access to land is a binding constraint on smallholder agriculture in Africa. It might be possible that rural households could acquire more land if they chose to. And perhaps factors of production other than land are the more binding constraint on agricultural intensification.

*Is land expansion possible for smallholder farmers?*

Zambia provides an interesting case study for exploring rural households’ perception about the availability of unallocated land for future expansion of agricultural production. Zambia has one of the lowest national population densities in sub-Saharan Africa and it is widely believed that there is major potential for area expansion.

One of the questions asked of households in the nationally representative 2001 Post Harvest Supplemental Survey (CSO 2001) was “Is there unallocated arable land that is available to households in your village?” Nationwide, 44.1 percent of households felt that there was unallocated arable land that was available in their village area. Table 5 presents respondents’ answers to this question by province. Also included in the table is the amount of unutilized arable land in each province according to Central Statistical Office estimates in 2004.
Table 5. Perceptions of available arable land by rural households and population density, by province, Zambia, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Is there unallocated arable land?</th>
<th>Arable &amp; unutilized</th>
<th>Arable and unutilized minus already cultivated land (kms²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Responding Yes</td>
<td>% Responding No</td>
<td>(i.e., unutilized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>65,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>23,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>6,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>28,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>11,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>102,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>151,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>6,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>1,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>398,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The survey covered 7,264 households and is statistically representative at the province level.

The responses in Table 5 initially suggest that many households in Zambia perceive that there is unallocated land available in their villages. This view is particularly strong in the sparsely populated areas of Northwestern and Northern provinces, which incidentally also have the biggest portions of arable and available land, and to a lesser extent in Central province. Central province is third in terms of available arable land. However, in the major agricultural provinces of Eastern and Southern provinces, less than 40 percent of respondents reported that unallocated arable land was still available in their areas. These two provinces have, other than Western province, the lowest amount of unutilized arable land.

One might expect that the “no” responses would be concentrated in the most densely populated provinces, and the “yes” responses would be concentrated in sparsely populated areas. This is not uniformly the case in Zambia. For instance Western province has the second lowest population density in Zambia but it contained the greatest proportion of respondents indicating that no additional land was available. This result is most likely because many parts of Western province are unsuitable or only marginally
suitable to crop cultivation, hence population density underestimates the degree to which population is concentrated in a few productive areas.

Because 94 percent of Zambia’s land is in the customary tenure system, it is often implied that there should be great scope for area expansion by African farmers. Metcalfe (2005) and others, however, feel that this conclusion should be heavily qualified:

"Although it is sometimes stated that 94 percent of Zambia falls under customary tenure from that proportion must be deducted the 8 percent of the country designated as national parks and further 8 percent designated as forest reserves. From the remaining 76 percent must be deducted two percent for urban areas and 12 percent as unspecified areas (e.g., state farms, property, military, research stations, etc.). Finally, from the remaining 64 percent the Game Management Areas (GMAs) that make up 23 percent of Zambia’s land area must be considered" (p. 7).

These figures put into context the generally held notion that 80 percent of arable land in Zambia remains uncultivated, and that 94 percent of its land is under customary tenure, implying that it is available for smallholder agricultural development. According to Chizyuka et al. (2006), land falling under customary administration is 62 percent of the country territory or 46,500 square kilometers, but this includes mountainous areas, marshes and swamps, areas that are permanently flooded, infested with tsetse flies, and/or too arid to be suitable for intensive crop production. We conclude that, in reality, a much smaller amount of viable arable land is available for future generations of Zambian smallholders than is often thought.

**A paradox of land pressures amid land abundance?**

Several conclusions emerge from the evidence presented so far. First, while many parts of sub-Saharan Africa are very sparsely populated, often leading to relatively low population densities when computed over all rural area; a growing proportion of its population reside in fairly densely populated areas of 500 persons per km$^2$ or greater. These data may resolve the apparent paradox of land constraints amid the appearance of land abundance and massively under-utilized land.

However, the major disparities in the population densities of 1km$^2$ grid cells within each country examined raises questions about how such extreme differences have arisen and why hasn’t migration tended to equilibrate these differences over time? Why is much of Africa’s rural population concentrated tightly in particular areas while vast areas potentially suitable for agriculture remain largely unutilized? This question requires more intensive investigation but for now, we forward three major factors explaining the observed great variation in rural population densities:

1. **Natural clustering of population to the most hospitable and fertile areas.** These areas include the highlands of eastern and southern Africa, the humid tropics of West Africa, and coastal areas near natural ports and river confluences. This historical clustering of the population, when combined with the common
usufructory or “use rights” system of land tenure, introduces rigidities in land markets that would otherwise reduce spatial differences in population density over time. Land assets cannot generally be sold by the family (customary land officially belongs either to the chief, president, or state), and hence a decision to migrate out of the area means that the household will lose its access to land in its home area without compensation. Households with sufficient means have been able to acquire new land in other areas while retaining some members on their original homestead, but in general the usufructory land system tends to inhibit population shifts over time from land-constrained to land-abundant areas (Low 1986).

2. *Pattern of prior public investment.* Potentially arable land can remain underutilized because it has yet to receive the requisite public investment in physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, electrification, irrigation), water, schools, health facilities and other services required to raise the economic value of land and thereby attract migration and settlement in these areas (Goverehe 1999). Several governments have shown a willingness to devote state resources to develop land for large-scale commercial investment but much less so for smallholder-led agricultural development.

3. *Colonial segregation of Africans into reserves.* A major factor in countries with a colonial settler history such as Kenya, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, has been the historical and post-independence continuation of colonial tenure systems separating “customary lands” from “state lands” (Basset and Crummy 1993; Binswanger et al. 1995). Many areas under customary tenure are facing emerging land constraints borne of steady rural population growth since independence. By contrast, much of Africa’s unutilized arable land is under state authority, which is not readily accessible for settlement by smallholder populations under prevailing land allocation institutions. Post-independence governments have often allocated land to non-farming elites in exchange for political support, contributing to land underutilization while nearby farming areas exhibit signs of land pressures and degradation (Kanyinga 1998; Mbaria 2001; Stambuli 2002; Namwaya 2004). It is perhaps not surprising then that median farm sizes are quite small and declining for the vast majority of the farming population, as indicated in Table 4, while large tracts of land in other parts of the country remain unutilized. This dual land-tenure structure has impeded natural migration from processes 1 and 2.

Many of the “state vs. traditional chiefs” conflicts that have featured prominently in post-independence Africa (Herbst 2000) have centered on attempts by the state to wrest control of customary lands. Politicians’ arguments for converting customary land to state land normally focus on the need to allocate land to commercial entrepreneurs and capitalized “emergent” farmers with the ability to use it productively; although as shown earlier there is very little evidence to suggest that large-scale farms are more efficient than small-scale farms (Binswanger et al. 1995). In areas where traditional authorities have succeeded in retaining control over customary land, there are still numerous reports
of land being allocated to local elites having no legitimate claim to land in that area under
traditional norms (Deininger and Byerlee 2011).

Regardless of whether land is retained under customary or state control, several scholars
argue that African farmland is facing an “enclosure” process in the absence of efforts to
reverse it (Woodhouse 2003; Stambuli 2002). Woodhouse argues that much of Africa is
facing increased commodification and individualization of land driven by population
growth and increased pressure on remaining arable land regardless of land tenure regime.
This process is being intensified by the post-independence continuation of converting
unutilized customary land into titled property or state land. While one might be tempted
to regard this as evidence of emerging land markets in Africa, in most cases the processes
of allocation are opaque; little public information about land transaction prices have
emerged in any country that could serve as a basis for price discovery more broadly.
Meanwhile, many customary (i.e., smallholder) farming areas are facing intensifying land
constraints borne of steady rural population growth since independence, which is only
made more acute by transfers of land from customary to state control (Colin and
Woodhouse 2010). An important literature in Kenya has documented the rapacious
disempowerment of local communities from their traditional lands, first by colonialists
and later by successive post-colonial governments (Juma 1996; Kanyinga 1998; Okoth-
Ogendo 1976). Post-independence Kenyan governments have largely retained the same
institutions despite recognizing the importance of land rights and even elevating it to a
crucial post-independence challenge (Republic of Kenya 1965). While the modes of land
access were primarily through inheritance and the market, access to state land (and land
converted from customary to state land) has been a major instrument of patronage
favoring the political elite. For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that median
farm sizes are quite small and declining for a large proportion of the smallholder
population, while large tracts of land in other parts of the country continue to be allocated
by the state to local elites and foreign investors.

When do agricultural growth and poverty reduction converge and when do they
diverge?

Returning now to several debates discussed earlier on the role of land in affecting
development trajectories, some scholars and a growing number of African governments
believe that greater support for investment in large-scale agriculture may be the best use
of public funds for poverty reduction. Other analysts have argued that overcoming
Africa’s food security and poverty problems is primarily a challenge of improving the

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20 For example, in a recent study of “emergent” farmers (10-100 hectares) in Zambia, Sitko and Jayne
(forthcoming) found that most of the 186 farmers interviewed purchased or obtained a 99-year lease from
local authorities in customary lands. Of these, the majority entered into farming later in life after earning
enough money from urban (often civil service) employment to purchase land. These farmers are cultivating
an average of 27 percent of the land obtained, while over 90 percent of the surrounding small-scale farmers
in the area own less than 5 hectares.

21 Namwaya (2004) reports that over 600,000 hectares of land, or roughly one-sixth of Kenya’s total land
area, are held by the families of the country’s three former presidents, and that most of this land is in
relatively high-potential areas.
uptake of productivity-enhancing Green Revolution technologies. Consider, for example, Roger Thurow’s (2010) conclusion:

“Thus, more and more eyes are turning to Africa, agriculture's final frontier. Africa was largely left out of the green revolution, the postwar movement to push up crop yields in the hungriest parts of the world by promoting the use of new seeds and new farming technology. And so agricultural production on the continent could jump quickly if farmers there simply used existing seed, fertilizer, and irrigation technology. And if more efficient networks were developed to distribute and sell the harvests, boosting agricultural yields in Africa could be a major step toward feeding not just the continent but also the rest of the world.”

This section explains why the uptake of improved technology may indeed boost agricultural yields and yet do very little to address rural poverty that is associated with pervasive constraints on access to land and other productive assets. The recent experiences of Zambia and Malawi illustrate how agricultural growth that is not broad-based may have very little effect on rural poverty. Both countries have succeeded in doubling maize production between the early and late 2000s. In both countries, the marked increase in maize production coincides with the scaling-up of government input subsidy programs. The national use of fertilizer and hybrid maize seed in both countries has roughly doubled between 2004 and 2010, and yield growth in both countries has been the primary source of the production booms (Mason et al. 2011; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011). In Zambia’s case, farmers have benefited from the purchase of maize at above-market prices (roughly $275 per ton) through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). Together the input subsidy and maize price support programmes in Zambia accounted for over 60 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture’s public budget over the past five years and over two percent of the country’s GDP in 2010. These two programs also accounted for 90–96 percent of the total budget allocated to the ministry’s Poverty Reduction Programmes (PRPs) during the 2006–2011 budget years. In Malawi, the input subsidy program alone has exceeded 10 percent of the national budget in at least two of the past five years.

In spite of the impressive growth in grain yields and production, rural poverty in both countries has declined very little over this time span. In Zambia, the rural poverty rate was 77.3 percent in 2004 and 76.8 percent in 2006; while official poverty rate estimates for 2010 have not yet been released, preliminary estimates suggest that the rural poverty rate remains in the range of 74–78 percent. So, why is it that maize production has increased so impressively without making a serious dent in rural poverty?

Table 6 shows data from the nationally representative 2011 Crop Forecast Survey to show how maize production has varied according to farm size. Column A of Table 6 shows the number of farmers in five farm size categories. Overall Zambia has an estimated 1,471,221 small- and medium-scale farmers (‘smallholder’ farmers), defined as farmers cultivating between 0.1 and 20 hectares. Approximately 42 percent of them are cultivating less than one hectare of land; 33.3 percent of the smallholder farms are cultivating 1–2 hectares; 2.9 percent are cultivating 5–10 hectares, and 0.5 percent are cultivating over 10 hectares (column B). Farmers cultivating less than two hectares
accounted for 75 percent of the total number of farmers in Zambia’s smallholder farm sector.

**Table 6. Smallholder maize production growth from the baseline period (2006-2008 harvest years) to 2011, by farm size category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area cultivated</th>
<th>Number of farmers, 2006-08 to 2011</th>
<th>% of farms</th>
<th>Annual mean during 2006-2008 baseline period</th>
<th>2011 harvest</th>
<th>Absolute change (D-C)</th>
<th>Increase in maize output per farm (E*1,000/A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>(F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-0.99 ha</td>
<td>616,867</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>212,335</td>
<td>309,324</td>
<td>96,989</td>
<td>157.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1.99 ha</td>
<td>489,937</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>381,293</td>
<td>707,438</td>
<td>326,145</td>
<td>665.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.99 ha</td>
<td>315,459</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>490,102</td>
<td>1,130,527</td>
<td>640,425</td>
<td>2,030.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9.99 ha</td>
<td>42,332</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>196,848</td>
<td>494,719</td>
<td>297,871</td>
<td>7,036.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 ha</td>
<td>6,626</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>103,156</td>
<td>144,888</td>
<td>41,732</td>
<td>6,298.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,471,221</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1,383,735</td>
<td>2,786,896</td>
<td>1,403,161</td>
<td>953.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Column C shows the estimated total maize production within each of the farm size categories over a ‘baseline’ period (the three years covering the 2005/06 to 2007/08 crop seasons). Column D shows the estimated maize production for these five farm size categories in the 2010/11 crop season. Overall, maize production increased from an average of 1,383,735 tonnes in the baseline period to 2,786,896 tonnes in the 2010/11 season.

Column E shows the change in maize production over this period for each farm size category. Farmers cultivating less than one hectare contributed an additional 96,989 tonnes to national maize production in 2010/11 compared to their average maize production during the three-year period 2005/06-2007/08. By dividing the additional maize production in column E by the number of farms in each category as shown in Column A, we derive the additional maize production per farm for each of the farm size categories, as shown in Column F. When expressed on a per farm basis, it is apparent that farmers cultivating less than one hectare produced 157.2 additional kilograms of maize per farm in 2011. Farmers cultivating one to two hectares contributed 326,145 additional tonnes of maize in 2010/11, which amounts to 666 kilograms of additional maize per farm. Farmers cultivating two to five hectares contributed an additional 640,425 tonnes to national maize production in 2010/11, or 2.03 additional tonnes per household. The 2.9 percent of the farmers cultivating five to 10 hectares contributed an additional 297,871 tonnes to national maize production in 2010/11, which amounted to 7.04 tonnes of additional maize production per farm. And lastly, the 0.5 percent of farmers cultivating
10–20 hectares increased their maize production in 2010/11 by 6.3 tonnes per household compared to the earlier baseline period.

The data in Table 6 show that very little of the increase in national maize production in 2010/11 came from the bottom category of farmers (less than one hectare cultivated) even though they account for over 40 percent of the smallholder farms in Zambia and are among the poorest of the rural poor. Given that their maize output increased by an average of just three 50-kg bags per household between 2005/06-2007/08 and 2010/11, the national maize bumper harvest is unlikely to have resulted in significant reductions in hunger and poverty among this group of farmers. The main increase in national maize production (column E) came from farmers in the 1–2, 2–5 and 5–10 hectare cultivated area categories. When expressed in per farm terms, however, the major increases in maize production were enjoyed by farmers cultivating over five hectares—farm households that constitute only 3.4 percent of all the smallholder farms in Zambia. Table 6 clearly shows that the increase in maize production per farm is strongly related to farm size. However, even the relatively small increases in average maize production among the smallest farms is likely to have improved their food security status substantially as a result of their harvesting even a few more 50-kg bags of maize in 2010/11 than in the earlier period.

Table 7 uses the same Crop Forecast Survey data to examine the amount of subsidized FISP fertilizer received during the 2010/11 crop season by farmers within the same five categories. The number and percentage of farms in each category in 2010/11 are shown in columns A and B, respectively. The percentage of farms receiving FISP fertilizer in each category is presented in column C. Slightly over 14 percent of the farmers cultivating less than one hectare received FISP fertilizer in the 2010/11 crop season. The average quantity of fertilizer they received was 168 kg. Across all 596,334 households in the category, the average household received 24.1 kg of FISP fertilizer (column D). By contrast, over 50 percent of farmers in the 10–20 hectare cultivated category received FISP fertilizer in 2010/11, receiving 657 kg per farm. The average amount of FISP fertilizer received by farmers in the 10–20 hectare category was 346 kg, about 14 times more per farm than those in the less than one hectare category.
Table 7. FISP fertilizer received (2010/11 crop season) and maize sales, 2011, by farm size category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total area cultivated (maize + all other crops)</th>
<th>Number of farms</th>
<th>% of farms</th>
<th>% of farmers receiving FISP fertilizer</th>
<th>Kg of FISP fertilizer received per farm household</th>
<th>% of farmers expecting to sell maize</th>
<th>Maize sales (kg/farm household)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-0.99 ha</td>
<td>596,334</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1.99 ha</td>
<td>499,026</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4.99 ha</td>
<td>354,116</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>139.7</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9.99 ha</td>
<td>49,410</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>309.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>6,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 ha</td>
<td>6,999</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>345.6</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>15,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,505,885</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Column E shows the percentage of households selling maize. This ranges from 22.2 percent among the smallest farm size category to 86.8 percent among the largest. In terms of quantities of maize expected to be sold, column F shows that, on average, about 135 kg of maize will be sold for every farm in the less-than-one hectare category, compared to 1.7 tonnes per household in the two to five hectare category, and over 15.1 tonnes per household in the 10–20 hectare category. Clearly, the benefits of the FRA maize support prices are disproportionately enjoyed by the relatively large farmers over five hectares, even though they constitute only 3.8 percent of the smallholder farm population.

The smallest farmers in Zambia—those cultivating less than two hectares who account for over 70 percent of all the smallholder farms in the country—participated only marginally in the maize production expansion of 2010/11. These farmers received relatively little FISP fertilizer and sold very little maize, hence they were unable to benefit from the FRA producer price of 65,000 kwacha per bag. The farmers benefiting the most from the government’s expenditures on supporting maize prices were clearly those selling the most maize. In contrast, about 30 percent of the relatively poor smallholder households actually had to purchase more maize and maize meal than they produced to meet their families’ food needs and hence were adversely affected by a support price policy that raised maize prices in the countryside. This disaggregated picture of Zambia’s maize production expansion may reveal why rural poverty rates remain so high despite the record maize harvests in the past several years. Similar conclusions emerge from Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011).

The composition of the Zambian government’s public spending on agriculture reveals that the lion’s share of its budget was devoted to maize price supports and input.
subsidies, which as shown below were captured primarily by larger farmers (Figure 5). The types of scale-neutral public investments that can promote productivity even on one-hectare farms, e.g., improved seed and agronomic research, farmer education and extension, physical infrastructure, etc., receive only about 20 percent of the public budget to agriculture across all ministries.

**Figure 5. 2010 budget allocation to agriculture, Government of Zambia**

![Pie chart showing budget allocation]  
- Food Reserve Agency (56.5%)
- Farm Inputs Support Programme (21.8%)
- Other Min. Agriculture programs (14.7%)
- Other Ministry programs (7.0%)

Source: Ministry of Finance published budget figures including supplemental spending.

Notes: Expenditures to agriculture accounted for 15.3 percent of total government budget in 2010. Other Ministry of Agriculture programs included the Zambia Agricultural Research Institute (0.3 percent of total agricultural budget), Veterinary and Tse Tse Control programs (1.0 percent), seed control and certification (0.2 percent), provincial agricultural research stations (0.1 percent), Policy Analysis Unit (0.7 percent). Agricultural programs in other ministries include feeder roads, Central Statistical Office, Forestry, farm block, and resettlement programs.

This disaggregated picture of the distributional effects of growth – at least how it was achieved in Zambia and Malawi – demonstrate the limitations of current approaches for achieving Green Revolutions in Africa. Conventional approaches such as those focusing

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22 The sampling frame for the CFS survey covers farms cultivating 0.1 to 20 hectares. Anecdotal reports indicate that African farmers cultivating well over this amount of land are perhaps the biggest recipients of the government fertilizer subsidy program. Hence the findings presented in this section may underestimate the skewed distribution of public agricultural expenditures to relatively large farmers.
largely on farm price supports and input subsidy programs may increase aggregate farm output but have tended to produce concentrated benefits that are correlated with farm size and asset wealth (Jayne, Mather and Mghenyi 2010). This form of (mis)targeting has therefore lost valuable opportunities for public expenditures on agriculture to reduce rural poverty rates in the process of raising agricultural production. The Zambia and Malawi experiences stress the need not only to promote the use of improved technology but to do so in a way that reaches – directly or indirectly – farms in the bottom half of the asset distribution. Taking action to expand access to land for smallholder farm production, as a complement to input promotion and farm productivity programs, may be fundamental to effective national agricultural development and poverty reduction policies.

Hertel (2011) concludes that there is substantial scope for endogenous intensification of production in response to higher product prices, particularly in Africa, where fertilizer application rates are low. Higher farm prices may indeed provide incentives for profitable intensification to close the high yield gaps observed in the region (Fisher, Byerlee and Edmeades 2009). The findings reported here for Zambia confirm previous evidence that the African farming sector can quickly and robustly respond to higher food prices, but that the response is likely to be greatest according to which type of farmers receive the greatest public support to respond to price incentives. Some analysts promoting a prioritization of large-scale agriculture based on conclusions of dismal past performance of smallholder agriculture seem unaware of how public funds and policies have consistently been allocated (often unintentionally) to benefit larger farms at the expense of small farms. Governments and development partners concerned with reducing poverty and food insecurity can therefore take advantage of the scope for endogenous intensification of production in response to anticipated higher food prices by allocating public budgets to agriculture and erecting policies in ways that enable the rural poor to be part of the growth process. Land allocation policies and land taxes are obvious entry points for achieving these goals.

Moreover, there are likely to be severe food insecurity problems if farm intensification in Africa is driven by higher food prices alone, because of the large proportion of resource-poor farmers who have insufficient access to land and other assets to produce a surplus through either intensification or extensification, and are likely to remain net buyers of food even under a high food price regime (Jayne, Mather and Mghenyi 2010). Policy strategies to broaden the base of farms that can respond to future price signals and agricultural growth opportunities may increasingly require explicit consideration of egalitarian approaches to expand and broaden access to unutilized arable land in the region.

This conclusion raises questions, therefore, about the potential impact of promoting large-scale investment in farmland in response to heightened global demand for food. The advocacy of a large-scale commercial farm approach (e.g., Collier and Dercon 2009) seems unable to address how the majority of Africa’s rural population could be integrated into such an approach. Large-scale farms are capable of absorbing an exceedingly small fraction of the rural labor force, and unskilled farm labor in most cases pays very little above poverty-line wages. Moreover, there is little evidence that the non-farm sectors in sub-Saharan Africa will be capable of rapidly absorbing more than a small fraction of
labor force into skilled or semi-skilled non-farm employment. The region’s longstanding infrastructural and educational disadvantages relative to other regions translate into relatively high production costs of non-farm goods and services. Hence, under the most plausible scenario of a continued slow transition of the labor force from agrarian to non-farm sectors, a public investment and policy orientation explicitly biased in favor of large-scale agriculture raises major questions about how governments will address the livelihood challenges for a major fraction of the region’s underserved population remaining in rural areas.

The recent World Bank report on land issues by Deininger and Byerlee (2011) provide a more nuanced argument that the promotion of large commercial agriculture could complement a small farm-led development approach, or at least co-exist with it, without choking off the prospects for the latter. They are guardedly optimistic that new investment in large-scale farming can be promoted for areas of Africa that have abundant unutilized land. They stress that due diligence must be exercised to ensure that investment in farmland by outside interests does minimal disruption to local interests and conclude that there is good potential for mutually beneficial outcomes especially in land abundant areas with low population densities.

The main risk with this World Bank position is that an explicit promotion of new large-scale farm investment might encourage scarce public expenditures to be allocated in ways that are even more distributionally regressive and skewed in favor of large-scale and “emergent” farm interests than they currently appear to be in many countries. Findings earlier in this section from Zambia (and more broadly as described in Jayne et al 2010) attest to the extent to which programs ostensibly designed to support smallholder agriculture are actually channeled to medium- and large-scale agriculture. An explicit focus on large-scale agriculture could easily exacerbate the distributionally regressive use of public funds. Already, several African governments appear poised to devote substantial public resources in support of large-scale commercialized agriculture in the form of irrigation, electrification, and road development, based on little consideration or analysis as to whether the same magnitude of public support for smallholder agriculture might produce even greater benefits to productivity and poverty reduction. Perhaps most importantly, allowing the discourse on agricultural development in Africa to be cast in terms of how best to exploit the continent’s unutilized land has arguably diverted attention from the more central and enduring challenge of implementing agricultural development strategies that effectively address the continent’s massive rural poverty and food insecurity problems, which require recognizing the growing land constraints faced by much of its still agrarian-based population.

**Conclusions and policy implications**

Despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 contains much of the world’s unutilized and underutilized arable land, a significant and growing share of Africa’s farm households are living in densely populated areas. These areas are characterized by small and declining farm sizes for the majority of people living in them. Ironically, inadequate access to land and inability to exploit available unutilized land are issues that almost
never feature in national development plans or poverty reduction strategies. There has been seemingly little recognition of the potential challenges associated with increasingly densely populated and land-constrained areas of rural Africa, despite the fact that a sizeable and increasing share of its rural population live in such areas.

Nationally representative farm surveys consistently show the following regularities: First, there are great disparities in landholding size within smallholder farming areas. While the top 10 percent of the rural population reside on farms ranging from five to 25 hectares, half or more of Africa’s smallholder farms are below 1.2 hectares in size, and a quarter of the farms are below 0.5 hectares, with limited or no potential for area expansion (Jayne et al. 2003). Second, because of this pattern of landholding size distribution, farm production and marketed surplus are similarly skewed. In most nationally representative surveys in the region that the authors analyzed, the top five percent of farmers (not counting large-scale commercial farmers) account for 50 percent of the marketed grain surplus (Jayne et al. 2010). Third, and in stark contrast, half or more of rural farm households are unable to produce enough grain to feed themselves and are either buyers of grain or go hungry because they are too poor to afford to buy food. Most of the households owning less than one hectare of land fall into this category regardless of their agro-ecological or market access conditions, and their incomes tend to be below the poverty line. After controlling for agro-ecological conditions, small farm size is highly correlated with income poverty (Jayne et al. 2003). Fourth, a high proportion of farmers in densely populated areas perceive that it is not possible for them to acquire more land through customary land allocation procedures, even in areas where a significant portion of land appears to be unutilized (Stambuli 2002; Yamano et al. 2009; Jayne et al. 2008). Land markets, both formal and informal, appear to on the rise (Woodhouse 2003; Holden et al. 2009). In Kenya, roughly a quarter of young men and women born in rural areas start their families without inheriting any land from their parents, forcing them to either commit themselves to off-farm employment or buy land from an increasingly active land sales market (Yamano et al. 2009). And fifth, survey evidence points to increasing concentration of landholdings over time as well as declining mean farm size (Jayne et al. 2003).

These concerns lead to policy questions about appropriate and feasible smallholder-led agricultural strategies in the context of land-constrained farming systems and limited off-farm employment opportunities to absorb redundant labor in densely populated rural areas. Associated issues for research revolve around whether many farms are becoming, or have already become, “too small” to generate meaningful production surpluses and participate in broad-based inclusive agricultural growth processes given existing on-shelf production technologies. Evidence presented earlier about population density being inversely related to soil fertility and farm size might suggest the presence of threshold effects in the relationship between population density and farm productivity, especially labor productivity, as the intensification of labor and capital per unit of land may lead to diminishing returns to labor and capital beyond some point. Other reasons for declining agricultural productivity beyond some threshold level of rural population density may include reduced fallows leading to soil fertility depletion, and the tendency to produce little or no surplus production on very small farms with many residents; leading to difficulties of purchasing needed cash inputs in the presence of incomplete rural financial
markets. All of these dynamics may be mutually reinforcing in the threshold relationships between population density, farm sizes, and farm productivity. These relationships are likely to be strongly conditioned by variables such as agro-ecological and market conditions. Future empirical research is needed to investigate these conditioning influences.

Certainly, most of sub-Saharan Africa’s land area is not characterized by such dilemmas. Most of the continent is sparsely populated. However, based on two alternative spatial databases capable of estimating populations at the level of one square kilometer and distinguishing between arable and non-arable land, a high proportion of rural people nevertheless live in densely populated areas. This apparent paradox is resolved when the unit of observation is shifted from land units to people. In at least five of the 10 countries analyzed, 25 percent of the rural population resides in areas exceeding 500 persons per square kilometer, which, by at least one account (Henao and Baanante 1999), is estimated to be the maximum supporting capacity for areas of intensive crop cultivation in the region.

The evidence presented here suggests that there tends to be a fallacy in concluding that most of the people in rural sub-Saharan Africa live in land abundant conditions. This has created the false perception that the development challenge for the region is how to productively utilize the continents’ underutilized land resources. In the past several decades, and especially since the rise of world food prices, there have been concerted efforts to transfer land out of customary tenure (under the control of traditional authorities) to the state or to private individuals who, it is argued, can more effectively exploit the productive potential of the land to meet national food security objectives. Such efforts have nurtured the growth of a relatively well-capitalized class of “emergent” African farmers, most of whom did not start out in agriculture but rather bought land earned from salaried employment in the towns (Sitko and Jayne forthcoming). These farmers are well represented in many African countries’ powerful farm lobbies, disproportionately enjoy the benefits of input subsidy and price support programs due to their relatively large farm sizes, and become major forces lobbying for the continuation of such programs.

Moreover, some African governments are increasingly receptive to devoting state resources to develop land for large-scale commercial investment (e.g., investments in irrigation, electrification, and road infrastructure). Ironically, policy debates in the region seldom address whether similar public investments in customary tenure areas could generate even greater payoffs in terms of agricultural productivity growth and poverty reduction. Instead, rural poverty is increasingly being viewed as a problem to be addressed through social safety net, food assistance, and drought recovery programs.23 Increasing reluctance of ministries of agriculture to view poverty reduction as part of their mandate is consistent with land policies currently transferring land out of customary systems, where it is reserved for future generations of smallholder farmers, into private titled and state land.

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23 Ironically, even programs explicitly created to reduce rural poverty are also often disproportionately captured by the rural non-poor (Morris et al 2007; Xu et al. 2009; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011; Banful 2011; Mason et al. 2011).
Widespread anecdotal evidence suggests that potentially the greatest threat to broad-based agricultural growth is the process of customary lands being sold or leased to a small but growing class of African elites. These processes of elite capture of the political process appear to be moving quite rapidly in a number of African countries. Before his assassination in 2003, the Economic Advisor to the President of Malawi, Kalonga Stambuli, wrote that:

*I have seriously deplored the social injustice and economic marginalization associated with land conversion from communal tenure to leasehold tenure mostly enjoyed by the elite who also enjoyed a monopoly in the production of export crops. Most deplorable is the fact that the abundance of idle land among estates explains much of the low equilibrium trap to which our countries have been subjected. The economic hegemony of the agricultural elite was compounded by state enterprise expansion into the private sector, over-regulation, a stifling bureaucracy, and totalitarian politics. Inadequate amounts of land available to farmers remain a major constraint to supply response.*

These anecdotal reports are consistent with research pointing to the growing commodification and individualization of land in customary areas (e.g., Woodhouse 2003).

The growing focus on how best to exploit Africa’s unutilized land has arguably diverted attention from the more central and enduring challenge of implementing agricultural development strategies that effectively address the continent’s massive rural poverty and food insecurity problems, which require recognizing the growing land constraints faced by much of the rural population. It may be increasingly relevant to ask whether structural transformation processes may be retarded in situations in which the distribution of rural assets are so highly skewed that a large strata of the rural population may be unable to benefit from agricultural growth incentives that would otherwise generate broad-based growth multipliers. In most of the national household surveys from Africa reviewed in this paper, the distribution of land and other productive assets within the smallholder sector is at least as skewed as in much of Asia at the time of their Green Revolutions. Estimates of land concentration would certainly be worse if the authors accounted for the large-scale farm sectors in these countries.

The literature on growth linkages indicates that the first-round beneficiaries of agricultural growth generate important multiplier effects by increasing their expenditures on a range of local off-farm and non-farm activities that create second-round benefits for a wide-range of other households in the rural economy (Johnston and Mellor 1961; Mellor 1976). In much of Africa, the consumption growth linkages have been found to be especially important (Delgado and Minot 2000). The extent and magnitude of these second round effects depend on how broadly spread the first-round growth is. The initial distribution of land and other productive assets will clearly affect the size of these multipliers. If dynamic labor and services markets can be developed, then other employment opportunities should be easier to create in the very locations where the

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24 Email from K. Stambuli to Professor Michael Weber, Michigan State University, February 13, 2003, subject: “Elitist Land and Agricultural Policies”.
larger smallholders are investing and raising their output and productivity. Pro-active public sector investment and policy support in developing these labor and service markets will be a key determinant of the magnitude of the growth linkages to be derived from agricultural growth.

Viewed in a static way, one could conclude that the only way out of poverty for the severely land-constrained rural poor is to increase their access to land. Viewed within a dynamic structural transformation framework, this group’s brightest prospect for escape from poverty will most likely involve being pulled off the farm into productive non-farm sectors. Farming will be increasingly unable to sustain the livelihoods of people born in rural areas without substantial shifts in labor from agriculture to non-farm sectors.

Education, which played a crucial role in Asia by allowing households to exit agriculture into more lucrative off-farm jobs, is relatively low in most areas of rural Africa by world standards. Investments in rural education and communications are likely to become increasingly important to facilitate structural transformation.

Therefore, while greater equity in landholdings is important to kick-starting inclusive rural growth processes in the short- and medium run, an important long-run goal will be to pull the rural poor out of agriculture and into skilled off-farm jobs through investments and policies that support the processes of structural transformation.

Implications for development strategy

1. *African governments and international donors could greatly relieve Africa’s growing land problems (and related food security and poverty problems) by focusing on efforts to sustainably improve crop and animal productivity.* Closing the “yield gap” through productivity growth can relieve the severity of land pressures in densely populated areas and buy needed time for longer-run investments such as education and health improvements to enable more rural people to integrate into gainful off-farm employment. Higher food prices are likely to provide greater incentives for intensification of input use and contribute to yield growth. Peak oil projections may also fundamentally change the economics of global food production in ways that are difficult to predict with accuracy now. 

25 Despite skepticism in some quarters about the prospects for achieving smallholder-led development (Collier and Dercon 2009), this path has been the way out of hunger and poverty for much of Asia and, historically, most other areas of the world (Lipton 2005). Successful small farm intensification will also help to conserve the world’s remaining forestland and biodiversity. For all of these reasons, it would seemingly be in governments’ and donor agencies’ interests to redouble their efforts to support small farm productivity growth.

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25 Peak Oil projections are based on the summation of individual producing nations’ petroleum production over time. In its *State of the World 2005*, Worldwatch Institute observes that oil production is in decline in 33 of the 48 largest oil-producing countries. See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil) for a review of over 150 reports.
2. However, closing the yield gap will in many cases require a reallocation of public expenditures from price supports and input subsidies targeted to relatively large and capitalized farms to investments that can support productivity growth on one hectare farms. While the long-term strategy is to effectively shift marginal farms out of agriculture and into productive non-farm jobs, this cannot happen by pushing farmers out of the sector; broad-based rural productivity growth will be required to pull households from the farm into non-agriculture. Hence the need to provide greater public funding for activities that can achieve productivity growth on one hectare farms. These include farmer extension programs that effectively transfer improved technologies and agronomic practices onto farmers’ fields: planting on time, the use of conservation tillage practices, scouting for appropriate use of herbicides and pesticides, right plant population, soil testing to identify the nutrients that need to be added back to the soil, appropriate fertilizer cocktails for addressing soil nutrient deficiencies, including lime where acidic soils lock up phosphorus, use of coated nitrogen to reduce leaching, improving soil structure and organic content, investing in drainage, and of course public investments to generate improved seed varieties. Widespread adoption of these practices will raise the response rates of fertilizer application and are necessary to meaningfully close the wide yield gaps observed in the region (Fischer, Byerlee and Edmeades 2009).

3. Commission comprehensive land audits in each country: Current land allocation decisions are being made in an information void. Very few, if any, African countries keep accessible databases on the amount of unutilized and underutilized arable land available in each country’s customary and state lands. Nor has there been any government report showing the amount of customary land that has been transferred into private title or leasehold tenure in the past several decades. A comprehensive and transparent land database would raise public awareness and provide the means to assess the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to guide future land policy decisions.

4. Consider applying a land tax or user fees, with the lowest (or zero) rates being put on farms under five hectares (which would exempt 90 percent of smallholder farms in most countries) or farms in customary lands, and a flat tax rate per hectare on farms over five hectares. Similar taxes could be considered for water use to support the efficient use of these scarce resources.

5. Especially because land appears to a relatively abundant resource in many parts of Africa, an extensification strategy of pulling more land into productive use by the existing farm population that currently lack adequate access to land is likely to be part of the solution to addressing Africa’s food and hunger challenges. In many parts of the region, governments may be able to improve access to land for rural households through a coordinated strategy of public goods and services to raise the economic value of customary land that is currently remote and under-utilized. This would involve investments in infrastructure and service provision designed to link currently isolated areas with existing road and rail infrastructure and through allied investment in schools, health care facilities, electrification and
water supply, and other public goods required to induce migration, settlement, and investment in these currently under-utilized areas. Such investments would also help to relieve population pressures in areas where the carrying capacity of the land has been exceeded. The approach of raising the economic value of land through public investments in physical and marketing infrastructure and service provision was pursued successfully by Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe starting in the 1960s with its “growth point” strategy in the Gokwe area, once cleared of the tsetse fly. Public investments in this once desolate but agro-ecologically productive area induced rapid migration into Gokwe from heavily populated rural areas, leading to the “white gold rush” of smallholder cotton production in the 1970s and 1980s (Govereh 1999).

6. *Input subsidy programs*, currently in vogue, could be more effective in reducing poverty while raising aggregate food supplies by explicitly targeting the 70 percent of smallholder farms under two hectares, where rural poverty is concentrated.

**Some areas for future research**

1. How are land-constrained farming systems evolving differently from more land-abundant farming systems? Is there evidence of changing relative factor prices and factor proportions in densely vs. sparsely smallholder production systems? How does this affect the programmatic implications for rural development and poverty reduction strategies?

2. Can the general equilibrium effects of intensifying land access problems in sub-Saharan Africa be quantified? For example, to what extent are urban migration and the attendant problems of slums, health and sanitation problems, congestion, etc., exacerbated by the new generation’s declining ability to access sufficient land to earn a livelihood in agriculture? To what extent do land access problems account for the growing emigration of young Africans from densely populated areas (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi) to the Middle East, South Africa, and Europe?

3. What kind of farming systems lie beyond the continuum defined by Boserup (1965), andBinswanger and Pingali (1998), where population density has reached not only the level required to induce sedentary agriculture, land intensification, and the substitution of capital and labor for scarce land, but where population density has continued to rise well beyond this point? How would a scenario of higher world food prices affect land intensification incentives and the potential supporting capacity of rural lands disaggregated by agro-ecological potential and market access conditions?
### Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
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<th>Kenya</th>
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<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Tanzania</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zambia</th>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urban population</strong></td>
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**Sources:**


References


Core literature on land issues in developing countries, with a focus on Africa


The first development oriented study to show how farming systems adapt to changing population pressures and factor intensities. The work challenges the assumption dating back to Malthus that agricultural methods determine population via the food supply. Instead, Boserup argued that population determines agricultural methods. In Boserup’s theory, it is only when rising population density curtails the use of shifting cultivation that agricultural intensification begins. Contending with insufficiently fallowed, less fertile plots, farmers have incentives to use capital- and labor-using techniques (e.g., fertilizer, irrigation, bunds, ridging, additional weedings) that maximize returns per scarce unit of land. These changes often induce agricultural innovation and land productivity growth. However, Boserup did not sufficiently address the kind of dynamics that might occur to farming systems when institutions governing land, labor, and/or capital markets impede farmers’ ability to make sufficient land-augmenting investments, where population densities reach a point where farm sizes are too small to produce a viable livelihood given available agricultural technologies, and where off-farm opportunities are largely saturated.


The induced innovation model attempts to make more explicit the process by which technical and institutional changes are induced through the responses of farmers, agribusiness entrepreneurs, scientists, and public administrators to resource endowments and to changes in the supply and demand of factors and products. The state of relative endowments and accumulation of the two primary resources, land and labor, is a critical element in determining the patterns of technical change in agriculture. Agriculture is characterized by much stronger constraints of land on production than most other sectors of the economy. Agricultural growth may be viewed as a process of easing the constraints on production imposed by inelastic supplies of land and labor. Depending on the relative scarcity of land and labor, technical change embodied in new and more productive inputs may be induced primarily either (a) to save labor or (b) to save land.


This paper provides an internally consistent explanation for the major institutions and customary features of production relations in the land-abundant tropics that have simple technology and high transport costs. The paper also predicts how these institutions and features will change in response to increasing population densities and the opening of subsistence-oriented systems via external migration and interregional or international trade. Binswanger and McIntire argue that the consequence of the joint existence of high production risks, spatial isolation, and information problems is the nonexistence, or
minimal development, of several markets that economic theory usually takes for granted; namely, those for output, labor, crop insurance, and credit. They then analyze how these conditions interact with rising rural population densities to affect farm production relations, exchange, and productivity.


The fact that land issues are politically highly charged and controversial has often implied limited ability for policy to alter land inequalities, despite their important influence on the distribution of income and the potential to achieve broad-based structural transformation process. This piece takes a political economy approach to the historical analysis of land allocation and control in developing areas and then traces out how the nature of land rights and institutions has affected agricultural performance, economic growth, poverty reduction, and governance. The paper then considers policy actions to improve the security of land rights, reduce the cost of exchanging them and promote socially desirable patterns of economic development.


This article focuses on the socioeconomic and political dynamics leading to the commodification of land in Africa. A major conclusion is that increasing land scarcity is leading to greater individualized control over access to land, tending to disadvantage the rural poor irrespective of the kind of land tenure system traditionally in place. In a de facto sense, an enclosure process is occurring in Africa despite the appearance of land abundance and in contrast to the conclusions of Deininger and Byerlee. Woodhouse challenges the idea that local control of local resources necessarily leads to more equitable resource allocation than central state control. A main conclusion of the article is that if political goals such as improving the position of the disadvantaged are not identified and pursued by the central state, it is unlikely that they will arise spontaneously at the local level.


This is perhaps the first study to estimate the impact of the inequality of agricultural land distribution on country-level agricultural productivity, using data from 117 countries. In an estimation of an agricultural production function, the Gini coefficient for land holdings is found to have a significant negative relationship with agricultural productivity. The negative relationship between land inequality and productivity persists even when controlling for aggregate input use, land quality, human capital, agricultural research effort, and other country-specific institutional factors. A one standard deviation drop in the Gini coefficient implies an increase in productivity of 8.5 percent. The negative relationship between land distribution and productivity is consistent with the
productivity advantages of farms operated primarily with family labor, something documented extensively for Asia during its structural transformation process by Bruce Johnston, John Mellor, Michael Lipton and colleagues. The evidence suggests that variations in the shadow price of labor drive the inverse farm size/productivity relationship. Vollrath’s findings suggest that the failure of land markets to allocate land efficiently has serious aggregate consequences. A one standard deviation fall in the Gini coefficient is associated with an increase in productivity of 8.5 percent. To put these findings in perspective, the difference in median Gini coefficients for Latin America, 0.81, and the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 0.56, is associated with a difference in output per hectare of approximately 13 percent, holding constant aggregate input use, land quality, human capital, and institutional quality.


This edited volume provides a collection of recent studies on the emergence of land rental and sales markets in Africa. The opening two chapters provide a very useful theoretical framework for understanding the differentiated functions of land rental and sales markets for households with different resource endowments, how agricultural practices may vary depending on the functioning of land markets, and insights as to how and why these land markets function differently between densely populated Asia and less densely populated areas of Africa. Indeed, these chapters serve as must-read distillations of several decades of literature on land tenure transactions in both Africa and Asia. The value added of many of the chapters lies in interesting descriptive information from reasonably large samples on the characteristics of African farm households that are relying on different kinds of land tenure arrangements. For example, many households participated in land rental markets: 46 percent of households participated in Amhara regions of Ethiopian highlands, 53 percent in Tigray region in Ethiopia, 21 percent in a sample from Kenya, 20 percent in Uganda, and 28 percent in Malawi. In Kenya and Uganda, land sales transactions were more common than rental. Almost 40 percent of renting household in the northern and central highlands of Ethiopia, and 30 percent of renting households in Uganda, were female-headed. Many of the chapters present sizable indicators of tenure insecurity; perhaps 10 percent of fields in the various samples were thought, by farmers, to be at risk of being taken away. Perhaps a critique of this book is that it tends to avoid the broader political economy issues on the motivations and incentives of major actors influencing land institutions and how they perform, e.g., governments, customary authorities, corporate agribusiness, local investors, and donor organizations.


This impressively comprehensive study estimates the available supply of unutilized arable land (currently under grassland and forest cover) in the world, the geographic location of this land, the forces shaping the demand for this land, alternative approaches for reducing stress on this land, and a review of foreign investment in farmland. Because
about two-thirds of the unutilized and potential usable farmland in the world is in Africa, the study provides a good deal of focus on African experience. The study differentiates countries into four quadrants, stratified by their degree of land abundant and the extent of current “yield gaps” between actual and potential yields. This typology provides the basis for the study’s recommended policy actions toward allocation of unutilized land and public investments to agriculture more generally. The study strikes a middle ground on the “land grab” debate, both documenting the mixed experiences of foreign direct investment in Africa and Latin America, but at the same time making a case for large-scale agriculture and foreign direct investment, especially in regions of Africa that have a good deal of unutilized arable land available.


This article concisely summarizes the various forces affecting the current and future supply and demand for global farmland. A major conclusion is that agricultural economists have much to contribute to understanding the rate of expansion of farmland and the effects on the environment and global food prices, as these are determined by various underlying elasticities that can be estimated. Hertel argues that endogenous intensification of agriculture in Africa and other developing areas may arise if future global food prices rise sufficiently due to supply constraints on bringing new land under cultivation. The article generally paints in broad strokes, and does not address the likely food insecurity and income distributional effects of alternative scenarios which can be gleaned from micro-level data. Nevertheless, it packs a great deal of information on the likely future interrelationships between global food and land markets and environmental issues into a relatively short piece.


Using two recently compiled spatial databases capable of estimating populations at the level of one square kilometer and distinguishing between arable and non-arable land, the study is perhaps the first to quantify that a significant and growing share of Africa’s rural population live in densely populated areas. Use of these data allows for much greater localized variation in rural population densities than has been previously possible when estimated at more aggregated spatial units. The study finds that in at least five of the 10 countries analyzed, 25 percent of the rural population resides in areas exceeding 700 persons per square kilometer. The apparent paradox of a large proportion of Africa’s rural population living in densely populated conditions amidst a situation of massive unutilized land is resolved when the unit of observation is changed from land units to people. The paper then reviews recent household panel surveys on the distribution of land within African farming systems and the impacts of rising population densities on household behavior and welfare. This review underscores the following major empirical regularities:
(1) declining mean farm size over time within densely populated smallholder farming areas; (2) great disparities in landholding size within smallholder farming areas, leading to highly concentrated and skewed patterns of farm production and marketed surplus; (3) half or more of rural farm households are either buyers of grain or go hungry because they are too poor to afford to buy food; most households in this category control less than one hectare of land; and (4) a high proportion of farmers in densely populated areas perceive that it is not possible for them to acquire more land through customary land allocation procedures, even in areas where a significant portion of land appears to be unutilized. The paper concludes that, perhaps ironically, there has been little recognition of the potential challenges associated with increasingly densely populated and land-constrained areas of rural Africa, despite the fact that a sizeable and increasing share of its rural population live in such areas. The paper concludes that the growing focus on how best to exploit unutilized land in Africa has arguably diverted attention from the more central and enduring challenge of implementing agricultural development strategies that effectively address the continent’s massive rural poverty and food insecurity problems, which require recognizing the growing land constraints faced by much of its still agrarian-based population.
Discussant comments on “Emerging Land Issues in African Agriculture”

Derek Byerlee, Independent Scholar, Washington DC

Let me congratulate Thom Jayne and his co-authors on a comprehensive overview of emerging land issues in Africa. Resolution of these issues is clearly central to the successful transformation of the agricultural sector in Africa in terms of growth, poverty reduction, and sustainable management of natural resources. Even more fundamentally, it is critical to avoiding the growing number of conflicts surrounding land issues. The paper by focusing on people rather than land per se and drawing on a wealth of farm household data over many years provides an important complement to the recent media attention to “land grabs”.

There is little doubt that available land per capita is rapidly changing. My first exposure to Africa was over 40 years ago when I did my PhD thesis on Nigeria at a time when the population of that country was 57 million, and it was regarded even then as having significant areas of high population density. Today, Nigeria has nearly three times that number of people and by 2050, 40 years hence, the UN projects that it will have nearly 400 million. (For all sub-Saharan Africa, population has increased by about 500 million people over the past 40 years and one billion more are projected by 2050). Later I moved to Sierra Leone, where we carried out one of the first national level surveys of farm households. We were alarmed to find that the average fallow period was approaching 10 years, the minimum period regarded as necessary to restore soil fertility (each farm household was controlling around 16-20 ha). Today the fallow period has surely reduced well below that critical level. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to obtain reliable up to date information on fallow periods in Africa.

My comments will focus on the way forward for some important sets of conditions in what is a hugely diverse continent and elaborate on a major missing element of the paper, the poor functioning of land markets.

Structural transformation

There is general consensus that increasing productivity in smallholder agriculture has to be at center stage, a message we strongly endorsed in the 2008 World Development Report (World Bank 2007). Even though agricultural growth has accelerated to 5-6 percent in much of Africa the sources of that growth are troubling—land area expansion accounts for about three quarters of growth since 1991, while total factor productivity growth averages only about half of other developing regions (Fuglie 2011).

Still I believe we need to be careful translating the Asian green revolution experience of structural transformation to Africa for at least two reasons. First, Africa is much more diverse so that the path of structural transformation will differ depending on initial resource endowments. In the humid forest areas of Africa, tree crops rather than cereals, will play a much greater role. Just as in Malaysia and the outer islands of Indonesia,
structural transformation through tree crops oriented toward exports is already well advanced in Ghana and, until the civil war, in Cote d’Ivoire. Already Ghana has met the millennium development goals of halving hunger and poverty, and cocoa has been a prime mover (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). Second, in most African countries, a much higher share of African staples are non-tradables (sorghum, cassava and in inland locations, maize) than in Asia. This means that lower food prices may play a larger role in translating productivity increases into nonfarm growth and poverty reduction. In Asia, food prices did decline in real terms but at a slower rate than the increase in agricultural productivity so that both farmers and poor consumers were beneficiaries. This will be much more difficult to manage in Africa (Lipton 2007).

Priorities by population density
Jayne et al. have rightly highlighted the challenge in high population density areas. Pathways out of poverty in these areas will combine high value agriculture (horticulture, intensive livestock rather than food staples), increasing nonfarm employment and out-migration. In countries with a rapidly growing and maturing nonagricultural economy, such as Kenya, the need to supply an urban food demand that will quadruple over the next 20 years should provide the opportunity to exploit each of these pathways, especially if priority is put on upgrading education and skills of rural people. The big challenge is in areas of high population density in relation to the agro-climatic potential that are not well connected to markets, as in some of the Sahelian countries and more remote areas of Ethiopia.

Low population density areas of 25-75 persons per km in the savannah zones are already the main breadbaskets in many countries and could be breadbaskets to the world in the future since these are the areas where more land could be brought into production. The puzzle is why have these areas not taken off through the emergence of entrepreneurial small- and medium-size commercial farmers, as have similar areas in Northeast Thailand (World Bank 2009). In a number of countries, improved maize varieties and fertilizer have been fairly widely adopted, but these maize revolutions have not been sustained, largely due to the inability to transition from state to private-sector in input, financial and output markets. As Jayne et al point out, even as countries have increased expenditures on the agricultural sector, public investment in rural roads, R&D, and extension continues to be shamefully low.

In addition, insufficient attention has been given to labor saving technologies in these areas to allow farmers to manage a larger land area. Mechanization of tasks such as land preparation through the emergence of tractor rental markets as has occurred in other developing regions has been very slow, while outside of a few pockets such as Zambia and Burkina Faso, conservation farming is new to the region. Why is this? I hypothesize that a major constraint on adoption of mechanization and other labor saving technologies has been high transaction costs in accessing underutilized land at the community level. Informal land markets are emerging but often with strong kinship ties and transaction costs. There is a large research agenda in these areas to better understand at the community and household levels the interface between demographic changes, land
allocation, land access, fallow management, and soil fertility. This needs to involve anthropologists and agronomists, as well as economists, and build on pioneering work from the 1970s and even the colonial era (e.g., Lagemann 1977; Allen 1965).

Finally there are areas of very low population density under 25 person per km estimated for the World Bank by IIASA has having some 200 million ha of land suitable to bring into cultivation (Deininger and Byerlee 2011). There are of course reasons why these areas have not been cultivated—usually related to a combination of poor infrastructure, problem soils, or disease. However, none of these are insurmountable with appropriate policies and large investments, as shown by the Cerrado of Brazil. Given scarcity of labor in these areas, a strong emphasis on labor-saving technologies or in-migration will be needed complemented by capital and technology. The current wave of private investors of course offer one way to open up some of these areas, especially if they are willing to co-finance some of the infrastructure and technology development. An estimated 30-50 million hectares have been transferred over the past five years to outside investors although most understandably are focusing on more accessible areas, where there is likely to be conflict with existing land users. Investors have been also highly heterogeneous in terms of origin, expertise, and focus commodity, and the benefits and risks are likely to be correspondingly heterogeneous. Some investors such as the Asian investors in oil palm, a crop that originated in Africa, could, if responsibly managed, provide much needed capital and technology as well as a large number of jobs and outgrower opportunities that could serve as key drivers of structural transformation. However, it is not clear that large-scale fully mechanized food crop farming will succeed due to lack of technology as indicated by the dismal record since independence in Sudan, Tanzania, Nigeria and elsewhere. Further, development impacts will be limited given the lack of job creation, few spillovers to local communities and substantial risks of treading on existing land rights, given poor delineation of those rights and the difficulty of implementing them.

Formalizing land rights to get land markets moving

All of this brings me to my final comment which is I feel an important gap in the Jayne et al paper. I do not know any area of Africa where land markets are working well. Reduced transaction costs in land transfer and more secure tenure for both smallholders and investors would allow entrepreneurial smallholders to scale up, facilitate migration from very high to low density areas, and provide an exit strategy for those with nonviable holdings. Because land markets are not working, capital and labor markets do not work well either. About 80 percent of land is currently under customary tenure with unrecorded rights but this system cannot meet the increasing pressure imposed by population growth and commercialization. A prerequisite is to recognize customary rights, record those rights (especially women’s rights), and make land transactions fully voluntary and transparent. In high population density areas, individual rights are generally preferable since farmers are already using a permanent cultivation system. Indeed, clearer definition and recording of land rights is critical to maintaining peace and stability, especially with in-migration, as shown by the tragedy of Cote d’Ivoire under the pressure of expansion of
cocoa (Woods 2003). Fortunately, some countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Ethiopia are recognizing this challenge although implementation is too slow.

References