FSI Stanford Publications

Nuclear Safeguards: How Far Can Inspectors Go?

Journal Article

Author
George Bunn - Stanford University

Published by
IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 48 no. 1, page(s) 49-53
March 2007

A look at experience in Iran and North Korea--and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s--offers insights into the authority of IAEA nuclear inspectors.

Topics: Nuclear safety and security | Iran | North Korea

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Complete (modified April 2007)
PDF: Bunn-IAEA_48.2.pdf (432.3KB)

Parent Research

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism
CISAC Project (Completed)

Publications of interest

Nuclear Verification Under the NPT: What Should It Cover--How Far May It Go?
George Bunn, Roland M. Timerbaev
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation vol. 5 (1994)
How Verification Can Be Used to Ensure Irreversible Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons
Wu Jun
CISAC (2001)
Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials out of Terrorists' Hands
Siegfried S. Hecker
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 607 (2006)
Does the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) require its non-nuclear-weapon members to permit inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of nuclear activities that have not been reported to the IAEA?
George Bunn
CISAC (1992)

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To Go or Not to Go (Nuclear): Generalizing from France, India, Argentina, and Australia
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A Survey of Russian Scientists: Will They Go Rogue or Can Western Assistance Help Keep Them Home?
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Nuclear Safeguards: How Far Can Inspectors Go?

Parent Research

Publications of interest

Events of interest