Many pollution-related industries wield strong political power and can thus effectively block policies that would harm their profits. A politically realistic approach to environmental policy seems to require the avoidance of significant profit-losses in these industries. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we examine the added efficiency costs of avoiding profit-losses in key pollution-related industries, beyond the costs that would apply under simpler emissions permits or tax policies that do not insulate profits. We find that the relative increase in efficiency cost (compared to the cost in the case where profits are not protected) is highly sensitive to the extent of pollution abatement, ranging from above 100 percent when the required pollution abatement is modest to below 10 percent when the abatement requirement is extensive. Expanded opportunities for end-of-pipe treatment of pollution reduce the absolute efficiency costs of abatement policies, but have little impact on the relative increase in efficiency costs attributable to the constraint on profits.