Professor, in your interview in a year 1999, which was published on a Stanford web-site, you named five principal goals of American foreign policy, namely: maintenance of international peace and stability, promotion of development and so-called "representative government", coping with consequences of USSR disintegration, coping with globalization issues and coping with a problem of so-called "failed" states. Do you think that these issues are still on the US foreign policy agenda? Do you think that they are still at the top of this agenda, and if they are not, which issues namely left the agenda, and which new ones appeared?

I think that probably the same issues, but I wouldn't put them in the same order, if we are talking about 2005. I think that current Administration worries less about maintenance of international peace and stability. At the top of the agenda would be democracy promotion and also coping with the consequences of failing and failed states. And I see no indication that this Administration is going to abandon those two goals as their primary goals.

Any new goals?

Well, I think I included economic development in my list. I think it is third on my list. I think this is also very important too for those guys. But I don't think there are new issues. No, I don't think so.

And as for coping with USSR disintegration, do you think it is still an issue?

Well it is still an issue..

But it is not a priority for US foreign policy in general?

No, I would not say that. It's going to be a priority in part because US Secretary of State is herself a specialist and she does think about it. And I think it's interesting - she did come over here and didn't go anywhere else, right? I mean she flew to Europe, then she flew to Asia and then she flew to Moscow. I mean she didn't tour other places. And I think that's significant. I think that means US-Russian relations will be important to this Secretary of State. And what happens in Ukraine obviously is important to this Administration. For the rest of the former Soviet Union I'm not sure. I think they take a highly instrumental view, which means you deal with Central Asia as an adjunct to the US war on terrorism in particular.

What core issues, on your opinion, constitute a nucleus of US - Russian relations now and for middle-run perspective, that is for 3-5 years?

I would say first on the agenda is enlisting and maintaining Russia's support in what the Administration calls "the global war on terrorism". It takes numerous forms including intelligence sharing. I think that would probably be the N1 goal. The second and third goals are distinct but they are related. In second place I would put promotion of Russian democracy or support for Russian democracy. Third would be Russia's full integration into the international economic system. But they linked in a sense that Russia has not achieved the latter yet. That's still a goal. Russia is not yet in WTO. And I think the Administration will be more or less supportive on that depending on how they see the prospects for Russia's continuing democratic reforms.

So democratization is a precondition to Russia's joining?

That's too strong. That's too strong. That's not quite how I would put it on. That's why I said they are distinct policy goals but they are related. And I suspect that was on the Secretary of State's list of talking points when she was here earlier this week.

Any other issues?

Yeah. Dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. In particular in a nuclear context and in chemical and biological weapons area. That continues to be a priority for this Administration but also for the US Congress. Fifth and finally US relations with the other successor states have to be a piece of the US-Russian agenda as we found out during the electoral unpleasantness in Ukraine. Though my guess is that US policy-makers are continuously talking to their Russian counterparts about the nature of US involvement in the rest of the former Soviet Union. So I'd say those five are probably the top issues.

OK. Then, do you think that there were significant changes in US-Russian relationship since a year 1999 and if they were could we observe, could you observe any stages in these changes?

It's a very good question. Yes, I think there was a significant difference in US policy towards Russia between 1999 on one hand and 2001, when the new Administration came in. The new Administration has been highly critical of the Clinton Administration for its (as they regarded as) involvement in Russian domestic politics and domestic economic affairs. So the republicans came into office saying: That's really none of our business. We will deal with Russia, as it exists. We'll treat Russia as the great power that it is, not get involved in terms of its domestic political orientation or the choices that the government makes with respect to the economic policy. And they held to that policy until September 11th. And if you ask them: why policy towards Russia changed, they say: September 11th. Out of a sudden it became important again to them to have some sense for Russia's trajectory because of Russia's involvement into the global war on terrorism, because of deepening involvement with the states of Central Asia. So instead of just treating Russia as a neutral factor in international politics, just another great power they have shifted to a policy that looks much more similar to Clinton Administration policy then it does differ.

Well, how would you evaluate current President, Russian President Mr. Putin as a politician? Could you list some essential characteristics of him as a politician?

Well, a couple of things come to mind. If "charisma" is the word that comes to mind then you think of Boris Eltsyn in particular in the early years: 1991, 1992, 1993. And I think he was a charismatic figure at the beginning. Vladimir Putin is an anticharismatic, by design I think. I think as a politician he has read the Russian political mood correctly. That is after a period of high instability, high drama with respect to Eltsyn he has purposely pursued a much lower profile, a very businesslike, portraying himself as very efficient, unflappable, stolid, dependable, predictable. Which I think has when he came to power. It is on rise in 2000. I think it was what appealed to the Russian people. That's what they found attractive about him. Since that time and in particular since his own reelection I think you see a kind of a second faze. And the second faze is more of an emphasis on a "strong hand", being disciplined, maintaining control and trying in fact to extend control that is reestablish central authority. I think he's been much more transparent about that goals since his reelection. But that would characterize him as antipolitician almost, emphasizing more his skills as a manager then as a politician.

But do you really think that these two public faces do really match his own face?

I don't know. I don't know. I don't know who he is.

So you still do not know who Mr. Putin is?

No. I think that's right. I think that's right. I think, you know, we knew who Boris Eltsyn was, we knew who Gorbachev was, but I think it's safe to say that we don't who Vladimir Putin is.

How would you define as an analyst, as a specialist on Russian politics the causes of political transformation, which equals to a change of the constitution, which was started by President Putin in August of a year 2004, that is abolition of local elected governors?

I think everything that President Putin does derives from one central overarching goal and that is restoration of Russia as a great power. And if you go back to his first speech to the Federation Council, when he was first president, he is very clear in saying that in order to achieve that Russia must recover economically and everything else is secondary to its economic growth. And in fact it seems to me that a country that he focused on was Portugal. He said just to underscore the severity of the problem, he said: if Russia grows at an annual growth rate of 8% a year for 10 years, at the end of 10 years per capita income in Russia will be the same that it is today in Portugal. Just to underline the magnitude of the task in terms of economic reconstruction. I think his domestic political agenda is first and foremost oriented around the country's economic recovery and in his view and view of his advisors that means centralization, pulling more power to the center in order to have more control and more influence over what happens economically. I do not think and I have never felt that his policy have been driven fundamentally by political calculus to roll back Russian democracy. I don't believe that's the calculation. I think the calculation is "everything is secondary to the country's economic recovery".

So we can say that in this case the situation could be characterized as economically determined in a Marxist sense of the word?

Yes, yes. I think that's right. The one development I think is especially problematic though in political terms. And I know, my friend Secretary of State talked about this with the President and with the others. It's the effective disappearance of independent broadcast media. Why that constitutes a policy goal? Why that has been emphasized by this leadership? I don't understand and have never understood that, because it's not centrally connected to the overarching goal that I talked about earlier that is economic recovery. And it's obviously deeply troubling to this Administration.

So you think the war on terrorism inside Russia, which was used as a pretext for introducing such a reform is in reality a pretext and not a cause?

Yes.

Don't you think that these changes do manifest an authoritarian turn in Russian internal politics?

I don't know what cycle is, I don't know. It clearly is a retreat from liberal democracy. I don't think it's a rout of liberal democracy. It's a retreat. But there are many forms of democracy and one thing that I agree with President Putin on, when he met with President Bush in Bratislava, was when he said: you know, Russia will be democratic but Russia will be democratic after Russia's choices. I mean, I think context, cultural context, historical context is important. There is no reason to assume, there is no rational reason to assume that Russia has to mimic the political culture of Germany, or the United Kingdom or the United States in order to be democratic. Russia will find it's own way. I think that's correct. But there are certain core features of a democracy, the most important of which is the accountability of those who rule by those they rule, if you will. That is the accountability of the leadership to the electorate. That is the sine qua non of democracy.

And you think this accountability will be maintained despite the current reforms, despite abolition of elections?

Well, time will tell. It would certainly be my hope that Russian voters would have the opportunity to choose their own leadership in 2008. I think that would be better for the country's political development if the governors were elected. But I would add in this context that United States senators were not directly elected until 1913. They were chosen by state legislatures, and we certainly considered ourselves a democracy in 1865 and in 1900. So there is no single model, but I think it's better to go the other direction that is to more and more democracy.

Talking about ideology, talking about current moods of explaining political reality and setting strategic agenda how would you estimate a current ideological landscape of Russian politics? Can you agree with an assertion that we observe a change from liberalism to Russian nationalism as ideological background of actions?

I think that's a fair characterization. But there's nationalism and there's nationalism. Nationalism can be a positive force; nationalism can be a negative force. When I think about the role of nationalism in politics today in Russia, it doesn't worry me. It doesn't worry me because I think some recovery of national identity along cultural lines, along historic lines, as I said, is important for Russia. And as long as it doesn't swing too far so that it becomes either National Socialism, which is another word for Nazism and Fascism, or as long as it doesn't end up being an ideology that excludes some members of Russian society from full participation, then I think it's OK.

But do you really think that Russians will not really go too far as to accept a nationalism that is much like Nazism?

It would certainly be my hope that it would be what I characterized earlier as a healthy form of nationalism. But there is always a danger of a kind of fascistic undertone to nationalism. Let me say in this context this is not only a fear that I have with regard to Russia, but it's a fear that I have with respect to a lot of developed societies that confront major social challenges. That tend to make societies look inward. There's a far-right in France, that is significant, there's a far-right in Germany, there's a far-right in Italy, there's a far-right in the United States. That's basically a manifestation of middle-class unhappiness with a direction of social change. That danger I would argue exists also in Russia, which is why I worry about nationalism. But I don't see much evidence of it now. I was more worried about it five years ago.

OK. During not so long a period of time we witnessed a series of very important events happening around or inside the former Soviet Union that is co-called "orange revolutions". The first one was in Serbia, next one in Georgia, third in Ukraine and the last one in Kyrgyzstan. What country would be the most likely to follow this path?

It's an interesting question, because in terms of social development, in terms of what I would expect to see I would say Belarus. But unlike the leadership in Ukraine and unlike the leadership in Kyrgyzstan the leadership in Belarus is prepared to use force in order to maintain itself in power, which I think most of the people of Belarus know, so although I think socially Belarus has the greatest capacity to undergo a change like this, I suspect it will not happen. Where else it might happen? I suppose elsewhere in Central Asia, but where exactly I don't know. But I do think we are witnessing something profound. I'm not quite sure what it is. I'm not quite sure what triggers it. But it is a real phenomenon and it's fascinating to watch. But I do not know where it appears right now.

You determined Belarus by objective characteristics. Viewing the situation from the point of actors, subjects involved in these situations, what would you judge by an activity of those who were involved in previous cases? Could you judge anything, could you trace somebody somewhere doing same things?

No, I don't think so. But there's clearly a demonstration effect. I mean, you said: Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan. I think what happened in Serbia influenced what happened in Georgia, what happened in Georgia influenced what happened in Ukraine. I'm not so sure that what happened in Ukraine influenced what happened in Kyrgyzstan, because that strikes me as something different. It's linked but I think it's analytically distinct. But beyond the power of demonstration I don't see a kind of an invisible hand operating behind, including a suspicion that somehow the United States is masterminding this. It's not true. It really isn't true. We are not that good.

Then how would you evaluate relatively the probability of the two political scenarios? The first one. President Putin retains his power in years 2007-2008, that is up to the end of his term of office. And the second one. The revolution like those in aforementioned countries topples his administration down before the end of his term of office.

I think President Putin will serve all his term and I think he will retire from the presidency in a year 2008.

So, the probability of a revolution in Russia is regarded by you as almost zero?

Yes.

And my last question. What would be US and European governments' reaction and actions if President Putin tries to prolong his power beyond his term of office?

I think it's safe to say that it would be extremely negative, that is the response would be extremely negative.

What forms it might take?

The most benign form would be a public declaration on the part of the United States and probably the European Union that they were reappraising their bilateral relationship with Russia. That means that you go back to square one. You don't just continue along the course that you are now on. You actually do a strategic review of policy, which can actually change that how the United State or how the European Union might engage with Russia. First and foremost that has to do with economic relations, economic links. The support of the United States and the European Union, as an example, for Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization. That would be the first concrete action. And I think that would happen. I think that would happen. I would be willing to bet money on that one unlike on some of your other questions.

Thank you very much. It was really great to talk with you.