Christophe Crombez is a specialist of European Union (EU) politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions, the institutions' impact on EU policies under alternative procedural arrangements, EU institutional reform, lobbying in the EU, and electoral laws and their consequences for voter representation, party politics and government formation.
His publications include: “The Status-Quo Bias and Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: Impact of Voting Rules, the European Commission, and External Changes,” with Jan Pokrivcak and Jo Swinnen, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2006; “Gatekeeping,” with Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel, Journal of Politics, 2006; “Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors’ Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations,” with Simon Hix, European Union Politics, 2005; “Another Look at Connections Across German Elections,” with Brian J. Gaines, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2004; “The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado About Nothing?” European Union Politics, 2003; “Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union,” European Union Politics, 2002; “Understanding the EU Legislative Process: Political Scienstists' and Practitioners' Perspectives,” with Bernard Steunenberg and Richard Corbett, European Union Politics, 2000; "Codecision: Towards a Bicameral European Union," European Union Politics, 2000; "Spatial Models of Logrolling in the European Union," European Journal of Political Economy, 2000; "Institutional Reform and Codecision in the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, 2000; "Policy Making and Commission Appointment in the European Union," in Decision Rules in the European Union: A Rational Choice Perspective, Peter Moser, Gerald Schneider and Gebhard Kirchgaessner eds., London: Macmillan, 2000; "The Codecision Procedure in the European Union," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1997; "Legislative Procedures in the European Community," British Journal of Political Science, 1996; "Minority Governments, Minimal Winning Coalitions and Surplus Majorities in Parliamentary Systems," European Journal of Political Research, 1996.
Crombez has been at The Europe Center (TEC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University as a visiting professor since 1999. At FCE he organizes seminars and other events on European Union politics and economics and European political systems. Crombez is also visiting professor at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, where he teaches a course on Politics and Business in Europe. He also teaches in the International Relations Program.
Furthermore, Crombez is professor of political economy and strategy at the University of Leuven in Belgium. He has been teaching in Leuven's business and economics department since 1994. His teaching responsibilities include political business strategy and applied game theory.
He has also held visiting positions at the following universities and institutes: the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, in Florence, Italy, in Spring 2008; the Department of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy, in Spring 2004; the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, in Winter 2003; the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, Illinois, in Spring 1998; the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in Spring 1998; the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in Spring 1997; the University of Antwerp, Belgium, in Spring 1996; and Leti University in St. Petersburg, Russia, in Fall 1995.
Christophe Crombez obtained a B.A. (Licentiaat) in Applied Economics from the University of Leuven in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University in 1994.