FSI Stanford Events

Why the U.S. Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Chemical and Biological Weapons Attacks

CISAC Research Seminar

Date and Time
January 12, 2000
12:00 PM - 1:30 PM

Availability
Open to the public
No RSVP required

Speakers
Scott D. Sagan - Professor
Jayantha Dhanapala - Under Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at United Nations

Location
CISAC Conference Room
Encina Hall Central, 2nd floor
616 Serra St.
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
» Directions/Map

Events of interest

Should the U.S. be ambiguous about whether it would retaliate in the event of a chemical or biological attack?
Damon Colletta
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes
Amy Smithson
Uncertainties Associated With Biological Weapons Attacks
Dean Wilkening, CISAC
Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology
Steven Block

Commitment Trap, The: Why The United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks
Scott D. Sagan
International Security vol. 24, 4 (2000)
Correspondence: Responding to Chemical and Biological Threats
Scott D. Sagan
International Security vol. 25, 4 (2001)
Nuclear Theft and Sabotage: Priorities or Reducing New Threats
George Bunn, Matt Bunn
IAEA Bulletin vol. 43, 4 (2001)
India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe
Paul Kapur
International Security vol. 30, 2 (2005)